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I N Q U I R Y

INTO

THE PRINCIPLES OF

The Distribution of Wealth

MOST CONDUCTIVE TO

HUMAN HAPPINESS;

APPLIED TO

THE NEWLY PROPOSED SYSTEM

OF

VOLUNTARY EQUALITY OF WEALTH.

BY

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PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

THOSE who have observed, reflected, or written on political economy and the various branches of knowledge connected with it, may be ranged in two classes, the intellectual and the mechanical. Of later days, and in this country, conspicuous amongst the intellectual speculators or philosophers stands Mr. Godwin, the author of "Political Justice." Equally eminent amongst the mechanical reasoners, particularly in his earlier productions, is Mr. Malthus, whose treatise on the "Principles of Population" is become almost the text-book of a politico-economical sect.

The *intellectual* speculators, informed by their own feelings of the gentle, ever-springing, and all-sufficient pleasures of sympathy and intellectual culture, their animal wants being all comfortably supplied and therefore exciting little of their attention, little studious perhaps of the physical laws of nature, of the physical constitution of man and the beings that surround him, conscious of their own power of restraining and regulating what they regard as the grosser propensities of our nature, proclaim man as capable of attaining happiness by his mental powers alone, *almost* independent of material subordinate agency. To such a superiority have they elevated the thinking part of the human organization, as to suppose that man may hereafter, by the perfect use of it, *will* his own health independent of the material agents usually employed to promote it. They have thought that the mind may command mechanical operations, such as ploughing or navigation, without the

intervention of intermediate physical means. How these mysterious processes, these wonders of volition, were by possibility to be carried on, consistent with any established analogy of things, could not of course be explained. Though such alleged possibilities were the extreme of the system of those who rested their hopes of the improvement of mankind, almost exclusively, on the cultivation of their intellectual powers; it is easy to conceive how great an influence such theories must exert over the judgement when directed to the investigation of the every-day, sluggish, realities of life. In possession of so compendious and sublime a mode of commanding nature, how should they submit to walk the lowly paths of observation, to toil through the endless slavery of experimenting in order to get a glance at a new power of nature, or of a new or more useful mode of application of any thing before known? how could they stoop to examine the vulgar agency, by which rustics and mechanics elaborate inanimate matter into forms moulded by the caprice of their superiors? Would they not almost esteem it time lost to discuss the efficiency of unthinking things in influencing the happiness of a being so superior, or capable of being made so superior, to their controul?

As the superstitious impute all changes to the arbitrary caprice and favoritism of their divinities sporting with the essential and immutable properties and mutual relations of material things; so do these intellectual speculators introduce a species of divinity within themselves, to exercise that controuling power over nature, before which, when placed without them, the superstitious tremble. The fears of the one and the hopes of the other, are almost equally vain. For whatever advances mankind may make in the arts of social happiness, they must be indebted, to an enlarged and minute acquaintance with the surrounding universe of things and of themselves, and to the wise use and distribution and regulation of them. The intellectual speculators on political economy, wishing to make man *all thought*,

affect to disdain *labor* as mechanical and grovelling, unaware of the paramount principle of *utility* by which alone the worth or worthlessness of every thing must be estimated. What is thought, but motion produced and *felt* in the brain? what is labor, but motion communicated to and in co-operation with the ever-active energies of nature? And by what standard is the superiority of either species of motion to be estimated, but by their relative tendency to produce human happiness? Herein, in their contempt for the mechanical drudgery of labor, coalesce the intellectual with the political aristocracy. The one disdaining its exercise, ungratefully glory and plume themselves in the use and exhibition of the articles it produces; while the other, the intellectual aristocrat, disdains, or affects to disdain, equally its exercise and its productions, forgetting that without its kindly and ever-recurring aid in the supply of food, clothing and shelter, the high intellectual energies, of which he boasts, could scarcely for one hundred hours preserve themselves distinguished from the unconscious air around them, or from any other masses of unorganized matter. There are endless shades of opinion amongst these intellectual speculators on wealth and human happiness. They all agree in over-estimating the capabilities of mere mind, or what they term morals or virtue, to promote happiness, and leave too much out of their calculation those homely physical agencies, on which the development of both mind and morals depends, and without which they could not exist.

If the class that I have termed intellectual speculators, leave material things and physical agencies too much out of their calculation, those whom I have termed *mechanical* speculators adopt the opposite extreme. With them, intellectual power and sympathy form no part of the creature, man: he is altogether a mechanical agent, like the plough or the loom or the horses with whose motions he co-operates; and he is to be urged to labor by the same rude means that operate on other animals. Those who call themselves pure political economists, and

profess to have no other object but wealth in contemplation, belong more or less to this class. By them the sublime notions of intelligence, benevolence or mutual co-operation and perfectibility, are held in derision. Their sole object is so to arrange, as that the machines, whether living, as cows, men, or horses, and propelled by food and air, or inanimate and propelled by steam or water, should produce in the greatest abundance all articles of food, clothing, shelter, and elegance, or caprice ; and that, on the other hand, means should be devised that an abundance of consumers should be found to use the articles produced, so that every year a continual demand should be kept up for these or similar articles. By what means, or by whom, the articles were produced, whether by camels, horses, men, slaves or not slaves, whether by hard labor or easy labor, by healthful or life-consuming exertion, signified not ; except in as far as the wear and tear of the dead or living machinery might enhance the price and lessen the production. By what means, or by whom, these articles were consumed, whether by the mass of the producers to diffuse gladness through a smiling population, or by a few living in palaces surrounded by unenjoyed waste and sickly appetites, signified not. The problem with them has been, how to raise the greatest produce and to ensure the greatest consumption or efficient demand. No considerations but such as related immediately to wealth or exchangeable value, were admitted into the reasonings of these severe economists. Amongst these mechanical reasoners there are shades of opinion as well as amongst the intellectual speculators ; and they occasionally adopt more or less of their adversaries' views.

Is it to be wondered at, that neither the one nor the other of these two classes of reasoners on political economy and human happiness, called here the intellectual and the mechanical, have arrived at truth ? that no consistent and useful system of human labor and the most wise and wholesome distribution of its products, has yet been devised between them ? that while each of

them have discovered on their own side a good deal of truth, their chief felicity has consisted in developing the errors of their opponents? How should it be otherwise? Man is not a mere machine like a steam-engine or spinning-jenny, nor an uncalculating animal like the horse or the ox whose labor he employs. Nor is man a mere intellectual agent, without properties in common with both the inanimate and the living things around him. Man is a complicated being. Like the timber or the wool on which he operates, he is liable to the impulses of external things. Appropriate agents produce chemical and mechanical changes on his structure, both within and without, just as on other masses of matter. The overwhelming force of the current or the tempest equally shatters and sweeps away him and all inanimate obstacles, whether the shed which he has reared for his protection or the plank to which he clings for succour, in proportion to the mass and powers of resistance of each. Certain living powers, the result of organization, developing themselves in nervous and muscular motions, enable man to increase but a little his power of resistance. Like all other animals, man exists but on the condition of keeping up the eternal excitement of air and food: like the best organized of them, he is liable to various sources of enjoyment and of pain, by means of the terminations of different species of nerves in what are termed organs of sense on different parts of the body: like them, he is liable to certain impulses arising from internal secretions, entirely independent of his volition, and thence to certain propensities, desires or wants, inseparable from his actual organization. But, unlike condensed or aërial particles of inanimate matter, unlike any known vital organization but his own, not only is he liable in a super-eminent degree to the feelings arising from the observation of all things around him and their relation to himself, not only to the feelings of memory perpetuating these original feelings of observation, but also to those of comparison and reasoning. Hence he is enabled to look in upon his own structure,

to look forward into futurity to calculate the effects of his actions, and thence to be guided by *distant* as well as immediate motives. By proper training, he is enabled to add to the pleasures of the senses and of internal excitement, the pleasant feelings of intellectual cultivation; and by the wise *regulation* of his appetites and passions, he not only increases indefinitely their pleasures, but avoids the evils to which want of foresight would lead them, and contracts a sympathy and inclination to benevolent co-operation with his fellow-creatures.

Can we reason then on any matters, in which the labor, voluntary or forced, of such a creature as this, is the chief ingredient, as we could respecting sheep or the wool separated from their bodies, or respecting the powers of air, water, steam, and machinery? Or can we justly reason on any matters in which such a creature as this is chiefly concerned, as if he were *all* composed of intellect and benevolence, as if he were uninfluenced by the chemical mechanical laws of nature operating within and around him, as if he could shake off the feelings and impulses co-existent with the several stages of his organization, as if he were gifted with a mysterious power of producing changes within and around him, by mere volition, without the intervention of the usual ascertained natural agents or causes? like the power ascribed to the great spirit or mind of nature, in the poetical creation of all things?

I conceive, then, that in order to make the noble discoveries of political economy—and magnificent they are when viewed in their proper connexion—useful to *social science*, the application of which becomes the art of social happiness, it is necessary always to keep in view, the complicated nature of man, the instrument to operate with and the creature to be operated upon. Without a constant reference to it, the regulating principle of utility is sacrificed, and the grand object of political economy, the indefinite increase of the accumulations of wealth or of its yearly products, become worthless objects consigning to the wretchedness of unrequited

toil three-fourths or nine-tenths of the human race, that the remaining smaller portion may pine in indolence midst unenjoyed profusion. It is not the mere possession of wealth, but the *right distribution* of it, that is important to a community. It is with communities as with individuals. Men cannot be happy without the physical means of enjoyment, which in all civilized societies consist chiefly of objects of wealth: but, with a comparatively small portion of these objects, men may be happier than they have ever been seen to be; while, though surrounded with them to superfluity, they may still be miserable. 'Tis not the *multitude* but the *use* and the *distribution* of the objects of wealth, with which society is chiefly interested. Hence the necessity of considering wealth not only in its effects on industry and reproduction, but also in its moral and political effects, in every way that it can influence human happiness.

Moralists have been, for the most part, ignorant of physical science and of the truths of political economy: theologians affect to disdain all other knowledge but their own peculiar and profitable dreams: political economists profess to direct their sole attention to the production and accumulation of wealth, regardless of its distribution further than as it may influence re-production and accumulation, leaving to moralists, politicians and statesmen, its effect on happiness, and drawing a broad line of distinction between their solid material speculations and the airy philosophy of the mind. Nay, more; the chemist and mechanic and operative manufacturer or merchant, have, till lately, affected to disdain the speculations of political economists, as mere theories, inapplicable to the realities of their respective operations.

What is to be inferred? Not that we condemn the division of knowledge any more than the division of labor; but that we would have it limited to the improvement of its own particular branch, and not have it applied to the immense concern of social happiness without regard being had to all those other equally important data on which a just application must depend. *Social*

science, the science of morals, including legislation as one of its most important sub-divisions, requires not only a knowledge of what is technically called morals and political economy, but of the outlines of all that is known, with a capacity for following up any particular branch that may be, on particular occasions, conducive to the general end. None of these speculators have confined themselves to their own peculiar province, but have adventured, without appropriate knowledge, on the direct application of their isolated speculations to social science. A few illustrious exceptions might be named, one of whom has done more for moral science than Bacon did for physical science: for whereas Bacon did no more than point out the new and secure road to physical discovery, *he* has not only pointed out the right road to moral investigations, but has made such progress in it as no man ever before conceived, much less accomplished. Following in the road which he has demonstrated, our object is to apply to social science the ascertained truths of political economy, making these and all other branches of knowledge subservient to that just *distribution* of wealth which tends most to human happiness.

Mr. Mill in his useful epitome, the “Elements of Political Economy,” chapter on Distribution, page 52, says, “If the *natural laws* of distribution were allowed to operate freely, the greater part of this net produce would find its way, in moderate portions, into the hands of a numerous class of persons exempt from the necessity of labor, and placed in the most favorable circumstances both for the enjoyment of happiness and for the highest intellectual and moral attainments. Society would thus be seen in its happiest state.”

These *natural laws*, or tendencies to distribution in particular channels, with the effects, moral and political, as well as economical, necessarily resulting from them, are no where developed, partly because they extend beyond the mere bounds of political economy or wealth prescribed to the work, and partly perhaps because the

author conceived that the intelligent reader might gather them in the way of inference.

I need not cite the vague speculations of the more numerous and unreflecting portion of the community, to prove that no particular opinions are yet assented to as true respecting the most useful distribution of wealth; but simply refer to the opinions of some of the most able writers who have lately condensed and simplified for public use what they conceive to be the *ascertained truths* of political economy. The author of the “Conversations on Political Economy” (as well as of those on Chemistry and Natural Philosophy) would lead us to believe, that such an inequality as we see in England in the distribution of wealth, that such luxury as we see concentrated in capital cities and elsewhere, is necessary to give employment and food to the great bulk of the industrious and productive classes of society, and that the poor must starve if there were not to be found masses of wealth of hundreds of thousands of pounds per annum concentrated in single hands to set the people to work, by means of its expenditure. Much of abuse as may take place in the expenditure of these enormous masses, she still thinks that the state of things producing them, is necessary, even for the employment of the productive laborers themselves. The necessary inference is, that this mode of distribution being so excellent, our efforts in legislation and otherwise should be directed to its support and continuance, if not to its increase.

The celebrated author, as above, of the History of British India gives his opinion as to the best mode of distributing the national wealth. And what is—as far as his explanations can aid us in forming a supposition—this best mode? He tells us that literary men not under the necessity of any bodily labor for their support, possessed in a moderate degree of the comforts and conveniencies of life, are capable of enjoying, and do enjoy, more of happiness than any other members of society. He therefore advises such a state of things, such a dis-

tribution of wealth, as will tend most to increase the number of this happy class of beings. I need not go further to point out the fallacy of these speculations founded on mere partial views; the one founded on an excessive admiration of the baubles engendered by excessive wealth, the other founded on a more rational admiration of moral and intellectual pleasures, than thus to put them abreast, and permit them, like certain chemical mixtures, to neutralize each other. It is evident that some more general, some universally-comprehensive principle, embracing the happiness of the whole of men or of nations, taken, not as classes, but as sentient beings, must be resorted to, in this momentous inquiry.

Consequences so extensive, so awfully important to human happiness, as those arising from different modes of distributing wealth, must not however be left to mere inference. That inference, which to one intelligent mind may appear legitimate, another may look upon as un consequential. Not to advance beyond the proposition above quoted from Mr. Mill,—how many are there who think the present state of society, of excessive wealth and extreme poverty, preferable to the existence of the numerous class of small possessors therein described? who will not admit the existence of any natural law or tendency to bring about such a state of things? and who still think that such a natural tendency ought by every possible means, even by force, to continue to be restrained, as it now is every where, by force restrained? To me it appears that the *natural laws* of distribution, if left freely to operate, would produce much more happiness in any community so wise as to unchain them, than is even promised above: to me it appears not proved, nor a just inference, that freedom from the necessity of moderate labor is essential either to the highest intellectual or moral attainments, or, as flowing from these and from a due supply of physical wants, to the enjoyment of the greatest happiness: to me it appears that the natural laws of distribution, if left freely to ope-

rate, would, with the present aids of art and science, do much more than produce to a *numerous class*, intellectual and moral culture, with the comforts and conveniences of life, and therefore happiness: to me it appears, that what I conceive to be the *natural laws* or the wisest mode, of distribution, would even produce these blessings to the *community at large*. Is it not then of consequence clearly to ascertain what these natural laws of distribution are, from which such mighty consequences are anticipated? and respecting the actual tendencies of which, and the desirableness of these tendencies, opinions so contradictory prevail?

But the subject, the distribution of wealth, is a hackneyed subject. What subject important to human happiness is not hackneyed? The subject of wealth in general is indeed so: but it is conceived that the least hackneyed branch of the subject is the *distribution*. No bold hand, it is conceived, has yet presumed to lay down just principles on this all-sensitive subject. Force, fraud, chance, prescription, are almost every where the main arbiters of distribution, and have almost frightened reason from daring to contemplate the mischiefs they have caused. Injustice in this most momentous matter has every where prevailed; but the perennial source has not been unfolded. Hence discontent, misery, vice, universal degradation—degradation not always absolute, but compared with the state of happiness attendant on the natural laws of distribution, if left freely to operate, in the present state of improved and every-day extending knowledge.

In every nation, and in almost every age, of the world, the blessings of equal comforts to all, and the enormous evils of great inequality of wealth, have been dimly seen and recognised; and vain and ignorant efforts have been made to establish a just distribution. Force is the instrument employed by ignorance to accomplish every thing, even justice itself: to establish equality, therefore, was force employed. But no sooner was force made use of than *security* fled, and with se-

curity production and consequently the means of happiness. Here therefore is the cruel dilemma in which mankind have been placed. Here is the important *problem* of moral science to be solved, "*how to reconcile equality with security ; how to reconcile just distribution with continued production.*" This problem it is the object of the following pages to develop, to trace its consequences, and to point out those just and gentle means by which the *natural laws* of distribution may be every where introduced, and by which security, impartially applied to all, and not exclusively and hypocritically applied to a few, may become the firmest guarantee, instead of being the eternal opponent, of rational and healthful equality : as it is the only sure basis of the continued reproduction and accumulation of wealth.

This momentous problem has not been yet fully solved. Mere political economy has not attempted to solve it. To the minds of a few enlightened men the first principles necessary for its solution may be familiar : but none of them has yet undertaken the task of bringing to a point the scattered rays of knowledge on this subject, applying them all to the *distribution* of wealth. To diffuse, and by diffusing to direct to *practical use*, the knowledge acquired on this branch of social science, to lead forth from the calm closets of philosophical inquirers, where they have delighted and elevated the minds of a *few*, into the world of life and action, those important truths, which it behoves *all mankind* to know and to practise, to assist in wiping out the stain from science, noticed thirty years ago by Condorcet, but still adhering, that though she had done much for the *glory* of mankind, she had done nothing or little for their *happiness*, is to me an object of the most anxious desire.

Who can throw his glance over the affairs of the civilized portion of mankind, and not rejoice ?* Who can behold the proofs, every where and every day exhi-

* Written in 1822.

bited, of the diffusion of real knowledge, and not rejoice? Who can behold all the civilized nations of mankind either in the very act of calmly new-modelling their social institutions, according to their respective degrees of knowledge, or on the point of undertaking the bounteous, the magnificent, the inevitable operation, and not rejoice? Who is there that sees not that whatever may be the absolute quantity of knowledge or of the articles of wealth in a community, it is not their abundance, but their right use and distribution, that constitute the happiness of that community? Is not this therefore peculiarly the time to investigate with uncompromising steadiness the natural laws of distribution, to ascertain how far legislatures and individuals may usefully co-operate with these tendencies of things, that new organizations of society may reject those perennial sources of vice and misery which ancient ignorance engendered?

But if the aspect of the great commonwealth of civilized nations and the interest which we of these countries have in the general progress of events, be not sufficient to awaken our attention to a matter momentous like the present; there is an aspect of things nearer home, in our very bosoms, which challenges our attention this moment to the *distribution* of wealth. How comes it that a nation abounding more than any other in the rude materials of wealth, in machinery, dwellings and food, in intelligent and industrious producers, with all the apparent means of happiness, with all the outward semblances of happiness exhibited by a small and rich portion of the community, should still pine in privation? How comes it that the fruits of the labor of the industrious, after years of incessant and successful exertion, are mysteriously and without imputation of fault to them, without any convulsion of nature, swept away? It is not for want of physical knowledge; it is not for want of abundant materials of wealth to make all comfortable, it is not for want of the capacity or inclination to abundant reproduction. To what then

is this strange anomaly in human affairs to be attributed? this misery in the midst of all the means of happiness? That savage tribes, ignorant of the means of production, disinclined to labor, should be overtaken by want, were a matter of no surprise: but that where art and nature had run, as it were, a race of emulation in the prodigality of their gifts to intelligent and industrious millions, that these millions should be disenabled from enjoying these products of their own creation—this is the mystery, this the astounding spectacle. To what but to a *vicious distribution of wealth* can this extraordinary phenomenon be attributed? What so natural as the cry of injustice, under such circumstances? What so natural and so usual as the imploring of the interference of the strong arm of power, to remedy such injustice? What so necessary as to ascertain the *causes* of this vicious distribution? whether they are of a temporary or of a deep-rooted and permanent nature? whether present appearances are any thing more than the full development, the maximum, of the evils inherent in long-established errors and radically vicious institutions, now brought to the crisis of their injurious operation? whether there are in art or nature any means to be found, excluding the use of force, which would make impossible the recurrence of similar calamity, and substitute a universally-benevolent, self-regulating, and self-preserving distribution for the present, engendering the evils notoriously experienced? Can any inquiry be more called for, not with a view to mere topical, temporary, remedies, but to radical cure?

✓ The tendency of the existing arrangement of things as to wealth, is to enrich a few at the expense of the mass of the producers; to make the poverty of the poor more hopeless, to throw back the middling classes upon the poor, that a few may be enabled, not only to accumulate in perniciously large masses the real national, which is only the aggregate of individual, capital, but also, by means of such accumulations, to command the products of the yearly labor of the community.

Who is not alarmed at the every-day increasing tendency to poverty on the part of the many, to the ostentation of excessive wealth on the part of the few? Who sees not the gradual undermining of the nation's resources, the sickening of the very spirit of industry on the part of her producers, if this progress cannot, by a recurrence to first principles, or otherwise, be arrested? Is it not time to inquire whether, by the laws of nature and society, we are doomed to submit to actual and anticipated evils such as these, under the peril of enduring still greater, if we rashly attempt to remove them? All moral and political wisdom should tend mainly to this, the just distribution of the physical means of happiness: for how senseless would it be to send codes of laws and maxims of morals to the savages of New Zealand for the regulation of their passions, if matters were not so adjusted, as that—if not by gift—at least by the exercise of their faculties, these savages might be put in the way to procure not only the means of existence, but of comfort in life! 'Tis in the use and distribution of these that all their good or bad qualities, their vices or virtues, must be chiefly developed. Skill and persevering industry are necessary to produce the objects of wealth, the means of enjoyment. Truth or falsehood are used to facilitate their acquisition by exchange or otherwise. Honesty is displayed in respecting the acquisitions of others; violence and cruelty in ravishing them from their producers; prudence and temperance in so regulating their use, as to secure all the immediate pleasures they are capable of producing without the drawback of those contingent remote evils which would follow a blind obedience to instinctive feelings; and beneficence in yielding to the grateful emotions of sympathy under the guidance of wisdom, and making wealth tributary to the happiness of others. In this way is the most important portion of our virtues and vices so indissolubly connected with the distribution of wealth, that to speak of morals and legislation with an affected contempt of such matters, is to grasp at a shadow and

to leave a substance—is to add hypocritical or ignorant insult to the miseries of communities.

Should we find that that mode of distribution which political economy requires, militates against political utility, while general morality is silent, we must weigh the claims of wealth and politics and carefully adjudge the balance. Should we find the increase of wealth and supposed political utility calling for one mode of distribution, and universal morality prescribing another, we must, consistently with our principles of promoting the greatest happiness of the whole, compell both wealth and politics to bend to that distribution which ensures the greatest virtue, the greatest happiness. But should we be so fortunate as to find that that species of distribution of wealth which tends most to its production and accumulation, tends also to political utility more than any other possible distribution of it, and affords the grateful aspect of the widest diffusion of moral habits, while it is, at the same time, so simple as to require no cumbrous legal machinery, almost no machinery at all, for its support; we shall unite all impartial voices in approbation of a mode of distribution so recommended. Such, and attended with so many concurring benefits, is, it is believed, the mode of distribution, the description of which follows.

Three modes of human labor are discussed and contrasted in the following pages: first, labor by force, or compulsion direct or indirect; second, labor by unrestricted individual competition; third, labor by mutual co-operation. The last of these modes of human labor, that by mutual co-operation, is shown to be as superior in production and happiness to the second, or that by individual competition, as the second is superior to the first, or labor by force or compulsion.

The immediate incident that gave rise to the inquiry pursued through the following pages is as follows: In one of the literary societies established in the city of Cork for the *diffusion* of knowledge, a gentleman celebrated for his skill in the controversies of political

economy, thought proper to descant on the blessings of the *inequality* of wealth, as now established; on the dependence, and consequent gratitude which the poor should feel to the rich; on the too-great freedom and too-great equality of wealth of the United States of America; with similar topics. Astonished at such notions, and particularly from such a man, the writer not only repelled them at the time, but determined to enter into the subject, and to lay it before the Society in the shape of any essay, for future and more enlarged discussion. As the essay proceeded, the importance and extent of the subject seemed to increase; and the confused and erroneous notions prevailing almost every where, in print and conversation, redoubled the zeal for its completion to whatever extent the interests of truth might require. Thus has the proposed essay extended to the present inquiry.

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ON

THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH.

CHAPTER I.

INVESTIGATION OF THE NATURAL PRINCIPLES, RULES, OR LAWS, ON WHICH ALL JUST DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH OUGHT TO BE FOUNDED: DEDUCED FROM OUR ORGANIZATION, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES, PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL, WHICH SURROUND US.

UTILITY, calculating all effects, good and evil, immediate and remote, or the pursuit of the greatest possible sum of human happiness, is the leading principle constantly kept in view, and to which all others are but subsidiary, in this inquiry. In Bentham's "Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation," and the first chapters of the celebrated "Traité de Legislation," this principle, recognised by Helvetius, Priestley, Paley, and others, is developed and established for ever, to the exclusion of all other pretended tests of morals.

No subject is more interesting, or if rightly treated more useful, than the *Distribution of Wealth*; because on its just and wise distribution will be found to depend, not only, directly, the physical comforts of every community, but, consequentially, in a very great degree, the quantum of morality, of the pleasures of sympathy, prudence, and benevolence, as well as of intellectual enjoyment, within its reach.

The distribution to be here inquired into, is that which will promote the *greatest possible quantity* of human happiness, or the *greatest happiness of the greatest number*. It will be seen that this greatest number is never a mere majority, but nine out of ten, or ninety out of a hundred, of the whole community. In fact, the real happiness of *the whole*, even of the apparently sacrificed minority, will be found to coincide with the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The greatest possible quantity of human happiness, the greatest happiness

of the greatest number, the happiness of the community, and the happiness of the whole, will therefore be found, in almost all cases, to imply the same, and may for the most part be indifferently used.

The propositions on which the natural laws of distribution are founded, appear to me so plain, as to ensure assent as soon as they are understood, and the consequences flowing from them are the most universally extensive in their application, and most intimately connected with human happiness. They should be therefore freely canvassed; for, if true, they should be always kept in mind, to direct our reasonings on moral and political subjects: if false, the sooner their errors are pointed out the better, that they may not be injuriously applied in practice. In the investigation of truth respecting quantity and numbers, certain positions are laid down, the perception of the truth of which is felt, as soon as the terms are understood. Just so should it be in moral and political disquisitions. Though for want of an *accurate measure* of the degrees of resemblance or difference, of the different intensity of the same or different species of feeling, and of the consequences of actions, including these and other particulars, we cannot reach the same certainty of ultimate deduction in the moral sciences, that we can in those of quantity and numbers; yet as our moral deductions require to be extended but a few links beyond first principles, we may still arrive at nearly the same certainty in both; for first principles are equally capable of intuitive evidence, or perception, in both; and the more necessary it is that we should know what these first principles are, on which so much depends. We shall find, that though we cannot by means of them ensure mathematical certainty in all our reasonings, we shall arrive at that strong and overwhelming probability, even in matters of minute detail, on which the mind justly and necessarily reposes with as much confidence, and which leads to as energetic practical demonstrations in the affairs of life, as if measurement could verify every step of our progress. Be it observed, that where we cannot arrive at this strong probability, called moral certainty, the importance of the object to human happiness proportionally decreases; as in metaphysical, antiquarian, and theological speculations.

It will be asked, "What is meant by the words, *natural principles*, *natural rules*, or *natural laws*, of Distribution, to be here inquired into?"

No word has been more misapplied than the word *Natural*; nor is it necessary here to enter into an analysis of its original, derivative, or present significations. So pleasing are the as-

sociations connected with it, that it is arbitrarily allied to almost any thing which it is sought to recommend. The word Law, too, implying a sanction, a penalty, is something which must be obeyed. If therefore the name of law can be applied to any proposition, and if to that can be superadded the word, natural, no exhibition of consequences or uses is supposed to be requisite. To disobey the law is criminal, to gainsay is presumptuous: to this add, that the law in question is not that of one or a few individuals like ourselves, but of a mysterious and irresistible power called Nature, and who shall dare to oppose?

Even political economists have frequently used these words without any accurate definition. They frequently refer to the Natural Laws of Distribution, as things existing and known, and use them as grounds, or as aids, to argument, precluding reply. Against such abuse of these terms the reader is warned. No natural laws of distribution, or of any thing else, in the sense here given them, any where exist. By natural laws of distribution enlightened political economists do mean, or ought to mean, those general rules or first principles, on which all distribution of wealth ought to be founded, in order to produce the greatest aggregate mass of happiness to the society, great or small, producing it. As therefore economists have hitherto used the terms, they are here retained; but without any wish to derive any factitious aid from their employment. Our inquiry is respecting those useful rules or first principles on which distribution ought to be founded, which by others have been vaguely hinted at under the name of the Natural Laws of Distribution. The most appropriate meaning perhaps which can be given to the word, natural, in conjunction with the words, laws, rules, or principles, of distribution, is simply such as require no factitious aid, which demand the removal or the non-imposition of restraint, instead of new machinery for their support.

The Laws here spoken of have never been written or promulgated, still less enforced; they exist only in the discussions of the inquirers after truth, and if admitted by rational men after the most severe scrutiny that can be applied to them, will become the rules of action and the guides of real written law as to the distribution of wealth. The word, natural, may be supposed to qualify them, as intimating that such good or evil alone attends their violation or observance, as follows the ordinary course of events where no human compulsion interposes. It will be found that no aid whatever is sought to be derived in the following pages, from the words, Natural Laws, in support of any argument. To truth, tracing the real differences

and resemblances of things and the real consequences of human actions, the appeal is always made. To the rules of distribution here proposed, no sort of deference is asked in consequence of the use of two metaphorical words, retained with a view of entering more easily on a train of inquiry in which they had been employed by others. Too much mischief has been done by pretenders of all sorts, in every age, by feigning mysterious intercourse with certain oracles; their own will, guided by their own interest, rarely by mere delusion, the only gods that dictated the responses. We pretend to have discovered no oracles, to have intercourse with none: the natural laws here to be investigated, are simply, with the modifications above explained, the opinions of the writer.

The propositions to be proved in this chapter are the following; placed here consecutively, that the reader may bear their connexion in mind.

SECTION 1. Wealth is produced by labor: no other ingredient but labor makes any object of desire an object of wealth. Labor is the sole universal measure, as well as the characteristic distinction of wealth.

SECTION 2. The object to be aimed at in the distribution of wealth, as in its production by labor, is to confer thereby the greatest possible quantity of happiness, *i. e.* of pleasures, whether of the senses or of a moral or intellectual nature, on the society producing it.

SECTION 3. All members of society (cases of mal-conformation excepted) being similarly constituted in their physical organization, are capable by similar treatment of enjoying equal portions of happiness.

SECTION 4. The happiness of the greater number is to be preferred to the happiness of the lesser number: otherwise, the object in view, the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, would be sacrificed.

SECTION 5. Those means of enjoyment or happiness which come under the name of wealth, being produced by the application of labor, guided by knowledge, to the materials afforded by nature, sufficient stimulus, in the way of *motive*, must be afforded to put the necessary labor guided by knowledge into motion, to produce this wealth.

SECTION 6. The strongest stimulus to production (and that which is necessary to the greatest production) that the nature of things will permit, is, "security" in the entire use of the products of labor to those who produce them.

SECTION 7. All voluntary exchanges of articles of wealth,

implying a preference on both sides of the thing received to the thing given, tend to the increase of happiness from wealth, and thence to increase the motives to its production.

SECTION 8. The forced abstraction of the products of labor, the objects of wealth and means of happiness, from any individual, will cause more loss of happiness to him than increase of happiness to the person acquiring.

SECTION 9. The forced abstraction of small portions of wealth from any given number of individuals, will lessen the whole quantity of happiness more than it can be increased by the additional pleasures conferred on any one or more individuals enjoying these united small forced masses.

SECTION 10. Therefore, the produce of no man's labor, nor the labor itself, nor any part of them, should be taken from the laborer, without an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory.

SECTION 11. The materials of wealth should be so distributed as to accomplish the double object of promoting the utmost possible equality of enjoyment and the utmost possible production; that is to say, to promote the utmost possible equality of distribution "consistent with *security*;" the degree of development of every useful human energy, physical and intellectual, and of course of the production of wealth, depending on the degree of security enjoyed.

SECTION 12. To accomplish this just distribution, no *encouragements*, or *restraints*, partaking of the nature of wealth, whether of a positive or negative kind, on the direction given to labor, or on the free interchange of the products of labor, should be instituted or upheld.

SECTION 13. That inequality in the distribution of wealth, and that alone, which arises from securing to every man the free use of his labor and its products, and the voluntary exchanges thence ensuing, should be upheld; because without that extent of inequality, there would be no security, without security no production, without production no wealth to distribute.

SECTION 14. All other species of inequality of distribution, being not only unnecessary, but injurious to the excitement of production, should be repressed; because they unnecessarily detract from the benefits of equality, and thus lessen the sum total of happiness, the object aimed at in the distribution of wealth.

SECTION 15. General inference from the above premises.

“Natural Laws of Distribution,” or General Rules, the observance of which is necessary in order to attain the greatest happiness derivable from wealth.

First. All labor ought to be free and *voluntary*, as to its direction and continuance.

Second. All the products of labor ought to be secured to the producers of them.

Third. All exchanges of these products ought to be free and *voluntary*.

SECTION 1.

Wealth is produced by labor: no other ingredient but labor makes any object of desire an object of wealth. Labor is the sole universal measure, as well as the characteristic distinction, of wealth.

A few illustrations will perhaps be sufficient to demonstrate this proposition, whether as applying to articles the unaided production of nature, or to those in which the agency of man is alone conspicuous. But first let us state what is conceived to be a just definition of wealth; in the support of which all our illustrations will terminate.

The word, *wealth*, signifies “that portion of the physical materials or means of enjoyment which is afforded by the labor and knowledge of man turning to use the animate or inanimate materials or productions of nature.”

Perhaps it may be useful to bear in mind in more compendious, if not as accurate terms, that wealth is “any object of desire produced by labor.”

Value in exchange is not necessary, though it almost always attaches, to the idea of wealth: for small communities have been rich and happy by labor in common, without any exchanges. Would not woollen cloth be wealth though every man made his own coat? Without value in exchange, an article, ever so much an object of desire to him that owns it, and produced by ever so much of his labor, can have no marketable value: it will not in a market be exposed for sale to those who have no desire for it: but that does not make it the less an object of wealth to him who desired it because it was useful, and who wisely employed himself in its fabrication for his own use.

Without labor there is no wealth. Labor is its distinguishing attribute. The agency of nature constitutes nothing an ob-

ject of wealth : its energies are exerted altogether equally and in common, in the production of all the means of enjoyment or desire, whether objects of wealth or not objects of wealth. Labor is the sole parent of wealth.

National wealth is nothing more than the aggregate of the individual masses of the matter of wealth.

Land, air, heat, light, the electric fluid, men, horses, water, *as such*, are equally unentitled to the appellation of wealth. They may be objects of desire, of happiness ; but, till touched by the transforming hand of labor, they are not wealth. Of these, air, heat, light, the electric fluid, and frequently water, though objects of desire and utility, even of necessity, not only to health, but to the continuance of life, are not objects of wealth. Why so ? Because it requires no *labor* to produce them, to gather them together for use, to enjoy them. They exist in such quantities, and are used and enjoyed with so little exertion, some of them requiring—as air, light, and heat—a positive exertion for the exclusion of their operation upon us, that no sort of labor is necessary to gratify our desires for them. Drove of horses or horned cattle abounding in regions thinly peopled, are not objects of wealth any more than the air or light. There are more of them than are wanting for use : no human exertion has produced them : whoever will employ the labor necessary to appropriate any of them, becomes their owner : and the mere labor of acquisition makes that an object of *wealth* which before was merely an object of possible desire. The *value* of the animal depends entirely on the average quantity of the labor of men of ordinary strength and skill, necessary to convert it to use, whether as a beast of burden, or for the use of the flesh, or of its skin merely. What renders a fine horse an article of wealth in civilised society ? What nature has done for him ? No such thing. Nature has done as much for the wild horses of South America ; and they are not articles of wealth. Has nature done more for the trained horse ? No ; but man has done it : and the horse, exulting in his strength, stands, pawing the earth, the representative of the labor employed in producing the things he has consumed, and for which *his* labor has not yet compensated, from the time he was born till his exhibition for sale. His trifling value at birth is but a mere equivalent for the consumption of food during the time lost from labor by his mother, when nourishing him before and after birth, and for the expenses incurred on the father in fitting him for his idle Turkish occupation of pleasing 100 concubines. Thus, as articles commonly esteemed objects of wealth, lose that quality under circumstances in which no labor is requisite for their

production; so do other articles, not esteemed objects of wealth, gain that quality when under circumstances making labor necessary for their enjoyment. By day, when light profusely flows every where over the illumined half of our planet, that species of light, the light of the sun, the most useful and grateful of all light, is not an object of wealth. But let the earth continue its revolution and avert from the sun its lately illumined portion, and let light be still desirable for human convenience, and it will become immediately an article of wealth under the name of the substances from which it is in scanty portions extracted. The value of candles, oil, gas, &c., is only the value of the light extracted from them; and as science improves and the modes of extracting are increased and facilitated, the value of light diminishes with the smaller quantities of labor necessary for its extraction. Till directed by labor under the guidance of knowledge, the powers of nature, in point of useful production of articles denominated wealth, are beneath estimation. Where nature would give the means of mere existence to a few individuals, of shelter, clothing, or comfort to none, labor does, out of the same materials, produce all the means of happiness to thousands. Let the labor of any community cease but for one year, and how many of that community would be preserved in life, by the *materials or energies of nature*, to tell the perilous experiment to the succeeding year? Not only the comforts but the very *existence* of all nations depend on the eternal operation of labor. While the mouth consumes, the industrious arm is reproducing.

Wealth is limited to the *physical* means or materials of enjoyment. Labor or muscular exertion can be occupied on physical things alone: they only are capable of accumulation. There are numerous means of enjoyment besides those of a physical nature, besides those which are tangible, visible, or which tend, through any other of the senses, to the production of happiness. All of these numerous means of enjoyment, though founded on and resolvable into exterior and interior sensation or feeling, may clearly and usefully be considered apart: physical enjoyment, meaning those pleasures only which *directly* affect the senses. There are moral and intellectual, as well as physical, pleasures; and what the two former want in intensity is more than compensated by their facility of acquisition or cheapness, their permanence, and facility of reproduction. With these moral and intellectual sources of happiness we are not now concerned, as they are not directly comprehended in the meaning attached to the word, wealth. There are also numerous *physical* means of happiness which

come not under the definition of wealth. Light, by its varieties of colors, gives pleasure to the eye, water to the taste, the sexes to each other; yet are neither of these means of happiness denoted by the term wealth, because they are the gift of nature alone, without any addition made thereto by the labor or skill of man.

The mere utility of a thing carried to any extent and superadded to its mere existence, or what we call its production by the hand of nature, constitutes nothing an object of wealth till labor in some shape becomes identified with it: then it is separated from all other objects of desire, all other means of happiness, and becomes *wealth*.

What is wealth also in one country is not wealth in another, because the very same article which in one region, whether from the constitution of our nature or from mere caprice, is an object of desire requiring labor for its production, in another region causes pain, and of course no labor is expended in its acquisition or preparation.

Thus ice in equatorial civilized regions is an article of wealth and luxury; while approaching the poles, it becomes the bane of existence. In parched sandy countries, a well of water is a source of wealth; while the land is the property of no one, not being worth the trouble of appropriation. Labor was not necessary to make the well, nature, we shall suppose, having produced it; nor is the labor of drawing out the water to be alone estimated. But the existence of the well in that spot *saves the labor* that would be otherwise necessary to bring water there from its nearest supply; and the value of the well is to be measured by the quantity of labor thus saved.

Men and women, at different times and places, have been converted into mere objects of wealth; compelled by brute force, without any equivalent, to administer to the pleasures of their owners; and still this disgrace to humanity continues, upheld by the two nations, at either side of the Atlantic, who boast most of their love of liberty and their regard to human happiness. The two circumstances necessary to constitute wealth being, "objects of desire" and "procured by labor," or effort, apply to human beings, like any other substances, such as iron or sheep, when tyrannically converted into objects of wealth. Not only is an expense of labor, of force or effort, necessary, in the first instance, to make human beings slaves, and thus objects of wealth; but also to retain them in slavery. And this expense of effort is of the most irksome kind, and attended with constant risk; differing for the worse, in these particulars, from ordinary labor. False calculations of partial interest give birth to the desire of possessing slaves. Whether human beings ought (*i. e.* whether it promotes the

happiness of them and their masters, collectively and individually taken) under any circumstances, to be so converted, is quite another question. Other principles will show the wickedness, because the overbalance of misery, produced by such appropriations.

It will not be objected, that, by including effort and force under the head of labor, every act of violence and robbery would constitute any thing desired by the ferocious, an object of *equal praise* with that acquired by peaceful industry. It will prove indeed that such objects of desire as are by force sought after, must in all probability be objects of wealth; but not that those objects of wealth ought to be enjoyed by any one who can seize them. Scarcely would risk and effort be superadded to ordinary labor in the acquisition, if the articles were not esteemed articles of wealth. The simple question now discussed is, not to whom these articles of wealth ought to belong—which we shall presently discuss—but what circumstances they are which constitute any objects of desire articles of wealth; the possession, the distribution of them, so as to produce the greatest quantity of happiness, being the main subject of this inquiry.

As to violence exerted to constrain, say the person of a woman to submit involuntarily to man's inclinations; wherever this violence is permitted, women become property, to people harems, as men do to cultivate the soil or to work in domestic thralldom.

It would be little better than impertinence, in an inquiry addressed to a civilized community, formally to except human beings from becoming objects of desire and of appropriation to each other: nor would it be necessary; for, wherever these most pernicious desires have existed, so as to lead to appropriation, property has followed, and they have been constituted matters of wealth, like any other materials animate or inanimate. Wherever the *power* of appropriation has accompanied the fatal *desire*, the appropriation, and the sometimes illegal, but always unjust, conversion into property or wealth, has followed of course.

Numerous are the objections that may be made, from partial views of particular objects, to this simple explanation of what constitutes an object of wealth. To explain them all would be an endless task. It may suffice to notice a few of the most conspicuous and apparently of the most difficult explanation. Of all the physical objects of desire to man, few are more attractive than the possession of a rich and well-cultivated piece of land, yielding every year teeming harvests of grain and fruits, or sending forth from its bosom useful minerals, such as iron, tin, silver, rock-salt or coal. Is this

land, or are all its products objects of wealth? First, are this land and all its products *objects of desire*? Circumstances evidently may exist under which neither the land nor any of its products, internal or external, may be objects of desire in the way of appropriation; as where rude hunters occupy it, as half a century ago was the case with all the fruitful lands and immense *materials*, or things capable of being converted into wealth, in the territories of the United States, west of the Alleghany mountains. Vast tracts of these lands, now cultivated by men flourishing and happy in as far as free, and erected into states, were not then objects of desire to any human beings. Want of knowledge as well as of inclination arising from acquired habits, concealed from their savage occupants the uses to which they might be applied. Remoteness, want of security, necessarily prevented civilized strangers from thinking at that time of settling on them. Though abounding in all the physical materials of happiness, they were not therefore objects of wealth, because not objects of desire. But when the scene changed, and civilized men turned their eyes and footsteps towards them, desiring to convert them to the means of happiness; were they then converted into objects of wealth? They were simply in the way of becoming so: but they were not yet so converted. Labor was wanting to be superadded to mere desire, and in proportion as labor was bestowed upon them, they were transformed from mere objects of desire into objects of wealth. The first settler cleared the timber and erected a shed, and affixed the value of his labor to that part of the soil on which it had been expended, and to those contiguous spots rendered by it more convenient for use. A second settler, paying for the labor under the name of the land, still added to its value by expending more labor upon it, in clearing a larger space, cultivating useful crops, and improving the sheds, and perhaps rearing and domesticating some animals. A third settler pays an increased value for all these products of labor under the name of the soil to which they are attached, introduces stock and machines, all produced by labor, and leaving the former erections for subordinate or temporary purposes, erects houses and makes fences suited for permanence and convenience. Thus is a piece of rich land which was a few years ago an object of no value, now converted into an object of wealth. What has nature done towards this conversion? Nothing. What has man, what has man's labor done? Every thing. All that we call the work of nature, the mere existence of the land and its capabilities, were in as palpable existence before the land was converted into wealth as after it. Nay, by repeated culture

the capabilities of the best land are frequently impaired or exhausted. But, all this time, the minerals lying on the surface of the land, or arranged in its interior, though capable of the most extended use, have not been regarded, have not been esteemed articles of wealth. Whence comes this new phenomenon? In general, because none of these articles have been all this time objects of desire, and therefore no labor has been expended upon them. Some of them, such as coal, have not been objects of desire, because other articles procured with *less labor*, such as wood, necessarily cleared away to fit the ground for cultivation, have been used instead of them. Others, such as iron, from want of the skill and machinery necessary to convert them to useful purposes on so limited a scale, have been disregarded, in as much as *less labor* applied to the soil would procure articles sufficient to get them, or rather things fabricated from them, *in exchange*. But let an increase be made in population, let the number of those requiring such articles be such as to afford constant employment to the machinery and skill of a few, let the timber be cut down and exhausted; then will the neglected iron-stone and the coal become objects of desire; then will labor be bestowed upon them and they will become objects of wealth. A new value will be given to the land; not because nature has done any thing to increase the capabilities of useful application of the objects of which the land consisted, but because circumstances have led to the formation of desires for their appropriation, and in consequence of such desires, labor has been bestowed upon them.

If it be objected that these lands are bought, before any labor has been expended upon them, of the United States government; it may be observed, that the moderate price paid is but a very small remuneration for three benefits which the comparatively weak individual occupant derives from the powerful community from whom he purchases; by which he is saved a hundred fold in risk and labor in the cultivation, in the enjoyment of his land. 1st, Immediate peaceable possession; 2d, Guarantee by the national force from savage attack or fellow citizens' annoyance, permitting the whole of the cultivator's exertions to be directed to improvement, none of it being abstracted for defence; 3d, *Security of title* in future enjoyment or transfers, the original appropriation becoming a public act registered and authenticated; thus saving litigation resolvable into loss of wealth or useless expenditure of labor, with its accompanying vexation and consequential evils to an interminable extent.

Nor does the fertility or barrenness of the soil require any

modification to be made in the definition given. If the land be so barren as not to afford an adequate return in the means of comfort for the labor that might be bestowed upon it, that labor will be withheld; and this desire will depend on the facilities of getting from other sources by means of less labor, the objects contemplated by the application of labor to the land in question. No matter whether the land be rich or poor, let the desire of making it, or any thing attached to it, tributary to enjoyment, be once produced, and let labor be in consequence applied, the value of the land will necessarily depend on the quantity of labor guided by ordinary skill and judgment bestowed upon it. If land more fertile be discovered, after lands less fertile have been cultivated, and so near and convenient in point of situation as to come in competition with them, the new land may be cultivated in preference; and that part of the labor bestowed on the old which had not been returned by means of the crops but expended in more durable changes, called permanent improvements, would be lost. That particular parcel of land first cultivated, ceasing, from whatever cause, to be an object of desire, the labor expended upon it would no longer preserve it an article of wealth, as the labor of drawing stones, not objects of desire, from the sea, would not convert them into articles of wealth. Let any thing be once an object of desire, labor is the only ingredient necessary to erect it into an article of wealth. The desire removed, no labor will, except by compulsion, be employed upon it. The desire excited and the object not to be obtained without exertion, labor is bestowed upon it, and it is converted into an article of wealth.

Suppose a trading colony settled on a confined barren spot, as the British on the island of Malta, for the mere purposes of commerce: What will determine the value of the few barren spots of ground in their neighbourhood? The quantity of labor that has been expended upon them. What determined that quantity of labor? The quantity that it has been necessary, or that it would be necessary, to expend upon them in order to afford for sale whatever articles the climate and convenience permitted, on the same terms that articles equally good could be imported from the cheapest accessible market. If more money were demanded for a vineyard, an orange-grove, or a corn-field, than this mass of labor, with the necessary profits of capital as they are called and superintendence, would amount to, it could not be given without loss; because the productions of the spot would not repay the interest of the capital deposited with the yearly expenses of culture necessary to meet the rival foreign article. The value again of the ar-

ticles brought from abroad would depend on the quantity of labor there necessary to produce them.

Suppose that instead of being barren, the spots of the island had been very rich; their value would be equally determined in the same way, either by the quantity of labor expended upon them, or (whether to the whole amount expended or not) by the quantity of labor, or the worth of labor, they would save the proprietor, the amount which without them he would have to pay in freight, first cost, and attendant expenses, for a quantity of produce equal to that which his home culture could produce.

In such way would the value of a piece of land be determined for agricultural purposes on such an island. In what way would it be determined for building or for pleasure-ground? The value of building ground depends on the quantity of labor in carriage and otherwise which the situation would save, and in the probability of quicker sale or letting it would afford; all which are resolvable into the saving of labor. The price of pleasure grounds depends on the competition of the desires of the rich. To these, when wealth is viciously divided, and when great ignorance is joined to great wealth, it is hard to assign a limit. The loss of other enjoyments, which the acquisition of a spot, so over-valued by caprice beyond its agricultural or building value, would entail on its acquirer, is almost the only check to this competition. If labor somewhat beyond what could create agricultural sites, could create new sites equally suited to caprice for pleasure-grounds; the amount of this labor would stamp the value. But these favorite pleasure-grounds are in general limited in quantity, and such as cannot be imitated by labor. They have therefore a surplus value of their own, arising from the competition of desires, more or less reasonable, on a supply necessarily limited. But this surplus, over and above their agricultural or building value, or value for health or any other useful purpose that can be estimated by labor, could scarcely have place, or but to a very small extent, as we shall see, under the natural, unconstrained, and most useful distribution of wealth. This surplus is a mere artificial value, not appreciable or worthy of being appreciated in the scale of the wealth and happiness of any community. Still however, in all cases, the two ingredients of desire and labor are necessary to constitute an article of wealth. If nature have limited the supply of the article so that labor cannot furnish the demands of desire, the artificial value of caprice commences: but whereas, in ordinary cases, the value of an article of wealth extends to the smallest quantity of labor that could produce it, here the value

of caprice cannot extend even as far. Scarcely any amount of labor, not such as any individual fortune could purchase, could create a new river for instance and form sites upon it, or continue exploring the earth till new diamonds or similar baubles, equal in size to the largest known, were discovered. Even this surplus artificial value therefore comes within our rule: for not only can it never *exceed* the amount of labor necessary to produce similar articles, but it seldom reaches that amount. The amount of labor expended or saved on objects of desire, is therefore in all cases the utmost limit of their value, and what constitutes them articles of wealth.

Though the proposition heading this section, asserts that labor is the *sole* measure of the value of an article of wealth, it does not assert that this sole measure is in all cases an *accurate* measure. As an article must be an object of desire to be an article of wealth, and as these desires and preferences are apt to vary with circumstances both physical and moral, particularly with the quantum of knowledge, (of science and art) of the means of converting to use the materials and energies of nature; it is evidently impossible that the absolute quantity of labor can be any accurate index to these. Superfluous trinkets without use are sought after by the savage and the courtier. Under representative self-government, they would be equally disregarded as things conferring merit, and reduced to their commercial value, to the value of real use. Uninformed nations may disregard the sea-weed and the siliceous sand on their shores; by the union of which, by means of heat, into one substance, light and warmth might be enjoyed in their dwellings; and should other substances supply the place of these, in cheaper substitutes, they would, if not wanted for other purposes, be equally disregarded by civilized nations. What is asserted, is, that in any given state of society, with any given desires, at any particular time, labor, employed with ordinary judgment on objects of desire, is the sole measure of their values; and under such circumstances, an accurate measure. While the quantity of land and the supply of the materials of many articles remains stationary, population and knowledge at the same time increasing; while desires or tastes vary as the moral and intellectual condition of mankind improves, no accurate measure of value, as applied to wealth, can be given. To seek it, is to hunt after a shadow. Nothing but labor or effort bears any relation to the converting of objects of desire into objects of wealth: they may by possibility all change their characters, and be at one time objects of wealth, while at another they are mere objects of desire; or may cease to be even objects of desire.

Greater skill it is evident is exerted in one species of labor, and by one laborer at the same work, than in another. But these are resolvable into the ordinary labor of the community. If by extraordinary skill at a particular employment, or by ordinary skill at an employment requiring a considerable expenditure of previous labor to learn, an individual accomplishes that in two days which ordinary skill or untaught skill could not accomplish in less than four, this labor is double the value of ordinary labor. The estimate of the value of a day's labor is that produced by ordinary skill and diligence in the ordinary occupations of the laborious part of the community. There are also other circumstances, such as danger, noxious smells, noxious airs, moisture, cold, extra-exertion, which increase the value of particular species of labor. The products of these species of labor being objects of desire, the repulsiveness of the work requiring greater effort must be met by increased remuneration, if it cannot be obviated by indirect means requiring more labor or time. Thus, though labor is not an accurate measure of the relative value of articles of wealth under the varying circumstances of human society, it is the best approximation to such a standard; and is the only standard by which we can judge whether an article of desire is or is not an article of wealth.

There is no one article of desire, usually esteemed an article of wealth, which has not been, and which is not, in many places, denied that title. There are tribes, by whom neither corn, nor cottons, nor woollens, nor gold, nor rice, nor silver, would be esteemed articles of value, or wealth: but there are no tribes, there are no human beings, with whom human labor is not esteemed an article of value. Ignorant or enlightened, poor or rich, depraved or beneficent, labor is every where, to all men, an article of value: it is every where the price paid for the continuance of existence as well as for the means of enjoyment. It is the only universal commodity. No where without human labor or effort can objects of desire be obtained in such quantity or state of preparation as to support life.

Enough, it is hoped, has been said to prove, that "wealth is produced by labor; that labor is the sole ingredient by which an article of desire is converted into an article of wealth; and that labor is the sole universal, though still not an accurate, measure, of the value of wealth."

From what has been said follows also the truth of these propositions,

First, The mere desirableness of, or desire for, any physical, or other, object, does not constitute it an object of wealth.

Second, Nor does its rarity, nor its beauty, nor the pleasure, ever so pure, intense or permanent, that may be afforded by it, nor even its necessity for existence, constitute it an object of wealth.

Third, Nor, of course, does its *utility*, or its subserviency to any or all of the above, or to any other, uses, constitute it an object of wealth.

Fourth, Labor alone, added to the desire for physical things, constitutes them objects of wealth.

There are also two circumstances to be noticed, which when combined exclude physical things, though objects of desire, from having labor bestowed upon them so as to be constituted articles of wealth, viz.

First, The exhaustless supply of some physical objects of desire.

Second, Their existence in a state fit for use.

Such are the light of the sun, the air, sometimes water, atmospheric heat, &c.

Having a clear idea of what wealth is, we shall be able to understand each other when we speak of its distribution. Let us proceed then to our next section.

SECTION 2.

The object to be aimed at in the distribution of wealth, as in its production by labor, is to confer thereby the greatest possible quantity of happiness (i. e. of PLEASURES, whether of the senses, or of a moral or intellectual nature) on the society producing it.

OUR organization has made us *sentient* beings, that is to say, capable of experiencing pleasure and pain from various sources. Happiness denotes that continued state of well-being which is compounded of the different items of pleasurable feeling, experienced during a considerable space of time. Pleasures are the component parts, of which happiness is the aggregate, or the result. There is no space here for making an estimate of the different species of pleasures which compose happiness. The only rational motive to exertion of any sort, whether to acquire wealth or for any other purpose, is to increase the means of happiness, or to remove or lessen causes of annoyance, immediate or in

prospect. To add to happiness therefore, wealth is produced. If nature produced spontaneously an abundance of food and all other comforts for the use of man, as she does of air for his respiration, no effort would be made to produce or appropriate them, no *distribution* would be thought of: every one would take and consume as his wants demanded. With the sole view of adding to happiness, wealth, which nature does not give, is produced by labor: and the greater the happiness produced, the more satisfactory must be the effort. If we are delighted with one portion of happiness as arising from our wealth—be it enjoyed by whom it may—we must be more delighted with two portions, and with three still more than with two; and so on with any increase, to any extent of the number of portions. And as wealth can only be produced with a view to being made the means of comfort or enjoyment by its use or consumption, and as it must be distributed in order to be consumed, that distribution must be the best which gives the greatest number of portions of enjoyment, which gives the greatest possible quantity of happiness to those, the society or community, that produce it. The community producing the wealth will not send the fruits of their labor to add to the happiness of a neighbouring community, because that community possesses equal facilities for the production, because there is no reason to suppose a greater capacity for happiness amongst other communities, and because such gratuitous supply would annihilate the motives to production in the idle community receiving, as well as in the giving, unrequited, community.

The organization of man is so constituted as to enable him to enjoy an extent of happiness indefinitely greater than that of such an animal as an oyster or any number of oysters, or perhaps even of any number of horses: therefore is his comfort to be preferred indefinitely to the comfort of such inferior animals, whenever their happiness is incompatible with his. Between the capability of happiness of man and those animals that are unprovided with one or more of the five senses, as the oyster, the distance is immeasurable. Between man and the most perfect of other animals, as the ape, the distance is perhaps as great as between the ape and the oyster, or perhaps greater. This is to be attributed to the superior organization of man's extremities, his organs of voice, and particularly his brain, the organ of thought or feeling. From the development of this latter, comes *foresight*; by which he guides his future conduct by inferences from the past, and is liable to the pleasures of memory and anticipation. In this, and from this, in his immense capacity for knowledge and all

species of intellectual and moral pleasures, those of association included, stands the pre-eminence of man; the anticipations or other intellectual capacities, and thence the capacities for happiness, of even the most intellectual of other animals being extremely faint, hardly equalling that of a child of a year old. If now any one human being could demonstrate that his organization so excelled that of his fellow men as to enable him to experience indefinitely greater happiness than the rest of his species, his claim, like that of man above the oyster, ought to be allowed, and wealth and all other means of happiness ought to be applied to him, as by such application they would be the most productive. Even such a state of things would not violate our present rule. The greatest quantity of happiness, wherever it may be found to alight, must be pursued.

If, on looking round into society, we find the actual distribution very different from what we could expect from the principle of so distributing as to produce the greatest possible sum of happiness, it is quite another question to inquire how, under such circumstances, the happiest distribution could be brought about. We are now investigating first principles, unshackled by any fortuitous combination in any community.

Time was when this proposition, which some may *now* perhaps deem too trivial to be used as a basis of moral reasoning, too plain and too universally admitted to need illustration, would not have been endured. In days of ignorance the principle, both acted on and avowed, was, "We are possessed of the means of gratifying our appetites and passions, and will keep what we have: we have the power of adding indefinitely to these means, and will use that power to make the happiness of others subservient to ours. We know of no greatest happiness but the greatest happiness to ourselves." To this selfishness, this short-sighted selfishness, the reply was obvious,—“If your happiness be all to you, the happiness of every other individual is all to him, and so of any number of individuals: but to a third person, say a calm reasoner or legislator, it would be unimportant whether A. or B. enjoyed the happiness; his object would be to produce the greatest quantity by whomsoever enjoyed.” The only reason that can be given for the *production* of wealth at all, is, that it adds to the means of happiness: the only reason that it should be *distributed* in one way more than another, is, that it tends more to produce, to add to the stock of happiness, the object of its production, by one mode of distribution than by another. The object being happiness, the greater quantity of happiness held in view and attainable, the more completely is that ob-

ject accomplished, and the greater, of course, the efforts to produce it. What possible reason can be given that a smaller quantity of happiness, enjoyed by whom it may, should be preferred to a larger quantity of happiness? The state of things here supposed, is previous to distribution, whether of things supplied by nature or by labor, before any one has expended any labor, or acquired any property. What reason under such circumstances could any one give, that his avowedly smaller happiness should be preferred in the distribution to larger portions of happiness of one or more of those around him? If it could be proved that more happiness on the whole would accrue to society by centring the whole sum of wealth in many or a few individuals, such should be the distribution of wealth, in full accordance with this first principle. It assumes nothing as to the sort or numbers of persons to whom the distribution is to be made; but merely puts those to the proof, who assert that the greatest sum of happiness would be produced to society by distributing its enjoyment to them rather than to others. Consistently with this principle, if the slavery of nine out of ten and the superlative happiness of the tenth increased the sum total of happiness, *that* distribution, of slavery, should be pursued. All that is asked by this first principle, is, that the greatest quantity of agreeable sensations, both in intensity and duration, should be the object aimed at in the distribution of wealth. To deny it, would be to affirm that pain is to be preferred to pleasure, that no sensations are preferable to agreeable ones, that not feeling, which is tantamount to non-existence, is to be preferred to feeling or existence. Unfortunately, in older times there were few calm observers; all were influenced by the state of things and prejudices in which they had been brought up; and from the immediate necessities of life, every one pursued his own immediate apparent interest, without thinking, or being able to think, of first principles. Happiness in the abstract, and the greatest possible quantity of it, being then our first object, let us proceed to ascertain what mode of distribution will ensure the most of it. Our next proposition is,

SECTION 3.

“All members of society (cases of mal-conformation excepted), being similarly constituted in their physical organization, are capable, by similar treatment, of enjoying equal portions of happiness.”

WE might modify this proposition, and say merely, “All sane individuals are capable of equal enjoyment from equal portions of the *objects of wealth* ;” this branch of the larger and more important proposition being all that is necessary for our inquiry, which is limited to happiness as affected by wealth alone. The larger proposition, however, I hold to be demonstrably true in a comprehensive and legislative sense: that is to say, the apparent deductions to be made from it can no way affect comprehensive reasonings of education or legislation. It is not here meant to enter into any argument with some followers of Dr. Spurzheim, who would maintain, not only the local spot of existence of certain portions of the brain producing, when excited by their appropriate stimulus, certain mental feelings; who maintain, not only the *capability* of these portions of the brain to produce, when developed by circumstances, certain feelings leading to particular actions; but who maintain also the *inflexibility* of these organs, or of the whole cerebral mass, and their determination, in spite of circumstances and education, or in the absence of external exciting causes, to produce peculiar habits and characters. In cases of ordinary cerebral organization, as of ordinary visual or auditory structure, which is that of nine out of ten or ninety-nine out of a hundred of mankind, it does not appear that any anatomical or practical probability has been shown that the structure on which thought, or particular species of thought, depends, is incapable of being modified, altered, or new moulded, as it were, by education. Nay, the probability of such modification is almost infinitely stronger when applied to the cerebral organization, the organization of feeling or thought, than when applied to the organization of the senses. Within a few months after birth, the *senses* of man are developed to nearly as great perfection as they attain through life. Educate them or not, sounds, odours, colours, flavours, and external contact, will operate upon them: and no particular accidents occurring, they are equal in point of development, or capacity for use and enjoyment, to all men. Far different it is with the organization on which our mental feelings depend. Neglect *them*, they are little superior to those of the ape: cultivate them to the extent

of what is now known, and they much excel what poets feigned of the mind or morals of the old immortal gods. Instead, then, of supposing in the cerebral organization any thing more intractable, or any thing *less* liable to change than in the senses, the fact is directly the reverse. Instead of a greater tendency to inequality in the organization on which the feeling of thought depends; the original inequalities of that organization are *more* liable to be rectified and improved by education or circumstances, than those of the organization of the senses. But these general facts admitted, it will perhaps be said, that “as there are peculiarities of constitution, called idiosyncracies, tending to particular vital actions and appetites, to be operated upon by particular medicines, so there are peculiar *tastes* of the senses and of the mind. The taste of tobacco, of an onion, is disgusting to one person, while by another these tastes are extremely relished: the flavours of different fruits are preferred, as if by caprice, by different individuals: even the same individual will prefer different tastes at different parts of the day; tea and bread are insipid at the end of the day to those whose stomachs have been over-excited by excessive stimuli, particularly of fermented and intoxicating liquors. As to moral feelings, magnanimity and fortitude will more attract one, gratitude and pity another. In intellectual pursuits, not only is one pleased with lighter analogies of the imagination, another with palpable differences, such as can be measured by the senses, and relate to the matter-of-fact detail of life; but one prefers the dramatic representation of the very same scenes or feelings, which another will prefer to see exemplified in an heroic poem or a romance.” All these things are true, but do not weaken our general position; for, not to mention that many of these peculiarities, particularly the moral and intellectual, are clearly the result of circumstances or education, yet are these inequalities so trifling as not to affect, on the whole, the aggregate of pleasures of any particular sense, not to say the aggregate of all the pleasures of sense of any individual, and still less the aggregate of all his pleasures sensual, intellectual, and moral. But were even this the case—which it clearly is not—were the capacity for the aggregate sum of pleasures lessened by these peculiarities; what mode, what measure, have we to ascertain where or by *whom* this superior aggregate of pleasures, arising from such peculiarities, is enjoyed?

To us therefore such inequalities of capabilities of enjoyment *do not exist*, because they are by us inappreciable: they cannot enter into our moral and political calculations; for they can no more than the galvanic fluid be seized and measured. We have no means of weighing or measuring them, even if their

existence, and the inequality of their effects as to happiness, were as demonstrable as the light of the mid-day sun. The fact of their inequality is one thing, the possibility of measuring the degrees of this inequality, so as to make them serve as the basis of distribution, is another. 'Tis in vain that we say that different degrees of susceptibility to happiness exist, if we cannot demonstrate *where they are*, and in what *proportions*: without this they can be of no practical use. But, let us advance another step in the argument. Suppose that these capabilities, or susceptibilities, of enjoyment were, in the sum total of pleasures, different in different individuals, suppose moreover that we had discovered a mode of measuring them; another difficulty, of a practical nature and insurmountable, occurs. Who are to be the *measurers* of these susceptibilities? the rich or the poor, the young or the old, the studious or the illiterate? Are we to institute a court, and to impanel a jury, in the case of every individual: or, if this be too troublesome, are we to use a judge without jury, and label every man's neck, to say nothing of the women, with tickets of susceptibility of one to one hundred, supposing these numbers to comprise the extreme lengths of the chain? Behold! no sooner are our labels attached, no sooner is this delicate operation performed of valuing susceptibilities, than changes begin to take place, and the most accurate valuation becomes deranged. Accidents, diseases, the progress of years, mental or moral improvement or deterioration, all these causes are in unceasing activity; so that the table of susceptibilities of one year will be quite inapplicable the succeeding year, or perhaps the succeeding month. We must dismiss then, as altogether unworthy of consideration, the notion of influencing the distribution of wealth by speculations as to the capacities for enjoyment of different individuals. Whether, under similar treatment, with like incidents and diseases, similar *moral or mental qualities* would be developed, is not now the question: 'tis merely whether similar treatment, operating on healthy organization, will produce equal capabilities as to the aggregate of *enjoyment*, though it will also perhaps be found that in 99 cases out of 100 similar treatment will produce similar intellectual and moral qualities also. As to our immediate subject indeed, the distribution of wealth, even so much is not required. 'Tis not the susceptibility to every species of enjoyment which is demanded for our main argument, but simply to those particular enjoyments arising from the use of the objects of wealth. That "all sane members of society, similarly treated, are capable of similar degrees of enjoyment from equal portions of wealth," will now I trust be admitted, though the

larger proposition as to an equal capacity for all species of enjoyment—which appears to be equally incontrovertible—should be denied; always keeping in mind the impossibility of acting on these inequalities, even if they were proved to exist. In the application of punishment, indeed, the susceptibilities to pain may usefully be taken into account in order to render those punishments *equal*, opportunity being afforded in such cases of inquiring into individual circumstances.

Let it be always recollected that our reasonings apply to the *capabilities* of all human beings as formed by nature, and modified by external circumstances. If an *actual state* of degradation of a great portion of any community, and a consequent incapacity of physical enjoyment, could be exhibited, it would not weaken our argument, until it could be shown that the portion of the community so degraded, had been subjected to *similar treatment* with the more fortunate members of the same community. But such an extreme case does not exist, except perhaps amongst the slaves and slave-drivers of the West Indies, and in some of the so-called free states of the American Union. And have these slaves and their drivers been subjected to the *same treatment*? Passing by the circumstance of their being of different complexion and race, who knows not that the treatment of the black and the white, from their earliest infancy, and through every stage of their existence, has been diametrically the reverse of each other? And after all it may be doubted, which of them, the slaves or the masters, from the opposite and balancing vices of their respective situations, are capable of the most enjoyment, through the means afforded by wealth. Nothing is more certain than that a given portion of wealth, particularly a small portion of wealth, would produce incalculably more happiness to the slave, alive to every unused pleasure, than to the master, over-excited and satiated with these same pleasures.

SECTION 4.

The happiness of the greater number is to be preferred to the happiness of the lesser number; otherwise the object in view, the production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, would be sacrificed.

THIS proposition necessarily follows the preceding; for if all sane persons are, by similar treatment, capable of equal por-

tions of enjoyment; to say, that the happiness of two of these equals is to be preferred to one, is no more than saying that two or any other number are more than one. Happiness being the object, the sum total would be lessened by the abstraction of any portion of it. Why then the necessity of stating a self-evident proposition? Because, though sometimes admitted in theory as to smaller associations, it has been most flagrantly and lamentably neglected *in practice*, not only as applied to society at large, but even in its application to these minor associations. To enumerate the practices that prevail in violation of this principle, would be to enumerate almost every case of privilege and exemption. It must be observed again, that though this, like the other propositions, is expressed in general terms as applicable to every species of happiness, to happiness derived from all other sources as well as from wealth, because they are thought to be universally true; yet is our general argument concerned with no more than this, that *that* portion of the happiness of the greater number, which is *derived from wealth*, is to be preferred to that portion of the happiness of the smaller number which is derived from the same source. The *direct* operation of wealth is chiefly to afford the means of more extensive pleasures of the senses: it is only indirectly that it operates to increase our moral and intellectual pleasures; and when unequally distributed, and in very large masses, it tends, as will be proved, to eradicate almost entirely these higher moral and intellectual pleasures.

There can be therefore no possible reason why the happiness of a smaller number of individuals should be preferred to that of a greater number. How are we to find out who this favoured smaller number shall be? the *already rich*? This circumstance might be a very good argument in leading us to direct our attention to those not yet provided with the objects of wealth or happiness; but it is surely the worst of all possible reasons why we should do again what was already done, (supply the rich with the means of more happiness or more wealth,) and neglect that which is undone, supplying those who are unsupplied, and who want those means. Of all the perversities of human selfishness distorting human reason, there is perhaps no where to be found more lamentable absurdity than is too often exhibited under this head; confounding the pursuit of security of wealth obtained by labor or voluntary transfer, with an interminable effort to add to the heap by usurpations on the right of the poor to free labor and free exchange of the products of labor. If this smaller favored number are not to be the *already rich*, who are they to be? The individuals, virtuous or vicious,

happy or miserable, actually in possession of the collective *power* of the society? If we do not name them, will they, having the power, convert it to any other distribution of wealth amongst any other favored number of individuals, the literati, the moral, or the religious? The very thought, the very statement of the question, seems absurd. If they are not convinced to use their power, as far as it can or ought to influence the distribution of wealth in preferring the happiness of the greater to the smaller number, if any exception be allowed to this rule, they will naturally make the exception in their own favor; for we are all the best, the most worthy of happiness, in our own eyes. The alternative is therefore evident and pressing. Either the general principle of impartial justice set forth in our proposition, must be adopted, or philosophy must sanction the law of brute force, the empire of the strongest: for to what number of individuals less than the majority shall we leave the decision as to those to be elected into the favored few, for whose particular enjoyment the distribution of wealth is to be fashioned? If we leave it to the majority, they will naturally determine in favor of their own happiness, and thus establish our principle. But we shall find as we proceed, that whatever really useful advantages the favorers of any smaller number may expect from their system of direct favoritism, these advantages will be attained in a more easy and effectual manner by adhering to our rule of universal justice, without producing any of the ill consequences, selfishness, jealousies, murmurs, arising from their arbitrary preferences. We shall find that in every thing the unrestrained tendencies of things, aided by knowledge, will produce more of happiness, than any artificial arrangements.

But should not the happiness of the intelligent and the moral, some will still perhaps weakly ask, be preferred, in the distribution of wealth, to the happiness of the ignorant and vicious? First, it was dissimilarity of treatment alone that made the one enlightened and the other ignorant, the one moral and the other vicious. None so ready to proclaim this truth as the intelligent and the moral. Ask them from what sources their happiness is derived: ask them how much of it proceeds directly from mere wealth, and you will be astonished at the scantiness of the proportion of their enjoyments arising from that source, beyond the supply of the average comforts of life. Will *they* wish, will they demand that the physical enjoyments of others should be deliberately sacrificed to theirs? that the distribution of wealth should be directed out of its natural channel of free labor and voluntary exchanges,

to favor them? Will *they* desire by any artificial regulations, to obtain the fruit of other men's labor without their consent, and for which there is no equivalent given?

Far from the intelligent, far from the moral, would be such a wish: if they want to obtain additional wealth, an additional supply of those means of happiness which wealth bestows, they will desire no more than that free competition, which the rest of the community do, or ought to, possess. If they want wealth and have no moral or intellectual equivalent to offer, they will devote themselves to industry, instead of wishing by fraud or rapine, open or disguised, to appropriate the products of other men's labor without their consent. The happiness of the wise and good could not be promoted by such means; they require the forced sacrifice of no man's happiness, of the happiness of no portion of their fellow-creatures, to promote theirs. Such injustice would but mar their happiness instead of increasing it. To the slave-driver they would resign the sweets extorted from the unrequited labor of the slave. The more abundant their sources of happiness independent of wealth, the more unjust would they feel it to be to wring from those who have no other sources of enjoyment, a portion of that scanty source which is left to them. They respect the happiness of all other men equally with their own. But suppose the case were the reverse; suppose that the wise and moral did, in this unwise and immoral way, require the sacrifice of the happiness of others, of the greater number, to theirs, how should we find out who were the moral and the wise? By the forming of such wishes? Who would not then put in his claim for morality and wisdom? Every individual would assert his exclusive claim. To avoid this confusion, we give—to whom?—the power of deciding who are to be the favored virtuous and wise. If to those in power, whose legislative measures regulate the distribution of wealth, will they prefer the interest of the wise and good to their own exclusive interest? Or will they not find out at once that they are the wise and good; that to themselves and their friends, as the wisest and the best, the preference should be given; if the happiness of a smaller is to be preferred to the happiness of a larger number?

Let us turn to which side we may, it will be impossible to find any rational ground for preferring the happiness of the smaller number as derived from wealth, or indeed from any other source, to the happiness of the larger number. If we took any side on this question of preference and exclusion, it would be that directly opposed to those notions which have been generally entertained and acted upon. Were there ten

persons, wise, rich, powerful, and nine unenlightened, poor, and unprotected, making nineteen in the whole ; and were the question asked in whose favor should the distribution of wealth be turned, in order to produce the greatest quantity of happiness on the whole ?—should the tendency of wealth and its enjoyments be rather directed to the greater or the smaller number, to the ten or the nine ? we should—were we forced to be unjust to one of the parties—prefer the injustice to the most destitute, though the fewest in number, and would rather direct wealth by artificial means to those whose wants were the most pressing, and who were debarred from other sources of enjoyment. If any argument for preferring the happiness of the smaller to the larger number could be listened to, it would be evidently in favor of those who are *in the most need* ; therefore even of the minority—if in the most need. This is however an impossible case : the minority of society are never in the most need : the most destitute are also the majority. They have therefore the double title, in all communities, of being the most in number, and the most in need, the most destitute of those means of happiness which wealth affords. The happiness of the greatest number must therefore be always kept in view by the moralist and legislator, without any regard to morals, manners, intellectual or other qualities. In fact, our argument does not incumber itself with the supposition of the actual existence of any inequalities of character or circumstances. We take mankind as actually constituted by nature, and as capable by similar treatment of being fashioned by circumstances ; and under these data, we ask what is best to be done in the way of the distribution of wealth ? A future stage in the inquiry will lead us to an investigation of the best mode of introducing our natural arrangement into a society laboring under the evils of forced and artificial arrangements for distributing wealth.

The happiness of the greater number is therefore to be preferred to the happiness of the lesser number, in whatever arrangements may be made respecting the distribution of wealth. We may now pass on to the next our fifth proposition ; which endeavours to show that,

SECTION 5.

Those means of enjoyment or happiness which come under the name of wealth, being produced by the application of labor and knowledge to the materials afforded by nature; sufficient stimulus in the way of motive must be afforded to put the necessary labor guided by knowledge into motion to produce this wealth.

FOR every voluntary human exertion, an adequate motive must be afforded; and the longer continued and more painful the exertion, the more remote, the slighter, and more doubtful, the advantage to be derived from the exertion, the more powerful must be the motive to produce the effect required. Man in his first wild uncivilized state, like the other animals surrounding him, is urged to exertion, almost exclusively by the feelings of hunger, and the desire of enjoying the pleasures of taste. Were it not for the immediate and painful feeling of hunger and the pleasure obtained by gratifying it, it is very doubtful whether the remote advantage of preserving life would be sufficiently appreciated by the rude human animal to rouse him to the exertion of keeping his stomach supplied with a sufficient quantity of food to preserve life. Certainly no other species of animals would preserve their existence, if depending on such distant motive to urge them to the activity requisite for its support. How should it be otherwise? What is life good for to these animals but for the pleasures of eating and drinking attendant upon it? The pleasure of sexual intercourse is only occasional; the pleasures of the eye, the ear, the smell, the touch, abstracted from their connexion and association with the pleasures of eating and drinking, are feeble and little enjoyed by them, and by no means capable of stimulating, by their immediate pressure, to any continued line of action, such as the regular acquisition of food. As to the motive presented by foresight, and operating in the shape of apprehension of the loss of these gentle pleasures, it does not appear that any animal but man is capable of regulating his conduct by such distant and extensive views. If some animals lay up food for half the year, they are urged to such exertions by the desire of continuing the pleasures of eating and drinking alone, not from any abstract wish of preserving their existence or with the view of enjoying more delicate pleasures: some think that the inferior animals act without even this motive, without any motive, by instinct, as mere machines. In man's rudest state, he so far resembles inferior animals, that

the acquisition of food to avoid the pain of want and procure the pleasures of taste and feeling, is the paramount object of his existence, forms the ruling motive of his conduct. Satisfied at first, like other animals, with seizing what nature throws in his way, of vegetable or animal nutriment, he never learns till these fail him, to domesticate, to confine, and rear, wild animals, or to imitate the processes of nature in sowing a kernel or seed with a view of reaping the grain or gathering the fruit to be produced by them. He is urged in all things by the pressure of want, or by the apprehension of future want, less frequently by the desire of pleasure. It is on the most sagacious only, that apprehensions for the future arising from experience of the past, will strongly operate: but the most sagacious will probably be the best able to supply their wants as they arise, and be independent of the necessity of providing for the future, from the frequent union of strength with sagacity. It is not then probable that the most strong, or those best able to protect the products of industry, will be the most provident, will be most inclined to lay up stores for future consumption. Were those who began to cultivate the earth, or in any other way to provide for future wants, universally the most capable of protecting the fruits the produce of their labor, they might be led to persevere in their exertions, particularly if they were able to exchange any superfluity of the products of their foresight for any other objects of desire. But here is the great obstacle to the development of exertion amongst mankind, not only in its earlier stages, but through all its subsequent struggles; the want of "*security*." No sooner has the provident matured and brought forward in state for use, for consumption, the articles of food—those being always the first objects of human foresight and industry—than they are exposed to the attacks of all around, urged by superior strength or the urgent calls of appetite. The first obstacles to the progress of industry in the acquisition of wealth are, want of adequate motives to conquer the love of ease, want of foresight, want of apprehension, want of knowledge to devise the means of producing or increasing the quantity of the articles required. When these difficulties are surmounted when knowledge has been acquired, when motives sufficiently urgent have been developed by circumstances; there remain still a condition without which all knowledge to produce, a desire of producing, must remain eternally barren and unproductive of effectual exertion—the want of *security*. Without it, exertion, continued exertion, is impossible. Even with the most assured aid, it is often almost impossible to conquer the indolence of savage man. Frequent efforts have been made

in North America by individuals and governments, on a confined and on an extensive scale, on whole tribes and on a few selected from the mass of uncivilized men, to induce them to change their habits of indolence for industrious habits; but almost uniformly without success. Not only has perfect security been afforded them by the aid of protection, superior to their own, from external violence; not only has the whole of the produce of their labor been afforded to them, but implements and facilities of exertion have been gratuitously supplied, so as to enable them to reap much more than the fruits of their industry in the production of articles of comfort and convenience. Here knowledge is supplied without the intellectual labor of reasoning and invention, to uncivilized man; here motives are assiduously sought after and presented to his mind; here an addition is made to the natural products of his industrious exertions, and full security is afforded for the peaceful enjoyment of them. Yet has it been found an infinitely quicker and more advantageous process to people whole provinces, and tracts of the magnitude to nourish nations, by increase from the neighbouring mass of civilization, than to persevere in the hopeless effort of inducing man brought up in the state of wildness and idleness, to turn to habits of industry. Whether it is possible by other means of persuasion and new combinations of industrious exertion to overcome these difficulties, is a question which it is not necessary here to discuss*.

It must be observed however, that as it is the impulse of want, of necessity, backed and supported by the desire of pleasurable sensations from the supply of food, which prompts the exertions of the savage, in his wild state, even to support his existence; so is it the same impulse of want, of necessity, aided by habits acquired in early life, which prompts the exertions of the productive laborers of civilized communities. The savage must hunt for his animal or vegetable repast, or starve; the civilized laborer must ply his tools, and pursue his industry, or he must starve also. If the uncivilized man is asked to adopt the slow-producing labors of civilization, he has always an alternative, the old hazardous chase, or the new persevering and slowly but certainly-rewarded toil. But to the civilized laborer, no such alternative is presented. To him the wilds of nature are open to allure him to liberty and risk, to exertion and repose. He must persevere in industry, or

* See Mr. Hunter's interesting memoirs of his captivity from childhood nineteen, amongst the North American Indians. Mr. H., it is said, is about to try an experiment of civilization amongst his Indian friends on the banks of the Mississippi.

perish; necessity compels him to labor in order to live. Annihilate the neighbouring woodlands or immeasured plains of the savage, and he too, like the civilized laborer, must work or starve. But, from want of acquired habits of industry, his exertions will be grudged, and will be limited to the rudest supply of physical wants. Knowledge, motives to labor from seeing the good effects it produces around him, secure enjoyment of what his labor produces, all these favorable circumstances are insufficient to make the savage industrious. Yet the civilized man is industrious under apparently similar circumstances; similar certainly as far as mere wealth is concerned. We must look then beyond mere wealth into the intellectual constitution of man. In what do these two supposed sets of laborers, the civilized and uncivilized, now differ? In the different *habits* which each of them has acquired in early life. The wants and circumstances of the savage, have impressed upon him the habit of occasional violent exertion, of long rest, of freedom from restraint, and have in a great measure absolved him from the necessity of so regulating his conduct as to avoid the ill-will and ill-offices of those around him: with social morality, springing out of the relations of men to and dependencies upon each other, he is little acquainted. Circumstances of a very different nature surrounding from his birth the civilized man, he acquires the habit of gentle and continued labor, of short repose, of skill in handling certain tools, of using and therefore wanting certain small gratifications, and of shaping his conduct to the restraints of established laws, established customs, or established force, and consulting the passions and interests of those around him. Such being the difference of character, of inclination, of the two individuals or classes of men, the savage and the civilized, when both are newly-placed, as we have described, under exactly similar external circumstances; let us further inquire how these different habits have been generated, and how they must be altered or amended. Habits are generated by false or true associations, by false or true views of interest. Habit is the constant repetition of the same act or series of actions; but for doing the first act or for repeating it there must be some reason, some inducement, some motive, dread of pain or desire of pleasure. In savage life the motive to exertion is urgent, is direct, the immediate necessity by direct means of appropriating food from the common storehouse of nature. The call is seldom made, but when made cannot be resisted. Hunger and thirst provided for, the call for labor ceases, and indolence reigns. There is no reason to fear but that the habit of yielding to this energetic call will always remain in

full force in the mind of the savage. The reason of the habit is true, energetic, and always present. Having been accustomed to obey such obvious and direct motives alone, he will not yield to such as are less energetic. He feels not the want, because he has never enjoyed the pleasure, of the objects which superfluous toil is to produce: he therefore despises the want, and the labor employed to produce it. The drilling, the habit of the civilized man, of the productive laborer of civilized life, will lead *him* to be operated upon by motives more distant than those necessary to impel the savage to action. But has the habit of persevering industry ever been taught, can it ever be taught on a national and general scale with any energy or success, if those who teach the habit, who set the example, do not themselves feel the benefit of the habits, which they diffuse? 'Tis vain to say that they too, the teachers, may have been brought up mechanically to the habit without further motive assigned than the dread of authority. While childhood or even youth and authority last, such motives may operate; but they will but feebly survive the withdrawing at maturity of this forced and unsatisfactory stimulus. Habit will not supersede the necessity of adequate stimulus, in the shape of rational motive to exertion in the production of wealth. It will merely facilitate, it will clear the way, it will open a theatre for the exhibition and development of motives, which without the acquired habit of industry would produce no effect whatever. Industrious habits render men accessible to the motives for production. Without these habits of activity, without the previous conquering of the love of indolence, men are not accessible to any motives but those of immediate want. The habit of exertion therefore, however developed, whether mechanically, rationally, or from a union of both reason and authority, will produce nothing without motive: it resembles the magnificent lamp, provided with burners overflowing with oil, and aided by surrounding polished and reflecting surfaces: without a constant supply of vital air, it gives neither light nor heat, nor is the beauty of its construction visible. Motives of interest are the vital air to those whose industrious habits are formed: a constant supply of these is eternally necessary to keep up the production of wealth, to diffuse its vivifying effects through society. A review of the state or progress of all nations, whether industrious or indolent, will prove that industry has every where prevailed exactly in proportion to the motives held out in the form of rewards of industry, enjoying the product of its labor.

It would not be necessary to dwell so much on these simple truths, were it not that, from the habit which almost all of us

have acquired of surveying the immense machinery of production constantly in motion, we are apt to think that there is some internal sufficient cause for its eternal continuance, like the eternal revolutions of the planets; and never inquire for those all-pervading agents, the rational motives, that support these voluntary actions in never-ending exertion. By neglecting these, and by looking on production as a mechanical effect, instead of being the result of the voluntary action of intelligent agents, the springs of industry have been undermined, and habits of happy exertion have been palsied and annihilated. "Labor conquers all things, but without gain industry languishes"—is destroyed.

In many parts of the world at this moment, and in almost every country at some period of its history, an expedient has been adopted of setting the wheel of industry in motion, without the aid of any voluntary motives. Force has been substituted for voluntary motive, and the dread of pain, compulsion, have been made to produce the stunted imitations of healthful voluntary exertion. In an economical point of view, this labor has been proved to be the most expensive. In a moral point of view, it abstracts from the mass of human happiness. If there be any truth in the principles here laid down, no proof of the comparative cheapness of production by compulsory labor, no proof of the impossibility of procuring any desired portion of wealth without such labor, would suffice for a moment to justify its introduction or continuance. The simple question of justice to be asked is—"Is the sum total of human happiness, including that of the slaves as well as of their masters, lessened or increased by substituting compulsory for voluntary labor?" To ask such a question is absurd, because, if compulsory labor produced more happiness, there would be no need of using compulsion, it would become voluntary. Wherever slavery is established, however, the greater number are the slaves; for were it otherwise, the forced labor of a wretched minority could hardly raise the necessary supplies to keep an idle majority in existence; not to speak of affording them comforts. Be the slaves the majority or the minority, the sum total of happiness is diminished, were it even by the existence of a single slave; his happiness is diminished, and that of the rest of the society is not increased, but cankered by the example of permitted injustice.

All motives arising from terror being then excluded, and man being to be operated upon as a voluntary agent, sufficient stimulus must be applied in the shape of *voluntary motive*, to induce him to continue the exercise of those habits of industry, which in civilized life he must more or less have formed. It

is evident that in proportion as these motives are of extensive range and cheering operation, their effect on the laborer will be proportionably increased, and the produce of his labor and his own happiness will be augmented.

A distinction, very important but often overlooked, must be here made. It would be quite superfluous to hunt for motives to induce men to desire and aim at the appropriation and enjoyment of the materials of wealth after they are produced. To appropriate and to enjoy without the labor of producing, is too much the wish of mankind, and requires not a spur but a *curb*. The motives to appropriation and enjoyment, the constitution of man abundantly supplies, without any need of external aid or arrangement of any sort; the only difficulty is to supply motives for *production*. As soon as these motives are supplied and production is accomplished, our work as to the supplying of motives is done. Nature supplies such energetic desires and efforts for the use of what labor has added to rude materials, that the course to be pursued by the legislator and philosopher becomes altogether changed. He must take heed that the motives to appropriate, to consume, or accumulate, do not interfere with those which are necessary for continued production, the great and paramount object to be aimed at. Any mode of distribution unfriendly to continued and increased production, is like a child gnawing the entrails of the parent that produced it. The great object is to supply sufficient voluntary motives for *production*. Where is this sufficient stimulus to be found? Our next proposition undertakes to solve this question.

SECTION VI.

The strongest stimulus to production (and that which is necessary to the greatest production) that the nature of things will permit, is 'security' in the ENTIRE USE of the products of labor, to those who produce them.

WE have already seen, that no extent of knowledge on the part of the productive laborers, no profusion of motives tempting them to exertion, not even the acquisition of industrious habits, will induce them to persevere in the continued production of wealth, if they are not by some means protected, whether by their own strength or by co-operation, in the *use* of what their labor has produced. To continue voluntary

labor, uncompelled, for the benefit of others, would be a proof of insanity; and has in fact, on a national scale, never occurred. It is a moral impossibility. In order to *continue* voluntary production at all—for it may be begun without reflection or by the way of experiment—the producer must derive the expected benefit from the thing produced. But this general principle admitted in words, has been pertinaciously opposed in practice. The constant effort of what has been called society, has been to deceive and induce, to terrify and compel, the productive laborer to work for the *smallest possible portion* of the produce of his own labor. The object of those who instituted and maintained such a state of things, was altogether different from the simple object which is here put forward as the only just end of legislation, of morals, or of the association of men, *the production of the greatest possible quantity of human happiness*. Such men, possessing mostly the wealth and the ruling powers of society, have uniformly established their subordinate objects as ultimate ends of pursuit; such as the support and continuance of their order, the continuance of the system of rule, whatever it might be, which they had introduced; the continuance, at all events, and increase of their own superiority in wealth, power, and happiness. Now, to promote different objects, different means must be used. It were childish to expect results from a set of measures favorable to *one* object, which were instituted with a view to *opposite* results: except by way of ignorance or accident, no such consequence can follow. The only candid way of reasoning on the first principles of economy and legislation, is, to avow explicitly our ultimate object. The ultimate object of political economy has been to increase the absolute mass of accumulated wealth in society, leaving it to moralists and politicians to divide the yearly produce and the permanent accumulation in whatever proportions their mysterious wisdom might think fit; satisfied with the achievement of increasing the wealth (the productive powers of the labor) of the society, and confident that comfort and happiness must, somehow or other, or somewhere or other, be the necessary consequence of increased and increasing wealth. The rich and the powerful, with eye intent on the direction of this wealth, when produced to their own use, were altogether soothed and pleased with speculations developing the easiest means of multiplying all the objects that could minister to their delights; and they fancied themselves, from their adventitious command over these means of enjoyment, the dispensers of food, clothing, and habitation to the productive classes. “Enough must be left with the laborers,” say the rich, “to make them *work*.” All

beyond this was so much lost to themselves; nay, worse, tended to make the working classes discontented, insolent. With such ultimate objects in view, the absolute quantity of wealth to be produced was only a secondary object, and held no importance, except as ministerial to the most abundant supply of their own means of enjoyment. It is necessary then candidly and explicitly to avow, that we hold all such objects as the *mere* production and accumulation of wealth, to be childish; all such preferences of the happiness of one class of human beings over that of another, to be absurd, cruel, unjust; that no regulation, no institution, ought to stand in the way of, ought to be one moment substituted for, our principle of the greatest happiness; that we accept of no parley, no compromise with any other interest; that our principle must reign uncontrouled, and suffer no divided empire. The question, then, comes simply to this:

The object being to promote the greatest sum of happiness to the productive classes—for even the increase of wealth, if it were not accompanied with an increase of happiness, would cease to be an object of rational desire—will these productive classes be more happy (all other circumstances, climate, institutions, morals, manners, &c. being equal) in the use of a *part* or of the *whole* of what their labor has produced? It will be demonstrated elsewhere, that the happiness of the majority of the productive classes, instead of being opposed to the happiness of the whole community, is intimately connected with it: that they are necessary to each others' well-being; and that the welfare of the majority includes and necessitates the happiness of the whole. In truth, the productive classes must always, in every society deserving the name, form an immense majority of the whole of the community. Were the nature of things otherwise, were these interests of the many and the few irreconcilable, our position is still unalterably true. The less must yield to the greater, if *they are incompatible with each other*. If more and higher animal enjoyment be derivable from a given tract of fruitful country, if peopled by civilized men, than if peopled by carnivorous animals, the inferior animals should, with as little suffering to them as possible, be compelled to give way. Even so in a community of civilized men, if real interests—which seldom happens—are incompatible, the lesser must yield, with such compensation, as always to preserve the greatest possible sum of happiness on the whole.

Well then, the question thus simplified, “Are the productive classes, are the laborers likely to produce more and to be happier by that portion of security which guaranties to them the free disposal of the whole of what they produce, or of any

smaller quantity?" The habit or facility of exertion being acquired, a specific object is required to set labor in motion. Neither rude nor civilized engage in voluntary laborious exertion for the mere sake of the pleasure of the exertion, but for some advantage, some means of pleasure beyond, to be derived from it. The greater the advantage, the more productive the means of pleasure, the more likely is it that the exertion will ensue; the less the advantage, the less probable the exertion. The uncivilized can be stimulated with nothing less than the desire of the immediate gratification of energetic appetites or passions. The civilized has formed numerous smaller, gentler wants, which are sufficient to put his productive powers into motion. Will both of these, the uncivilized and the civilized, lavish the most exertion where they obtain and enjoy the *whole* of what that exertion produces?

Suppose a thousand individuals, healthy, willing to work, with acquired habits of industry in different departments, associated together for mutual support on the system of mutual co-operation and economy by all the aids of science, applied by art to useful purposes. Suppose them without tools, without a supply of clothes or food, till their labor could be made productive, without land to till, without materials to work upon. It is evident that these one thousand individuals are in many respects in a much more unfavorable situation for production than one thousand savages associating amidst the wilds of nature—were such a phenomenon possible, even in the neighbourhood of civilized man—for a similar purpose. The civilized colony resembles the savage in being destitute of any supply of clothes, but the immediate covering on their bodies; they resemble each other in being destitute of tools; they resemble each other in being destitute of a supply of food, till their labor can produce it: but in other respects the difference is extreme. The savage has all the materials of nature, unused around him, to work up. Are there minerals, plants, or animals within his reach, affording the materials for clothing, food, for tools, shelter, or other conveniences? he has only to put out his hand and gather them, and transform them by labor into consumable or exchangeable wealth. Does he want land teeming with the powers of reproduction and inviting his arm to co-operate with and direct the sleeping energies of nature? He is bewildered in the choice of rich land, claiming no owner, and ready to reward abundantly with its fruits and permanent possession the industry that will occupy and give it a value. How opposite, in these respects, the colony of civilized men, in a civilized community! Against *them*, all the materials to work

upon are appropriated by the previous labor, force, or fraud, of some of their compatriots, not a piece of stone containing any iron or any useful metal, not a branch of a tree, not a skin of any animal, no rude material that can be turned to any use for food, clothes, or covering, or any purpose subservient to convenience, that is not already obedient to an owner. Nature yields the civilized colony nothing in the way of rude materials. And as to land to work upon, which presents itself every where to the savage settlers, where shall the civilized colony find it? Even the very mountain, bristling with rocks and repelling the tools and the toils of cultivation, is fenced round by the claims of ownership. Not a foot of land can the civilized colony procure to work upon without giving a full equivalent, according to the market value of the land. What equivalent have they to give for the land, any more than for the materials? Nothing but their labor. The land itself to work upon, the materials the basis of furniture and clothing, as well as the tools to work with, must, as a preliminary step, be *purchased* by labor. To counterbalance these two fearful advantages of the savage colony,—unappropriated supply of land and rude materials,—what has the civilized to boast of? Nothing but the acquired habit of labor, the skill of hand and limb in the operations of agriculture and manufactures.

Behold then our colony of a thousand, men, women, and children, without stock of clothes or food, seeking for a settlement where every thing for which any object of desire that can be had in exchange, as well as land to work upon and materials to work with, is eagerly appropriated and guarded. Behold them provided with nothing but habits of industry and skill. What shall we say? Can mere industry and skill surmount these giant bars to happiness, to existence? How shall we stimulate this helpless colony into exertion sufficiently energetic to conquer so many obstacles, and to raise themselves into the enjoyment of the comforts of existence? By giving them security in the *entire use*, the free disposal of whatever their labor can procure, shall we accomplish this desirable object? or by giving them *any thing less* than the entire? Assuredly the question is preposterous. Assuredly the difficulty is, how without removing some of these obstacles, how without some additional encouragement, to put the labor of such a colony into productive motion. The difficulty assuredly is, how without compulsion—the compulsion of want superseding that of force—to make such a colony labor at all, further than necessary to existence; the prospect of acquired comfort out of the produce of labor being so remote.

To accommodate matters to this striving colony, the owner of the land comes forward and says that he will not insist on an equivalent in labor for the *purchase* of his land; but he will be satisfied with disposing of the *yearly use* of his land, getting in return every year so much labor, measured by its products, so much of the increase of the soil, as may be deemed an equivalent. The colony then undertakes to give the produce, every year, of a portion of its labor applied to the soil, in the way of *rent* for the use of the soil and its productive powers. The owners of the rude materials for manufactures make a similar claim on the labor of the colony for the use of the materials with which to work up the clothing and other comforts of the colony; the productive laborers yielding a portion of the value of the articles they make to the suppliers of the materials, which portion constitutes their *profit*. Sometimes even the owner of the tools to work with, if they be very complicated and costly in their structure or require permanent fixtures or buildings, make a similar demand on the unprovided laborers; and even those that possess the food that the laborers must consume until the produce of this labor is in a state for consumption or exchange, demand a profit, a portion of the return of the labor, for their aid, with repayment of the whole of the food advanced.

Will any one ask, Why should the laborer be burthened with payment of a part of his labor for the entire cost or the use of the tools, clothes, food, materials, or land, with or upon which he works? Why not give him the *whole absolute produce* of his labor without any of these deductions? Because other people who have appropriated this land, these materials, by labor or voluntary exchanges, who have made these tools or clothes, who have co-operated with nature in the production of this food, require the same stimulus to continue their productive industry, require the same "security," in the entire use of what their labor has produced, that is demanded for the unprovided laborer. We must not rob one producer to encourage another. Security in the entire use must be administered impartially to all. By violating the security of another, the productive laborer annihilates with his own hand his own claim to security, not only in the entire use, but in any use of what his labor has created. *No exchanges but such as are voluntary, no possessions but such as industry has acquired*, are reconcileable with impartial security. As to the *amount* of compensation claimed by capitalists, that will be considered hereafter.

Now with all these deductions to be made from the produce of the labor of the colony; with a deduction every year for

the yearly use of the land, with a deduction for the use of the materials of manufacture, with a deduction for the use of tools and machinery, and with an additional deduction to be made for the advance of food; will the productive labor of the colony yield such a surplus as to afford more than sufficient stimulus to set the colony to work for the sake of such a remuneration? Even under such terms, the pressure of extreme want—for they must work or starve—it may be said, will *compel* them to work. Yes, truly. But is this the strongest stimulus, the highest reward that the nature of things will permit? Is this giving to productive laborers the *entire use* of the whole of the produce of their labor? Can political economy devise no further expedient, no additional encouragement to cheer, to reward, the labors of such men? In the way of wealth, and on a scale of such extent as to produce any thing like national utility, political economy can do no more than this; and this is giving the laborer security in the entire use of the produce of his labor.

But, be it always recollected, this is exactly the situation of every unprovided laborer in every civilized community.

Still it will be objected, “May not *bounties* be given; may not rewards, honorary or otherwise, be held out; may not contributions, subscriptions, be raised, to buy for, and present to, the colony, the land out of which they must raise their food, the materials out of which they must manufacture their clothes, furniture, or other conveniences, the machinery and tools with which they may work, or at all events the supply of food to keep them alive till they have provided food of their own? None of these things will be done on a large scale, because capitalists will not risk their capital without being assured of the ordinary profit. And for the payment of this profit, not to speak of the risk of their capitals, they will hardly be satisfied with the guarantee of such a community. It is evident that *voluntary transfers* could never be expected on a large scale. To *force* wealth, obtained by productive labor and voluntary exchange, from those who have produced it, in order to encourage others to productive labor and voluntary exchange, is evidently undoing with the one hand what the other is aiming to accomplish. As to bounties or honors, in a case of tremendous exigency like this, they would not be thought of. They may *misdirect* labor: the question here is to *produce* it.

If the application of force, then, to excite productive labor must be discarded; if no presents of land, materials, food, or tools, can be expected; if the mere pressure of absolute want will produce no cheerful exertion at all, or if such exertion will relax as soon as such pressure is removed; if no boun-

ties or honors will avail; if no other way can be devised for making the laborer work with alacrity for less than security in the entire use of the products of his labor; may we not try, whether the drilling of superstition through the associations of early education, will not lead him to work as a matter of duty for less than the entire use, and whether these associations would not be a more energetic and productive principle of action?

The whole history of the exertions of human industry has belied this hope. If superstition could stunt the growth of the faculties as directed to one subject or one line of thought or exertion alone, without weakening the faculties themselves; if men could be kept children in *one* matter, and that the most important of their lives, without being spiritless, uninventive, and unproductive in *every other* matter; then might such a scheme succeed. But such is not the constitution of our nature. Gross deception destroys that curiosity, that elasticity of mind, which is requisite for vigorous exertion. And, after all, when it has made man an unthinking automaton, will it feed and clothe him? will it supersede the necessity of presenting substantial motives to excite his feeble powers? or will it only make him stupidly inaccessible to all impulses of reason and his own interest? The unfailing effect of such schemes has been to render men stupid or ferocious, but always passive, slaves, producing almost nothing for their own comfort or that of their masters.

If superstition, or *false* or *pretended* knowledge, can give no new stimulus, no stimulus at all, but is an absolute drawback on industry, *real* knowledge will wonderfully strengthen and accelerate its efforts, will afford free scope for the operation of all tutelary motives, will show the benefits of moral habits, will explore modes of improvement and economy, will appreciate the blessings of just institutions and equal laws, and produce the full development of human capabilities. Hereafter, under another head, we shall have to enlarge on this topic. Enough to say here, that knowledge can never act as a *substitute* for the stimulus of the entire use of the products of labor. On the contrary, it would make this entire use the first condition of productive industry; but, with this condition, it would indefinitely increase its powers.

The state of a savage colony of 1,000 laborers has been compared with that of a colony of an equal number of civilized men, and their respective peculiarities pointed out. There is however a third stage of colonization, such as might occur on the rich and now-peopling lands in the western parts of the United States of North America. *There* a great many of the inconveniences of both the savage and the civilized

colony would be avoided. One thousand industrious poor men, emerging from the bosom of civilization and settling there, would have land free or nearly so, would find all the rude materials around them unappropriated, and would require nothing but a supply of tools, food, and clothing, till they could make their labor productive. The tools required for the land are the least expensive of machinery; the chase, fish, and wild fruits, would assist the supply of food and clothing; and of this last the most simple might satisfy, for a time, the laborer. Such a colony would have the habits of industry of the civilized, with the wide command of nature of the savage. But even here, what stronger stimulus can be afforded to impel the colony to the greatest exertion, than security in the entire use of what their labor produces? In no state of things can any stronger stimulus be devised; nor can any other stimulus be resorted to or even imagined, as capable of being used as a substitute for it. This is the reward which the American settler receives; it is through this stimulus alone he has been urged to those creations which have converted wildernesses, in a few years, into busy nations. This has been the only and the sufficient stimulus, and this has been applied to its fullest extent and on its grandest scale. No stimulus so strong has ever in any part of the world, on a national scale, been successfully applied.

But, in addition to the obstructions to the development of industry, which nature or the progress of cultivation throws in the way of the savage, or the civilized, man, or of the American settler, there are other obstructions of an appalling nature, and to an indefinite extent, which have been foolishly, or wantonly, or cruelly thrown in the way of the productive laborer. Those who neither supplied him with land, nor materials, nor tools, nor food, (however unreasonable their demands for the use of such materials,) have pressed round him and demanded a share in the produce of his labor. The *entire use*—these deductions made—of the produce of his labor has not been left with him: he has been permitted to enjoy *security* in the use of no definite part of it. Those who had no visible or tangible equivalent in the way of the exchange of wealth to bestow, have seized on parts of the produce of his labor. His consent has not been asked to sanction the transfer. No equivalent, by the laborer deemed satisfactory, whether of a physical or intellectual nature, has been afforded him. We do not ask, for the present, whether such spoliations, whether such violations of the principles of *security*, are just, whether they may or may not be supported by reasons of a higher order and altogether superior to the

production of wealth. Our object is now simply to inquire whether such forced deductions, over and above those which are necessary and voluntary, or which nature imposes, do or do not tend to weaken this strongest stimulus to the production of wealth. As the stimulus to production would be increased (all other things, knowledge, moral habits, &c. being equal) by removing any of the necessary obstacles, so would it be evidently diminished by adding arbitrary obstacles of any sort to those which are inevitable. Under no circumstances in the world has labor on a grand scale been so free and secure in the entire use of its products as in the United States of America; and no where has it been so productive. In proportion as the reward of productive labor has departed from this maximum, have the efforts of industry been relaxed; till at length, at their extreme point of apathy, from want of voluntary stimulus, brutal force has been used to extort, by means of terror, a reluctant produce from the arms of wretchedness. All history proclaims this truth; and it might be illustrated from thousands of pages. The same reason that would justify the *taking away* one portion of the produce of labor *without the laborer's consent*—which is the golden and universal check that we are in search of—would justify the taking away any other portion; till in the end, no stimulus being left, no possible exertion, no production but in obedience to physical want or compulsion, would ensue. The principle of *security* is equally violated in the taking away of the first as of the last portion. On what principle can any person but the producer lay claim to any portion of what another man's industry has produced? On the same principle can another lay claim to another portion; and so on without end. Admit one step, one inroad, and you can secure nothing.

Will it still be said that security to the laborer of the *entire use* of the produce of his labor would make him immoral, and thus prove useless to him? The question now before us is not as to the effects of the entire use on *morality*, but on *production*. Morality or immorality depends on other circumstances, though on none more essentially than on the proportion of the fruit of labor enjoyed by the producer. Moral or immoral, under any given circumstances, the quantity of production will depend on the stimulus to production: and the strongest stimulus is necessarily security in the entire use of the products of labor. Let these different stimuli, the entire use or the partial use, operate on any two colonies of laborers, the one moral, and the other immoral, and we shall find that in both cases, whatever may be the *absolute* superiority of production and enjoyment on the part of the moral over the immoral, a

similar relaxation of industry, though differing in degree, will be produced on both the moral and the immoral, by lessening their security in the enjoyment of the whole produce of their labor. Other opportunities will occur of demonstrating the fallacy of the apprehension that the highest possible remuneration that free labor can produce, has any natural or necessary tendency to produce vice. On the contrary, it will be shown that it tends equally to elicit the greatest quantity of morality, as well as of production. It is hoped, then, that all difficulties have been removed, in the way of admitting that, "the strongest stimulus to production that the nature of things will permit, is *security* in the *entire use* of the products of labor to those who produce them."

How far the claims of capitalists injuriously abstract from this entire use, will be inquired into hereafter.

SECTION 7.

All VOLUNTARY exchanges of the articles of wealth, implying a preference, on both sides, of the thing received to the thing given, tend to the increase of happiness from wealth, and thence to increase the motives to its production.

WITHOUT exchanges there can be no industry, no continued production of wealth. Labor without exchanges would be nearly as useless as exchanges without labor, as no one man can produce all the articles necessary to his own well-being. Suppose again a colony of 1000 laborers or a thousand individuals, including the usual proportion of women and children. The whole of these must not only be fed, but clad, and provided with dwellings, furniture, and other conveniences. By what process shall all these numerous wants be supplied? Shall every individual endeavour to supply all his wants himself, make his own tools, build his own house, till the ground for his own food, search out the materials for his own clothing and furniture, and manufacture them himself? But if every *man* should provide all his own wants, why should not every *woman* provide also hers? Why should not she also, till, build, manufacture clothes, food, tools, &c. for her own use? Because, not having as much strength as man, and a great portion of the time of her most vigorous years being devoted to the rearing of successive children; not only would she not have *time* to accomplish *all* these objects; but what

she attempted would be inefficiently performed. *Convenience* would require that the woman should occupy herself with that species of labor, useful to herself and her companion, and their offspring, in which her peculiar organization, and thence-resulting powers, would be the most productive. This reason is so very striking, that none but the most brutal and stupid of savages have been uninfluenced by it. In a few cases in savage life, the men have made the women carry burthens, work in the fields, as well as mind the house; rewarding them with compulsion and blows, making them complete slaves; as amongst some tribes in North America. The *object* of these savages however was not to increase production, but to gratify their own love of ease, of idleness, and domination. *Our* object being different, different means must be used to attain it. Now the very same convenience with respect to the increase of production, and thence of enjoyment, which would lead the man and the woman of one hut into different species of labor, would lead different men of the same community into different modes of production, or rather into the production of different articles. If all were to work at all trades, all would have to learn all trades. Evidently as much skill could not be learned in all trades as in one or a few. Here is then a *loss of skill* by the effort of every man to produce every article of his wants for himself. Then comes a second inconvenience of *loss of time* in turning from one operation to another; not only the time lost of putting up one set of tools and materials and getting out another, of loco-motion from place to place, but the chance of abstraction of mind or interruption from without, during the passage from one employment to another. But this is not all: one man may live in the neighbourhood of water or wood, and thence may find it more easy to catch the fish or make the tools, the materials for which are at hand. Again, some operations require the strength of many, others such expedition as only many hands can supply, both in agricultural and manufacturing operations. If such operations are undertaken by solitary individuals, it must be at a great disadvantage, one laborer unassisted not producing perhaps the 100th part instead of the 5th part of what five co-operating could produce. Moreover, some men are of weakly constitutions from defect of organization, disease, or accident, or may have acquired a particular delight and skill in a particular line of labor. The weak or the skilful may produce double the value of useful things in that line of labor for which they are adapted. Their time therefore would be comparatively lost in any other occupations. Another obstacle superior to all these together comes in the way. There is scarcely a spot on

the globe capable of feeding the smallest community, say ours of 1000 individuals, that contains within its own bounds all the rude materials of clothes, tools, &c. necessary for the comfortable existence of its population. To go no further, let us instance iron. What tool so simple as not to require prepared iron for its fabrication? but how few comparatively are the spots on the globe where this metal abounds; and how totally destitute of agricultural and other facilities are almost always the spots on which, or beneath which, the ore of this most useful metal is to be procured! If then all members of every community, or of any colony, made themselves, individually, all articles to supply their respective wants; all their productions would be wretchedly deficient in quality, in quantity, and many of the most useful articles for production or consumption must be entirely dispensed with. Still other evils assail the scheme of solitary unaided exertion. Can the *independent* supplier of his own wants predict exactly the capacity of his stomach or his family's stomach, or even the number of that family for the year? if he could, can he also foretell the produce of the soil and the accidents of the seasons? Is he sure therefore that his best-regulated exertions will procure him exactly enough of food to supply his yearly wants? and that no useless surplus will be produced? Will the leather for shoes, thongs, and other uses, always require a whole hide neither more nor less, the chairs or table always require a whole tree neither more nor less, the coat require exactly a whole fleece? and so on of all other rude materials. If there be a deficiency or superfluity of food, clothing, or other manufactured articles, what is to be done with this superfluity? how is this deficiency to be supplied? Is the superfluity to be turned to no account, to be an absolute loss? Is the deficiency to be submitted to with its train of privations, famine, sickness, and perhaps death? Where is the remedy to be found? In *voluntary exchanges*: so simple, so efficacious. Without the use of exchanges, the application of labor to the appropriation or modelling for use, the productions of nature, would be comparatively barren and inoperative in increasing wealth and the pleasures derivable from it. Exchanges therefore are as necessary to useful, to enlarged, production, as labor is.

We have in truth presumed far beyond the nature of things, far beyond the experience of any community however small, in supposing that individual exertion for the exclusive use of its separate members, could procure for the laborers a comfortable subsistence. Co-operation of labor on some occasions, division of labor on other occasions, are necessary to ensure any thing worthy the name of production. Over-pro-

duction and under-production from natural or accidental causes, where no exchanges took place, would be so frequent and so discouraging, that all stimulus to labor, so uncertain and unsatisfactory in its results, would be taken away. No skill in any thing could be acquired: no one object of necessity or convenience could be good in its kind. The herculean effort to produce *every thing* by solitary effort, would be relinquished by the individual or the individual family, as soon as undertaken; and nothing but what the necessity of existence demanded, would be ultimately produced. And the fact is, that mankind have nowhere been discovered in such a state of barbarism, except perhaps the savages on some spots of Austral-Asia, as not to have added to individual labor the practice of exchanging their mutual superfluities. Inferior animals labor, and some of them have partial foresight and accumulate against future want. But their intellectual capacity, their cerebral organization, is so deficient, that they have never conceived the use of *exchanges*: hence the effects of their labors, even of the most intellectual, have been merely to keep up a supply of food to satisfy the most pressing and universal want of hunger, but seldom have they proceeded so far as to prepare habitations. The simplest food and the simplest dwelling necessary to support life—what are they in comparison to the endless wants and enjoyments of civilized men? It does not appear indeed that the savages of New Holland, unacquainted with the benefits of exchanges, attained to the improvements of many, winged, four-legged, or four-handed, animals. Their life was an eternal contest with surrounding things, their own species sometimes included, to seize and devour whatever they could master, to allay the feelings of hunger as they arose; at one period over-gorged, at another almost famished.

Not only then in order to make labor productive to any extent, but in order to set the human arm to work at all, in order to raise man from the most degraded state of savage wretchedness, the utility of exchanges must be discovered, and exchanges must be practised. Take away the faculty of exchanging, and you annihilate the motives to labor. Give life to the principle of exchanges, and no solitary exertion of labor is lost. What is useless to the individual producer or even to those around him, brought into the common stock, will find some person with whom it is an object of desire, and who will give for it some equivalent in exchange.

We are thus led to the *moral* effects of exchanges. Useful as they are in an economical point of view, indispensable as they are to the production of wealth and the physical comforts

in its train, they are no less indispensable for the evolution of morality, of beneficence. Shall we picture to ourselves what man would be, what an isolated family of the human race would be, if working for itself alone, and deprived of the resources and benefits of exchanges? Nothing to give to, nothing to receive from, any other individual, no co-operation implying mutual exchanges of labor, man is an object of apprehension, of distrust to his fellow-creature. Has the more intelligent, the more industrious labored? has he accumulated? Is the idle, the improvident, the ferocious in want? His cunning lies in wait to purloin, his strength is ready to seize, whatever appetite or caprice may demand. The art, the wisdom of equivalents, of exchanges, he has never learned: force and cunning are his only arms, want his only and all-sufficient plea. The industrious lives in a state of eternal alarm: he has worked for himself alone; too happy if his unaided exertions have produced the means of supplying his own immediate and simplest wants, nothing is to be spared for the gratification of rapine. What kindly feeling can spring up in the human mind under such circumstances? Necessity, the necessity of existence, forces every thought home on self. The feelings, the interests of others, are always seen in opposition to our own. The association of the happiness of another co-existing, conjoined with, and dependant on, our happiness, cannot be formed; because that state of things does not exist in which this union of feelings and pleasures can arise. Instead of benevolent feelings, those of an entirely opposite nature must, under such circumstances, be engendered. Envy and rapine on the one side; alarm, suspicion and hatred on the other. Such a state of things as individual labor without exchanges, would be a school of vice. But, change the scene: let the utility of mutual exchanges be once understood; let their mutual blessings be felt in practice, and what was lately a theatre of rapine, a school of vice, becomes a nursery of social virtue. Man being, in common with all other animals, essentially a sentient being, it is impossible that any line of action should be followed by him which did not tend in his opinion, directly or indirectly, immediately or remotely, to his well-being. Tell him to be virtuous, to be beneficent, to promote the happiness of his fellow-creatures; you must show him it is his *interest* to be so. Tell him to be virtuous, and surround him with such circumstances as make the virtues you recommend contrary to his *apparent* interest; his conduct will unhesitatingly follow in the line of what seems to him his interest, and all exhortations in opposition thereto, will be unheeded and inoperative. Improve his powers of comparing and judging,

teach him to observe the *consequences* of his own actions as well as those of others, as well as their immediate effects, teach him foresight; and then, surrounded by favorable external circumstances, all the virtues will necessarily spring up. Let any other animal, without the cerebral organization and capacity of mental development that man possesses, be placed in circumstances the most favorable for the acquisition of sympathy and the practice of benevolence, that animal will never acquire such habits, because it is not capable of forming those associations, of exercising that judgment and foresight which are necessary to make it perceive that sympathy and beneficence are indispensable to its own well-being. What does the simple introduction of *exchanges* tell to man, capable of appreciating the truth? He sees that in the numerous ways pointed out, the co-operation of his fellow-creatures with him, and of him with them, is necessary to their mutual happiness: he becomes *interested* in the success of their *joint* labors; he feels a sympathy in their exertions: his feelings are carried out of himself in this first and simplest exchange of labor. When he finds that he has produced more of any article than is necessary for the supply of his own immediate wants till new exertions can procure a new supply; when he finds another person possessing an article which he wants, but which is to his neighbour a superfluity, and when in consequence he makes an exchange, giving superfluity for superfluity, receiving an object of desire for an object of desire; here again mutual satisfaction is produced, mutual sympathy is excited, pleasure is felt at the same time, from the same cause, by both, and thus a pleasurable *association* is formed, and the discovery is made that the happiness of others is not necessarily opposed to our own, but is frequently inseparably connected with it. The more of these mutually convenient exchanges that take place, the more man becomes dependent on man, the more his feelings become sympathetic, the more social he becomes, the more benevolent. He finds that these mutual good offices generate in his neighbour kindly dispositions, and thence, when an opportunity occurs, kindly actions. He partakes himself of a kindred disposition; and thus all traces of ferocious isolation become lost, from a perception of real and palpable interest.

The germs of benevolence and of production are thus born, nursed, and expanded at the same time: the same simple expedient, that of *exchanges*, has called both into existence. With what an ardor will production henceforth proceed! Has any particular individual more delight or more skill in one mode of exercising his industry than another? Can he

make tools for agriculture or for hunting or for simple manufactures, or can he build huts in a way superior to his neighbours? He gives free scope to his industry; he works not for himself alone, but for as many of those around him as he can supply. He fears not lest he should spend too much or too little time about his favorite occupation, lest he should suffer a deficiency, or have unprofitable superfluity to waste. Satisfied that all his labor will eventually, by means of exchanges, turn out profitably to himself, through the instrumentality of the interest of others, he works cheerfully and in confidence, and all his faculties are on the stretch to improve, knowing that the more his commodity pleases, the greater will be the equivalent he will receive.

Thus it appears that not only do all exchanges of the products of labor, tend to increase happiness, and thence the motives to the production of wealth, but that they are also at the basis of social virtue and of production, and without them labor itself would be inefficient to any extensive usefulness. ✓

Would it not be trifling to ask whether these exchanges should be in all cases *voluntary* or *forced*, or whether forced should in any case be substituted for voluntary exchanges? What virtue is there left in these exchanges if they are not voluntary? is not this circumstance the very essence of them? Take away voluntariness from an exchange, take away from the laborer without his consent the produce of his labor, and what is the result, what is the operation but brute force and robbery? As all *voluntary* exchanges confer happiness equally on both the parties concerned, and promote production and benevolence; so do all *involuntary* exchanges annihilate industry and virtue. They are in every respect opposed to each other: the one operates on the understanding and leads captive the will; the other condescends not to reason, but forces away what it demands. Whatever are the effects of the one, those of the other must be directly the reverse. Involuntary exchanges—if they be not a contradiction in terms—turn back every thing to the rule, the oppression, of the strongest; and not only exchanges, but production, but labor, would soon wither in their embrace. But, will it be allowed that the general principle of voluntary exchanges must be held sacred? that exchanges would be unmeaning and fraudulent if they were not voluntary? while at the same time *some exceptions* are put into the general rule, to accomplish some special purposes. We maintain unhesitatingly that this is a rule which admits of no exception. The most trifling attack on it destroys altogether the principle of security, and consequently of production. The broad principle of *security* applies equally to the protec-

tion of the products of labor and of the free exchange of these products. Such is its useful, clear, and natural extent; *beyond* which (as will hereafter be fully developed) all further extension is pernicious, but *within* which it is necessary, it is indispensable to production, to virtue, to happiness. What are these pretended exceptions to the principle of security, as applied to exchanges? What is the state of things that could justify the application of force to exchanges, and the yielding, at the option of one of the parties, of course of the strongest, an equivalent deemed unsatisfactory by the other, or no equivalent at all? When the surplus produce of a man's labor is taken from him, it may be either without any pretence of any return, of any equivalent in exchange, or it may be accompanied with such equivalent as the stronger party may deem adequate. The first of these cases was dispatched in our last section, where it was shown that security in the entire use of all the products of labor was necessary to ensure even the rude beginnings of production. Where part of the surplus products of labor are taken away contrary to the wishes of the owner, and it is pretended to give an equivalent in exchange; either that equivalent *is* in fact a real equivalent with which the productive laborer ought, if he knew his own interest, to be satisfied, or it *is not* a real equivalent, being in fact of no value, or of none commensurate to the thing taken. First, the equivalent given is supposed to be fully equal in real value to the thing taken, but through the obstinacy or ignorance of the producer, it does not to him appear to be a full equivalent: he is dissatisfied with it. In this case, what is wanting to be done by the person forcing the real equivalent on the productive laborer? what more simple and easy than his task? He has but to enlighten the ignorance, to explain the truth, to show his own interest to the person whom his proposed exchange would serve. And is this, in case of real interest, so difficult a task? has not the productive laborer the same mental powers, the same powers of feeling, comparing and judging, that the man of force has? Nay, is it not probable, is not the very fact of his being industrious a proof of his foresight and judgment, a proof which will hardly be found in the idleness and rapacity of him who wished to take without giving any satisfactory reason? The thing offered is supposed to be a real equivalent: surely its utility can be shown, and then, on the just principle of exchange, a double benefit will be produced, an equal and satisfactory benefit to both of the parties exchanging; a loss to none. Observe the difference between the continued employment of force in such real exchanges, and the employment of reason, of knowledge. Know

ledge once diffused, reason once convinced, all difficulty in the way of such useful exchanges *for the future*, is removed; the operation once performed, is performed for ever. All such future exchanges enliven industry and promote mutual kindness, by affording mutual and voluntary compensations of enjoyment. But where force is once employed to compel an exchange ever so useful, it is not the *less* necessary to employ it a second time, but the *more* necessary. Ill-will is generated by the employment of force; a false and unfavorable association is formed, that of pain with proffered exchange; prejudice is thus called forth; and indignation at presumed injustice takes away the power of reversing hasty decisions. It is therefore the more necessary to continue the employment of force, or the apprehension, the alternative of force, to compel such exchanges, than it was originally to employ it; reluctance increasing, when the reason is unconvinced, with every repetition of the violence. Thus what might be ever so useful, ever so auxiliary to production and happiness—an exchange in itself useful—becomes, by substituting force for reason, an engine of oppression blasting all the motives to industrious exertion. Even the real use that might be derived by the unwilling producer, from the forced equivalent, is lost to him: he will not use the pretended gift of oppression: instead of admitting it to be a real equivalent, he abstracts from it all sort of merit: the original vice of its introduction to him is mingled with it, and makes it hateful to him: his antipathy converts sweetness into poison, and he loathes, through false associations, what might be a source of happiness to him.

Another argument equally cogent in favor of the use of knowledge and persuasion, instead of force, in effecting exchanges, is, that the persuasion, the satisfaction of the producer—for by the supposition the other party is persuaded and satisfied—is the best *test* that the nature of things will permit, of the utility of the exchange. It is not an *unerring* test. No such tests are to be found amongst creatures whose reasoning powers are imperfect. But compared with any other supposable test, it is the most likely to be true: nay, it is impossible to devise any other test that can serve, a moment, as a substitute for it. By this test the *two* parties interested, and with opposing interests, must be convinced; by the other only *one*: double the pleasure of satisfaction therefore in this case. But this mutual satisfaction mostly goes hand in hand with real utility. Where it does not, where even the concurrence of *two*, and those interested to judge correctly, is not always sufficient to ensure correct judgment and wisdom in exchanges, shall we increase the chances of wisdom and justice by letting

the decision rest with only *one* of the parties? and that one with an adverse interest, uncontrolled, deciding in his own cause? Shall we not on the contrary reduce the chances of just decision almost to nothing? Make it necessary to produce conviction in the mind of the producer, to produce conviction without fraud, and you lay an immediate *restraint* on the selfish desires of the party demanding the exchange. You lay him under the necessity of finding reasons, of conciliating, of adding to the value of his equivalent. All the countless host of enormities that would flow from following his uncontrolled notion as to the value of his equivalent, would be rendered impossible: and where the interest of both parties must necessarily concur, and free use is given to their faculties, useless or pernicious productions or exchanges could not long continue. All the cases that can be brought forward, of both of the exchanging parties being in error, such as exchanges of slaves for spirits or implements of destruction, prove nothing. For it is not pretended that the power of voluntary exchanges will give to mankind at once, or at all, perfect wisdom: it will produce, not an unerring perfection, but an infinity more of production and happiness than any other arrangement. No other arrangement can possibly be devised that will not lead directly to the domination of the crafty and the strong, to all the combined miseries of force and fraud. The simple and obvious remedy for those cases where both exchanging parties are mistaken as to their real interest, is to show them their mistakes, to give them *knowledge*. As soon as they see their mistake, they will of course correct it. This operation of showing them their interest, is not only the most certain and lasting remedy, but the speediest. After preventing these exchanges a thousand times, the disposition (the judgment remaining uninformed) is still as fully inclined as before to engage in them through any number of years: but when once the judgment is disabused, such exchanges cease of themselves. Ignorance must be *always* compelled: but knowledge *once* diffused keeps the springs of real interest in motion without any further, without any external, aid. In the case of the exchange of slaves, however, the principle of security, of voluntary exchanges, has been altogether violated. The original vice of the acquisition of the slave mingles itself with every future operation. What slave was ever obtained by voluntary exchange? When did savage or civilized man ever *voluntarily* surrender for a little water and a bit of bread, the power of bruising or torturing their bodies or minds, and of extorting labor at the option of a master? The disposal of labor, of the smallest portion of labor, the exchange of the produce of labor,

of its minutest part, must be voluntary, and yet the disposal of the whole man that includes all labor, all exchanges, all volition, may be involuntary or forced. 'How could our principles of free labor and voluntary exchanges, be more signally violated than in this case? Where such iniquities as those of slave-making exist, as along the coast and in the interior of Western Africa, the usual consequences of poverty, wretchedness, and vice, follow, as in all cases where the principles of free labor and voluntary exchanges are departed from. The question then is reduced to the voluntary exchange of two things, fairly and *voluntarily acquired*. Both parties, we shall suppose, are in error; the production of one, or the other, or of both of the articles to be exchanged, was pernicious; or the exchange was conducted on unfair principles. Under such circumstances, the probability is, that the exchanging parties only participate in the general ignorance and false associations of those around them as to such matters; and still the only remedy is the *diffusion of knowledge*. For, though it were possible—which it is not—to place an unerring director of exchanges over such a community; still the violation done to the principle of security in interfering with voluntary exchanges, would not only preponderate over the pretended good to be derived from any superiority of judgment, but would sap and ultimately annihilate the springs to industry, and thence to virtue and happiness. Of what use, *then*, would be superiority of judgment without any industry to work upon, to guide according to its particular notions? The *first* object is to ensure industrious exertion; the second and minor object is to direct it. In whatever state as to knowledge a community may be, security in the free disposal of labor and of the products of labor must be equally upheld. Without this, there can be no exertion, no industry; and as to knowledge, this freedom of labor and of exchanges, is the most efficacious expedient to develop it where it does not exist, to improve it where it has been born, and to facilitate its introduction where it is offered from without.

The supposition of any person or any number of persons (the violation of the principle of security even for a moment forgotten,) being calculated, in a simple intellectual point of view, to produce more rectitude of decision, and of course more useful exchanges, than would be made by the parties themselves, is in the last degree futile and absurd. Who that is not acquainted with *all the circumstances* of both the parties exchanging, with their moral and physical character, their previous supply, all their domestic and external arrangements and connexions, could possibly hazard an opinion as to the

utility or inutility of any particular exchange in the case of any two individuals? From a hundred accidents, the exchange that may be useful to-day, may be useless or pernicious to-morrow. Who but the parties themselves can know any thing about these eternal individual changes? What less than omniscience could direct such transactions? and if we obtained omniscience, we must add to it universal benevolence, universal sympathy with the wants and wishes of all. Allowed, say the lovers of force or the pretenders to unerring wisdom, allowed the absurdity of general interference. We would only select a few particular cases of evidently erroneous judgment, and where the exchanges would be *hurtful to others*. Here the ground of interference is altogether changed. In as far as the interest of others as well as of the parties themselves is concerned, correct their judgment, give them real knowledge. In as far as their conduct in exchanging interferes with the security of free labor and exchanges, restrain them; as these rights ought to be equal to all. Should any consequential injury arise to third parties from a voluntary exchange of things justly acquired, (and we are supposing none others,) restrain the injurious act, as you would any other act equally injurious to society; but interfere not with the faculty of freely exchanging, the evil arising from the violation of the general principle being incalculably greater than any partial benefit from modifying particular exchanges. But, the security of all being in the eye of justice equally sacred, no violation of the security of others should be permitted. But, *even these restraints should be voluntary*. This will be hereafter developed: otherwise, security in freedom of labor and voluntary exchanges could not exist.

From what has been said it appears evident, that security in voluntary exchanges is as necessary, as in the free use of labor and of its products. They are the parents of production, and not only of production but of morality and happiness. Without them man could scarcely raise himself above the inferior animals, on whom he now so proudly looks down. No substitute can be devised for voluntary exchanges *: no su-

* Mr. Owen's plan, of labor in common, and mutual co-operation, may be cited as a practical objection to this position. In his societies, or small associations of a few hundred to a few thousand individuals, production and happiness proceed, it may be said, without any exchanges.

Perhaps it may be more correctly said, that his system—as far, and only as far, as it is perfectly voluntary—is the perfection of voluntary exchanges and of the kindly feelings they engender. In his system, every one labors for every one, every one benefits and is benefited by every one. Though there is no exchange of individual articles from individual to individual, there is a constant and universal *exchange of benefits*. This universal system

periority of force or of intellect, real or supposed, of either of the individuals concerned or of any other persons, can in any case be usefully substituted for voluntary exchanges. They are founded on the interest, and produce the satisfaction, of the parties concerned. Their operation extends through the whole structure of society, to the grand outlines of its organization, as well as to the minute operations between man and man, and to all his social relations. They are founded on the utility of the employment, in all things, of reason and persuasion, instead of brute force; and the great extent and influence of their operation will be hereafter more fully developed. The same principles of justice, because of benevolence, of benevolence because of tendency to promote the greatest happiness, that should regulate the distribution of wealth, particularly the principle of voluntary exchanges, should regulate all human intercourse, and pervade all human institutions. Wherever this principle is neglected, misery and vice follow in proportion to the extent of the violation. This will be exemplified further on, when the forcible exactions made for supporting existing establishments come under review.

Let it be always recollected as a justification of the simplicity and extent of our details, that as reasonings on moral, political, and economical, subjects, cannot be safely carried to very remote deductions; it is the more indispensable that our first principles should be clear and thoroughly sifted, and that every one should perceive their truth and utility. An illustration of this observation will be afforded in considering our next proposition.

of voluntary exchanges, could only be elicited by wisdom in a very improved state of social science. It is but applying the principle of one individual exchange to the mass of all the labor of every individual. If the ultimate benefits of this general system of exchanging the whole labor of every individual for portions of the products of the labor of the rest of the community, be found more productive of happiness than the system of individual exchanges, why should it not be pursued? It is not substituting a new principle to that of exchanges, but applying it on a comprehensive and universal scale. This system of mutual co-operation will be resumed in a future chapter. The question is, whether the general and remote motive of individual benefit from mutual co-operation, will be a sufficient substitute for the ever active principle of immediate personal interest, attending every separate individual exertion and exchange?

SECTION 8.

The forced abstraction of the products of labor, the objects of wealth and means of happiness, from any individual, will cause more loss of happiness to him than increase of happiness to the person acquiring.

WHY undertake, it may be asked, to demonstrate so simple, so universally received, a proposition? Who is to be convinced? Who denies its truth? Why demonstrate what no one disputes? Because the mere assenting to a proposition, without knowing the reasons for the assent, produces very little salutary effect on conduct, directing merely in cases of every day practice, but rendering the understanding incapable of perceiving the most gross violations of the principle, provided those violations are as frequent and notorious as the observances. Knowing the *reasons* of a principle, we can make it universally operative, and can detect the sophisms that would exclude its benefits, where perhaps they may be of by far the greatest importance to human welfare. Besides, the energy of our conduct in supporting the useful operation of the principle, is doubled, when we see distinctly its utility: we do not act as machines, but as rational beings. We shall never neglect the principle where it ought to be applied: we shall never suffer evil to be done under the pretence of its right application.

Although few will in words deny this principle, yet does almost every one habitually *act* in flagrant violation of it, or unconcernedly witness its violation. Laws even and institutions are enacted and upheld in opposition to it. Its application and misapplication are universal; and so are the evils or benefits resulting from it. It is necessary therefore that it should be put in a clear light.

When forced abstraction is made from any individual of the products of his labor, the objects of wealth, in what does the *loss* which he has sustained consist? what are the constituent parts of the evil which he has experienced? On the other hand, what is the *gain* which the party taking has made, and what are its constituent parts? Let us review these two masses and compare them together, that we may see where the balance of evil lies.

First, as to the mere articles themselves, which are taken from the one and seized by the other, they are evidently, in most cases, the same in the hands of both parties: what the

one immediately loses the other gains, as a pound of flax, a bushel of corn. The one loses the corn or the flax; the other gains it: no loss or waste of the materials is *necessarily* attendant on the transfer, though it may most frequently occur. It is our object to reduce things to their simplest elements: therefore let us suppose that what is lost by the one, is gained, without defalcation, by the other. A bushel of corn will go as far in feeding, and a pound of flax towards the clothing, of one individual—size and appetite being equal—as of another.

The article then itself not being affected by the transfer, the gain of matter capable of usefulness being as great in the one case as the loss in the other, we must look out for other sources of difference in the two cases; and we shall find them in the *immediate feelings*, the state of mind, of the two parties concerned, and in the *future consequences* resulting to each of them from the operation.

The man who forcibly takes the corn, consumes and digests it like the producer: his taste and hunger are gratified notwithstanding his robbery. But what are the *associated feelings* which arise in his mind, from the laws of his organization, while the animal consumption is going on? An ox might consume corn forced from another ox, just as if it had not been so obtained; but no human animal, ever so rude, is without those powers of mind which produce feelings necessarily associated with such enjoyments. The man of force consumes, but, while he consumes, he cannot help knowing that he has excited the ill-will of him whom he has plundered; he knows that he is liable to his ill-offices, that if opportunity occurred, the plundered article would be taken back by the producer, the owner. He has moreover a feeling of his own injustice, and sometimes a feeling of regret, of pity, towards those whom he has wronged. He knows that he would not like that another person should take away from him what he had with much labor produced: and though he yields to the temptation of enjoyment, and seizes what he can from another, the feeling of the injustice must occasionally intrude, and so far lessen his satisfaction. Should he be above all fear from insecurity, should he be beyond all remorse for injustice, he will perhaps be the more accessible to pity for the miseries caused by his plunder. Or, under a last supposition, which is a very rare one, and almost impossible, he may be without fear, remorse, or pity; and if so, what will be his capacity for enjoyment? That of the hyæna. The mere animal feeling of the moment without foresight or sympathy, without any of the pleasures of judgment or benevolence to increase his animal gratifications, or to fill up their intervals with lighter but more fre-

quently-renewed pleasures. In fact, however, such a human creature could hardly exist; for if he had sagacity enough to make his force available to cope with the combined sagacity and strength of his neighbour, and to prevail in his seizures, he must have sagacity enough to perceive *some* at least of the effects of his conduct. If he had no more sagacity than the hyæna, his attacks would be repelled with equal facility. But still, were such a human creature possible, what immediate pleasure would the corn give him? The sole pleasures of taste and hunger: after these, mere insensibility: no pleasures of association, or of communicating enjoyment to others: whereas in the case of the producer, the corn supports his existence to make it the vehicle not only of the pleasures of taste and hunger, but of all the other gentler pleasures incident to the sagacity requisite for industrious labor. Still perhaps it will be objected, that we have omitted in our enumeration the greatest pleasure of all felt by the seizer of another's labor, the pleasure of success (of successful rapine or injustice to be sure, but still of success). We are reminded of the universal prevalence of this feeling to such an extent as to have originated a proverb, "Stolen waters are sweet; and bread eaten in secret is pleasant." Than this a more false or more pernicious proverb was never countenanced by man*. What means this proverb, if it have any true meaning at all? To seize by force the products of industry and to consume them in secret, may be sweet when compared with the absolute destitution of idleness and rapine. A hungry robber, like a hungry and pursued wolf, rejoices in the immediate gratification of his rapacious appetite; and compared with the miseries of starvation, even such consumption may be sweet. But compared with the pleasure of consuming the same things produced by the industry of the consumer, and enjoyed, not in secret, but in open and free security, without apprehension, without the sense of injustice, what becomes of its pretended sweetness? "Stolen waters are *not* sweet, and bread eaten in secret is *not* pleasant." To the lawless alone, plundering

* 'Tis true, that a vague intimation of terror and vengeance follows; "but he knoweth not that the dead are there; and that her guests are in the depths of hell." That is to say, "Though we allow that it is sweet and pleasant to consume in secret the acquisitions of robbery, yet we tell you, you are in the way to hell if you indulge in such enjoyments." "But he knoweth not that the dead are there," is like the pernicious frightening of children with Raw-head and Bloody-bones. Yet *such* are the things that have been given to mankind, by way of, or instead of, *reasons*, to induce them to refrain from what is called immoral conduct, and what they are at the same time told is *delightful* conduct. Now, in the text, the sweetness and pleasure of such secret consumption is altogether denied.

and exposed to plunder, who had never felt the pleasures of consuming in peace what their industry had produced, who never knew of any comparison to be instituted, except between want and plunder, it belongs to deny this position: to them alone is such consumption sweet and pleasant. To them *comparatively* sweet it is; but *absolutely* it is bitter as wormwood. All things are called good or bad, pleasant or unpleasant, sweet or bitter, by comparison with other things. Now when articles plundered, (that is to say, taken away without the consent of the producers,) and consumed in secret, are said to be sweet, it must be with reference to the ordinary mode of acquiring and consuming such articles: that ordinary mode must be by means of industry in the acquisition, and security in the consumption. Such must be the meaning of the proverb to make it general, to give it currency as any thing more than a pernicious by-word for the use and the encouragement of robbers. But give it any such extension, and it is utterly false: and apply it in the only sense in which it is true, and it is most pernicious. No maxim could possibly be devised more destructive of industry, of morality, and happiness. Whether in savage, half-civilized, or civilized communities, the mere pleasure of success in plunder, could never, of itself and unattended with the gratification of want, be of much effect: for, not to speak of its being counterbalanced by apprehension, it is met by a much greater pleasure, that of successful industry, on the part of the producer.

Now, to oppose to these pleasures of the plunderer, of him who forcibly abstracts the products of labor, the means of wealth and happiness, from the producer of them; what immediate pleasures has the man of industry to bring forward? He physically consumes just like him who took away his wealth: but what are the feelings necessarily associated in his mind with the physical enjoyment? The pleasures of successful industry, not of the effort of an hour or a day, but of a long-continued course of effort, all directed to one object and all brought to the wished-for result: the pleasure of skill, of perseverance, of success. These accumulated pleasures are brought, as it were, to a focus at the time of enjoyment: they have filled up all the moments of production, and now memory brings them forward to heighten the enjoyment. These are all included in the pleasure of employment, of having some *fixed purpose in life*, which fills up all the voids of existence and keeps out the pressure of weariness and disgust. He knows moreover that *his* success is attended with the sympathy and good opinion of all the peaceable and industrious

members of the community. All these soothing associations which the man of force is without, are superadded, in the case of the industrious, to the mere pleasure of success; so that in this respect alone the success of industry is infinitely more pleasurable than the success of force. All natural and unavoidable associations add to the one, while they abstract in an equal degree from the other. The success of force from its uncertainty is, to be sure, at times accompanied with very noisy demonstrations: but place against these, not only the re-action when reflection comes, but the number of disappointments that bring with them vexation and fear; and then compare this noisy over-excitement with the calm, steady, and daily repeated, pleasures of success attendant on productive industry.

But let all these considerations be forgotten, let the pleasure of the success of the one be supposed to be equal in intensity and extent to that of the other, the main point of distinction between their mental feelings, their associated pleasures, must be still dwelt upon. The pleasure derived from the use of the article of wealth to the industrious producer is accompanied with *security*, or else he could not be permanently industrious; while the pleasure of the plunderer is necessarily poisoned by insecurity. The industrious has injured, has excited the ill-will, the ill offices of no one; he therefore apprehends, he fears them not: for what he enjoys he is indebted to his own exertions alone, or the voluntary exchanges of the surplus produce of his labor with others. He apprehends no resentment where he has given no cause for any. He enjoys with a consciousness that he has earned, that he has a right to, his enjoyments, and therefore enjoys undisturbed with any alarm, at least with any permanent or necessarily connected source of alarm: he is liable to none that are not extrinsic and accidental. The consumer, on the contrary, of wealth plundered from an industrious producer, knows that the very act of his acquisition has necessarily excited indignation, resentment, desire of retaliation on the part of him from whom he has taken. Nay more, as his only pretension is force, he must know that any stronger than he, will be as little inclined to respect his possession and use of an article, as he was to respect that of the producer. Enjoying by force alone, his very title contains in itself an invitation to those who are stronger, a justification to those from whom he has taken, to ravish from him his unjust acquisition. This is no casual accidental circumstance attending his enjoyment, but the necessary inevitable effect, always resulting from every.

acquisition by force. While the organisation of man is constituted as it is, insecurity palpably perceived, and not relieved by any notions of justice, must give birth to alarm; and that alarm must, in proportion to its intensity, lessen or annihilate the enjoyment. Secrecy and fraud are the necessary resources of insecurity, and plainly indicate their origin. Every intruding eye is feared as that of an enemy: every breeze is laden with apprehension. Truth is shunned as leading to exposure, for it is not the interest of the plunderer that truth should be known.

We will enlarge then no more on the comparison between the states of mind, the pleasures of consumption, of the producer, and of him who takes by force the produce of another's labor. A sense of injustice, of remorse, of fear, must trouble the enjoyment of the one; while a sense of justice, of peace, and of requited effort must enhance the pleasure of the other. The one is insecure in his enjoyment, fearing loss on every side; the other, injuring no one, is undisturbed by the dread of privation; the one naturally resorts to secrecy, silence and fraud to protect him; the other needs not the aid of such treacherous allies.

Dismissing, then, the *immediate feelings* of the industrious, and the seizer by force, let us proceed to the second head of comparison, and point out the *future consequences*, as to the production of wealth or other desirable objects, of permitting the products of industry to remain for use in the hands of the producer, or permitting any part of them to be forcibly abstracted from him for the use of another. It is here that the balance turns with the weight of infinity to one, against the man who takes by force the produce of another's labor. Were there even no difference whatever in the enjoyment of the two; were the enjoyment of force even allowed to be greater than the enjoyment of industry; still would the overwhelming evil of the *consequences* of the one, compared with those of the other, be so great as utterly to obliterate the pleasure of immediate feeling, if ever so superior, on the part of the seizer by force.

What are the consequences to the laborer? what are the consequences to him who takes by force the produce of another's labor? In both cases the extinction of the motives that lead to productive labor, and of course the discontinuance of that labor itself, where it has been previously active, or its early and immediate withering, where it is only showing its first efforts, or its utter disregard from the chance of acquiring the means of enjoyment without labor.

The productive laborer has toiled, and the fruit of his labor

is taken from him. Why should he work again? His sole object in laboring was to procure for himself some object of utility; that is to say, of remote or of immediate gratification. At the moment that his labor, guided by foresight, had produced the object which was to constitute his reward, that reward is forcibly abstracted from his grasp, and he finds that he has labored in vain. What is the consequence? The springs of his industry are relaxed; he can no longer securely rely on procuring by means of labor those comforts or enjoyments, the prospect of which supported him in his toil. The first time that the produce of his labor is taken from him, he is alarmed and has less reliance on industry as a means of procuring enjoyment; the next time, he is still more alarmed and his reliance is still further weakened; till by degrees, from the frequent repetition of such forcible seizures, his inclination to industry is rooted out, from his experience of the utter unproductiveness of his toils. What now is the amount of this evil, the loss of the spirit of industry to the industrious man? Is it the loss merely of the article or of the one or two or five or ten articles, the produce of his labor, which had been forcibly abstracted from him? By no means. These losses, grievous as they are, are nothing to the real and absolute future losses of the productive laborer. He loses with his industrious habits, all those comforts, renewed through his life, which perseverance in industrious pursuits would, with security, have given him. Were the pleasure then of the spoiler ten times as great in the enjoyment of the articles abstracted as that of the productive laborer in the enjoyment of the same article, and were twelve spoliations requisite to banish the spirit of industry; still from the discontinuance of the production of these articles on the part of the industrious, his monthly, weekly, or daily enjoyment of them would through his whole life be lost. Here then is a balance of evil: as the pleasures of a life of enjoyment, in any particular line, derived from any particular article, are to the pleasures of a few hours enjoyment derived from the same article; so are the pleasures of the industrious to those of the plunderer. Such is the superiority of the good effects of protecting from forced abstraction the products of labor. Mark too, every instance of success on the part of him who forcibly seizes, renders *less probable* his future supply by discouraging production; while every enjoyment, every instance of success in productive labor, confirms the habits of the industrious, gives a new stimulus to his exertions, and renders *more probable* his future supply.

But it may be said that it is an extreme and improbable

case to suppose the forced abstraction of the *whole* of the produce of the labor of the industrious, that in fact it is but a part, but what he can spare, over and above his necessities, that he generally loses, and that this *partial* abstraction will not materially affect his industry. In the first place, every abstraction operates injuriously as far as it goes; the *alarm* excited by the abstraction of a part extends to every atom left, and makes the whole insecure; and if the whole have not been abstracted, 'tis most probable that the want of opportunity or of power, not of inclination, saved the remainder. The explanation however lies deeper. So urgent are the motives to gratify hunger and to support life, that no attacks on the products of labor can exterminate that portion of exertion which is requisite to allay such imperious wants. But for mere existence, without comfort, what is requisite? The casual labor of the savage, of the wretched husbandman of Syria or Egypt as described by Volney in his admirable *Travels*, fearful lest he should over-supply his wants and feed his plunderer. Were there no produce of industry left from the frequency of rapine, so strong are the cravings of appetite that men would, like rats, on the failure of food, kill each other for the chance of surviving. 'Tis allowed therefore that the forced abstraction of the products of labor will not annihilate the desire of existing or rather of shunning the miseries of want. But is this industry? are such the hopes, the rewards of productive labor? Destroy production to this extent, and population and happiness will decrease where they now exist, till busy towns and valleys become as the abode of the savage; and under such circumstances the uncivilized will never assume the comforts of industry. Are not these effects dreadful enough? but must the race of man absolutely cease to exist? The relaxation of industry however will do no more: it will do no more than bring men down to this level. Industry therefore consists not in the production of what is merely necessary for the support of the lowest animal existence, but in supplying as many additional sources of physical enjoyment as possible, superadded to these mere means of existence. The cravings of want alone are sufficient to urge every animal to provide for its gratification; but the cravings of want will do no more, and nothing less energetic than these cravings is sufficient to make head against the abasement caused by the forcible abstraction of any part of the products of labor. Until labor becomes voluntary and excited by motives of less urgency than the necessities of existence, it is not called industry. Every thing that comes under the name of industry, or of *voluntary* labor with

the view of *increasing* our enjoyments, is evidently incompatible with the forcing away from the laborer that article, greater or less, which he had produced with the sole view of enjoying it. If, in order to avoid this result, and to lessen the alarm, it be proposed that one article only, and that of small value, shall be forcibly taken, the result evidently would be, that the production of that particular article would cease altogether; so that such a proposition could never be carried into effect, the publication of the endangered article necessarily annihilating its production and forcing industry into secure channels. Forcible abstraction must therefore be general, or must be altogether relinquished; if it may fall on *any* article, the alarm is universal, the depression of industry proportioned to the amount and the frequency, till perseverance annihilates industrious exertion altogether; if it be confined, it is useless even to those who seize, and must be relinquished from want of food to prey upon.

So overwhelming therefore is the balance of enjoyment ravished from the productive laborer over and above that gained by the employer of force, that our proposition might be safely rested here: for has it not been shown, *how* "the forced abstraction of the products of labor from any individual, causes more loss of happiness to him than increase of happiness to the person acquiring?" Though not necessary to our argument, it may not be improper to advance here a step further, and to show that even this evil, immense as it is and preponderating over any pretended enjoyments of the spoiler, is absolutely lost when compared with the greater evils inflicted on the whole community of productive laborers by the forced abstraction of wealth, the product of labor, from any individuals.

For the caprice or the momentary enjoyment of the spoiler, the product of the labor of the industrious is taken from him. Does this industrious man live in solitude, or is he surrounded with other individuals industrious like himself? We have seen that without *voluntary exchanges* industry could not exist, and that industry implies co-operation and society. The force committed on the one, is therefore known to all around him. In whatever way force *has* been employed to take from him, it *may* be employed to take away from them the products of their industry. The same reason that leads him to fear a repetition of the attack upon him, must lead them to fear its introduction to themselves. The *alarm*, instead of being confined to the individual despoiled, is shared with him by all those in a similar situation with himself, by all those whose industry has given them any thing to lose. They fear that

what their industry has procured may be forced from them; their reliance on the enjoyment of what their labor may hereafter produce is lessened, and the springs of their industry, the motives to their exertion, are relaxed. Let the seizure be repeated on the same or another individual, and the alarm is increased not only to him but to all the industrious. Distrust and apathy increase and diffuse themselves through the whole community, till that relaxation of industry which has occurred to one becomes general, from the very same cause, through all the productive laborers of the community. From a relaxation of industry, comes a diminution of production: from a diminished production, comes a diminished consumption, a diminished enjoyment. Thus the loss of the happiness of numbers without limit, of the whole community, is the result of the *insecurity* arising from the forced abstraction of wealth, on partial occasions, from a few individuals. It is not then by the pleasures of a life of industrious enjoyment as felt by *one* individual, as contrasted with the temporary pleasures of plunder, that we are to estimate the evils of forcible abstraction, but by the loss of the pleasures of industrious enjoyment through the lives of the whole of an industrious community, and the loss of the pleasures of the moral habits thence resulting to them all.

Such are the inevitable effects of violating the principle of security, in the forcible abstraction from the productive laborer of the product of his toil. It signifies not by what name the spoiler may be called, whether his act be deemed expert, brave, and meritorious, as amongst the wandering Arabs, whether it be deemed illegal as in the flagrant cases of robbery amongst what are called civilized nations, or whether the abstraction be sanctioned by law; in every case, the sole question to be asked is, "*Is the abstraction voluntary, or is it forced?*" If the abstraction be forced, no form or ceremony of law or superstition can alter its nature or effects. On the voluntariness of the exchange all its merit depends. Take away this ingredient; let the produce of labor be taken without equivalent satisfactory to the owner, and all the evils mentioned to individuals and to society result from it; restore this ingredient, satisfy him from whom the article is taken, and the forcible abstraction becomes a voluntary exchange, the most useful and beneficent of social operations. Is any abstraction of the products of labor just? The sufficient and only answer ought to be, "*Is it voluntary?*"

SECTION 9.

The forced abstractions of small portions of wealth from any given number of individuals, will lessen the whole quantity of happiness more than it can be increased by the additional pleasures conferred on any one or more individuals enjoying those united small forced masses.

WE have already seen that the happiness gained to the spoiler by the forced abstraction of the matter of wealth, the product of industry, is as nothing compared with the happiness lost in consequence of the same operation. To diminish the evil to the sufferer, an expedient has been put forth and very generally acted upon,—the expedient of dividing the shares of loss into as many and as small lots as possible, so that they may ultimately become almost imperceptible and afford no contrast of privation to the glare of enjoyment exhibited by the one, or small number, who use the things seized. In this case, the enjoyment of those who forcibly take, remains a fixed quantity: the object is not to increase their enjoyment, but to lessen the pressure on those who are forced to contribute. Our inquiry is, therefore, Does it produce this effect? Does it, by dividing the loss into small shares and spreading it over a comparatively large surface, diminish the *whole mass* of suffering or discomfort? Are the small losses of money less productive of evil than those conjoined losses borne by one? Or, whether less or greater, are they so modified as to bear no proportion to the increase of happiness gained by the forcible consumers?

Were there not some fundamental error in this ingenious notion of annihilating distress by diminishing and diffusing it, the principle of spoliation might be carried to any extent by means of the principle of division and diffusion. But a fundamental error has been made on this subject; and that is overlooking the most important feature of these losses, of these abstractions, whether large or small, the consideration in all cases, whether they are *voluntary* or *forced*. A forced abstraction of the matter of wealth, be its amount what it may, is liable to the charge of *injustice*, is followed by all the evils of *insecurity*. The principle of security, of voluntary exchanges, once trenched upon, who shall set bounds to its extension? What is to restrain it? what but the *prudence* of the forcible consumers, tempted by immediate interest, by the desire of immediate enjoyment, to press the contributions till

their amount becomes diminished, that is to say, till the springs of industry are dried up?

Where the forced abstraction of wealth, the product of industry, is made in one heap from one, the loss of the absolute material is certainly to that one, just a thousand times as great as it would be if shared amongst one thousand in lots of one each. Here, in the absolute material, there is neither loss nor gain: the same amount is raised in both cases. We must look therefore for any differences, for any points of comparison, beyond the thing seized to the *feelings* produced by the seizure in the minds of those who suffer the loss. Where the abstraction, represented by 1000, being all taken from one, causes the absolute ruin of that one, exposes him to the pressure of hunger, the dread of starvation and cold, there can be little doubt of the wisdom or benevolence of the policy that changes this excess of intense wretchedness for the surrender of a thousand small portions of pleasure. But this is a case that in practice almost never occurs. Why so? Because, in order to have an opportunity of abstracting largely, large masses of wealth (the products of industry) are naturally sought out; and from him who has comparatively to spare, much is taken. In such a state of things, it seems certain that the abstraction represented by a thousand, say 1000 shillings, causes a greater loss of happiness on the whole, than if the whole thousand were taken from the wealthier individual. To be sure, the loss is not so apparent; it makes no exhibition when divided; but is it not as certainly *felt*, because it affords no exhibition or contrast? The smaller contributions must, from the nature of things, be levied from those who have comparatively little, and to whom the loss of a small part of that little must be more severely felt than an absolutely larger mass by those that possess more. It is not said that every poor industrious man losing a shilling is as much distressed thereby as the wealthier from whom the 1000 shillings are taken, and who has more left after the 1000 are removed, than the poor after losing the one. Suppose that the loser of the one suffers but the tenth part as much—and this is surely an ample concession—as the loser of the thousand, the loss on the whole will be as 100 to one. There will be in this case one hundred times the loss of happiness by diffusing the loss divided into small portions, that there would be by abstracting it at once from one individual; because, though every individual of the poorer thousand suffers but the tenth part of him who loses the whole in a mass, yet as there are 1000 of these smaller sufferers for one of the larger, these 1000 tenths added together will make 100 whole parts, each equal to the suffer-

ing of him from whom the whole was taken in one mass. If it be alleged that the feelings of the poor, from whom these numerous smaller portions are necessarily taken, are reconciled by the *habit* of privation and suffering to the loss, it may be equally alleged that the feelings of the rich who make the abstractions are equally blunted by habit to enjoyment. Habit, operating equally in both ways, at both ends of the scale, diminishing equally enjoyment and suffering, must therefore be left out of the question.

There seems little use in analysing the case in which the forced abstraction or loss is divided amongst 1000 persons equally wealthy, instead of being taken from one of them, because our object is practical, and in practice such cases seldom occur. The suffering on the whole would certainly not be diminished by this operation; for though each individual contributor of the 1000 only suffered the one thousandth part of the pain of the one losing all, yet these 1000 decimal parts of suffering added together evidently make up the same aggregate quantity of suffering on the whole; so that no diminution would be effected thereby; while the pain of the loss more intimately felt by every individual when he himself suffers than when he merely hears of another's suffering, though to a larger extent, would seem to carry the balance against the system of division, and to make it probable that the mass of suffering is even in this case increased by diffusing and subdividing it.

No doubt there are powerful motives, altogether independent of the greater or smaller portion of suffering produced by division or concentration, which urge those who forcibly abstract, to prefer the system of diffusion and subdividing the shares of loss. The injustice is not so flagrant; it is not attended with so much éclat, it does not produce so strong a sensation, it does not lead to such rough inquiries; the right is not so likely to be disputed, when but a very little is taken from a great many. Next, when the seizure is from a great number in small lots, the *injustice* of the operation seems to be forgotten in its *equality*. An equal distribution of injustice is apt to be regarded as a species of justice, the *principle* of the measure being forgotten in the consideration of its *mode of operation*: whereas nothing is more evident than that the mode of operating the most iniquitous measure may be impartial and just. By confusing these two positions, such an advantage is taken as to divert the mind from the nature of the abstraction itself, from its effects on individual or social happiness: and the illusion is assisted by the small quantity in each case demanded. The object of those who forcibly abstract is their own enjoyment: indifferent

to them how the suffering is diffused, provided their object is accomplished: that mode of abstraction which the most certainly and securely accomplishes the seizure, is the best for them, in contempt of the feelings of those from whom it is taken.

Those very reasons, however, which make it prudent or wise on the part of the spoliator to subdivide and diffuse the loss in every case amongst as many as possible, are those which would render this very diffusion undesirable to the community. It is the interest of the community that the real effects of every seizure should be known; that no operation, by which delusion might be practised, and rapine, shrouding itself under the guise of equality to ensure the better chance of success, should be permitted. When an injustice is committed, it is the interest of the community that it should be seen, felt, known, and duly appreciated. When *any* act is done, whether just or not, it is the interest of all that its *real* effects should be known. Truth, that is to say, a knowledge of the real qualities and relations of things and of the real consequences of actions, must be useful to all: it *seems* to be pernicious to those who wish to be unjust, because they do not understand their own real interest. Therefore whatever mode of forcible seizure exhibits the nature of the operation in its *truest* colours, is most useful to the community, were even the balance of immediate suffering in favor of concealment, which it has been shown not to be.

Having shown that the division of the forced loss into many shares, does not lessen, but in most cases increases, the sum total of suffering, instead of annihilating it, as in the language of political quackery; it remains now to prove, that this waste of happiness caused by the diffusion, is more than equal to the gain of happiness experienced by those amongst whom the matters abstracted are divided.

It makes no difference to the question, whether the articles abstracted are divided amongst one or many. Dividing amongst many is only a repetition of a similar operation; and the evil depends in every case on the absolute quantity of wealth taken by each as compared with the number and situation of those who are compelled to suffer the loss; the greater in each case the gain, the lesser the *comparative* happiness derived from it. Of 1000 portions of the matter of wealth, the first 100, suppose, are necessary to repel hunger and thirst, and support life. The use of this first portion is as life to death: the value is the greatest of all human values, including the capacity for all other enjoyments, for which nature or education may have adapted the individual. What is the

effect on the same individual of the application of a second mass, say of a second hundred, of these portions of wealth? Nothing ecstatic, no change as from life to death; simply the addition of some of the most obvious comforts of life demanded by real convenience. The effect of these second hundred in intensity of enjoyment, is so infinitely beneath that produced by the first 100, as to be incapable of any comparison. We proceed however, and to this second we add a third 100, and ask what is the effect of this third equal supply? Does it produce an equal portion of happiness with either of the two former? With the first, it admits of no comparison; with the second, of very little: the first was existence, life or death; the second, *real* comforts; this third, what? *imaginary* comforts, such as the opinions and customs around us render desirable. These are acquired by the third hundred; but they are unaccompanied with the craving recommendations of want, or even of real comforts, and are recommended by public opinion alone and doubtful utility. The recommendation of public opinion, observe, was not wanting to the two first portions, while the effect of the third 100 depends on it alone: its effect in producing happiness is therefore proportionally weak, and is much less than the second, but not so much less than the second as the second was less than the first. To the three lots of 100 portions each, of the matter of wealth, we add a fourth lot of the same kind. The individual is already supplied in wants, in real comforts, in comforts of opinion the most approaching to utility: how shall he apply this additional, this fourth portion? He necessarily looks out for those lighter sources of enjoyment, which hold the *second* rank in the opinion and customs of those around him. This process of seeking out lesser gratifications is unavoidable; for, with the previous 100 the choice was open, and those enjoyments esteemed the most desirable would naturally be selected first. This fourth addition therefore gives a still less absolute increase to happiness than the third, but the difference between its effect and that of the third is less apparent. We now give a fifth addition of the means of enjoyment in another hundred portions of the objects of wealth. How shall this fifth mass be applied? Wants, comforts, real and unreal, secondary conveniences, are already supplied. A search must be instituted for conveniences of a still more doubtful nature; and fancy and caprice begin their empire. The fifth addition is still less productive of absolute increase of happiness than the fourth; and if, in order to add to enjoyment, we make another addition of another hundred portions of the articles of wealth, we shall find that this sixth mass is still less

operative than the fifth. Utility having been long ago gratified, caprice begins now to display itself in the mere changes of *form* or *quality* of the articles used, or in the acquisition of the objects of mere pomp and exhibition. An addition still decreasing is made to happiness by this sixth 100; and if we add a seventh, the effect on happiness will be proportionally less; till the mere habit and pleasure of accumulation becomes almost the sole influential motive to the acquisition. Every hundred added is less and less productive of absolute increase of happiness to the possessor; but the difference of effect of each addition is less and less as we recede from the first portion and the first addition; till at length an addition equal in amount to that which allayed hunger and secured existence and its capacities of enjoyment, becomes a matter of mere indifference.

Such is the effect on happiness of the continued addition of successive portions containing equal quantities of the matter of wealth. The effect of the first portion is great and striking; but every succeeding portion diminishes in effect, till all expectation of increase of comfort is relinquished, and the pleasure of the occupation, of mere habit, or of skill, that is, the skill of despoiling (for the skill of industry is here out of the question), supersedes the original, rational, and useful, motives to the acquisition of wealth. The effect of every succeeding portion however, though absolutely less than that of the portion immediately preceding, is constantly differing less and less from the one before it, till the absolute additions to happiness become so small, that the difference of effect between the ninety-ninth and the hundredth portions is quite imperceptible. And it must be recollected that all these consequences follow on the supposition that the character and capacities of enjoyment of the individual receiving these additional portions remain entirely unchanged by the influence of wealth and indulgence—a supposition, which will be shown hereafter to be entirely opposite to the truth. A second and overwhelming source of the diminution of happiness expected from endless accessions of wealth will be brought to light; but which being superfluous to our present argument, is not here insisted on.

We have now seen what are the additional pleasures conferred on those who enjoy the united small forced masses of wealth, abstracted from numerous contributors. If the enjoyment of the first portion which the rapacious receives, suppose, from the first of the 1000 contributors, is considerable, that, from the last of the 1000 portions, will be scarcely perceived. Now it mostly happens that the person receiving

these 1000 portions is not in the same circumstances, is not in equal want, with those who contribute the 1000 portions: and therefore even the first portion, on him, will produce a very trifling effect in the way of pleasure, compared to the pain of the loss. And, while the pleasure of the gain is, as we see, diminishing with every portion added; the pain of the loss remains the same to each forced contributor, be they ever so extensive. The pleasures from every new portion are always diminishing till they become imperceptible, while the pains of loss are the same throughout, and never decrease. Here are already fearful odds against him who forcibly abstracts the products of others' labor. But all this goes on the supposition of the first portion (if given to one in circumstances similar to those of the contributors) producing an effect in happiness gained by the enjoyer equal to that lost by the producer. The fallacy of this position was demonstrated in the last section, in which it was shown that the evils of the loss, (though abstracted by the rapacious most in need,) of the industrious producer, were as almost infinity to one when compared with the pleasures of the gain to the despoiler; the pleasures of the gain being as nothing in the comparison. The steps of our argument then are as follows, and are all facts of universal notoriety.

First, the *evil* of the loss and *its consequences* to the productive laborer exceed in a degree very great, though not capable of being put down in numbers, the advantages of the gain to the rapacious, *though both were in equal want, and though one portion only of wealth were taken from one producer.*

But, second, those who forcibly seize are almost never in equal want with the producers: whence a second aggravation of the evils of the loss.

Third, those who forcibly seize, take more than one portion from one producer; they take other equal portions from other producers; the evil of the loss of each portion succeeding the first remaining the same, while the pleasure of the gain is diminishing to infinity; whence a third aggravation of the evil of the loss.

Fourth, we shall see hereafter that, from causes inherent in the physical and intellectual constitution of man, and in the objects and circumstances surrounding him, the *capacity for enjoyment decreases* with the acquisitions of excessive wealth (that wealth only being here called excessive which is procured by any other means than those of free industry and voluntary exchanges); whence a fourth aggravation of the evil of the loss.

Let us now from these data attempt a rough numerical estimate of the evil of the loss of small, forced, masses of

wealth, to the producers, as compared with the benefit of the gain to him who has possessed himself of the whole. Say that the balance of pleasure lost by the productive laborer is as 1000 to one compared to the pleasure gained by the despoiler: and when we reflect on the *consequences* to the community, as well as the *immediate feelings* of the individual, in the tendency to annihilate industry and social improvement over an undefined circle, we shall rather be inclined to think this number too low than too high. This 1000 to one, however, is on the supposition of the despoiler being as much in want as the producer, which not being the case either amongst barbarous or civilized despoilers (wretched common pilferers and thieves excepted), we must double at least this 1000; for few despoilers are not at least twice as wealthy as those from whom they take: the evil of the loss thus becomes 2000 to one. But every additional portion of wealth gained by the despoiler diminishes in its effect on him till that effect becomes absolutely inappreciable, while the loss from a million of producers of the same quantity is the same to the last as to the first contributor. The aggravation of the evil from this cause will be plainly greater or less in proportion to the number of forced contributors. Say that the addition to the pleasures of the despoiler by the last portions is as 1000 to one compared with the pleasure the first portion gave him: it may be more or may be less. We must multiply then 2000 by 1000 to estimate the evil thus increased, and we shall find the evil of the loss to be, as 2,000,000, to one in the case of extensive forced contributions or seizures. When to all these sources of aggravation we add the fourth, to be hereafter developed, when we find the grasping despoiler, from the very circumstances inherent in his acquisitions, pining in the midst of his means of enjoyment and no longer capable of that easy excitement to pleasure existing in the industrious from whom he has taken, and once perhaps existing in himself when like them; we shall be compelled still to reduce by one half the effect in happiness produced on him by any one of these numerous small contributions. The proportion of two millions to which the evil had augmented, we must still multiply by two, or double it; and the grand ultimate result turns out to be, that the pleasure lost by the contributor of the *last* portion of a multitude of producers is to the pleasure gained by the forcible enjoyer of it, as four millions to one. In the use of even the *first* portion taken, his enjoyment was seen to be diminished as two thousand to one. The *average* of his enjoyment will therefore be the mean between 2000 and four millions, or as 1,999,000 to a single unit. The unit is the average magnitude of the pleasure

gained by the user of a multitude of small forced masses by each small contribution; the 999,000 is the comparative magnitude of the pleasure *lost* by each of the forced contributors.

Our argument is no way concerned with the numerical exactness of this calculation. It is given merely to illustrate the principles advanced, which are altogether independent of any such calculation. Let these proportions of enjoyment to the productive laborer and the extensive despoiler, be reduced a thousand fold, and they will be as 1,999 to one against taking many small portions of wealth from many to gratify one. Let the proportion be still reduced a hundred fold, and the balance will still be nearly as 20 to one against the despoiler. Continue the operation and divide still these twenty by whatever number caprice may suggest, there will still always remain some product, some *decimal* of mischief, against him who forcibly takes: and it has been already shown that justice requires that the greater sum of happiness should be always preferred.

But wherefore such concessions to injustice? The universal experience and feelings of all the thinking part of mankind, confirm abundantly the principle of our calculations to their fullest extent. Be the sum large or small, let it be a pound or a penny, of which a million are taken from a million of unconsenting productive laborers to gratify one. Does each penny or does pound give as much pleasure to the enjoyer of the whole as it would have bestowed on the industrious man, if suffered to remain with him to reward and encourage his labor? Does the single penny or the single pound give the tenth or the hundredth part of the pleasure to the holder of the million that it would have given to the producer and owner of the one? Who with human feelings and of good faith will not exclaim, "A thousand to one is the importance of such a sum to the industrious producer." But if the comparative pleasure in each case of the industrious be so very different, recollect that there are, by the supposition, one million of such cases to counterbalance the one consuming them all. It is then as ten, or as 100, or 1000, multiplied by a million of contributors, that we must estimate the loss of happiness by transferring these small portions of wealth from the million to the one. The deduction to be made for the increase of happiness by the union of the million in one hand and around one system of perceptions, is trifling, not as ten, certainly not as 100 to one: that is to say, the holder of the million does not derive ten times the happiness from the *whole* million that the owner of the one does from that one. Whether the involuntary contribution is a penny or a pound,

signifies not: the principle—the *comparative* loss of happiness is the same. A pound will supply a considerable mass of substantial comfort, or shield off want from the productive laborer. Will a pound produce the 10th, or the 100th, or the 1000th part of this benefit to the holder of the million, that it does to the industrious, despoiled of the one. A penny will purchase a little luxury of enjoyment, fruit, sugar, &c. vividly felt by the industrious producer. Will this penny produce the 10th, the 100th, or the 1000th part of this vivid pleasure to the holder of the million pennies? The principle then remains the same whatever be the amount of the sum abstracted from the producers of wealth. The evil may be truly said to be as millions, almost as infinity to one.

No doubt if a million of pounds, taken from the industrious, instead of being consumed by one despoiler, were shared amongst ten, or a hundred, or amongst a thousand, each having £1000, the enjoyment arising from the abstraction—the whole amount remaining the same—would be increased the more in proportion to the division. The evil of the suffering however would remain exactly the same. The *mass of enjoyment* on the part of the whole of the despoilers, will be increased till their number is extended to that of the despoiled, one gaining exactly what the other loses—the case illustrated in the last section.

In point of fact, a large sum never is or can be levied from one individual,—the injustice would be too palpable and flagrant; while on the other hand a very small sum cannot be divided amongst many, being limited by the trouble and expense of the collection. The smallest sum must be so large as to be worth gathering, to be felt as a gain by the user of it, while of course it is in a greater ratio felt as a loss by the producer losing it. There is no gain ever so small, worth the trouble of receiving, by the abstraction of which an indefinitely greater quantity of happiness is not lost by the loser than can be gained by the acquirer: for, let the forced object be in itself absolutely worthless, the pain of *involuntariness* remains without compensation to the loser, with all the evils of, “insecurity,” resulting from it. But, such vexation not being worth the risk and the expense, some substantial value is always superadded to the abstraction.

It appears then that our position is entirely established. The lightening of the pressure of forced abstraction, by means of division and diffusion is a mere delusion. Where the desire with the power of forcible abstraction exists, the process is diffused as the producers increase, and the largest quantity that can with prudence be withdrawn from each and every one

of them, is the only limit to the demand. The principle of security, in its branch of voluntary transfer, once violated, there is no other limit to oppression than the caprice of the rapacious, whether the spoliation is supported by laws or decrees, or by them marked out for punishment.

SECTION 10.

The produce of no man's labor, nor the labor itself, nor any part of them, should be taken from the laborer, without an equivalent by HIM deemed satisfactory. The principle of voluntary exchanges admits of no exception.

THE above proposition, it will be said, is a mere consequence of the preceding, and must be admitted by all assenting to the preceding statements and reasoning. Why then put it prominently forward as requiring particular development? From its importance, from its immense utility, it is thus put forward; and to afford an opportunity of bringing equally forward and estimating the value of some objections yet unnoticed. Truth is simple and one: falsehood is various: exaggeration and misrepresentation assume a thousand forms. A proposition so *prolific in consequences* as the above, in consequences the most important to human welfare, should be examined on all sides; and no objection, wearing any appearance of truth or sincerity, should be left unnoticed.

Certainly, if happiness be the only ultimate object that reason can pursue; if the greatest sum of happiness—intensity and duration considered—be preferable to a lesser sum; if the only practicable mode of estimating the sum, the extent, of this happiness is by the *number* of well-organized human beings united together to produce it; if labor producing wealth, the means of happiness, cannot be excited in such beings without an adequate stimulus in the way of motive; if the most efficient stimulus that can be employed is *security* to the producers in the *entire use* of what they produce; if all *voluntary* exchanges necessarily imply an increase of happiness to *both* parties, while involuntary exchanges or *forced abstractions* of the objects of wealth, produce at their extreme point the disorganization of society, and in all their stages misery incalculable; if no pretended expedients for lessening these evils of force by division and diffusion produce in practice any other effect than extension and multiplication; then is it plain

that no particle of the matter of wealth, the product of labor, nor of course the labor itself, can be forcibly withdrawn from its producer without lessening the sum total of human happiness, the grand object of our pursuit.

Forcible abstraction is always included in *involuntary* exchange: for suppose that eleven portions of an equivalent are given to him who deems the value of his labor to be twelve portions, the balance, the one portion in this case, between what is given and the estimate of the loser, is so much taken by forcible abstraction. Here the source of the main sophistry, to be combated under this proposition, lies.

“God forbid,” says hypocrisy, “that I should take away forcibly the product of any man’s labor! I take nothing for which I do not give an equivalent—an equivalent infinitely beyond the value of what I take: but the ignorant creature to whom I give an equivalent, physical or *moral*, in return for what I draw from him, is not able to judge of what is for his real interest. If left to his own short-sighted views, he would refuse the superior good I offer him. The necessity of things compels those who have superior intelligence to make use of it for the benefit of the uninformed, the mass of mankind. Why does man provide for the inferior animals, and compel them to those habits and modes of existence which are necessary to their well-being? why, but because the intelligence of man supplies their want of intelligence? In as far as the ignorant resemble in this respect inferior animals, their interest must in the same way be promoted, even without their acquiescence, by those who understand it.”

The analogy between man and animals of inferior orders, altogether differing from him in organization and intellectual capacities, is futile and merely poetical. The analogy between the conduct which man pursues towards inferior animals, and that which he ought to pursue towards other men constituted like himself, is void of foundation, because the *object* which he aims at in the one case is diametrically opposed to the only rightful object which he ought to aim at in the other. The object which man seeks in his treatment of inferior animals, is avowedly the happiness of *man alone*, without any regard to the happiness of such inferior animals, except in so far as their comforts may coincide with the interest of man. They are in the hands of man machines, like the steam-engine or the thrashing machine, kept clean, and bright, and strong, that they may the better perform the purposes to which they are directed. As the living machines can *feel*, while the others are insensible, every sympathetic owner of such living machines takes care to remove from them all sources of discom-

fort which are *not necessary* for the due performance of the labors imposed upon them. The infliction of such pain, causes, from association, pain to the owner; and its practice leads to habits of cruelty, the antagonist of benevolence, which is the basis of social virtue. Thus the *service* of the inferior animal is the only direct object man has in view: the happiness of the animal is secondary, and when incompatible with the first, the direct object, must always yield to it. Not so with man in the treatment of his fellow-creatures. The only rational object here, is to promote the greatest sum of happiness amidst the whole community of beings, the relative importance of the agent being but as one to the whole number. It is plain therefore, from the dissimilarity of the objects to be aimed at, that the mode of conduct which would be rational and appropriate in the one case, would be altogether inappropriate and irrational in the other, and that no analogy can be drawn under such circumstances.

The next point of distinction is the utter dissimilarity between the *nature* of the two orders of beings, men and inferior animals, to be operated upon. From the inferior organization and consequent inferior intellectual capacity of the lower animals, man *must* obtain by compulsion their services, or do without them. They are not capable of being operated upon by motives of distant good addressed to the will: scarcely could any of them be made to comprehend even the reward of food to repay the exertions of the passing day: the only labor they can be brought voluntarily to perform is what is necessary to supply their immediate physical wants: pressed by appetite, they seize and enjoy. Whatsoever more they may do in communities, in a state of nature, in the domestic state, under the influence of man, they have never been brought to act but by compulsion, or for the immediate gratification of appetite. Who could make a horse, for instance, comprehend that if he did not perform a certain quantity of work during the day, he would for that day be deprived of food? How mighty the difference between the intellectual power of man and such animals! Distant motives which operate at the termination, not only of a day, but a month, a year, or the whole of life, can be made, and are made, to influence the conduct of the least intellectual of mankind. As man has the *power*, through the comprehension and foresight, of being influenced by such remote motives, so has he the *inclination* to yield to their suggestions when proved to be conducive to his welfare; and his conduct is never so energetic as when it is voluntary. Those means of compulsion, then, which in the case of other animals we must employ, in

the case of men *need not* be employed, and *ought not* to be employed, so different are the organization and constitution of the two orders of beings to be operated upon. If inferior animals had such intellectual capacity that they could be operated upon without direct compulsion, great would be the economy of human time and labor in so conducting them: a *motive*, comprehended in the morning, would keep them at work during the day. In the case of brutes, then, it is not an *advantage* to man to be constrained to operate upon them by means of force and compulsion, but a very great *disadvantage*: it is not a *gain*, but a *loss*. That system of force, which nothing but necessity compels us, and always at a serious loss, to adopt towards inferior animals,—shall we adopt it without necessity, and where from other causes the loss would be so wonderfully enhanced, towards human beings?

The analogy from the treatment of man towards inferior animals of a nature *differing* from his, to what his conduct ought to be towards other human beings whose nature is *exactly similar* to his own, being thus disposed of; what remains in the objection to our position? The general fact as to the evils of compulsion is conceded; but in particular cases it is still contended that “labor or its products may be abstracted when a real equivalent is given, although the producer may not be able, from ignorance, to appreciate the value of the equivalent. It may not be always possible to satisfy the selfish ignorance of the producer or laborer, though 100 times a real equivalent were offered him in exchange for his labor or for the article of wealth it had produced.” In such case we say *universally*, Let no exchange be made. The benefit of the equivalent, though real to the enlightened, will be altogether swallowed up and lost in the evil of the compulsion.

We wish to obtain from the industrious a portion of his labor, or an article of wealth the product of his labor. There are two modes of proceeding to accomplish this desire; *compulsion*, or the offer of such an equivalent as shall lead the possessor to a *voluntary* transfer. In all ordinary cases we suppose it conceded that compulsion would be most pernicious. What are the extraordinary cases in which compulsion might be permitted? It will be said, Where the equivalent is really sufficient, and where the ignorance of one of the parties is such as to preclude him from seeing its real value.

It is desired to make an exchange. How is this desire known? by the expression of the wish of *one* of the parties only? That cannot be; for to make an exchange, the concurrence of at least two is necessary. Without two desires there can be no exchange. One desire may lead to rapine.

But the second party comes forward and consents to an exchange, provided an *unreasonable* equivalent is obtained. Who is to ascertain the unreasonableness? This insuperable difficulty we pass by, and admit the claim to be really unreasonable. Shall the unwilling be *compelled* to take a reasonable equivalent? The evils of forcible abstraction have been pointed out. Until the possessor or laborer is satisfied, the abstraction is forcible, *for so much*, as to him: and the usual evils of force will follow. What are the benefits in this case, to counterbalance these evils? The allowed superior real value of the equivalent forced upon him. Involuntariness will deprive it of all its value, and turn its blessings into poison. Now, it is clear that if there be in the nature of things any mode by which the use of the really superior equivalent can be transferred to the unreasonable bargainer without incurring the evils of force, of forcible abstraction, that mode should be pursued. That mode does exist, and consists simply in *enlightening the mind* of the unreasonable. The unreasonable has intellectual capacity equal to that of him who kindly wishes him to take a superior equivalent, or he has not. If the capacity be equal, the benefit of the exchange—which is supposed to be a real benefit—can be surely demonstrated to him. If his capacity be inferior, the advantage of superiority of intellect is supposed to be on the side of reason; and in such case is not persuasion certain? Nay, is not the probability overwhelming that such superior intelligence could make even unreasonable, and very unreasonable, exchanges, appear reasonable to the inferior in understanding? No doubt that reason prompted by interest—for in all free exchanges the interest is reciprocal—could effect this. Why is it not then universally employed? To save the *trouble of showing the truth*, to those who by the supposition are in possession of it, and of superior intelligence too, to explain and demonstrate it. What possible reason is there why all the evils of force should be suffered in order to save trouble, the trouble of persuasion, to those who are in possession of the truth? What is this trouble? what is the amount of it? where are to be found the constituents of this evil, of this trouble of persuasion? Is persuasion unamiable or uninstructional? Is persuasion, by unfolding the truth, and showing the real qualities and relations of things, and the real consequences immediate and remote of actions, less instructive to him who persuades than to him to whom the persuasion is addressed? 'Tis impossible to say to which of the parties it is most useful. To the ignorant it gives knowledge and happiness by teaching him his real interest, and inspires him with the pleasurable feeling of grati-

tude for the benefits received. To the intelligent it affords an opportunity of exercising and improving his talents, leads him to gentleness and benevolence, and supersedes the inclination to violence and injustice. Thus does this pretended trouble, this scarecrow, turn out, on examination, to be a real benefit, a benefit which wisdom would invent, if nature had not prescribed it. So triumphant, on an accurate analysis, are found the benefits of reason, of persuasion, of gentleness, so fatal the effects of compulsion and violence, that even the very evils, falsely said to flow from an undeviating adherence to justice, are found to be blessings. It is proved that no evil effect arises from deferring exchanges until *both* parties exchanging are satisfied with the equivalents they receive. The immense majority of exchanges, without which social intercourse could not be carried on, nor human life scarcely supported, are entirely voluntary; without which voluntariness, no objects of wealth could be produced, nor happiness ensue therefrom. On all ordinary occasions, there could be no question in any reflecting mind that an involuntary exchange is a sort of contradiction in terms, and that one party to an exchange has an equal right to be satisfied with the other. But as the universality of this principle would altogether eradicate all pretended right of force, all encroachments of injustice, an extreme case of undoubted wisdom and benevolence on the part of one of the exchangers, and of ignorance and selfishness on the part of the other, has been put forth. It has been shown how utterly groundless is the demand for the employment of force even in this case; that reason is the appropriate instrument to effect such exchanges, and that the process by which it operates is equally useful to all parties. Will it be said that a great deal of time may be lost in effecting such persuasion? that while reason is working its way, all the benefits of such exchanges are lost to both parties? Is it necessary still to reply, that the actual and practical benefits of such pretended exchanges are imaginary? that the question is not, what good they would do if occurring between parties inclined to the transfer because aware of its advantages, but between parties one of whom denies the value of the equivalent and whose disinclination would nullify all its pretended benefits? that where, as in all ordinary exchanges, there is a real equivalent, that equivalent is universally seen and acknowledged? that in all cases where effort is required to convince one of the parties, there must be great doubt and uncertainty as to the assumed benefit? that men are ordinarily clear-sighted as to what affects their interests? and that if the use of compulsion were in any case justifiable, it would be just in that case where it is not

used, where the reciprocal benefit of the exchange is clear and undisputed? and that it becomes manifest from all these circumstances, that nothing but a secret consciousness of the insufficiency of the equivalent can ever induce a rational being to put in a plea for the enforcement of exchanges of labor, or of its products, by compulsion?

Behold the benefit, the inappreciable benefit, of the *universality* of the principle of voluntary exchanges, of exchanges deemed satisfactory equally by both parties! It operates as a simple and all-sufficient *check* to arrest force, fraud, or injustice, in any shape, under the guise of exchange; it necessitates the exercise of intellect and benevolence; and there is not in the nature of things any other check to be substituted for it. Allow in one instance the principle of force instead of that of persuasion in the effecting of exchanges, and where will you stop? The same judgment, the same power, that compels one exchange, may compel another, and another, till all is caprice on the one hand, and pining of industry on the other. An infallible judgment would be necessary to enforce none but useful exchanges; while the *enforcement* even of such entirely useful exchanges, would dissipate the good effects expected from them. On the principle of voluntary exchanges, is the equivalent offered by either of the parties unsatisfactory to the other, though really useful to him? What stronger motive can be conceived for the exercise of the mental powers of the party wishing the exchange? In order to succeed in his object, to get the equivalent desired, he must persuade: in order to persuade, he must cultivate his own reasoning powers, he must study the disposition, the mind, of him whom he wishes to convince: he will show the uses to which the equivalent may be applied; he will communicate knowledge in order to excite a counter-desire to his own to get the exchange effected. He will also study the *feelings* of him whom he wishes to persuade; he will neither do nor say any thing revolting or offensive, he will seek to soothe and to please him, and will thus learn the habit of conciliation and kindness; and what interest first prompted, habit will confirm. Exchanges, leading man out of himself, thus become the parent of benevolence as well as of intellectual culture. The utility of the check to injustice from the universality of the voluntariness of exchanges, proceeds as much from its extreme *simplicity* as from its universal application. Who so ignorant, so devoid of understanding, as not to know without the possibility of error, when the industrious is satisfied with the equivalent offered him for his labor or its produce? Who can effect a mistake on this head? Without voluntariness, the equivalent,

is not delivered. Where force is excluded till both parties are satisfied, there is no act done. 'Tis the plainest of human transactions. How much unlike the opposing system of compulsion, forcing a real equivalent ! Where is here the check ? Where is here the simplicity ? Check, there is none : for the unsatisfied party, being ignorant, is mute ; or, if complaining, is not listened to. The *will*, the unrestrained will of *one* of the interested parties is the rule ; and that will must be influenced by the varying speculations of his mind as to the fitness of the exchange for those on whom in every case it is proposed to force it. And with a volition secured from the control of any other motives than those arising from its own views of its own isolated and exclusive interest, what mortal ever continued to judge rightly, to act with justice ? What less than omniscience can penetrate the fitness that is to square with the circumstances of others, to know their varying feelings and wants ? What mortal could undertake, what mortal could conceive, a task, so complex, so inscrutable ? If voluntariness or mutual satisfaction be the extreme point of simplicity, compulsion is surely its opposite, the extreme point of complexity and confusion.

Here nature supported by the clearest deductions of reason, presents to our hands a check to all injustice in matters of wealth, so clear, so simple, so effectual, that nothing can be wished beyond it. Why then search for arbitrary and artificial checks to restrain the operation of that fraud and force which we voluntarily permit, when we sanction any departure from the strict rule of justice, the mutual and complete satisfaction of both of the parties making exchanges ? No other check can be devised : for if it be said that the progress of reason, and consequently of morality, will ultimately show the *one* party, judging for both, the *real* comprehensive interest of both in opposition to the supposed immediate interest of the one ; what should prevent the dissenting party from being equally accessible to the influence of reason and the acquisition of morality ? Nay, by the supposition, the dissenting party will be *more* liable to the influence of reason ; for the exchange being really for his benefit, and the other party anxious to unfold the truth, the real operation of the exchange ; is it not certain that such a real interest must be soon understood ? Whereas, in the case of the party exclusively wishing for such exchange, there is a constant temptation of immediate interest to misjudge in his own favor, the *power* being vested in his own hands of deciding for the interest of both himself and another. Where the equivalent is a real one and ought to be mutually satisfactory, there is no place for the influence of

reason on the mind of him who is already satisfied; but the constant probability, nay certainty, is, that the principle of compulsion once established, the influence of reason on the mind so circumstanced, under no necessity of cultivating it, would be gradually diminishing instead of increasing, till it would be finally proscribed as a useless labor, and force under the guidance of caprice would be omnipotent.

It will not surely be said that, though none of the objects of wealth, the products of labor, should be taken from the producer without an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory, though his labor should be respected equally with its products, and for it also a satisfactory equivalent should be given; yet a part, a small part of either of these, of labor or its produce, may without injury be forcibly abstracted, though the producer may not be satisfied with the equivalent given.

It is solely with the view of leaving nothing in the way of objection, of difficulty, unremoved, that such positions as these are noticed. Captious and absurd as they may appear when brought to the touchstone of reason, positions much more unreasonable have been admitted as truths, and have been very influential, and *are* very influential in human affairs. Mankind have hitherto acted, and from the necessity of their nature they must act in order to exist, very much at random. Until the circumstances in which various communities found themselves placed necessitated a variety of experiments in social existence, in social habits and institutions, it was impossible to know, to foresee, to predict, the consequences, the good or the evil effects, which such combinations might produce. In defect of this *experience* on moral subjects, as of facts and experiments in physical matters, men necessarily substituted speculation and theory for that experience and those facts which were wanting to them. For the last two or three thousand years, however, population diffusing itself over the whole globe, facts have been accumulated, experiments have been made, and almost every possible *fortuitous* combination of maxims, habits, and institutions, have in various districts and regions been produced by the contending interests and the more or less limited views of those who formed them. The result has been as might have been expected. An immense mass of errors have been committed, producing more or less of misery, as counteracted more or less by favorable circumstances, or by institutions of an opposite tendency. From a recurrence of these *experienced evils*, mankind will at least be guaranteed, as soon as the public mind can be exercised on the data before it: and when we consider the wide-spreading misery which unwise institutions have produced

through successive ages, and the successions of happy beings which but for them might have lived, we shall not estimate at a low price such a benefit. Once entered on the right course, and warned by experience, mankind will thenceforward be occupied in devising expedients the best calculated to produce the greatest sum of happiness, arranged calmly with this sole object in view, instead of shrinking from each other's attacks and oppressions, the offspring of ignorance and ill-regulated passions. The career of social improvement is immense, co-extensive with that of physical discovery. 'Tis not to be supposed that the mere removal of obstacles will all at once produce the perfection of social happiness, any more than that the discovery of the right mode of philosophizing from observation and experiment, can all at once lead to the unfolding of all the physical secrets of nature. The man even now lives who first established the principle of utility, or the production of the greatest possible quantity of human happiness, as the paramount object of universal morality. We are not to wonder therefore that while, hitherto, in the great majority of cases, the practice of injustice has not been deemed to require any justification, the reasons for its exercise, when through condescension given, should be found inapplicable and puerile.

“A *part* of the products of labor or of labor itself may be taken away without a satisfactory equivalent.” What reason will justify the abstraction of one part, that will not justify another part and another, till the whole article of wealth, or the whole day's labor, is taken by compulsion? If an hour why not a day, if a day why not a month, if a month why not a year, if a year why not the whole life, provided it suits the interested views of those who demand such unrequited abstractions? If a pint of grain be forcibly taken, that is to say, without a satisfactory equivalent, for a trifling object, why should not a bushel be claimed where the object is more important, or a hundred bushels where the urgency of the case, in the mind of the claimant, requires it? The same principle, the partial view of utility of one of the contracting parties, that would justify the abstraction of one atom of the products of labor or of one moment of laborious toil, would justify the forcible abstraction of any portion of them. No matter that the *abstraction* demanded is small in one case: the amount *gained* is equally trifling in that same case; while the sense of insecurity remains as great in the small case as in the large. No matter that this small portion goes with other decimal portions to produce an aggregate of apparently great enjoyment for one individual. This contrivance, it has been shown, only

diffuses the mischief, while it very partially increases the enjoyment, the increase always diminishing with every added portion; while the pleasures of sympathy and benevolence arising from the voluntary transfer of a small gift, are altogether annihilated. Would you reduce the portion for forcible abstraction or forcible exchange, so low as to make the loss inappreciable? all the discomfort of the involuntariness remains, while the cost of the collection would be more than the value of the acquisition. Make all these small exchanges or small contributions voluntary. Hold out *motives* to the minds of the contributors to make an offering of these same small impalpable portions; what a difference in the effect! Instead of the deadening effect of force, the cheering influence of voluntary exertion for a useful purpose is spread widely around. Instead of the alarm and relaxation of industry arising from insecurity, renewed energy of reproduction is produced to provide the means of gratifying on future occasions similar useful propensities. Instead of the fear and distrust and malevolence engendered by the exercise of force, confidence and kindness spring up under the benign sway of persuasion.

One strange error still remains opposed to the very simple proposition at the head of this section of our argument. A notion is very prevalent that the *products* of labor, and *labor itself*, are very dissimilar in their nature, and entitled to very different portions of regard. Articles of wealth and the wealthy are universally looked upon with complacency, while those who have accumulated nothing, who have mere capacity to labor, are regarded with indifference, with aversion. Wealth and poverty, that is to say, wealth and the producers of wealth, are contradistinguished from each other, are regarded as at irreconcilable hostility. To protect wealth to its *possessors*, every expedient is devised: to protect that productive energy which called wealth into being, is deemed superfluous; nay, every where, even, are systematic combinations made to control the free exercise of labor. Many therefore, who freely admit, nay who maintain, that no atom of any article of wealth, the product of labor, should, under any pretext, be taken from its possessor without an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory, have as fiercely maintained that labor, the productive spring of wealth, might be abstracted from its possessor, without a satisfactory equivalent.

It is presumed that no one who has proceeded thus far in these pages, could be influenced for a moment by the sophistry of such pretended distinctions. Shall we respect the mere unconscious, inanimate matter which labor has produced, and shall we not more respect the persevering hand guided by the

intelligent mind that produced it? Take away from the costliest article, silk, purple, or gold, the labor employed in their production, and what are they worth? Of no human use, as articles of wealth, are the unwrought materials. If it required no labor to appropriate them, though ever so useful, like the air or the water, they would be of no exchangeable value. 'Tis labor that makes them what they are. Labor is that ingredient which turns the otherwise useless materials scattered abroad by nature, into the means of happiness to man. It is labor alone that gives them their value and currency as articles of wealth. Without it, if they were ever so useful—and there is no article of wealth more useful than the light which enables us to distinguish every article around us—they would not be noticed as articles of wealth. These articles are respected by the judicious, only in as far as they embody and represent skill and labor, and as they tend, in the use, to promote human happiness. When we value an article of wealth, it is in fact the labor concentrated in its fabrication and in the finding or rearing of its natural material, that we estimate. What more absurd, therefore, than to pretend to respect wealth produced by labor, and to disclaim the labor that produced it? 'Tis admiring Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and at the same time affecting to despise the intellect that imagined it.

Again—for what reason is it that the free disposal of the *products* of labor must be respected, for which we should not also respect the free disposal of *labor itself*? Reproduction, morality, and happiness, require equally that labor and its products should be shielded from all force or involuntary exchange. Take away what labor *has* produced, or anticipate and seize on, as it were beforehand, what labor is *about* to produce: where is the difference in the operation? where the difference in the pernicious effects? If any, the difference would be in favor of seizing the products after production rather than anticipating them, because the relaxation of the producing industry is avoided where the products already exist, and the effect of discouragement would be only against *future* productions. But where the labor is compelled, the product itself to be seized upon is raised and completed with diminished energy. We deprecate the forcible seizure of an article of wealth, not for any evil, any ill effect, to be produced on the article itself, on the inanimate object, but for the evil to be produced on the intelligent agent, on the mind of the producer. The article itself is not necessarily injured, is equally capable of use whether transferred voluntarily or involuntarily; but the alarm, the sense of insecurity, the discouragement of future production, the disinclination to labor which is de-

frauded of its reward, are produced equally by compelling labor, or seizing, or giving an unsatisfactory equivalent for, its products. The injurious effects on the *mind* of the industrious, limiting future production and producing other *moral*, as well as these economical, evils—which are the only points to be regarded—are the same whether labor or its products are attacked; and the products of labor can in no case be considered but as the representatives of labor itself. The dead material is nothing: the active mind and hand are the sole objects, in our present point of view, of philosophical and moral regard. Under what pretext could I demand that the labor of any human being should be forcibly directed to my benefit, that could not be equally pleaded by that person in demand of the unrequited benefit of my labor? Further on, it will be pointed out how very inconsiderable are the effects on production and happiness, of the wealth absolutely accumulated in any society, compared with the powers of future production of that same society.

The universality of the principle of the freedom and voluntariness of exchanges being established, it will be incumbent on those who plead in any case for a departure from the rule, to demonstrate *particular* benefits from the departure in that case, preponderant over the general benefits of the rule.

SECTION 11.

The materials of wealth, the products of labor, should be so distributed, as to accomplish the double object of promoting the utmost possible EQUALITY of enjoyment and the utmost possible PRODUCTION; that is to say, so as to promote the utmost possible equality of distribution consistent with security; security alone calling forth the complete development of every useful human energy, physical and intellectual.

As it has been attempted, it is hoped successfully, to demonstrate, that all well organized human beings are capable, by similar treatment, of enjoying equal portions of happiness, particularly of that species of happiness which arises from the use of articles of wealth, and that of course the happiness of the greatest number of such similarly constituted beings must be constantly preferred to the happiness of any smaller number, when found—which under wise arrangements would scarcely ever be the case—incompatible with each other; it

would seem to follow that it should be our object to promote equally the happiness of all without any distinction of persons, and that *equality of happiness* should be the object aimed at. For if they be all equally capable of enjoyment, why give more to one than another? If this system of absolute equality were consistent with production, it ought to be universally adhered to. Successive portions of wealth diminish in their power of producing happiness when added to the same individual's share: but when divided amongst many individuals, the productive power of each portion is wonderfully increased, though the glitter of the effect may not be so apparent. The demand of justice would seem then to be, that the mass of wealth of the society should be divided in *equal portions* amongst its members.

This argument would be irresistible were not *labor necessary for the production*, for the existence, of wealth. This circumstance introduces a limitation to equality: which limitation however must be guarded within the strictest limits of its proper end. *Wherever equality does not lessen production*, it should be the sole object pursued. Wherever it decreases really useful production, (that which is attended with preponderant good to the producers,) it saps its own existence, and should cease. Let us illustrate this limit, which nature seems to have placed in the way of the wide wish of beneficence, the impartial hand of justice.

Suppose any article, now an article of wealth because an object of desire and requiring labor for its production, such as wheat, or sugar, or hats, were produced, by the mechanism of nature or by any other means, independent of human effort: suppose it to be produced, not like air or daylight, superabundant for the wants of all, but in such quantities as would give a *limited supply* to each individual in the community. Suppose that the supply increased regularly with the increase of population, without any exertion from any part of that population, but never to that extent to give an abundance to all that wanted. Water and air and light are useful articles, as useful, or more useful, than either wheat or sugar or hats: but though they are not for the most part in any way dependant on human co-operation for their supply, they exist in such excess as not to afford the means of our present illustration. Suppose then such a quantity of hats, always increasing with the increase of population, produced yearly without human effort, as, if equally divided, to afford one hat or two hats to every individual in the community for his yearly consumption. What distribution of these hats will produce in the consumption, the greatest possible

quantity of happiness? Shall we give three or four, or ten or twenty hats every year to some individuals, and leave others without any hat to wear, exposed to the changes of the weather, the moisture, cold, and the fervors of the summer's sun? The owner of the additional number—exchanges being out of the question—could derive no benefit from his superfluity, but the gratification of the childish vanity of the constant newness of the article he wore, say a new hat every month. If the enjoyer of the twelve hats in the year were of a well-regulated intellect and acquainted with the pleasures of sympathy, he would feel infinitely more pain or discomfort in the contemplation of the evils suffered by those whose share of hats he used, and of course left unprovided, than he could feel pleasure of vanity from the use of the additional unnecessary hats. But, be this as it may, let all the gratification which ignorant selfishness can picture to itself as arising from such a cause, be felt by the possessor of the many hats, what is the amount of the additional good gained to him, in comparison to the good lost (or evils endured) by those compelled to forgo the use of those hats? There are no limits to the consequential evils that may arise to the health, independent of the daily disreputableness and discomfort, of those who are compelled to do without hats. The question therefore will admit but of one answer. An *entire equality* should be preserved in the distribution of such articles, as every departure therefrom trenches immediately upon happiness, adding nothing to the gainer in comparison to what it takes away from him from whom the article is withheld. Strict equality is the invariable rule of justice and benevolence: Were the article, yearly showered down, or otherwise without labor obtained, wheat, or sugar, or any other useful because agreeable substance; (if followed by no counteracting ill effects) the rule would be the same, absolute equality of distribution. Were the free unearned supply of wheat or sugar sufficient for a day's, a month's, or a year's supply of food, or of the sweetener of food, to every individual in the community, it would be found on analysis, that in every case, be the quantity, large or small, so as to be within the limits of superfluity, equality of distribution would produce the greatest sum of happiness. If the supply of unearned wheat were sufficient to give but one day's consumption to every consumer in the community, every one ought to enjoy the one day, rather than the half or any smaller number should enjoy many days; for the capacity for enjoyment being the same, and neither having acquired by labor any property in the article, there is no possible reason why two or more portions of

happiness, or the means of happiness, should be given to the one at the expense of his neighbour. Were wheat an object of desire and of rarity, as in this case it would be, the person using it for thirty successive days, or using thirty times the quantity, would not (all other things being equal) derive as much enjoyment therefrom as thirty consumers of single shares; for each of them would enjoy the novelty of the acquisition, while every portion after the first would be more and more losing this quality, and be growing indifferent to the consumer of the thirty shares. The mere physical enjoyment of eating, of the thirty, moreover, would be enhanced by the pleasure of sympathy in the contentment of those around equally enjoying; while the enjoyment of the single consumer of the thirty shares would be diminished almost to nothing by the envy and ill-will of those deprived of equal shares. If there were no other food to be substituted for the wheat during the day, that one or more were deprived of their portions for the benefit of others, the evil would be extreme: but to put the most favorable case for inequality, we have supposed the supply of wheat to be a mere treat, a better sort of food, a species of luxury, as it would be to Irish laborers or West India slaves. As long as the article is in such quantity as to be divisible into shares capable of giving palpable enjoyment, the whole sum of happiness will be increased by the equality of distribution. Were the article sugar instead of wheat, or a mere article of luxury, procured in any limited quantity without human effort, the effect would be the same,—diminution of happiness would always arise from inequality of distribution. When a luxury becomes multiplied and many shares are given to one person, it *soon ceases to be to him a luxury*, it becomes a mere necessary, not a necessary of nature, but of pure convention, and with thirty times the quantity he frequently, from sated appetites, enjoys less than the consumer of the one, to whom that share is a luxury. Therefore in all cases, whether of luxuries or necessities, wherever labor has not been used in the production, equality must be observed in the distribution in order to produce the largest sum-total of happiness.

But, *in all those cases* in which wealth is the article to be distributed, *labor* is necessary for its production;—labor in searching for, labor in capturing or tending, labor in separating, labor in fashioning and preparing, as applied to pearls, jewels, and other precious stones, to domestic or wild animals, to extracting ores, saccharine or other juices, to the fabricating of all manufactures. In some shape labor must be applied to an article of use or mere desire, in order to constitute it an article

of wealth; and without labor there is no wealth. In the mere effort of seizing and appropriating what had before been seized and appropriated by no one, as in taking water from a common well, it is the application of labor alone that turns that into property which before belonged to no one. Labor therefore, as before proved, is the universal parent of wealth.

Having found out this ingredient which separates those objects of desire and utility, which are called wealth, from all other objects of use or desire to which the term wealth is not applied; let us suppose another case to be put abreast of the preceding case of wheat, sugar, hats, obtained without labor.

We now suppose an equal quantity of wheat, sugar, hats, to be produced every year that were obtained spontaneously before. The same quantity of all these articles is every year at the disposal of the community; but the yearly labor of one-half, or some other portion, of the community has been employed in producing them, in seeking for their materials, extracting and fashioning them. Shall we in the distribution of these articles follow the same rule of equality and impartiality that we advocated before? Will an equal distribution of these articles, obtained by means of labor, tend to produce the greatest possible quantity of happiness, as it would have done in the case of those same articles when obtained yearly without any labor of any individual?

Every one sees that a new law of distribution must here be introduced. Every one sees that the blessings of equality cannot in this case be obtained without injury, without producing unpleasant feelings and emotions, to those whose exclusive labor has been employed in the production of the articles in question. The industrious, whose time has been occupied, whose mental and corporeal powers have been respectively on the stretch, to produce these articles with the view of adding to their own comforts, stand forth and claim as their own, as *their property*, what their labor alone has made what it is, distinguishable from the unappropriated and unwrought articles around them. To take from them what their arm guided by their mind has produced, is like taking from them a part of themselves. It represents and exhibits in a palpable form their superiority to the unthinking, the improvident, the indolent. The motive to their exertion was the *use* of the articles to be produced; and the free use implies the power of free disposal. Is it useful to encourage this claim of right, this notion of exclusive property, on things appropriated and formed by labor? Without the acknowledgment of this right, it would be evidently folly to

produce them at all. *Without it they would cease to be produced.* As soon therefore as a new supply of articles springs up that are produced by labor, a new law of distribution, or a modification of the old law of equality as applied to articles *not* produced by labor, must be devised. The one set of articles will be produced to all eternity, though no labor be exerted in producing them: the other exist by labor, and derive all their value, as articles of wealth, from the labor bestowed upon them. This new law, rule, or suggestion of wisdom therefore is, as before established, "Secure to the producer the free use of whatever his labor has produced." Here then is a new rule of action, apparently antagonizing with the former rule of equality, counteracting it in all cases where labor is employed in producing an article of usefulness real or supposed.

What shall we do then? shall we renounce the blessings of equality as ideal, and not applicable to that real state of things attendant on human associations? By no means. First, the rule of equality must always be followed where no labor is employed in the production. Second, *Wherever a departure is made* (which ought scarcely ever, *if ever*, to occur) from the principle of "securing to every one the free use of his labor and its products," that departure should always be *in favor of equality*; not to increase the necessary and unavoidable evils of inequality.

Wisdom and justice then looking forward to enjoyment, and to production as the necessary means of enjoyment, admit in its fullest extent the claim of the industrious to the exclusive use of the produce of their industry. Is this admission a hardship on the rest of the society who have not produced, from want of foresight, from want of skill, from want of strength, from want of activity? Must the rule of equality and all its increase of enjoyment be given up in favor of the producer, and must the non-producers be left destitute while the producers have an excess?

The producers have an excess, that is to say, have more than their own immediate gratification demands. *Absolute equality* in the distribution of articles produced by labor, that is to say of articles of wealth (meaning always labor by competition, the ordinary mode of labor of all societies), is impracticable, or if practicable would, under the system of individual competition, be unwise. As absolute equality in such articles is out of the question, the next object of wisdom and benevolence is to make as *near an approach as possible to equality*, as near as is consistent with the greatest production.

The producers have an excess. What is to be done with

this excess? The improvident, the non-producers want. How are they to obtain? Here a third principle, that of "voluntary exchange," presents itself, which reconciles all the apparent contrarieties of equality and security. This principle, steadily pursued, leads to the utmost practicable equality, is a branch of security, necessitates the greatest production of the objects of wealth, and thus ensures the greatest mass of happiness.

The non-producers want. They want, because they have been unemployed while the industrious were producing an excess beyond their own immediate wants. If not absolutely idle, they have been comparatively unindustrious, because the producers have found the means to exist, as well as the non-producers, while their skill and labor were perfecting for use some unappropriated materials. The non-producers want; but they have nothing to give in exchange, nothing in the shape of wealth. What is wealth but labor concentrated in an article of desire? The non-producer has not *now* this; but, as long as he has labor and faculties, he has the means of producing it, he has that which alone gives it its value, which makes it what it is: the fountain of wealth, of property is within him. The non-producer has two modes, apparently different, but in reality the same, of procuring from the productive laborer the excess of his industry. He may either put his labor under the direction of the producer, the owner, of the article he wants, until he gives him an equivalent in labor; or he may apply his labor himself to the searching for, or preparation of, some article which the owner may deem a satisfactory equivalent. In both cases it is evident that the return which the laborer gives is the same. In neither case can either he or his employer *create* any material thing: all that they can do is to find it out, and mould it or put it in a way of being operated upon by natural influences chemical, vegetative, and so forth. Working for an employer, his labor superadded to the article, land, wood, cotton, &c. given him to work upon, is the only addition or change made in or to that article. Working for himself on the same material, and bringing that material when wrought as an equivalent, the process is exactly the same. Labor, equally in both cases, is the article added. Where the employer supplies the material to work upon, it is true that *more* labor must be given. But why so? To supply the labor previously expended in rearing or procuring the article, or bringing it up even to that rude state in which it is given to the laborer to be worked upon. Had he procured himself this material, he must have devoted this extra labor to it, so that the *quantity of labor* on the whole is the real

constituent of the value which forms the equivalent, as it was the real constituent of the article of wealth desired in exchange.

The non-producer then possesses the means of acquiring by labor and subsequent exchange what the producer has to spare. Having failed to produce it by his own industry, and not perhaps having the skill for the peculiar industry in question, he can in some other mode fix or materialize his labor so as to produce some article of desire to serve as an equivalent.

Thus we see that by means of the *voluntary exchanges* of labor or its products, we have a rule of action which reconciles and brings into harmonious operation the two principles of equality and security, of procuring the greatest mass of the materials of enjoyment, and of producing by means of them the greatest sum of happiness.

The only rational object of the production of wealth, as of all other human effort, being the increase of happiness to those, of whatever number, who produce it, equality of distribution tending the most efficiently to this end, except in as far as limited by equal and impartial security, and the freedom of voluntary exchanges (implied in security) leading directly to the utmost possible equality consistent with reproduction by individual competition; what other conceivable means can there be of educing the greatest sum of happiness from wealth which it is capable of producing, than by maximizing the blessings of equality and security? So far from being irreconcilable with each other, it is only by an undeviating adherence to (real) equal security that any approach can be made to equality. What has been hitherto worshipped under the false name of security, has been the security of a few at the expense of the plunder, the degradation of the many; particularly of the whole mass of the operative, the real, producers of wealth. This spurious unequal security is as much opposed to equality of wealth, as equal security is friendly to it. Security as to wealth implies the free disposal of labor, the entire use of its products, and the faculty of voluntary exchanges. The maintenance of this real and equal security tending to the greatest production, leads also to the utmost possible equality. These two objects of pursuit therefore so far coinciding as that the greatest quantity of the one will lead to the greatest quantity of the other, what so simple as the rule of action? promote in every thing the greatest possible security, and you promote the greatest production and the greatest equality. In as far as you depart from equal security, you lessen equality: in as far as you interfere to promote inequality, you lessen security.

Can there then be any question as to the propriety of *so distributing* these articles of wealth as to produce this two-fold result? Is there any other secondary and subordinate principle of distribution to be kept in view (the first and paramount principle being always the production of happiness) superior to this, or to be any way regarded in comparison with it?

The false principles that have guided mankind, the injurious objects they have had in view in the distribution of property, are almost without number. In one end only do they seem to have all met,—in the promotion of the supposed interest of those in power and possession. To maintain equality and security, equality as far as reconcileable with security was never contemplated by them. Sometimes, from a confused view of the benefits of equality, they have endeavoured to establish and maintain it in an absolute manner: but this was only done at the expense of making slaves of half the community, the productive laborers, as in Sparta, and in a less flagrant degree in the other states of Greece, or of eternal commotions and speedy relinquishment of an impracticable undertaking, as in the early ages of Rome, or the first institutions of Christian communities. Veering between equality and security, not knowing how to reconcile the opposing claims of these mortal adversaries, one or the other gained the ascendant as the pressure of the evil from its opponent happened at the time to be most severely felt; and, for want of knowledge, the best men have advocated and forwarded the most atrocious injustice. This happened even in republican governments, where the good of the greatest number was the presumed object in view. But under all other systems and institutions, where such an object as the happiness of the greater number was, not only not an object of contemplation, but was systematically disregarded, and where the acquisition, the increase, and the perpetuating of wealth and power, to those possessing them or either of them, was the declared object of pursuit; where the interest of the greater number was at times incidentally pursued, as the interest of horses is pursued, to make their work more profitable to their masters; there ignorance and violence usurped, and vested, sometimes in one, sometimes in a few, sometimes in many, the wealth of the community; and short-sighted and rapacious views almost always impoverished and always made vicious and miserable the whole of that community. From the usurpations of the rude chief of a savage or pastoral tribe over his neighbors, falsely justified, because naturally led to, by the *unanalogous* practice of unlimited parental authority, to the wide rule of an early Ethiopian, Egyptian, Assyrian, or other eastern despot; and from them

down to the present day, through all the varieties of fortuitous institutions, as particular interests happened to preponderate, the distribution of wealth has been always so regulated, with more or less of skill according to the knowledge of the contrivers, as to enrich the dominant party, at the expense of the greater number of the community, of the productive laborers, seizing the products of their labor by force, instead of voluntary exchange. Whether a single individual with his assistants usurped all, as was most frequently the case, through all the history of Asia and Europe; whether the priesthood, as amongst the ancient Jews, the subjects and worshippers of the Dalai Lama of Thibet, and the people of modern Rome, acquired such an ascendant as to seize on the power of making and administering the laws; whether an institution half priestly, half kingly, amalgamating the vices of both, as in the Turkish system of the faith descended from Mahomet; and (in an inferior degree, in the British system of king of Church and State, descended from Henry VIII.) monopolized all power to itself; whether an army, as the Mamelukes of latter days in Egypt, and in a considerable degree during Buonaparte's military sway in France, was the paramount authority; whether a set of men, under the name of nobles, patricians, privileged orders, lords, or other designation, seized on, for a longer or shorter period, for life, or to descend to their descendants, wise or foolish, the right of governing a community, as in Venice and other un-mixed aristocracies; or whether a fortuitous mixture of these different interests occurred, and a species of compact was formed between them or any number of them, to exercise for their joint benefit the powers of legislation and execution, as in most of the old Italian and Swiss Republics, in Poland before the partition, in Holland, England, and in most of the late European governments;—under all these systems of rule, the *principle* of “voluntary exchanges” has been almost equally violated: *in practice* the violation has not been carried so far in some as in others. But the principle has been every where disregarded; and with the sacrifice of the principle of voluntary exchanges, has been necessarily sacrificed the principles and the blessings of *equality* and of *security*; the only mode of deriving the greatest happiness from each of these being, as has been shown, by means of entire voluntary exchanges. The English system of government is the most complete example of the coalition of different particular interests, combining for mutual advantage to promote each other's views; the general interest, that of by far the greater number of un-classed persons, of *productive laborers*, being altogether over-

looked, except in as far as by the physical or mental laws of nature, the interest of the producers happens to be identified with that of some of the governing classes. As a priest, through the heads of the priesthood in the house of the privileged orders; as a lawyer, through the chancellor, the head of the law, also the head of the house of the privileged orders, and possessing other immense and incongruous powers; as a member of *some* universities, through their representatives in the insolently stiled *Lower House*; as having an absurd and false addition made to a name, entitling the misnamed and his descendants to the power of voting in the making of laws and to other pernicious privileges; as a member of some corporations, each varying from the other in caprice of charter and by-laws; as the holder of certain tenures in a county, regulated by no one principle of intelligence, probity, or even pecuniary value, through the representative of such holders in the said lower house; as one of the army or navy, through the executive government and its head, the head also and cherisher of the army and navy, and having an equal power in the *making* of laws—to say nothing of executing them—with all the other component parts of the legislature together; as a collector or consumer of the public revenue, through the executive moving every thing through its corruptive influence: in any of these capacities an individual's interest may be attended to in a direct manner as forming part of the larger interest of which he constitutes a part. In an *indirect* way also, if a man has wealth enough, he can buy of a borough owner or patron, for one or many years, the power of voting in the making of laws for the community; or if he be very rich, he can almost command a senseless addition to his name, which promises him and his descendants *for ever* the faculty of co-operating in the making of laws. As a *man*, born in the country, ever so wise and intelligent, his interest is in no way recognised by the English system, which is founded on the union of the more prominent particular interests; not on a regard to the rights and happiness of sentient and rational beings. Here also, as elsewhere, the rights and happiness of one half the human species, *women*, are not only not considered, but altogether denied; the pernicious consequences arising out of which antisocial and preposterous state of things, on the interest and happiness of society at large, require only to be seriously examined, to become obvious to all. Yet was this system of political institutions, with all its evils and absurdities, the best, that is to say, the least productive of evil, of any which circumstances had generated amongst extensive communities, till the establishment of the

representative and elective system in the government of the United States of America. *There was the only sound principle of just social institutions first solemnly proclaimed and acted upon.* "No representation, no taxation," elsewhere unmeaning words, are there the undeviating rule of action; *except in the iniquitous case of slaves in many of the states, and in the degradation of women, there as amongst all mankind.* Every exchange, either directly from the productive laborer himself or indirectly from his representative whom he has deputed to act for him, is there *voluntary*. Force is excluded. Representative and elective agents in every department of the state, and nothing but representation and election—such is the simple and vivifying principle of all just government, having the greatest possible sum of happiness of the whole community in view.

What is now the inference as to our argument from this apparent digression? Can any one for a moment hesitate to admit that in all those communities the principle of "voluntary exchanges," and of course of equality and security, have in fact been, and, to ensure their very existence, must have been, systematically violated? What principle have they uniformly and necessarily substituted? The application of *force*. *Force*, more or less disguised, has been the support of them all, in utter contempt of the principle of returning to the productive laborer an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory.

Now, there is in fact no intermediate principle between the principle of "voluntary exchanges" by means of equivalents satisfactory to each of the exchanging parties, and the empire of "brute force." The *degree* of force employed, and the *direction* in which it is exerted, may vary; but the *principle* is the same, whether the robber or the ruler seizes on any portion of wealth, the product of labor, without giving an equivalent satisfactory to the producer. No intermediate principle between these two can be even conceived. Half-voluntariness is involuntariness for the portion wanting to make the satisfaction complete; and for that balance compulsion is the only alternative. All the evils of force and insecurity, superadded to those of inequality, must therefore be inherent in every mode of distribution but that which is founded on the assent of the producers. To discuss therefore all the different plans of forced distribution, would but lead to an enumeration of the evils of inequality and insecurity brought about by varying means.

All the above modes of social institutions are merely *fortuitous experiments* during the infancy, and of course ignorance, of human affairs, in social science. These experiments are not the less useful for having been fortuitous. Such is the

law of our nature, before a certain portion of knowledge of facts is acquired in any science, no comprehensive experiment can be instituted: accident must supply to observation the first materials: then thought is excited, and rational combinations and experiments, with a determinate and useful object in view, succeed to those which were merely fortuitous. The advance of any science to this point, secures its progress to perfection, or at least to great excellence. Every human energy, physical and intellectual, is exerted in its service; its legitimate *objects* become every day more clearly seen, the *means* to attain those objects become manifest, and new *applications* continually present themselves to delight and surprise the inquirer after truth and happiness. Such is now the state of social science. Fortuitous experiments in abundance have been made: reason has entered the interesting field, and will mould the vast materials, discordantly scattered around, to utility, to human use and comfort.

In as far as, under any of these social systems, priestly, republican, kingly, &c., the principle of "free exchange" of the products of labor has been respected, *in so far* has property been there distributed in the most useful manner that the knowledge of the age would permit, producing the greatest equality and security; and in so far they leave our principles untouched. In most of the ordinary transactions between individuals in the *exchange* of the products of their mutual labor—land excepted—the best regulated of these systems have not interfered in an open and palpable manner, because the trouble was considerable and they saw no adequate motive of interest: but wherever the interest, real or supposed, of those in power and possession has been concerned, voluntary exchange has been disregarded, compulsory seizure has been resorted to, and equality and security have been laid prostrate. All taxes and imposts, levied without the authority or consent of the payers, are in their very nature *forced*, and therefore destructive of equality and security. But, not content with these, the products of labor, and labor itself, have been seized, moulded, and directed in a thousand ways at the caprice of any of those possessing influence with the directing heads; sometimes with the mistaken view of doing good, more frequently with the avowed object of adding to the heaps of the most wealthy and powerful.

If security and equality be, as they assuredly are, the only two conceivable means by which the continued reproduction of wealth can be secured, and the greatest sum of happiness derived from the consumption of that wealth; if in the train of security follows the development of all human faculties physical and intellectual, the continual increase in

knowledge, and the acquisition of moral habits, and if security implies voluntary exchanges as well as the free direction of labor and the entire use of its products; what other wise and useful mode of the distribution of wealth can be conceived than that which produces the greatest equality consistent with security which guarantees the greatest production? Security being inconsistent with force or compulsion in any shape, and all other modes of distribution to promote any purposes whatever, implying compulsion, there remains no other mode of distribution than the sublime simplicity of justice, "secure to every man the free disposal of the entire products of his labor." Nothing more is wanting for man to perform in the way of distribution: the hand of nature will do the rest.

SECTION 12.

To accomplish this just distribution, NO ENCOURAGEMENTS, NO RESTRAINTS, partaking of the nature of wealth, whether of a positive or negative kind, on the direction given to labor, or on the free interchange of the products of labor, should be permitted.

It is impossible that any encouragements or restraints partaking of the nature of wealth should be given without violating the principle of security, and in most cases also aggravating the unavoidable evils of inequality. These encouragements or restraints of social science are denominated in the language of commerce, *bounties, protections, apprenticeships, guilds, corporations, monopolies*, as applying to those whom they favor; while as applying to those excluded, to the great mass and majority of the individual members of all societies, they are denominated *prohibitions, contraband*, &c., engendering the utmost cruelty of punishment to uphold the pernicious privileges which they confer. No privilege less than universal (which is no privilege at all, but a *common right* founded on *utility*) can be conferred on any individual or number of individuals, except at the expense of the rest of the community. It may be said that *all common rights* are universally supported by punishments. True—but if the pain of the infraction be universal, the advantage of the right is also universal. Universal good is upheld at the cost of occasional partial evil; while in the case of privileges, the rule is reversed: partial good is upheld at the cost of *universal evil* in the restraint of the prohibition, as well as *partial evil* in the occasional punish-

ment for infraction. No mere order or declaration will induce the rest of the society voluntarily to relinquish what ought to be their legal rights, in favor of privileged persons. Wherever therefore there is *advantage* given to any over others, the use, the enjoyment of that advantage must be secured by threats, by terror of punishment, to those who contravene, who do not surrender their rights of free voluntary exertion not interfering with similar rights in others. To such an excess have the evils of such punishments been carried, that no benefits of mere increase of wealth to the favored (even supposing that the sum total of the society's wealth was not thereby lessened) could for a moment be placed by justice in the scale of utility and happiness, against the immoralities and sufferings necessarily engendered by them*. The more flagrantly unjust these advantages are to the favored, the greater is of course the reluctance of the unfavored, the rest of the community, to submit to them; the more probable their efforts to contravene them. But in proportion to the strength of the motives, and thence of the probable efforts to contravene, must be the extent and intensity of the means, by terror and violence, to repress. Hence the more unjust the privilege, the more atrocious must be the means effectually to uphold it†. These

* See a small pamphlet on this subject addressed to the Spanish nation on the restrictive system of commerce, drawn up and edited by Mr. Bowring from the papers of Mr. Bentham.

† It is true, it may be said, that where the prohibition is useful, an increase of punishment is equally necessary in proportion to the strength of the motives, natural or acquired, to contravene. In such cases, it should be recollected that, first, the offences produced by energetic motives necessarily operating, under the given circumstances of society, cannot, *by any punishments*, be eradicated: the only thing that can be done is to confine them within the narrowest possible limits obtainable without preponderant evil of punishment: 2d, these necessary effects of energetic motives should be diverted by the law into a less injurious mode of action, as private assassination into fair duelling—a greater abomination converted into a much less: 3d, it may be doubted whether these cases of necessarily energetic motives leading to the commission of pernicious acts, be not extremely limited in amount and mostly produced by unjust institutions and restraints: 4th, the remedy, even for these, would be in almost all cases, the removal of restraints, the improvement (rather say the new modelling) of institutions, and the diffusion of knowledge: in the United States of America, there are no such things as treasons and seditions known: 5th, when these measures have been taken (which may every where be taken) it is not true, that motives necessarily energetic lead to really pernicious acts. Really pernicious acts being in themselves immoral, are opposed by the well-understood interest of every man. Perhaps, where excess of energy is usually directed to offences really injurious, all the excess is imputable to want of wisdom in the legislature; and that the *evils of the offence* are sufficient guides to indicate the quantum of punishment without any addition thereto from the urgency of motives. It requires a very energetic motive to lead to the commission of any atrocious act, because all the tutelary

considerations, which apply to every branch of social regulation, are alone sufficient to condemn any attempt to interfere with the free circulation of labor and the free disposal of its products. Wherever the new mode of direction proposed to be given to labor is in reality more productive, more useful, than the old mode, nothing more is necessary than the beneficent operation, which has been almost universally neglected, of showing those concerned, by the diffusion of knowledge, that it is their *interest* to adopt it. But, as if to demonstrate the conscious selfishness of all *forced* monopolies, as all privileges and monopolies must be—for the dread of unprotected monopolies in a community of free labor is worse than a bugbear—monopolists and their favorers have uniformly endeavoured to *conceal* all their schemes, all their knowledge, all their means of rendering labor more productive and of acquiring increased profit. The history of all monopolies and monopolists will prove these facts. As they are founded on exclusion, they are supported by the repression of knowledge and exertion.

motives, sympathy or pain from one's own feelings, retribution or pain from the injured individual or his friends, public opinion or fear of evil or of losing good from the disapprobation of our neighbours—not to speak of the terror of the law—are constantly operating to restrain. To overcome these, the motive must be strong; but in a well regulated state of things, such strong unsocial motive must be casual and founded on accidental circumstances, not permanent or rooted in human nature. When a large portion of punishment is allotted to the perpetrator of such an act, it is not, or ought not to be, in consequence of the energy of the motive, but of the injurious consequences of the action. Without energy of motive—except amongst fools—no very injurious act can take place; but we do not therefore punish the motive, but the act in consequence of its injurious effects. As a general rule, punishments ought to be lessened rather than increased, wherever powerful, natural or necessarily excited motives prompt to their commission; because the presumption in such cases always is, either that the evil of the offence is over-rated, or that the law has put an act not preponderately injurious under the class of offences. Instruction, therefore, or diversion of the line of conduct into less injurious channels, or producing a change of circumstances, institutions, &c., should be carried into effect, instead of addition of punishment. Rape is punished severely. Why? Not because a strong motive leads to it; but because of its most pernicious effects on personal security and happiness. The strength of the motive is merely to sexual enjoyment in general; and therefore none but monks and ascetics have dreamed of punishing this natural and useful inclination, but directing it so as to produce the greatest happiness. Rape is the occasional abuse, and requires a strong, but not natural or necessarily-active motive to its accomplishment: 'tis punished for its tremendously evil consequences, not on account of the falsely-pretended natural strength of motive leading to its commission. As society becomes civilized, such crimes as rape are scarcely heard of.—But this note is leading too far into digression.

See *Théorie des Peines et Récompenses*, Bentham par Dumont, vol. 1, for reasons opposed to these.

They are inconsistent with the diffusion of knowledge, which it is the duty of every friend to society to effect, in order to render labor, to whatever useful object directed, more productive. Wherever the privilege is what is called harmless, does not perceptibly infringe on the rights of others, and is attended with no penal consequences, it is in fact no privilege at all; and the uncontrolled use of public opinion would support it as far as useful. In fact, so troublesome and oppressive is the machinery necessarily attendant on privileges, that they are never employed except when it is supposed, however erroneously, that some substantial exclusive benefit is conferred by them. The moral effects therefore of privileges, guarding to a few the exclusive right to direct their labor in a particular channel,—even supposing that the wealth of the community was for the moment increased thereby,—are such as universally to condemn them. Though the materials of wealth, though universal production, were, contrary to probabilities, multiplied for the moment beyond what they would have been without the privilege, yet from the discouragements imposed on the development of the physical and intellectual energies of the rest of the community, from the consequent concealment and discouragement of knowledge, leading under the system of free labor and voluntary exchange, to immeasurable future improvements; the benefit of the small temporary addition which they could give to wealth would be beneath calculation.

Fortunately, however, the moral and economical effects of privileges and exclusions point the same way. Neither at their first establishment, nor at any subsequent period of their existence, do they tend to increase, but to diminish, the aggregate of the mass of national wealth. Their real object never has been to increase the sum total of the products of labor, but to add to the profits of the favored individuals, necessarily at the expense of the rest of the community. The *pretext* sometimes put forward to palliate their injustice, has indeed been, that they brought into existence a mass of wealth which would not otherwise have existed. But a few observations will demonstrate the futility of this pretext.

A community, consisting of a greater or smaller number of individuals, are in the habit every year of producing, by labor working upon the rude materials, and co-operating with the chemical, mechanical, vegetative and animal powers or energies of nature, a certain quantity of articles for food, clothing, habitation, and for other sources real or supposed of happiness. It is thought by some person that the community would add very much to its happiness by producing, in addition to all these, some other article which it had not been in the habit of

producing, such as sugar, cotton, grapes, or potatoes. It is evident that the mere wish of this person or of the whole community to produce or to enjoy either of these articles, does not add a single productive laborer more to the community, does not increase the natural productions on which labor must be employed, does not call any physical thing into existence which did not exist before, does not add an atom to the muscular strength and skill (labor), to the accumulated products of labor (capital), to the tools or machines for working with (also capital), or to the quantity of information, the knowledge, possessed by that community. The wish of one or of the whole community to acquire a new article, (if no improvement of skill or machinery takes place) can simply direct a portion of these their energies to its production, leaving an equal quantity of the old employment. The new article produced is obviously apparent and strikes the eye of every one; while the diminution of the old is not, on a large scale, perceived. This new article is one with which the community have been before acquainted, or of which they know nothing. If the community know nothing of it, 'tis impossible they should have any desire to enjoy or of course to produce it. What is then to be done? Simply to make them acquainted with its uses by description, by affording them information on the subject,—in a word, by *knowledge*. By using the article, and exhibiting its uses, this knowledge would of course be more expeditiously and impressively conveyed. This done, or the community already acquainted with its benefits, what remains to induce its production? The desire to enjoy it, that is to say, the *demand*, being excited, what is to prevent its production? Most probably the want is still the want of knowing how to produce it, the want of *knowledge*. But perhaps the productive laborers are already fully occupied in producing what they deem of superior importance to the new article. Here an effectual bar is opposed to the introduction, till accumulation of capital, the products of labor, or improvements in machinery or additional skill rendering labor more productive, sets free a portion of labor for the production of the new article. Perhaps their climate or their soil is not adapted to its production. Perhaps they have not the acquired skill of hand or of muscle requisite for its production. In all these cases, is it equally desirable to introduce the cultivation or manufacture of the article? and what must be done to introduce it when desired? Where all the productive power of the community is already employed in raising articles deemed of superior utility, the introduction of the new article, though in itself an object of desire, would evidently displace the pro-

duction of articles affording superior enjoyment. Where it might be advantageously substituted, there certainly it would be wise to introduce it, the soil and climate permitting. But where the soil and climate oppose, it never can be usefully introduced, from the great waste of labor in forcing, or in ineffectually endeavouring to force, its production. Where the soil and climate oppose, and where there is a superfluity of the old articles formerly produced by the community, the obvious expedient is to "make an *exchange*," provided also the articles in excess are objects of desire to the foreign producers of the new article. But it may be said, Where there are no obstacles of soil or climate, why not produce it at home, and thus acquire the double advantage of producing the articles to be exchanged and the new articles to be got in exchange for them? This is an impossibility, a mere mistake. *Both* of these articles, the exchanging and the exchanged, could not be at the same time produced at home. Suppose the article wanted was woollens, the article to be raised and sent for it, linen. Before the new article was desired, there was linen enough produced to supply the community; why therefore waste labor in producing more, if not for a useful exchange? But the new article is to be raised at home, and no exchange is to take place. Therefore that labor which, in case of exchange, would have gone to produce the equivalent, linens, is now directed to produce immediately, at home, the new article desired, woollens. If the new article be produced at home, an equivalent of articles to procure it in exchange will not be wanting, and therefore will not be produced. Whether the new article is obtained at home or in exchange, the quantity of productive labor necessary for the enjoyment of it, is the same. In the one case we devote, say every five men and women out of a hundred, to the production of woollen; in the other case we devote them to the production of linen, over and above what we want for our own consumption, to be given in exchange for the woollen. The one is a *direct*, the other an *indirect* operation to effect (at the same expense) the same object, a supply of the new article of desire, woollens. There is no advantage gained in producing the woollens at home, though there be no hindrance of soil or climate, provided; as was laid down, the community was previously fully and usefully employed. In all such cases then no encouragement is wanting, because the object to be promoted by it would not be desirable.

The most plausible ground, however, taken by the friends of *encouragements* in the way of wealth, rests on the following statement. In a thriving intelligent country they admit that

all such measures are unwise; but in a country favored by nature with navigable waters, with fertility of soils, salubrity of climate, minerals within the earth's bosom, a teeming population, unemployed, and turning to no account the materials of happiness within and around them—for such a population under such circumstances they demand encouragements to *call forth their industry*.

Alas! alas! such a state of things is a demonstration that the principles of security and equality have been grossly violated: such a state of things is a demonstration that the products of labor have been torn from the productive laborer without an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory; that voluntary exchanges have been disregarded, that *discouragements* and *obstructions* innumerable have been thrown in the way of industry, that physical and moral knowledge has been shut out from the minds of the community, and that sophistry and falsehood have been impressed upon them. Before a hand is raised or a foolish thought turned to afford *encouragements*, *invitations*, to the exertions of such a community, remove from them the mountains of obstructions under which they are buried. Whistle to an imprisoned bird to break the meshes of an iron cage and fly through to the pecking of a morsel of sugar on the outside of it: till then, cease to insult a community so circumstanced, so bowed down, *so robbed*, with offers of *encouragements* to industry. They want none of such encouragements: they ask no more than to cease to *discourage* them. Encourage them! with what? from whence should such encouragements come? *From the produce of their own industry*. There is no other produce from which such encouragement, in the shape of wealth, can come to a whole community, or to a portion of the whole community except from the remaining portion. Will you draw down, by your prayers, from heaven wealth ready made to shower *encouragements* on the way of the industry of a people? Encourage them with their own? No. But cease extracting it from them. Unloose the chains from the hands of the productive laborer. Rob him of no portion, not an atom, of his labor, without an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory.

But, if the refinements of exaction are still to be persevered in; if backed by terror, and ultimately rendered operative by force, almost the whole produce of labor is taken from the producer and scarcely enough left him to support a miserable existence; if the laborer be paid in *forced* wages, regulated at the caprice of those whose interests are opposed to his, after *forced* tithes and *forced* taxes of all sorts have been levied upon him; if the principle of "*security*," guaranteeing to the pro-

ducer the *entire use* of the products of his labor—proved to be essential to the most complete development and continuance of successful industry—be thus systematically and pertinaciously trampled under foot, how absurd to talk of *encouragements*! If to remove absolute and galling *restraints*, if to cease to practise devastating violations of the principle of security, be *encouragement*; in such a sense let encouragement be afforded, until every exchange is voluntary, and till neither labor nor its products are demanded without an equivalent deemed satisfactory by the producer. Many of those things, of those regulations, which have been called encouragements, such as bounties and drawbacks, are in truth nothing more than the removal, partial or complete, of previous forcible restraints thrown in the way of industry. A drawback, as its name imports, is nothing but the return, under particular circumstances, of a part or the whole amount of the duty, the forced levy, made on the production, carriage or transit, of certain articles, or in other words a forcible seizure of a portion of the products of labor. These therefore are no *super-added* encouragements, and do not come under the meaning of our term: they do but partially remove certain universal obstructions to free labor. Hereafter will be pointed out the only mode by which any species of impost can be reconciled with the principle of *security*, which requires free labor and voluntary exchanges. As levied hitherto, they have been plain and direct inroads on security and all its blessings. Hitherto, the meaning of the word, security, and all the advantages in its train, have been reserved exclusively for the rich: it is time that the real producers of wealth, the active and skilful laborers, should partake of its benefits, that strict justice, that perfect equality, should be observed in affording “security” to both rich and poor, that the same word should no longer have one meaning for the smaller and influential portion of society, and another, diametrically opposite, for the vast majority.

What shall be said then to *bounties*? to premiums or rewards absolutely given, over and above the natural returns of labor, still further to remunerate, and to urge to renewed exertion, the productive laborer? Here is exhibited not only a disposition to leave untouched in the hands of the producer all the products of his labor, but to *increase those products*. This language and the measures to which it would lead, on a large scale, are perfect absurdity and impossibility. It has been shown that there is no other fund in nature for the repayment and satisfaction of labor than what itself produces. A *nation's labor must repay itself*.

But a particular subordinate branch of industry, some influ-

ential person thinks, is strangely neglected, and would add much to the comfort of the community if established. First, this influential person may be wrong: next, if he be right and know better than the rest of the community, why not impart his knowledge to them? by means of which, some amongst them would adopt and introduce this particularly useful branch of industry. No, no: they would not adopt it, for it would not be *immediately* but *ultimately* useful to the community; and the bounty, the encouragement, is wanting to make up for the present loss. Whether the bounty is wanting to make up for present loss or to operate as an additional reward, it will almost universally be found that the *removal of restraints*, whether operating directly on the branch in question or affecting it in common with all other species of industry, is the only rational and really effectual operation. No doubt that by robbing other productive laborers, by still further violations of their security, by leaving them *less* of the products of their labor than they would otherwise have, and transferring it to others, those others will have comparatively *more*. But what speculation of plausibilities can justify such a strange inversion of things? Take forcibly from those who are satisfied and avowedly doing well, to give gratuitously to those who are as avowedly doing ill! that at some distant time they also may do well! Is not this a strange species of wisdom? Is it not an incomprehensible way of increasing wealth? Yet such is the simple and essential characteristic of every bounty levied on the products of labor. If it be said that such levies will be made whether applied in bounties or not, and that they had better be usefully applied than perverted to corruption or waste; we reply again, the true mode of procedure is to cease the plunder of the industrious: if the corruption or the waste be relinquished, there will be few advocates for the raising of funds for mere bounties; while the expenditure of one portion of wealth in this round-about deceptive manner is made use of as an argument for the levying of 100 times its amount for pernicious purposes. Besides, the same power that can *divert* levies, from being employed in wickedness or waste, to be expended in bounties, can cause the collection at once to cease, and thus save the cost of the machinery of collecting and again distributing.

By what mode of operation is it expected that a species of industry, a direction of labor, which is now avowedly so far from being productive as to require a premium to enable it to exist, will, by the continued application of that premium, become so productive as to be worthy of pursuit and able to support itself, like other trades, without the premium? The

bounty by giving a factitious profit to the trade draws many into it from other trades, leads them to acquire the new habits and skill peculiar to it, leads them to construct those edifices, to procure those tools and machines, which are necessary for the successful pursuit of the new line of industry. Do any of these operations, this new direction of labor, this accumulation of the products of labor, under the name of capital, in the new line, tend to make it more productive than the old? If the actual machinery or processes of the new direction, be improved after the bounty, so might the old have been improved without the bounty. It is an effectual demand operating on intelligence that would improve the old as well as the new. To ascertain the effect of the bounty and of the bounty alone, we must suppose that processes and machinery on both sides, the new and the old, remain as when the bounty began. How then can the bounty make that profitable in the end, which previously to the bounty and without the bounty, was unprofitable? "It will call the public attention to the new occupation, and will lead to the acquisition of habits of skill amongst the workmen." But in a state of free labor and voluntary exchanges, does not interest keep intelligence always on the stretch for improvement, and eternally excite the artisans to increased skill? Or, if affairs be complicated, do not bounties increase the complication, confuse the judgment, and deter from free speculation by the upholding of artificial and arbitrary regulations? "By the bounty an article is produced for the society, the value of which they could not know till they experienced its utility: but after this experience, they will continue to use it." A rare and modest price truly to be paid for an experiment which after all may turn out undesirable as probably as useful! Individual interest, and the communication of information in the particular line, is surely the proper and the sufficient expedient, an expedient, risking no possible evil, but operating entirely in good. How then can bounties alter the nature of things? how can they make that profitable which was previously unprofitable, or make that *ultimately* profitable which is not *immediately* so? It is evident that a bounty can produce no such effects. Its whole useful effect is limited to its supposed instrumentality in making people acquainted with their interest in the use of new articles; and its first step to produce this accurate knowledge of facts is to distort the features of the case! Individual exertion, the removal of restraint, and the diffusion of knowledge, are the only unobjectionable means of accomplishing such objects.

Now comes the explanation of the mode by which the bounty is supposed *ultimately* to cause the new article to be

produced at a lower price than at the beginning. By means of the bounty, a great deal of labor in the shape of capital will have been accumulated in the new employment, supported all the time by the bounty. If any part of the bounty be withdrawn, the buildings and machinery cannot follow the new direction of the bounty. If the new direction of industry be abandoned, or in part relinquished, on the withdrawing of the whole or of any part of the bounty, the buildings and materials are probably useless or of little value for any other purpose; and the loss of time and want of knowledge for other pursuits, keep the followers of the new pursuit still engaged in it. It does not follow therefore that, though the new trade may support itself when the bounty is withdrawn, it is as productive as other hardy trades which the circumstances of the country demanded without the aid of bounties. Where the trade will ultimately support itself, to the bounty it is perhaps indebted for more or less of its capital. But this accumulation of capital would not ultimately support it long, if a losing trade: a losing trade will swallow up any amount of capital. If therefore it ultimately succeeds without the bounty, the circumstances of the society must have changed during the continuance of the bounty from other causes entirely unconnected with it, and the trade would without any aid—restraints being supposed out of the way—have sprung up of itself. The more frequent result is, that when the bounties supporting particular trades are withdrawn, those trades languish and die, notwithstanding the temptation to continue them, from the great losses attending the breaking up of establishments, and of course the inclination to continue them at reduced profits. When at the end of a great number of years, during which the bounty has been constantly applied, we perceive a particular branch of industry fully developed and supporting itself on its own resources, we are apt to look on all this industry as the child of the bounty. 'Tis true that without the bounty, if the circumstances of the community did not require it, *that particular direction* of industry would not have been produced: but in another direction—all other circumstances, soil, climate, intelligence, capital, &c. being the same—a greater portion of industry would have been developed. In every case in which a bounty has so apparently succeeded, it has done no more than prematurely to force, at a greater or less expense of the wealth of the community, a particular branch of industry, which in a short period, without any of the evils of bounties, would have vigorously burst into existence and have spread its roots firm in the wants or the wishes of the people. Where the new di-

rection of labor becomes ultimately profitable, it is owing to circumstances entirely unconnected with the bounty.

The mere fact of giving a bounty shows that industry is deemed desirable by those who give it; that public attention, or at least the attention of many who think the most, is directed that way. The bounty could not have caused this original attention; it is only a mean of accomplishing its purpose. The establishment of the bounty excites in others and diffuses this attention; which object might be better accomplished in a way quite unexceptionable. As the bounty and the interest, and frequently the improvement, co-exist, the one is deemed the cause and the other the effect, without any nice discrimination, any laborious analysis. The discrimination of causes is the great difficulty of moral and economical science.

It will not be inferred from any observations here made, that the absurd notion is maintained, that the productive laborers of a country, whether as direct laborers, machinery-makers, or capitalists, are always able to judge of the most useful mode of directing their own productive powers, or that in point of fact their powers are always necessarily employed in the way most tending to increase their individual wealth or the aggregate of that of the community. This would be to assert that knowledge and wisdom are at the point of perfection in every successive and varying state of society. At this present period more knowledge is acquired than at any preceding period: yet there are, every day, changes, improvements made; preceding errors are every day rectified. Productive laborers therefore are no more infallible, have no more arrived at the end of knowledge, than those who kindly or presumptuously think for them. Their efforts are frequently directed by fortuitous combinations to labors of caprice, sometimes of mischief and vice; of caprice when directed (if voluntarily directed) to such purposes as raising pyramids for the dead or palaces for the corruption of the living;—to mischief and vice, when producing articles injurious to health and abridging the period of life, such as intoxicating liquors in larger quantities than are necessary for medical use, such as supporting and pampering an idle priesthood or army, to prostrate the understanding or the undrilled physical force of a community. But in all these cases of erroneous application of a part, and sometimes by far the greater part, of the productive powers of a community, it will invariably be found that one or the other, most frequently both, of two circumstances occur. The principle of *security* has been egregiously violated towards the laborers: by *force* their labor or its products have

been abstracted or misdirected; or, they have been deficient in *knowledge* to see their true interests. For either of these evils what is the remedy? Not surely bounties, in the proper meaning of that term; but *removal of restraint and diffusion of knowledge.*

There is nothing in numbers that should make *many* less liable to error than *one*. On the contrary, all discoveries and improvements have originated with individual faculties and have afterwards become general. It is by no means conclusive, because the productive labor of a community is absolutely directed into certain given channels, and because the producers think these channels the most useful, that they therefore really are so. Nor is it certain, because one of themselves or a looker-on thinks that a new and more useful direction might be given to a portion of their productive labor, that this new direction would be really more useful than the old. But, on which side lies the probability of a correct judgment, when the new direction is proposed, *from whatever quarter?* The one; say the lover of improvement,—for we suppose always that he is well intentioned, and not wishing to make dupes,—is naturally and creditably, if he be sincere, warmed with the utility of his own plan. His love of fame and of power, as well as his benevolence, are interested in its success. Practical details and difficulties may have escaped him. The community to whom he addresses himself are *interested* in adopting the new in preference to the old direction of labor as soon as they believe it to be more advantageous. Prejudices and habits, erroneous modes of thinking without judging, and erroneous modes of acting long continued, may, to be sure, cloud their understanding. From these, it must be recollected, however, the improver is not necessarily entirely free. In a state of free labor, of equal justice, every man is alive to his own interest, and anxious to practise what he believes will tend to his well-being. Under these circumstances, has not the improver ample means of effecting every really useful purpose, without the assistance of bounties? for, the same power that can give bounties, let it not be forgotten, can remove restraints. As to any thing in the way of bounty that any individual's private means can afford, it could only operate in the useful way of exciting curiosity, promoting inquiry, and diffusing knowledge, or correcting error: to the misapplication of *this*, the fear of private loss is a sufficient check. Has not then the lover of improvement abundant means in his hands of convincing the community, without the aid of bounties, that the new direction of labor which he proposes, is preferable to the old? for, when once this conviction is produced, the work is

done, and bounties are unnecessary. What more is wanting than to make the processes, the knowledge acquired, respecting the new direction of labor, public? and in an artificial state of restriction, to remove the obstacles to its exercise? Diffuse this knowledge, remove these restrictions where they exist, and aspiring arms will spring up in every part of the community to try, by the test of experiment, if the advantage be real. No contributions will have been wrung from others violating their security, to give a false and deceptive aspect to the result of such experiments. Individual prudence, working on its own resources, at its own risk, will reduce the loss of the experiment, if unsuccessful, to its lowest degree: and if successful, it will be universally adopted. But "inveterate prejudices may oppose the introduction." Where knowledge and experiment prove the advantage in the *way of wealth*, there prejudices the soonest retreat, or shuffle into a compromise. If not, will the giving of bounties, by magic, remove prejudices? On the contrary, will it not confirm them? Will it not be said, "You are conscious of the inutility of the new direction you wish to force some of our labor into, and therefore you plunder the industrious to give it a fictitious profit, to deceive us with an appearance of profit, which is only our earnings lavished under the name of bounties." Is it not much more likely that prejudices will be removed, when experiments are simplified as much as possible, than when they are complicated with calculations of bounties, with suspicions of fraud and collusion in the payment of those bounties? Though bounties are given, still knowledge must be diffused to attain the ultimate object: but the existence of bounties makes the diffusion of knowledge more difficult. The evil effect of bounties, as to knowledge, does not even rest here: not only do they supersede the necessity of information as to the utility of the new mode of industry; not only do they render it more difficult to acquire that accurate knowledge; but they tend to repress all useful inquiry and to lay prostrate human reason, rendering man a mere mechanical creature. Where bounties, with a greater or less degree of folly, are persevered in, the community *must* conform to the new direction given to labor; the old direction of industry, having been by *forced* means rendered unprofitable, cannot be persevered in without individual ruin: the new, the encouraged article, *must* be used, being brought cheaper to market by compulsory means than its discouraged rival. Men are therefore mechanically driven to use what they can get on the best terms, without making any use whatsoever of their understandings as to the greater or less cheapness or facility of pro-

duction, as to the greater or less adaptation to use and enjoyment. Under this arbitrary system of forced regulation, all comparison, all calculations, are stifled and relinquished, not only from the factitious difficulties thrown in the way of the inquiry, but from the absolute uselessness of the pursuit. By bounties, *any* direction of labor may be made more profitable than any other direction; and the lover of bounties is naturally led to prove the truth of his theory by adding bounty to bounty till his favorite direction becomes the most profitable. Thus does the employment of forced encouragements nullify the expansion of reason. Even on the mind of the lover of improvement itself, its effect is fatal. Supplied with the products of other people's labor to scatter artificial rewards and to make whatever direction of industry he pleases profitable, why vex his mind with the superfluous effort of looking round for illustrations and facts to persuade? His work is already done; he has only to *will* the bounty. Who shall measure the amount of wealth sacrificed in injudicious bounties? Where the exercise of reason is attended with no result either to the community or the improver, where it can produce no increase of power, no increase of enjoyment, there will it not be exercised, and the community will become mechanical unintelligent drudges.

From all these considerations it appears, that, though a community is no more hedged round with infallibility as to the most useful direction of its labor, than an individual with, or without, political power; yet is it infinitely more probable that a community, after information received and experiment made, will ultimately judge aright, than that any individual should without experiment form an accurate judgment. And in those few cases, if such there be, where, after information given and experiment made, a community still forms an erroneous judgment, the only useful remedy is still to vary, and persevere in, the means of persuasion, by experiment, illustration, and reasoning, and not to attach an arbitrary reward to the proposed new direction of labor, which on the one hand must falsify the judgment as to the result, while on the other it can only be afforded at the expense of those whose industry requires the stimulus for its own support. The amount of evil to be apprehended as likely to arise to a community from the non-reception of truth, of facts and reasonings, addressed to their own interest, is as nothing compared with the evils necessarily attendant on the use, not to speak of the abuse, of bounties.

There is another injurious effect of all bounties in whatever state of social regulation, simple or complicated, they may

have been afforded; an evil which is greater as the bounty is more injudicious. Those who engage in any new line of industry supported by a bounty require a *larger profit*, to compensate for the *uncertainty* of the continuance of the bounty, and of course of the trade, than those engaged in free occupations self-supported. The consumers pay of course this increased profit, whether in a higher price or in an increased bounty. If the same direction were given to labor and the same articles produced, without any bounty, but simply from the wants or wishes of the community excited by increased knowledge and improved habits, a much smaller profit or remuneration to the producer or the lender of the things previously produced (the capitalist) would be demanded; for the certainty with which the continuance of the existing demand founded on existing habits would be relied on, would induce the producers to continue without fear their labors at the lowest rate of remuneration for similar employments. If the general opinion be that the new, the encouraged, direction of industry have a good deal of the capricious in it, if it be at variance with the opinions or feelings of the people, the more reluctance there will be to engage in it, and the higher must be the premium paid to the producers; the greater will be the cost of production, whether in bounty or increased price.

“All these considerations,” it may still perhaps be urged, “are quite triumphant, and demonstrate the pernicious tendency of pretended encouragements to industry, under the shape of bounties, while a community remains in what may be called a natural state, under the simple system of free labor and voluntary exchanges; but do not apply to that artificial aspect which society actually exhibits, encumbered with imposts, bounties, restraints, and every species of complication.”

To every degree of complication, however, and to every stage of society, these principles, it is conceived, do apply. Where security is every day violated, the security of the poor man, of productive laborers, of an immense majority of every community, it is wished to give a bounty to a particular branch of industry. If this be not done by removing some restraint, by ceasing the practice of some particular violation of security, how is it to be done? By adding additional restraints, by practising new violations of security, in addition to those already inflicted? To obtain the amount of the bounty, new plunder is committed, and less of the products of their labor are left to all the industrious but the new order to be favored at their expense. It makes what was before bad,

still worse; what was before oppressive, still more oppressive. If any given amount can be spared in the shape of bounty, surely the same amount can be spared in the remission of some restraint, the removal of some obstacle to the free development of industry. The probability too of misjudgment as to the direction of the bounty under a very complicated system, is very much increased. Where the bounty or encouragement is given from private resources, and where those resources have been obtained by free labor and voluntary exchanges without any employment of force, directly or indirectly; the operation is good, a voluntary gift, proving at least the benevolence of the donors, and, if the occupation encouraged be really the most useful, their wisdom too. But where the funds raised to assist, whether public or private, have been obtained at the expense of security, of free labor and voluntary exchanges, the simple rule of utility is, "Cease to collect such funds, leave with the productive laborer the fruits of his industry, and if he be ill informed, enlighten and guide him with knowledge as to the most useful direction in which he can employ it." In whatever state as to complication the affairs of a society may be, whether in the most natural or the most artificial state, the system of directing labor by bounties, whether in a moral or economical point of view, is always unwise. In the most complicated state of things they only add to the complication: under all circumstances, they only take from one set of productive laborers to give to another. With the pretended view of increasing production, they violate security. They take from those and diminish their power of producing, for the products of whose labor there is an effectual demand, to give to those for whose labor no effectual demand exists. They substitute *forced* regulation for the use of persuasion; and by removing the *motives* for the exercise of the intellectual powers, both of the givers and receivers of bounties, and of the rest of the community, they become a bar to all mental improvement. By destroying free competition, they enhance the price of all articles; of the favored, by over-indulgence; of other productive laborers, by the levy of the bounty operating as a tax on their industry. When ill directed, they occasion an enormous waste of the public wealth, supporting consumption to their whole extent without countervailing reproduction. They cannot serve as a substitute for the diffusion of knowledge, which is the only appropriate instrument of encouragement in such cases to be employed: but they render accurate knowledge the more necessary and at the same time the more difficult to be acquired.

It is said that *competition* will bring down the profits of

forced trades to the level of ordinary trades. In one sense, this is true. Competition will bring down their profits to those of other trades *similarly circumstanced*, similarly dependent on the caprice of bounty-encouragement, or encumbered with other analogous inconveniences. But it is not true that competition will bring down their profits to the common level of trades encumbered with no dependence on bounties, but supported by the ordinary wants of society. For every portion of effort, uncertainty, or other inconvenience in any trade, a compensation must be afforded; so that the proposition should be modified thus, "Competition will bring down all trades similarly circumstanced, to equality of profits."

Were all trades encouraged by bounties, the cost of production would be increased in them all. But who could pay this increased, this wasteful cost of production? Who would be the consumers? Such a case, however, as the encouragement of all trades by bounties, is an impossibility: for where would the bounties come from? Labor is the essential source of wealth. The labor of a whole community can be repaid, can be rewarded, can be *encouraged* by nothing else (in the way of wealth) than the entire use of the products of that labor. It must with its own hand repay itself. Volition will not create articles of wealth, nor call the materials of bounties into existence. If all cannot be equally and impartially encouraged by means of bounties, why prefer and make a favorite of any one of them? In most cases it will be stunted, wasteful, and contract the vices of other favorites. Let such pretended, such sickly encouragements be then relinquished. *Freedom, security, equality, knowledge*;—behold here the real talismans of production and happiness! the only universal and all-commanding bounties!

If it appear that the operation of bounties is, in so many ways, to mar the blessings of equality and security, and to substitute mere caprice for the diffusion of knowledge in matters of wealth; what shall we say to other expedients which have been devised by the inexperience of mankind,—adding to the evils of bounties, restraints, and punishments on the virtuous exertions of the rest of the community? What shall we say of monopolies, of corporation-guilds, of forced apprenticeships, and such like contrivances, whose tendencies are frequently to counteract and nullify each other, and whose endless regulations have filled with vexation and perplexity almost every path of human industry?

It would lead us too far to enter into but a very limited discussion of such matters; though a right understanding and

explanation of them would illustrate and confirm all our previous principles. It is hoped that those principles, with the observations made on bounties, will be sufficient to guide to the true nature of such expedients.

The interference of law, or the public force of the community, is essential to constitute a monopoly. Where all labor is free and all exchanges voluntary, there can be no monopoly: such operations are excluded from our present consideration. Monopolies are of various kinds: sometimes they permit a few individuals to exercise exclusively a particular line of industry, as the making of snuff, tobacco, porcelain, &c.; sometimes they permit any one, or every one, of a whole community to engage in a particular trade, but exclude foreign countries or colonial settlements or dependencies of the same community, as refining sugar for the consumption of the community; sometimes they limit to a particular set of men the export of certain or of all articles to other countries, and sometimes the import of some or all articles from those countries, such as the East India Company as formerly and as newly regulated; sometimes they confine to particular colonial settlements the faculty of supplying the community with certain articles, such as sugar, rum, &c. from the East or West India colonies of all European powers, each community admitting exclusively for its own supply the products of its own colonies; sometimes they establish a mutual and reciprocal monopoly in the supply of certain articles, such as the old (Methuen) treaty between England and Portugal, for the mutual preference of the wines of Portugal in England, and the woollens of England in Portugal.

Monopolies are more degrading and revolting than bounties, inasmuch as bounties seem to operate entirely in the way of reward, in the way of encouragement and over-payment; they are of an exhilarating nature and wear the appearance of generosity; their pernicious effects are disguised and confounded with other circumstances and causes: bounties frequently invite *all* who may think proper to direct their industry, with the addition of the bounty, in the way they point out. But monopolies wear throughout and from the commencement the harsh features of restraint and punishment; they openly and avowedly favor the few at the expense of the many, under the same pretext that has been made use of to justify bounties; that, though injurious for the present, they will ultimately establish a useful branch of trade which would not otherwise have existed.

Monopolies seem to be liable to all the objections that have

been urged against bounties, but one; and to be liable to most of them in a much stronger manner than bounties are. They are liable to additional objections which do not press against bounties. The objection to which they are not liable, is, that while a direct tax, or a portion of the public revenue raised by direct taxation, is applied to the payment of bounties, there is no *necessary* call on the public funds for any thing in the way of pecuniary aid in the establishment of monopolies. Monopolies act by taking away the rights of others; bounties, by pretending to superadd factitious rewards to industry, forgetting the only source, the product, the reward, of the successful industry of the rest of the community from whence such rewards can be abstracted. The evils produced, in a greater or less degree, by both bounties and monopolies, may perhaps be collected under the following heads.

1. They violate the principle of *security*.
2. They violate the principle of *equality*.

These two evils, clearly established, are quite sufficient to condemn such expedients as bounties or monopolies: for if the productions of the whole society be lessened by the violation of security, and the aggregate happiness lessened by any inequality not necessary to security, any subordinate effects, were they all in good, arising from them, could be only partial drawbacks from the paramount mischiefs of insecurity and inequality. But bounties and monopolies agree also in producing the following additional evils. Or perhaps it may be more correctly said, that the following evils are but illustrations of the violations of equality or security; into one or the other of which they may be all ultimately resolved.

3. They are both liable to enormous abuses of misapplication and consequent loss of national wealth, from the necessary imperfection of knowledge of facts and judgment, on the part of their favorers—supposing them to be always well disposed.
4. They are both founded on the admission, that the direction of industry which they favor is less profitable than the average of other modes of employment.
5. They both require larger profits to compensate for the uncertainty of the continuance of their privileges.
6. They are both liable to be more wastefully carried on than other unsupported directions of industry; and they produce fraud and favoritism in the working of their necessarily complex machinery.

7. They both tend to raise the prices of other commodities, by artificially withdrawing the labor and capital usually employed in them.
8. They both remarkably discourage the acquisition and diffusion of physical and economical knowledge.
9. Both expedients, bounties and monopolies, are quite *superfluous*, though unaccompanied with any of the preceding evils; because appropriate means are at hand to accomplish all the good expected from them without any of the evil.

The evils incident to monopolies, over and above those which they share in common with bounties, may be classed as under.

1. Monopolies require punishments, mostly cruel and sanguinary, for their support.
2. They generate atrocious avarice and injustice in the favored traders, from the abuse of the power entrusted to them to support the monopoly.
3. They have in fact, in almost every instance, turned out ruinous as trading speculations, and have degenerated into theatres of corruption and plunder on the part of the agents; at the expense of the trading company of the community at home, and of the foreigners over whom their power has extended.

A few words, after what has been already said, will show that monopolies are justly chargeable with all the evils here attributed to them.

First, as to those evils of which they partake in common with bounties. They violate the principle of *security* as flagrantly as bounties do, but not exactly in the same *visible* way. They do not attack security by levying forced contributions as bounties do, by taking from the thriving the products of their industry, to lavish them on a species of industry which cannot support itself. But they violate security by arresting the arm of the laborer, the skill of the artisan, the adventurous energy of the carrier, from using their productive powers in that direction which may be the most useful to them. Monopolies do not wait until the products are made; they anticipate them, they strangle them in the birth. Monopolies act by exclusion: they exclude all but the favored few from employing their labor or exchanging the products of that labor in a particular line: they *restrain* the right to free labor and voluntary exchanges in all the rest of the community. Suppose that a laboring artisan has produced a hat or pair of shoes for his own use or to procure some article of desire by its exchange. This article, or its equivalent, or part of its equi-

valent, in money, is forcibly taken from the producer to raise the fund for the payment of bounties. But, in the case of monopolies, (as, say of hat-making,) the artisan is restrained from making the shoes or the hat. Where is then the difference, as to use and enjoyment, between taking away an article when made, or preventing it from being made? If the article be taken when made, and the robbery stop there, it may be made again; but in the case of the prohibition, the power itself of producing is arrested, is annihilated. The attack on security is therefore the more flagrant when immediately directed on labor itself, on the power of production, the characteristic constituent of every article of wealth. What are the circumstances that render so vicious, so deplorable the seizure of property, the product of labor? what but the insecurity and wretchedness produced thereby? the alarm, the discouragement, produced in the minds of others; the relaxation of industry, of every physical and intellectual exertion, the torpidity of man? It is not in consequence of any injurious effect produced on the article of property, mostly inanimate itself. It is not because hats and shoes would not be as good hats and shoes in one hand as in another: it is for the evil produced through them on the mind and the feelings of the intelligent agent, the producer, the owner. It is because his inclination to reproduce, to accumulate, would be weakened, and, if persevered in, destroyed thereby: it is because his immediate happiness would be invaded by the sense of wrong, and the loss of the pleasures, physical or otherwise, which the use or the exchange of the article would have procured him. But all these evils apply as strongly to any interference with labor as with its products, as strongly to what labor *will* produce as to what labor *has* produced. The principle of security is equally violated in both cases, and with equally baneful effects; but in a different manner. And if the evil of taking away property from the *original producer* of it, be, if possible, less than that arising from restraints on the free development of labor; how much less will that evil be when the property is taken, not glaringly from its industrious and meritorious producer, but from him into whose possession the numerous intricacies of exchange, force, or fraud, may have brought it! The evil to such is merely the loss of enjoyment the article might have afforded; which is but a small part of the evils of insecurity. The free right of labor, of the direction of all faculties mental and corporeal, for the benefit of the individual—not interfering with similar rights in others—is the most sacred of the rights of man, *because founded on the highest utility*. For the most part,

restraining labor from a particular direction is certainly not as injurious as *forcing it into* a particular direction (always for the benefit of others): the difference of the evil is only in degree, not in kind. Where the most useful, the most productive, kinds of labor are restrained, the evil is nearly the same in the one case as in the other.

Monopolies are also chargeable, as well as bounties, with violating the principle of *equality*. The equality here advocated is not *absolute, forced*, equality; but the utmost possible degree of equality compatible with security, with free labor and voluntary exchanges. Bounties violate equality by taking from the industrious a part of their earnings and giving them to a favored few, enriching them at the expense of the community, instead of protecting all under the ægis of free competition. Monopolies more flagrantly violate equality by interdicting a supposed means of useful exertion, and therefore of happiness, to all, but some privileged individuals. The wealth they produce is necessarily the most partial possible, the least diffused, the least depending on individual exertion and skill; and therefore for these and other reasons the least productive of happiness. We have seen that the more any given mass of wealth is diffused,—provided that each portion of it remains in such quantity as to be appreciable in its capacity of exciting enjoyment, and provided the minute labor of the division does not overbalance the minute enjoyment,—the more happiness it produces. The paramount claims of security, in order to ensure production and existence to mankind, form the only justifiable limit to the universal agency of this benignant principle. Security being provided for, equality is the universal law of justice. By it, the utility of every institution must be tried. What shall we say then to an institution, like that of monopolies, which first violates the principle of security, and then entirely tramples on the principle of equality? by taking from or restraining the many, the poor, the weak, and giving to the few, the rich, the strong. Had it respected security, its attacks on equality might have been palliated. Were it really necessary to uphold security, its attacks on equality would be justified. But instead of any such justification or palliation, it prostrates equally the two principles of security and equality, the most essential to human happiness.

These two evil tendencies, to violate security and to violate equality, attendant equally on monopolies and bounties, are sufficient, as before observed, to banish their use for the pretended purpose of increasing the production of wealth or of happiness by its distribution. Still, however, by glancing over the minor evils produced by them, we shall be the more

fully and permanently convinced, not only how utterly unnecessary such contrivances are for the most just distribution of wealth, but how completely they are incompatible with such just distribution.

Monopolies then, as well as bounties, “are liable to immense abuse by their misapplication, and consequently to great waste of national wealth, from the defective information and judgment on which they may be undertaken.” To deny this proposition is to contradict the whole testimony of history, as well as to assert the omniscience and infallibility of the planners of such projects. It is no justification to say that private individuals may also err in judgment and be deficient in knowledge. True. But their errors are on a small scale, soon rectified, and reduced to their lowest degree by the vigilance of private interest: while the experiments of monopolies are necessarily on a large scale, risking a considerable portion of the property of the community, their errors not being easily rectified, and their affairs necessarily conducted by delegation instead of individual anxiety. It would be hazardous to affirm, that any single monopoly that ever existed has produced, on a comprehensive survey of all its effects immediate and remote, a balance of good. Let us suppose that one half of them were useful as to the production of wealth. There will remain as much national wealth sacrificed by the injudicious as gained by the judicious monopolies: the balance equal as to wealth, all the evils of insecurity and inequality unremoved, are to be objected to the system of monopolies. Under the system of individual exertion, free labor and voluntary exchanges, there is *no risk* of average national loss, as proved by the regular and undeviating increase of wealth in every community adopting even partially this natural system; for though the efforts of one individual may fail exploring a new or mismanaging in, an old track, those of twenty succeed; so that in the community there is a constant balance of gain. The average industry of whole nations on the other hand has been paralysed by monopolies, supported as they necessarily are by force. Where therefore, under the one system, there is no risk of absolute loss, but a certainty of progression to a greater or less extent; and where in the other there is a great risk of positive loss attended with a gambling promise of fallacious gain in case of success, is it not the part of wisdom to renounce all expedients that would even *risk* the national wealth?

The next evil of which monopolies participate in common with bounties, is, that “they are both founded on the admission that the direction of industry which they favor, is, at the moment, less profitable than the average of other modes of

employment." Ordinary, straight-forward, intelligence would suppose that this circumstance alone would be sufficient to deter those, whose sole avowed object is the production and accumulation of wealth, from engaging in any such schemes: for, to people who wish to produce wealth a project is proposed, which, it is admitted, would, without certain foreign additions, tend to lessen its production. In what do these foreign means consist? In showing that a certain productive power of nature had been overlooked or uneconomically used? in demonstrating the utility, under given circumstances, of the co-operation and combination of labor; and, under other circumstances the equal utility of its division and subdivision? No. Such means are allowable, are entirely useful, involve no attack on security and equality; but are quite alien to the spirit of bounties and monopolies. *Unreasoning force* is their sole instrument, the abuse of power is the only means they resort to. They forcibly seize on the products of the labor of others, or prevent others from employing their labor in the way they may deem most advantageous, to give factitious reward to the patronized direction of industry. The very circumstance of this factitious addition of profit proves that the undertaking is injurious or premature. The possibility of future and always-to-be-disputed gain is not to be weighed against the certainty of present loss.

Again—"Trades carried on by bounties and monopolies require larger profits to compensate for the uncertainty of their continuance." Mr. Mill says, in his "*Elements of Political Economy*," chapter on Bounties, that the person engaging in a protected trade gets no more profit than the profit of capital in other trades, *competition* bringing down his profits thereto. Competition produces no *absolute* equality of profits or of wages of labor in society; but a *relative* equality, all circumstances of risk, skill, unpleasantness of the occupation, &c., considered. No man will or does engage in a dirty, dishonorable, or hazardous trade, without the expectation of higher profits or wages than if employed in ordinary occupations almost free from risk, demanding no peculiar skill, and almost certain as to their continuance. To the lowest that will repay these inconveniences competition will bring down the wages or profits of protected as well as of other trades. But for this addition attending the encouragement or restraint, the society pays; while by those concerned in the protected lines, the addition is not felt as a real increase of just remuneration. 'Tis so much lost, and a real loss to the community; a loss created by the act of protection. If the favored trade is such as the circumstances of

the country would very shortly lead to, the risk is esteemed nothing, and the profits are scarcely increased: but in all such cases protection is inoperative, useless, and is soon discontinued. Every direction of industry requiring foreign aid for its support, is altogether in the way of an experiment: if ascertained or believed to be useful, it would be carried on without any other aid than those afforded by the wants and the equivalents of other productive laborers. It is in the nature of every experiment to be liable to failure. For this risk, over and above the factitious reward equalizing the favored with other trades, there must be an equivalent; which must come in the shape of higher profits than those of ordinary trades. The consumers of such articles must of course give more of their labor or its products for the enjoyment of them. It is true, that monopolies, though causing higher prices to the community for the articles they deal in, have very seldom afforded the ordinary profits of trade to their members. This arises from another vice which swallows up and supersedes the present; the unfaithfulness of their administrators and agents, deliberately preferring their own private interest, as servants, to the general interest of the trading monopoly. Were it not for this substitution of private interests to general, were the interest of the whole trading monopoly the only interest pursued by its servants, the natural consequence would follow, that higher gains than ordinary would be sought by the monopoly. And although another and a sinister mode of gratification is frequently given to this desire; although the real traders are mostly deceived and sacrificed by their crafty leaders; yet inasmuch as this effect of higher profits would naturally follow if the monopoly were honestly conducted, and as the private interest of the servants is not an avowed, an ostensible object of the monopoly,—the evil which would naturally follow their just management ought to be admitted in its full force. It is only obviated at the expense of a still greater evil, the sacrifice of the interest both of the public and of the monopoly to its servants. If the public pay a higher price for the article afforded by the monopoly, it is quite immaterial to that public into whose pockets that higher price goes.

Another of the mischiefs arising from monopolies as well as bounties, is, that “they are liable to be more wastefully carried on than other unsupported directions of industry, and they produce fraud and favoritism in the working of their necessarily complex machinery.” The exercise of care and economy depend, other things being equal, like the exercise of other qualities, on the degree of interest engaged in producing them. In private pecuniary affairs this vigilance, this

prevention of waste, is at its highest: for be the character what it may, whether indolent or active, it will be *most* vigilant when engaged in personal concerns, provided they are such as to be deemed in themselves important. A trade supported by bounties may be conducted by individual vigilance, and is therefore little liable to this abuse; but the mischief is almost inseparable from monopolies. Where but the hundredth or the thousandth part of the mischief will fall personally on the agent who relaxes in vigilance, or commits, or suffers to be committed, waste, the same anxiety and the same exertion cannot be expected to prevent waste, that would naturally be expected where the whole of the evils arising from neglect must fall on the negligent. It will not be said that moral principle, in large concerns, will supply the place of individual interest. The whole history of man proves that when these two principles are placed, whether fortuitously or from a fatal system, in opposition to each other, moral principle will yield to immediate private interest. Besides, the great end and object of all monopolies being to make profits, that paramount object is apt to get possession of all minds to the exclusion of every other, and principle never pleads so weakly as when opposed to gain in such a concern. Under a system whose governing principle was mutual co-operation and benevolence, it is possible that social motives might be so identified with personal as to become the rule of action: but here, where private gain is the sole moving spring, to relinquish an opportunity of promoting it, is looked upon rather as stupidity than morality, and the *admissible* modes of seeking private interest at the expense of the concern, become so enlarged and varied from sympathy of mutual interests amongst the servant, or master-conductors, that the words fair and honorable change their nature, and become applied to any profitable neglect, or other mode of gain, that can be practised with impunity. Bounties are notoriously liable to frauds on the part of the claimants, notwithstanding the frequently complicated machinery to prevent them, the very subordinate agents of prevention becoming parties in the fraud: while favoritism in the dispensing of posts and places in monopolies is so constant, that the chance of the influence to obtain or procure one of them often becomes the sole motive of adhesion to the concern.

Monopolies, as well as bounties, are also liable to the evil, that "they both tend to raise the prices of other commodities by artificially withdrawing the labor and capital employed in them." If the same labor and capital were naturally withdrawn, that is to say, without the intervention of bounties or

monopolies, it would prove that the new object was more desired than the old; and of course those following the old direction being in part released from it by the change of desire or demand, could be spared, and would necessarily turn themselves to the new, leaving in the old just that proportion of labor and skill requisite for the lessened use. Supply, therefore, other things being equal, would accommodate itself to the demand, and prices would remain as before; the old employments tending rather to a lowering of their prices through competition than to an advance. But where labor and capital are artificially withdrawn, the case is very different. The desire, the demand, for the articles produced by all the old directions of labor remain, by supposition, as before, while an extraordinary motive is held out to the withdrawing of labor and capital from any or all of these old branches of employment, by the factitious remuneration given to the newly-encouraged line of industry. The demand then remaining the same, and the means of supplying that demand being lessened, the necessary consequence is, that prices advance. This effect of course takes place in proportion to the quantity of labor and capital turned into the new direction: and in proportion to the magnitude and promised blessings of the bounties or monopolies, must these injurious effects ensue. If they happen but to a trifling extent, the bounties, the monopolies, the pretended encouragements, are comparatively inoperative.

It is another of the mischiefs arising from these expedients, that "both bounties and monopolies remarkably discourage the acquisition and diffusion of physical and economical knowledge." Their tendency is to discourage *all* freedom of thought and calculation on the part of the community: physical and politico-economical knowledge coming more immediately in contact with these instruments, are more particularly operated upon by them. Bounties and monopolies imply a judgement formed, a dictation practised on the community, as to the direction in which their industry should be employed. There is no appeal made to the understanding of the people, no exposition, no explanation; given, no concurrence solicited, no examination permitted. The *will* of those who have the power, and whose interest may or may not be involved in the operations, determines that such a direction of industry shall be pursued, and levies money or lays restraints to carry it into effect. To question this supreme will, is an insult to its omniscience, if not an attack on its authority. All discussion, all activity of mind, being useless, or being even judged presumptuous, ceases. Of what avail to question operations which are clothed with the arm of power? Submission and prostra-

tion of the understanding to the absolute wisdom of the legislators of trade and commerce, are sought for by such legislators with an avidity always proportioned to their want of comprehension of mind, and exactly in the inverse ratio of their merits. Of what use to the industrious and intelligent to weigh, to calculate, to experiment on the most useful modes of directing their productive powers in the creation of wealth, when they find every thing arbitrarily regulated for them? Restraints and encouragements taken out of the hand of nature, and lavished at the caprice of the legislator? Of *what use* can intellectual exertion, under such circumstances, directed to such objects, be? Of what use, but to excite the ill-will of those who have the sovereign direction? But in proportion to the *inutility* of such exertion and thought under such circumstances, is the *difficulty* of these same operations. Where every thing is left to nature, that is to say, to the wants and desires, to the feelings and state of knowledge of the community, to the circumstances of soil, climate, and natural productions liable to be influenced by physical and moral changes, and even by similar circumstances in remote regions, *there* is an ample field for judgement, experiment, and speculation; even *there* are to be found sources of error in abundance, and *there* it is necessary to lead the way, to invite to investigation, to conquer the love of repose and the individual risk of new occupations. But, when in addition to these natural obstacles to investigations and correctness of judging, when in addition to these, which it would be the object of wisdom to soften and remove, new and arbitrary obstacles are thrown in the way of investigation, by factitious rewards and restraints and endless regulations to carry them into effect, and the jealousy of power guarding its own offspring, can we wonder that sound views have been so lately and so slowly diffused on these subjects? As if the inevitable difficulties of the investigation were not sufficient, new intricacies are imposed at every step, and concurrent or counteracting causes and effects are so mingled together, that errors are almost inevitable. In the triumph over the profound ignorance induced by such chilling interference, legislators regard the most pernicious institutions, banishing all but their own forced and sickly industry, as the result of sublime wisdom, and wonder how ignorance so gross as that around them should presume to question the useful tendencies of whatever power may chance to have established. Physical knowledge, that which consists in an examination of all natural productions, inanimate, vegetable, and animal, with the view of applying them to use, guiding, or co-operating with the productive forces and energies of na-

ture; that species of knowledge which is the basis of all industry, is peculiarly discouraged by artificial regulations and encouragements. As long as the field of enterprise is open, every useful quality of bodies, every physical energy of nature, is eagerly sought after, that it may be applied to use by the discoverer. But, under the system of bounty and restraint, the laws of nature are compelled to give way: industry is forced and artificial, and the productive powers of nature are restrained as well as the energies of man. If it be a vice almost inseparable from the pursuit of private gain that its energies are directed with equal effect, to make improvements and discoveries for its own use and to *conceal* them from others, thus arresting the *diffusion* of useful knowledge, how much more strongly will this additional evil tendency apply to favored trades, where power and legislation foster, instead of counteracting, all their selfish pursuits! The melancholy consolation is, that the restrictive system throws such insuperable obstacles in the way of improvement and discovery, that little mischief could arise from their concealment. If any discovery interfere with the bounty or monopoly, it is restrained; and who is to know, who can limit the application of almost any physical discovery? Physical discoveries are only useful inasmuch as they tend to the increase of human happiness: this they mostly accomplish by a new application of labor to improve or add to the number of the objects of wealth. But in proportion as labor in these articles is under the control of bounties or monopolies, discouragement is thrown in the way of exertion by narrowing its reward; and this discouragement extends not only to the favored articles, but through them to all other branches of industry. In spite of the restrictive system, and from other causes, free inquiry has more or less prevailed in these countries on the subject of trade, as well as on other subjects. Where no counteracting causes have been at work, as in Spain and Portugal, before the late advance towards representative and elective constitutions and consequent good government in those countries*, we must look to see the frightful effects, in the annihilation of knowledge and industry, of

* This was written in the year 1822. The short-sighted audacity of a few families in Europe has availed itself of the wealth abstracted from the equality and security of the productive laborers of Europe, to bribe the expiring ignorance and superstition of these countries to unite with their trained bands of savage force to arrest, *for a time*, the progress of these institutions.

“Fond, foolish man! Think’st thou yon sanguine cloud,
 Raised by thy breath, has quench’d the orb of day?
 To-morrow, he renews the golden flood,
 And warms the nations with redoubled ray.”

the system of forced and artificial contrivances. The wishes and the energies of man, and the bounties and the forces of nature, were alike made to yield to the spirit of intolerant dictation. And if power has only to *will* in order to regulate, what motive is left to take the trouble of persuading or of judging wisely? It is but at this moment that the rulers of even Britain herself, the most commercial of nations, have begun to *act* on principles opposed to the gross ignorance of national economy, which first gave rise to systems of restriction, and was afterwards perpetuated by them.

The last of the objections stated as applying equally to bounties and monopolies is, that “they are both *superfluous*, though unaccompanied with any of the preceding evils, because appropriate means are at hand to accomplish all the good expected from them without any of the evil.” Had we proved that these artificial means of directing labor were as useful as we have proved them to be inimical to production and improvement, it would not be a legitimate consequence that it would be wise to establish them; for they are *costly* or *penal* instruments, or both. It would be necessary therefore to balance their advantages with their admitted evils, and to proceed with caution according to the result. If any other mode of attaining the same advantages without the heavy cost of these expedients, taxation and restraint, could be devised, it should without hesitation be preferred. Such a mode is in possession of every community that is wise enough to use it. It consists simply in giving impartial protection to the equal rights of all, and in diffusing useful knowledge. The whole system of human regulations hitherto, has been little more than a tissue of restraints and usurpations of one class over another. It has been shown, it is hoped, with sufficient evidence, that the only way, in which encouragements or restraints have produced partial benefits (to weigh against their numerous mischiefs) towards the development of human industry, is when they have been the means of diffusing knowledge, and of exciting the desires and the activity of mankind into exertion. Diffusing knowledge of the means of useful production, exciting or inventing desires whose gratification would add to the sum total of happiness, adding to the powers of skill and labor by improvements in chemistry, mechanics, and other arts, physical and *moral*; all these are noble objects to be accomplished, and *sometimes* have been perhaps the influential motives in the minds of the depositaries of power in lending their authority to the schemes of interested traders; while at the same time it must be admitted that the accomplishment of some of these good objects has been cotemporary with the establishment of systems of pecuniary encouragement or penal

restraint. Now it is evident that these systems themselves must have been the *effect* of a persuasion, however acquired, more or less general, of the desirableness of increased production, and improved skill in the community. Encouragements or restraints must have been the *effect* of this persuasion; could not have been the *cause* of it, in the minds of their framers. The sole question is, then, as to the *diffusing* through the community this persuasion, this knowledge of what it would be useful to be done, and of the means of doing it. It has been shown that forced interference tends to lead astray and confound the judgement, and that the possessors of privileges are uniformly as jealous of whatever little knowledge they possess, particularly in the line of their privilege, as of the privilege itself. Whenever therefore great improvements in skill and industry, and new desires leading to new enjoyments, have been co-existent with these systems, we may rest assured that it was that very same change of circumstances—whatever it might have been—which led to the establishment of protection and restraint, which led also to the exciting of these new desires, and to this new development of skill and industry in the community; and that without such obstructions as those establishments have been, the progress of improvement would have been still more rapid.

On this part of the subject a capital error has frequently prevailed. The useful tendency of encouragements and restraints, and the whole artificial system of corporations, apprenticeships, &c., have been held to be demonstrated by the fact of the great improvement which took place in every part of Europe, where, by means of such contrivances, the old horrid system of feudal idleness, superstition, and rapine, was replaced by industry and independence. One observation, it is hoped, will set this objection to rest. The whole feudal system was nothing but a mass of the usurpations of force, an all-pervading violation, in gross and in detail, of the principles of security and equality. Succeeding therefore to such a system, and compared with it, the establishment of corporations and of privileges to the associated, was in fact, to an immense extent, the *removal of feudal restraints*, the asserting, in opposition to feudal barbarism, the principles of security and equality; and all the good effects of such establishments arose from their conforming to the principles we have laid down, bating the evils which their ignorant violation of these principles produced, and still generates in a new state of things, in which the monster of feodality is almost conquered. The restraints which these establishments impose, as compared to the rule of justice, of security and equality, are most mischievous, and ought to cease. The restraints which they impose, compared with that

utter insecurity and usurping rule of force, that characterised feudal times, is as vexatious mischief compared to utter desolation. The reason of these anti-feudal establishments not producing pure good, was the restraints which they still retained or invented. In no state of society could such encouragements or restraints be wise: but to expect that absolute wisdom, as to the regulation of industry, would have sprung up at once amidst feudal proscription of intellect, is no more rational than to expect that the steam-ship would have sprung forth as soon as the first boat of wicker-work and skins was launched on the waves. The steam-ship, set afloat by improvements in mechanics and chemistry, is worthy the improved knowledge of the age; while, to our shame, the corporations and restrictions of barbarous ages, the wicker-work and skins of political economy, are still our ne-plus-ultra of wisdom in *active*, whatever it may be in *theoretical*, social science. It is plain, then, that the origin of even the restrictive and partially protecting system itself, is an argument against its continuance, and in favor of our principles.

In a country desolated by a system of brutal force about equal in atrocity with the feudal system, in Egypt, Syria, or in almost any other part of the Turkish despotism, where the every day principle and practice of what is called government, is a systematic violation of security, where ignorant rapacity snatches from the hand of the producer the fruits of his labor, till all industry is extinguished, and the scanty exertion of despondency scarcely remains sufficient to perpetuate by reproduction the means of existence; in such countries, even the restrictive and protecting system would be a comparative blessing. *Its* restraints are so few compared with those of lawless or of law-directed force, that comparative industry would immediately revive out of the contrast. No rational man however would now endeavour by such partial restrictions to restore them to prosperity. He would establish at once the *entire* security of the productive laborer in directing his labor where he thought most advantageous, and in the free use of its products, and the law would afford impartial protection to all, without any exclusive favoritism to any. Under the influence of *free labor* and *voluntary exchanges*, and the *consequences*, to be hereafter developed, necessarily resulting, in the present state of human affairs, from these vivifying principles, these fine countries would spring up again out of their ashes, and the soil, products, and situation, would repay the active hand of industry with life, beauty, and enjoyment; and the remnant of the fine race, now slaves, that pine along its fields, would expand into nations of free and intelligent men.

Had Buonaparte remained in Asia and established there free industry, instead of returning to desolate Europe, mankind would have been indebted to him, in proportion to the restraints which he would there have removed from the development of human thought and action. Even the ordinary European restrictive system would be there comparative liberty, and would operate as partial security did on the feudal system: but it would be absurd to conclude from thence that it was the restrictive and not the anti-restrictive part of that system that produced the good effect.

The only but the all-sufficient remaining measure, in addition to the removal of restraints and the protection of voluntary exchanges, which legislatures could adopt to favor the progress of national wealth, is the *diffusion of knowledge*. But as it is too important to be here incidentally touched upon, we must refer to the chapter on that subject.

Having thus dismissed those evils, in which restraints and encouragements, monopolies and bounties, for the most part agree, it remains that we notice the mischiefs almost peculiar to monopolies.

The evil or mischief first noticed is, that "monopolies require punishments, mostly cruel and sanguinary, for their support." Without punishments law-making and restraints are useless: every law must have its sanction; (in cases of civil law, restitution is the sanction); and those laws which are the most useful to monopolies, giving them the greatest exclusive privileges, are exactly those which require the most terrible sanctions, as violating most flagrantly the common rights and sympathies of mankind. Hence the necessity for exemplary punishments in direct ratio to the injustice of the monopoly. That all monopolies, the Dutch, the Spanish, the English, in Europe, America, and Asia, have been enforced by punishments frequently the most atrocious, is a matter of history; and the necessity of such punishments to support such establishments is quite natural and palpable. When the law inflicts punishment for what is really an immoral, that is to say, a pernicious action, as for stealing, fraud, burning, or murder; although the punishment may be severe and sanguinary, and tend to brutify and harden the people, still the real evil of the crime, the insecurity and alarm arising from its prevalence if unrestrained, operate so strongly on the peaceable and the industrious as to counterbalance the horror produced by the punishment, and to weaken the sympathy for the tormented criminal. If the feelings are blunted and cruelty engendered by the sight of cold-blooded deeds of human butchery; this evil is not absolutely without an equivalent in the diminution

of real crime effected by such terror. But in the case of cruel punishments, or of any punishments, inflicted in support of monopolies, where is the equivalent for the violence done to human feelings? for the acute sympathy with the sufferer? for the association of cruelty and injustice with law in general? and the consequent hatred of all law? The act for which the punishment is inflicted is a strictly moral, a meritorious act, that of directing labor where it will be most productive: the crime is imaginary and of the law's creation. All notions of justice are reversed, the intellectual faculty of the community is bewildered, morality has no basis on which to found its judgements; and if the terror of punishment succeed—which it never has done where the temptation was strong, and the profit of contravening high—it can only be at the expense of the degradation of the activity and the intelligence of the community. When punishments are not severe, the only reason is, that, for some cause or other, the prohibited line of industry is not worth following, in which case the monopoly confers no advantage and is useless to the favored few. Society receives therefore no equivalent for such punishments; but, instead of equivalent, all their effects are so many huge masses of evil, contempt of law, bewildering of the intellect, annihilation of benevolence, pernicious activity or slavish inaction, superadded to the wanton pain or inconveniences of the punishment, and violating at every step the great principles of security and equality.

A second evil imputed particularly to monopolies, is, that “they generate atrocious avarice and injustice in the favored traders, from the abuse of the power intrusted to them to support the monopoly.” History concurs here also with the tendencies of things in proving this additional mischief. The atrocities of the agents of the great Dutch monopolies both in the East and West India Islands and on the Main, of the English in the East Indies, and of the Spaniards in supporting their eternal restrictions in America, must be familiar to every one who has read the history of these companies, or of the nations to which they belong. To produce a famine or an approach to a famine, that a speculator might enrich himself by means of those advanced prices which would produce disease and the lingering death of his fellow-creatures, is but a specimen of the expedients resorted to by avarice when intrusted with power without accountability. Where monopolies are established at home, whether in favor of the executive government or of individuals, so much cruelty of this kind is not practised, the government watching over the monopolists under its eye and jealous of their assumption of power; or, if itself practising the

monopoly, having still more important objects and cares to distract its attention from the mere pursuit of avarice. 'Tis in case of foreign monopolies, where a so-called civilized nation intrusts to a company of its trading citizens the pretended right, which the parent society never possessed and could not confer, of *sovereignty*, of ruling, of restraining, whether by laws or through momentary despotic will, the labor, property, and person of the inhabitants, with the sole view of making subservient to avarice, that sovereignty over tribes or nations discovered by navigation, that the iniquity of the system has most glaringly displayed itself.

Several circumstances have tended to mislead the public judgement respecting these monopolies, and to palliate their iniquities. The nations or tribes over which these usurping companies established themselves, whether in Asia or America, were always either mere barbarians, or subject to half-civilized despotisms, or contemptible from their weakness; and in all cases were ignorant and impotent compared with the European monopolists. Their superstitious feelings and prejudices moreover, differing from those of Europe—then as furious as they were absurd and cruel—deprived them of the strong sympathy which a community of faith in any extravagancies is apt to engender. Was any exaction, any robbery practised by the strangers under the veil of power? were any absurd and mischievous commercial regulations established? similar exactions, similar or more glaring absurdities, could be adduced as prevailing amongst the natives themselves: they wished for no better, they understood no better, they deserved no better: the natives had been accustomed to absurdity and misrule, and were therefore esteemed to be *unfit* for any better system—as if the best mode of curing a disease were to continue the deleterious causes that had produced it! But the object of monopolists is not to cure the moral or political vices of those with whom they trade, and over whom they have power, but to enrich themselves, and to turn to a mercantile account the vices or the virtues they meet with. Besides, an answer always ready and of sovereign efficacy was, “They are not of our communion, they are not of our faith, they are impious and execrable in the eye of our heaven, and therefore 'tis absurd to talk of *equal justice* to them; ignorant and miserable unbelievers in our rites and doctrines.” Thus was cupidity backed by fanaticism, by a consciousness of its own intellectual and physical superiority, and by contempt of those, if possible still more mischievous institutions and regulations which it wished to supersede by regulations and actions sometimes a shade less, sometimes a shade more atro-

cious. Is it wonderful that a public at home, fanatical, avaricious, half-informed, like the monopolists themselves, should esteem such circumstances, fully explanatory of the very *venial* and *natural* exertions made by their trading countrymen abroad to consolidate their mercantile power? Had these exclusive companies discovered or established connexions with communities possessing more knowledge, of wiser institutions, and more powerful than themselves, their atrocious avarice and injustice would not have been heard of, having no food to feed upon abroad, and no excuses with which to delight the vicious, to deceive the ignorant, and to insult the intelligent at home.

A third evil imputed particularly to monopolies, is, that "they have in fact in almost every instance turned out *ruinous* as trading speculations, and have degenerated into theatres of corruption and plunder of the agents, at the expense of the trade, of the community at home, and of the foreigners over whom their power has extended." These facts alone, the ascertained and historical result of almost all monopolies, supported by power, (for without *force* there can be no monopoly, all voluntary exchanges being not only innocent but salutary,) are sufficient to banish such expedients for ever from all enlightened legislation. The experiment has been tried over and over again, on the most extensive scale, by nation after nation, in almost every trading portion of the globe, and the question has been decided against monopolies as expedients to ensure mercantile gain. Experience has as satisfactorily shown, that they are instruments of the waste and ruin of capital compared with trade carried on by the activity and economy of private enterprise, as that the power of windmills is excelled by the immense and regular energy of steam. All great monopolies, ending with the English East India Company, have become insolvent. Notwithstanding its mercantile losses, this company still exists, partly by means of what is called revenue, taken by force from the unfortunate inhabitants of Hindostan, to help to balance its losses, partly by the contracting of a debt, which it will never be able to pay. To levy revenue for such a purpose, so foreign from at least the usual *ostensible pretext* of applying it to the support of the public institutions, for dispensing justice, morality, education, &c., through the community who pay it, has been reserved for the impudence of a trading company. Legally plundering the people with whom they trade, to make up for the balance of losses, caused by every species of waste and abuse!! Why then does this Company continue to exist? Private sinister interest, and political considerations support it.

Its original mere mercantile object is now entirely lost in these new views and interests. Originally from vile mercantile jealousy, and afterwards from an imbecility of rule surpassing the cruel and vindictive weakness of the now obliterated Spanish despotism towards South America, it excludes Englishmen not employed in the monopoly, from even entering *its territories!!* the very measure, the introduction of active and intelligent Europeans, which would tend most to diffuse knowledge, new arts and civilization through the country, and amalgamate the European and Asiatic races. While to unpeopled regions in Austral-Asia we are forcibly exporting thieves and giving bounties to the honest, to carry there a nucleus of any species of a British population; from the peopled and trading shores of Hindostan, a disgraceful policy, selfish, cruel, and foolish, interdicts the approach of the enlightened, the industrious, and the brave; thus trampling at once on the most sacred rights of almost half the people of the globe, *the security*, the right to free labor and voluntary exchanges, of the millions of Hindostan and of Europe and America, particularly of the Britannic Islands. Oh! may some daring genius soon and severely ask these jailors, by *what right* they have so long dared to lock out from all intercourse with the world of their fellow-creatures, the tens of millions of Hindostan? Establishments supported by such means cannot deserve to exist. Why then are they supported? Why is this anomaly of a trading despotism suffered to continue? Not for the trade—that is notoriously bad, though propped up by robbery under the name of revenue. Not for the sake of the consumer at home: for he pays double to the monopoly for what he could get by free trade at half-price. First, for the sinister interest of the servants, military, civil, and mercantile, of the Company; next, to prevent the Government at home, as now constituted, from making a still worse use of what is called the patronage, or at all events to keep this patronage in the hands of the Company's Directors. In *no hands* however, neither in those of the Company nor the Government, should such patronage be placed.

Thus it is that these monopolies are attended with evils incalculable. To the friends and connexions of those who have influence in the direction, and to their interest alone, the interest of providing for them by making their fortunes in India, where they themselves become the governors and agents of the governors, without any interference of the inhabitants of the country in their own affairs; to the sordid interest of these agents, destined to bring in succession the spoils of Asia to Europe, spoils exacted either by open plunder

or by a grinding taxation, is the right to security, equality, and political liberty, of nearly a hundred millions of rational creatures deliberately sacrificed; because they were perhaps *almost* as wretched before we visited them! And when these men, so enriched by foreign plunder, come home, their wealth, effeminacy, and oriental habits of oppression and contempt for the rights and feelings of their fellow-creatures, make them admirable tools in diffusing servility and corruption at home, as if to avenge on British freedom and happiness the untold miseries and degradation of the East. Yes, this is indeed a moral retribution; not the capricious sporting of imaginary beings with the destinies of human creatures, but the unerring operation of the laws of our physical and mental organization, necessitating a course of vicious action to those whose habits have been formed by the practice of corruption, cruelty, and oppression.

But to return. There is another mode, a branch of the system of monopoly, of encouraging a home trade at the expense of all foreign competition, by laying duties, not for the sake of revenue, but for the mere sake of protection, on all rival foreign goods. Its importance may justify a short separate consideration.

First, we are no more permitted, by the principle of *utility*, to invade the security, the right to free labor and voluntary exchanges, of foreign communities, than of that in which we live; because it will lead to retaliation and reprisals, by which our own industry will be in return equally shackled by them, and to effects of their ill-will in whatever other way they may have an opportunity of showing it; so that striking at their rights is indirectly attacking our own: the differences of language and government do not subtract an atom from the advantages of free competition and exchanges, these depending on differences of soil, natural productions, climate, and on a greater facility (however acquired) in the production of various articles. Difference of language and government is rather a presumption in favor of these foreign exchanges, inasmuch as they are almost always accompanied, to a much greater degree than at home, with dissimilarity of skill and produce. Another reason is, because injustice practised to strangers, to *any* of our fellow creatures, corrupts the judgment, hardens or distracts the moral feelings, and thus, deteriorating the general character, lessens the capacity to benevolent enjoyment, and prepares for the practice of similar injustice towards those around us.

Second, such mercantile duties on foreign productions raise the price, while they deteriorate the quality of the articles pro-

tected, on all the home consumers: they raise the price, because, if the home goods could be made at home as cheap as the foreign, protection by duty or otherwise would be superfluous; and they deteriorate the quality, because they prevent the full effect of foreign added to home competition.

Third, they give no additional profit to the home manufacturers, (risk of discontinuance, &c., considered,) competition amongst themselves soon bringing that down to the level of profit of *similar* occupations: whatever more they get is only a premium injuriously taken from the rest of the community to compensate for their risk, ignorance, &c., in the new undertaking.

Fourth, as affecting the national capital, the aggregate of that of individuals, as a whole, they lessen it and its total produce, by diverting a part of it out of its former *more* profitable employment, whatever that might have been, into the new employment, the natural profit of which would not support it without removing competition by the duty.

Fifth, if the protecting duty be high, it leads to all the miseries, vices, contempt of law and justice which *ought* to be the same, waste of property, &c., of smuggling, and to the expenses, punishments, and vexatious restrictions, necessary to enforce a collection of the duty. If on the contrary the duty be low, so as to render smuggling not worth the risk, the protection is in that very same proportion inefficient and uncalled for. All these evils are resolvable into violations of equality or security, or of both.

A specious fallacy is frequently employed to deceive mankind into an approbation of violations of the great principles of security and equality, by alleging, and truly alleging, that many most splendid and lucrative branches of manufactures and commerce could not exist in particular countries without the aid of the artificial system of restraints and encouragements. Where any species of industry, ever so splendid in the seat of its prosperity, cannot be introduced *by natural means*, by diffusing knowledge, exciting desires, and increasing skill; there, it is a demonstration that in *that locality*, at *that time*, it must be most pernicious to introduce it, however magnificently it may flourish abroad. If it cannot be introduced by natural means, what's the reason? Because, either the natural productions necessary for its fabrication, as coal-pits and metallic mines in England in the vicinity of each other, as grapes on the sides of sunny hills in warmer regions, are wanting; or capital or machinery are wanting; or, although none of these may be wanting, there may be some other article for the fabrication of which we have, whether

from nature or art, such peculiar facilities, as to enable us, after supplying our own wants, to produce *with less labor* an *equivalent* for the foreign article, than we could produce the article itself. In all these cases it is clearly our interest calmly to forgo an unattainable object, or attainable at the expense of the evils already enlarged upon, according to the different expedients that might be used for forcibly introducing the new article. The effect of the forced introduction would be, that the very same hands, or number of hands, that with *less labor* under the natural system produced the equivalent, would with much *more labor* produce, under the forced system, the foreign article wanted. In case of forcing the making of the foreign article at home, the cheap equivalent must cease to be produced, not being wanted.

After the lengthened, perhaps the too much lengthened, investigation which we have given to the oft-reprobated but still widely-practised systems of interference with free labor and voluntary exchanges, by pecuniary encouragement or penal restraint; violating the great principles of security and equality, on which the just distribution of wealth reposes; it will not be necessary to dwell on the minor expedients of petty corporations varying in every city and town, and violating in a hundred ways the principles of free industry. The less skill any man or number of men have in explaining and recommending what they wish to have accomplished, the more are they inclined to make use of force, as a supplement to, or substitute for, persuasion. Hence, and from the universal love of power and desire of gain, though at the expense of the labor of others, the capricious and impertinent fetters under which human industry, more or less, every where languishes. Even in the North American United States, that maximum of iniquity, of personal wrong, the accursed and accursing slave-trade, one of the precious inheritances of colonial protection, still exists. When that otherwise free and happy people is so slow in removing so foul a stain on the morality of their national character, we cannot wonder that forced apprenticeships, combination laws, regulation of wages laws, artisan and tool-imprisonment laws, regrating laws, forestalling laws, witchcraft laws, or game laws, should still exist amidst the mire of European regulations; though public opinion deters the coward malignity, that wants the honesty and the humanity to repeal, from often enforcing them. They all invade, in a greater or less degree, the sacred principle of *security* (with us no hypocritical principle, favoring the rich alone); but sacred to the protection of the labor of the poor,

as well as of the products of labor possessed by the rich ; impartial to all. Such laws also invade the sister principle of equality—which should never be departed from but in obedience to security—because they forcibly take from the poor to increase the store or the enjoyments of the rich. For their minor evils, arising from their peculiar objects and circumstances, they must be left to the discernment of the reader.

Having now proved that neither pecuniary reward nor the exertion of force, that neither encouragements nor restraints, are wanting, but are on the contrary extremely prejudicial to the production of wealth by labor ; let us proceed to the next proposition.

SECTION 13.

That inequality in the distribution of wealth, and that alone, which arises from securing to every man the free use of his labor, and its products, and the voluntary exchanges thence ensuing, should be upheld ; because, without that extent of inequality, there would be no SECURITY, without security no production, without production no wealth to distribute.

WERE food and all other objects of wealth supplied to man, like light, air, and in most places water, in such quantities as to be abundant for all, without the necessity of any human effort for their production ; and were it proposed, *in order to make them produce more happiness*, to limit their consumption by the greater number of individuals of the community, that the remainder might have more than they could consume ; who is there that would not exclaim against the absurdity of such a proposal ? Or, were they only in such quantity, but still unconnected with human exertion, as to afford but a limited supply to all, enough for mere necessary use but not for superfluity ; would not the person, in this case also, be deemed irrational who should propose to increase the sum total of the happiness of the community, by any inequality of distribution, taking from some what was merely necessary, in order to load others with satiety ? The absurdity and the mischief in the latter case would be the greatest : for those who had at best but merely necessities, would suffer more pain in being deprived of them to add to the superfluities of others, than those who previously possessed abundance. Suppose a third case, that a given supply, any how obtained, but with-

out the intervention of human exertion, that would give but a treat to all, were every year, every month, or every day, acquired by a community; the enjoyment of any individual using at the same time 500, 1000, or any other number of those portions, would scarcely, from the laws of our organization, double the enjoyment of any one of those from whom one of the single shares was taken or withheld. This, it is hoped, has been already made evident in sections 8 and 9, and will be further proved when we inquire into the effects of *excessive* inequality of wealth on the happiness of a community.

In all cases then, whether of a large or small supply, where human effort has not been concerned in the production, equality of distribution is the rule of justice. Let the reader pause, reflect, and speculate, and assign if he can any other justification amongst beings similarly constituted, capable of equal degrees of happiness, of a departure from the law of equality in distribution, than the necessity of human exertion for the production. There can be no other justification of a departure from equality of distribution. Its blessings are so transcendently great, so productive of immensely increased agreeable sensations, peace, and benevolence, that never but when justified by the necessity of continued production should they be departed from. To this superior *necessity*, and to this alone, must they yield; and to this necessity must they be strictly limited.

What is the circumstance which distinguishes the objects of wealth as means of enjoyment, from other means of enjoyment which come not under the name of wealth? The necessity of *labor* for their production. In nothing but in being the creatures of human labor, do they differ from other sources of enjoyment. Without labor they could not exist. Without security—which means the exclusive possession by every man of all the advantages of his labor—labor would not be called forth. Therefore in the distribution of such articles where labor is employed, called articles of wealth, and in these alone, equality must be limited by security, because in no other case are equality and production incompatible with each other. What is the reason of this? that equality is not, wherever attainable, to be desired? is it that equality itself is not founded in justice and productive of happiness? Far from it. But because its paramount blessings cannot be obtained, when applied to one particular class of objects of desire, those which are produced by labor, called objects of wealth, without destroying the source, the supply of such objects. Were it possible to ensure a repro-

duction by labor of the articles equally consumed, all the advantages of equality would be as fully derivable from the equal distribution of objects of wealth, as of any other objects of desire or materials of happiness whatever. A celebrated practical as well as philosophical inquirer, conceives that he has demonstrated *experimentally* that reproduction and equality are *not* incompatible even when applied to objects of wealth, produced, as they all are, by labor. He conceives that he has proved that other motives, besides *individual* necessity and the love of the factitious pleasures of superiority of wealth, can be found, and made to operate with sufficient energy, to ensure a constant reproduction of abundant wealth, for the equal use of the whole community. As *almost* all falsehood and violence, and as *all* stealing proceeds from inequality of distribution of wealth; *he* would certainly be no mean benefactor to his species, who could demonstrate the practicability of thoroughly eradicating, by removing the causes of, these the most numerous by far of human miseries and vices. The mischiefs arising from the mis-regulation of our appetites, passions, and desires, and from the want of knowledge and loss of the pleasures of intellectual culture, would be the only ones to which the attention of society would be then anxiously directed: and the whole attention being concentrated on these, the prospects of indefinite improvement would be captivating indeed. In a separate chapter will be investigated Mr. Owen's views, which are by no means regarded as visionary speculations, but as some of the most important problems of social science that were ever submitted to the consideration of mankind.

In the course of our argument in this inquiry, we have, however, all along reasoned on the supposition of labor by *individual competition*, and taken it for granted, in opposition to Mr. Owen, that the re-production of wealth and security were incompatible with equality of wealth. By no scheme or combination affecting a whole community, have these discordant principles been ever yet in human practice reconciled. But to assert that they could not, as moral wisdom improved; be found reconcileable, would be as presumptuous reasoning from ignorance, in morals, as to assert, in physics, (and not many years ago the writer heard the assertion made by an experienced naval officer, who now owns a steam-vessel and practises what he pronounced impracticable,) that it would be impossible to apply steam navigation to the ocean or to strong river currents. No part of our argument is built even on the practicability of reconciling these two hitherto rival principles of security and equality; or rather of reproduction and equa-

lity : for although equality might leave every one secure in the possession of his equal share by taking away the motives to plunder, it would remain still, under such circumstances, to *supply motives to production*. This is the real difficulty ; which Mr. Owen conceives he has solved. Conceding therefore so much on the one hand, we must strictly guard, on the other, against the abuses and false inferences that may be drawn from this concession. Wherever inequality is not called for by the clear necessity of security, not of that false security which is partially applied to soothe the imaginary alarms of the rich, protecting mere possession however acquired, while it overlooks violence applied to the very means of existence of the poor ; but of that equal and just security which is alike to all ; *equality* is to be pursued as the means of the greatest happiness derivable from distribution. Quite opposite to this has been the current philosophy, in order to uphold the enormous practices every where in operation, and outraging equally the principles of security and equality. There is scarcely a violation of the principle of security, for which the maintenance of that principle has not served as a pretext. The word, security, once laid hold of by the lovers of exclusive privileges and possessions, and but partially understood or wilfully misrepresented, has been reserved for the protection of the rich and powerful alone, to guard their possessions, however acquired, though at the expense not only of equality, but of the security of the rest of the community, and has been by the rich used as a cover for every oppression, nay as a justification of the most atrocious cruelty, the worst species of vice. To justify that transcendent enormity, the slave-trade, including in itself all the complicated evils combined arising from the violation of the principle of security, the name of that same principle of security has been as unblushingly as absurdly profaned. Allowing for a moment that our demonstration of the sole original right to *property*, as founded on free labor and voluntary exchanges, is erroneous ; allowing that it would tend to the happiness of a community that property should be acquired by its members by force or fraud, and that such acquisitions should be eternally by force or fraud maintained ; still the simple question of *security* comes to this. There are *two* human beings, the slave and the owner, equally concerned in the maintenance of this principle of security. If the slave were a house or an ox, or any such species of property, and *not a sentient being like the owner*, the principle of security would then apply to the owner alone ; but wherever man and labor are concerned, the principle of security will apply. To the owner the principle of security says, “ Your property,

that is to say, the free use and direction of your labor and all your faculties (not interfering with similar rights in others); and the right of voluntary exchanges for the products of that labor; and also, as an item of this your property, your expectation of so much happiness from *the use* of the living machine (provided it was acquired by free labor or voluntary exchange) shall be awarded to you." But to the slave the same principle of security says, "*Your property*, that is to say, the free use and direction of your labor and all your faculties (not interfering with similar rights in others), and the right of voluntary exchanges for the products of that labor, shall be awarded to *you*." How can justice in this case reconcile security with security? the security of the master with the security of the slave? It is impossible. But in such and a thousand similar cases, where two moral duties interfere with each other, and it is impossible to perform them both, what is the conduct which necessity, in compliance with the principle of the greatest good, requires? *That the lesser duty should be sacrificed to the greater*: making always such compensation, where practicable, to the party suffering as will not be attended with other preponderant mischief. In cases like the present, where the injustice has been sanctioned and upheld by the public regulations and public force, the compensation should be paid by the public. Compensation or not, the smaller evil, the smaller breach of duty, must be preferred to the greater. The greater security of the sentient and rational being, the slave, must be preferred to the smaller security of the sentient and rational being, the owner. In the security of the slave are comprehended *all his rights*, all *his means of happiness*, not only those arising from wealth, but from all other sources; all compromised and annihilated by slavery. In the security of the master is comprehended that additional *balance* of enjoyment which the forced labor of the slave could give him over and above the paid voluntary labor of any hired laborer. This *balance*, taking the large interest on the original cost into the account, is demonstrably, in most cases, no balance at all in favor of, but is against, the slave-owner. Whether in *any case*, under circumstances ever so favorable, the balance of *profit* to the agriculturist or manufacturer, is in favor of slave over free labor, at an equal cost, seems not to be fully ascertained. The amount of the *gross produce*, of the mass for consumption and happiness, is always diminished by forced labor or slavery: the only question is as to the share of the employer, whether *that*, putting down the interest or enjoyment of the forced laborers, the slaves, as nothing, is not always diminished by substituting slave for voluntary labor.

The loss, to the owner, of the malignant gratification of domination and cruelty, we pass by, as more than counter-balanced by the disquietudes, precautions, and efforts necessary to uphold forced labor. The security of the master consists in the preservation to him of a *very doubtful* balance of enjoyment in *one item* of all the numerous sources of happiness incident to human beings. The security of the slave consists in the preservation to him of *every item of all possible sources of happiness*, of which slavery robs him, and lodges in the caprice of another person. Thus then, on the principle of security alone, so ignorantly and so grossly profaned by the owners of slaves and the forcible retainers every where of their fellow creatures' rights, do their practices stand condemned*. The principle of "security" is the mortal foe of slavery, and of all injustice. *The security of acquired property, the produce of labor, is only a branch of the security of labor: and the security of labor is only a branch of general security, guarantying equal rights to all sentient and rational beings, founded on their similar organization and the equal utility of these rights to all.* Where two masses of security are incompatible with each other, the sacrifice of the smaller mass is to be preferred.

Having thus shown, in so flagrant a case, the mischiefs practised and justified under the pretext of doing homage to the principle of security, it will be easy to detect its abuse in all other cases. Equality of enjoyment, arising from equality of distribution, is never to be sacrificed, but when a real, not an imaginary, security demands it; when a real balance of security demands the sacrifice as necessary to reproduction. For what purpose should any, the smallest, portion of inequality not necessary for production be maintained? To maintain the happiness of those who profit by the inequality? But you thereby destroy a much greater portion of happiness of those at whose expense the inequality is acquired. There is no other reason than the necessity of supplying motives to production for any portion of inequality of distribution. Were there no fear of deficient reproduction, were not voluntary labor the necessary ingredient in that reproduction, why reward one person more than another, and at the expense of that other, with what is equally necessary, or would give equal enjoyment, to all? Were the human race like the race of many other animals, as that of the cats, in which the lion or the tiger requires ten times

* It is pleasing to observe that one of the first acts of the Congress of the representatives of Columbia, under the presidency of General Bolivar, has been, the gradual emancipation of all the slaves of the nation, nearly on this basis,—Freedom to the slave: compensation, by the nation upholding the wrong and participating in the wickedness, to the owner.

the food of the common cat, it might then be right to assign to the Liliputians of the human species, of two feet high, food, clothing, and habitations proportionate, and of course unequal to those of their larger brethren of six feet in height and corresponding wants. In such case, *wants* being unequal, equality of supply would produce the same mischief that inequality now causes; repletion to some, with scarcely any addition of enjoyment; scarcity to others, with the pains, moral and physical, of privation. Men being, as they are, of equal capacities of enjoyment from the sources of wealth, equality must be the object desired, where not destructive of, or tending to weaken, the motives to production.

An unanswerable reason—were any further reason wanting—why inequality of distribution is not desirable beyond this its natural limit, is, that this limit alone would always have upheld, though the additions made to it by force and fraud had been entirely suppressed, great absolute inequality of wealth; though, contrasted with what now actually takes place, it would be a comparative approach to equality. How far this approach to the blessings of equality may be carried, when all obstacles of force and fraud to the entire development of free labor and voluntary exchanges shall have been removed, and when knowledge shall be equally afforded to all members of a community, it would be hazardous to predict. That it would approach however very nearly to Mr. Owen's system of mutual co-operation by common labor, there can be no doubt. And as every approach to this state consistent with the greatest production, is always to be kept in view, hence arises the peculiar duty of those who seek the greatest happiness of the community in which they live, to oppose every institution, regulation, and effort, tending to add to those unavoidable evils of inequality which security requires. If equality and security, or production, can be reconciled by the diffusion of knowledge; or, in other words, if motives equally or more efficient than those arising from personal gain, can be put into operation to ensure an equally large production, no doubt social motives ought to be preferred to selfish. This phenomenon however remains to be exhibited in practice, as well as proved by theory: and as all its operations must be eminently and essentially *voluntary*; as all force and fraud must be equally excluded from its establishment and continuance; the system here advocated, of free labor and voluntary exchanges, will quietly lead to the adoption of every thing useful in it.

It may be said that we are conceding the very basis of our argument, when we admit, for a moment, the *possibility* of reconciling security or production with equality of distribution.

True, as far as concerns the system of labor by *individual competition*, the ordinary system of human labor, and the only one yet spoken of, security is not reconcilable with equality of distribution. We have been hitherto contrasting the system of free labor by individual competition with [the employment of force, compulsion, or restraint of any kind. Of production by mutual co-operation resting on individual security, or *voluntary* equality in the distribution and enjoyment of the products of united labor, a succeeding chapter will treat at length. If production can be hereafter obtained without the pressure of those hitherto necessarily attendant evils of inequality, surely so much the happier for mankind. Our object is to show how vast a mass of happiness is in the power of every civilized community, *in spite* of these and all other obstacles, whether real or the work of nature, or artificially fabricated by man: it being the duty, as it is the interest, of society to remove all obstacles but those which are unavoidable, or the removal of which would bring in their train preponderant evil.

On the whole then it is evident, that that portion of inequality in the distribution of wealth, whatever it may be, which unavoidably arises from the maintenance of *equal* security, must be submitted to, in order to procure the greatest happiness derivable from wealth.

SECTION 14.

All other species of inequality of distribution, being not only unnecessary but injurious to the excitement of production, should be repressed; because they unnecessarily detract from the benefits of equality, and thus lessen the sum total of happiness, the object aimed at by the distribution of wealth.

MANY of those who support the last proposition, but for reasons different from those which we have given, and in our opinion on false reasons, would reject altogether the present. Having proved the advantages of inequality, the *necessity* even of a considerable portion of it, for the very existence of every community, laboring by individual effort, which existence depends on the yearly production of its food, shelter, and clothing; enjoying themselves the larger shares, the prizes, in this unequal distribution, they are apt to regard inequality as a positive blessing, instead of a necessary evil to be endured only as far as that necessity demands. Hence the countenance which political economy has been supposed to give, which its

misapplication has certainly given, to the support of almost every usurpation on the equal rights of men. Inequality once proved a blessing, the more this blessing was diffused the better, the greater masses of this blessing the influential few could appropriate to themselves, the better. Nothing further remained than by an equal misapplication of the principle of *security*, to uphold for ever these supposed blessings of the greatest possible inequality; and thus enlist science in the maintenance of every existing system of force and fraud. No wonder that such reasoners should assert the necessity, not only of that species of inequality which was necessary to production, but of every possible degree of it, in the extravagant contemplation of which they could find any sickly delight. Was a voice heard in favor of the outraged rights of the suffering many of any community, on the ground of the inequality of wealth? "It proceeds from an ignorance of political economy," was the reply. "Such complaints would lead to equality and rapine: security, the security of the rich, requires the very evils ignorantly complained of."

Is this reproof merited? is it true? does it not fall back on the heads of those who use it? It is hoped that those who have gone thus far in this inquiry are persuaded that political economy, rightly understood, and humanity, are much more intimately allied than the supporters of the inequality of rights and of happiness would fain admit: it is hoped that, seeing clearly the reason for the permission of inequality—its necessity for security and reproduction—they see also the limits to which it ought to be confined; that all further extension of inequality impairs production and lessens security, as much as its extension *so far* increases the one and strengthens the other; that when further extended, it always violates instead of supporting the principle of security,—violates, in numerous and vital points, the security of the many, to maintain, on trivial or imaginary points, the security of the few. We would ask, what is that species of inequality which should be maintained over and above what is necessary for equal security and reproduction? That such inequality is destructive of happiness has been already seen, and will be shown more fully in the next chapter, on the effects of the *excessive inequality* of wealth. If not for happiness, for the greatest happiness of the whole community, for what purpose should such inequality be maintained? Because a community would not otherwise possess works of splendor and magnificence? If such works were not found by the community to contribute to its happiness, they ought not to be produced or maintained. If they were esteemed by the community to contribute to its happiness, common labor and exertion would provide them for public use. *That*

splendor and that magnificence which are founded on the depression of the many, and afford gratification to a few, are to be deprecated; because such gratification is vicious, arising from the contrast of the grandeur of the few with the destitution of those around them, and from the envy and influence to which such grandeur gives birth. Free labor, security in its products, and voluntary exchanges, lead to as much private splendor and magnificence as can be desirable for production and happiness. When we say that splendor and magnificence are to be desired in objects of wealth, we may mean two very different things, which are frequently confounded together. We may mean either that the objects themselves are desirable to the community or to individuals, considered as works of skilful art and exciting pleasing associations; or that the pleasures which the possessors derive from them, when in private hands, are so great as more than to counterbalance the evils of forced inequality. That splendor and magnificence, when obtained without cost, that is to say, without labor on our part, as in some of the works of nature, forests, mountains, the ocean, volcanos, the heavens full of suns and planets, are objects of admiration and of desire to contemplate, there is no doubt; these feelings of admiration and desire being always destroyed when such objects, from their vicinity, occupation of useful ground, &c., cause us alarm or injury. As in the works of nature, we destroy or fly from magnificence when it compromises our safety or comfort, though no labor of ours was expended in its production; so in works of art, we should carefully calculate the cost of solid comforts to the community, which the direction of labor to purposes of mere magnificence must occasion, and then only pronounce them useful when accompanied with a balance of happiness. Vastness of parts, skill of workmanship, and fineness of materials, which altogether constitute magnificence, have no merit of their own but as they tend to excite agreeable feelings or associations. To sacrifice to them feelings and associations still more productive of happiness, would be therefore absurd. When a community judges for itself, there is no fear of any abuse in this way, in the misdirection of their labor to mere magnificence, from the universal love of immediate enjoyment: but when individuals command by force, either directly or indirectly applied, the labor of others for their exclusive enjoyment, there is absolutely no assignable limit to caprice under the pretext of magnificence. For such purposes then as private magnificence, we may safely conclude that no inequality of wealth is desirable beyond what is necessary for securing the greatest production of wealth. Where objects of beauty, taste, and magnificence, can be procured for pub-

lic use, without preponderant evil in the cost of production, there can be no question of their desirableness as tending to increase happiness; but no forced inequality of wealth can ever be instituted for this purpose without lessening the sum total of the happiness of the community.

As to the second question, whether the rich derive such an increase of happiness from splendid things, as more than to counterbalance the evils of forced inequality, there is surely no one to maintain the affirmative. The real pleasure derived to the rich from such things is not the pleasure of skill, proportion, &c., for with that, ownership has nothing to do; and by too frequent repetition, such pleasure ceases: but it is the mere pleasure of vanity, of the influence over the opinions and actions of others, which such magnificence affords. When this pleasure also becomes the daily and hourly enjoyment of life, it too palls on the appetite, and degenerates into a mere *want*, begetting anger, disdain, hatred, and all the malevolent passions when its usual gratification is withheld. This is an evil inevitably incident to all factitious sources of distinction, and reduces their balance of pretended enjoyment to almost nothing. To the community, there is a great balance of pain in the display of matters of mere private magnificence, considered only as things to be looked at; envy and awe entirely superseding all pleasurable feelings of sympathy. To compare with so doubtful an enjoyment to the possessors, all the evils of insecurity and diminished production, not to speak of any possible pressure of physical want from these sources, would be but a waste of labor.

Another phantom that has been put forward to justify a greater degree of inequality of wealth than is necessary for free labor and voluntary exchanges (which have been proved to be necessary to the greatest production of wealth and the greatest quantity of happiness derivable from wealth) is, that without this forced inequality it would be impossible for certain institutions, certain privileged bodies, certain modes of faith, certain systems of physics or morality, to maintain themselves in a community. That it would be impossible, without such or similar forcible means, to preserve many such institutions and systems in existence, is at once explicitly conceded. But, with this concession, the short and simple reply is, Such institutions and systems ought no longer to exist, regard being had, where possible without preponderant mischief, to the feelings and happiness of the immediate occupants.

For what purpose are institutions, and systems, and orders of men supported, or rather for what purpose alone ought they to be supported amongst a community of rational be-

ings? For their own exclusive and individual benefit, forgetting or deliberately sacrificing the happiness of the rest of the community? Public morality now renounces so monstrous an avowal; and the supporters of all systems and institutions are now driven to show as well as they can, the *utility*, the tendency of what they advocate to promote the happiness of the community. Now in what way can any of these things tend to promote a nation's happiness, that would render necessary for that purpose the sacrifice of personal security and of the greatest happiness derivable from wealth? Take these away, the enjoyment of security and of the objects of wealth, and for what other purpose, for the production of what other species of happiness to the community, could these institutions, or castes, or systems, be made useful? Are all the other sources of our enjoyment put together—if it were possible to disconnect them, and if they could separately exist or be enjoyed—to be at all compared with the enjoyments derived from wealth, from labor? Let the pleasures of security and wealth be maintained, and all other sources of enjoyment will take care of themselves, either as having an existence without any voluntary effort on our part, or as arising out of the just distribution of wealth. The pleasures of sympathy and love, of the healthful working of our animal economy, and the grateful supply of air, of knowledge, of the regulation of our propensities, all come under this description. That just distribution, which maintains equality as far as compatible with security, directly or indirectly leads to the greatest enjoyment from all these sources. But, supposing that the *greatest* enjoyment from any or all of these sources, was incompatible with equality limited by security, and that a particular institution, system, or caste, was necessary to maintain this greatest enjoyment, from this particular source, and that such institution, system, or caste, could not exist if not upheld by *forced inequality*; the question would then be, whether for the sake of any such increase from any such source the benefits of free labor and voluntary exchanges ought to be sacrificed? Were we to examine, one by one, all the sources of happiness not immediately dependent on wealth or its distribution, we should find that none of them can be enjoyed to their greatest extent and intensity by any community except under the rule of equality limited by security. Were it otherwise, the paramount blessings attached to these are such, that no promises of advantage from any other source ought to lead us deliberately to part with them. What is the pretended good for which we are to sacrifice the pleasures of equality limited only by equal security? Is it to obtain the favor of heaven? to enjoy happiness hereafter? And is it by violating security,

by forcibly taking from one to lavish on another, that we are to obtain the favor of heaven? Can the enjoyment of equal or nearly equal happiness here, by removing temptations to vice and supplying inducements and means to benevolence, unfit us for the enjoyment of happiness hereafter? Where are now the impudent and interested hypocrites or madmen, that will dare to assert that mankind must deliberately sacrifice happiness here, comprehending their whole existence, for the sake of happiness, or to avoid torments, hereafter? Who sees not that such ranting imputes *malignity to God*, as to our happiness here; which conceded, what possible right have we to infer benevolence hereafter? The empire of force and forced inequality, would be indeed necessary to support such impotent absurdities. Whatever mode of the distribution of wealth tends to the most happiness, must be most pleasing to a benevolent being. Heaven therefore can never be interested in forced inequality, though those that abuse its name for their own selfish purposes, may.

Is it to uphold a particular system of government, or any branch of any system of government, that forced inequality, that inequality not called for by security, must be upheld? What is the object of all just government? What but to promote by just laws, ninety-nine out of a hundred of which are directly or indirectly concerned with wealth, the greatest happiness of the whole community, or, where that is not practicable, of the greatest number of the community? But this very object is the end aimed at by our distribution. No government, no institution or branch of any government, no caste, should be upheld by society which contravenes this just distribution; because by so doing it contravenes the only useful and therefore the only just object of its existence. There are numerous sources of our happiness with which government has nothing directly to do, though its influence *indirectly* extends to almost every thing. Of the whole range of our voluntary actions, under the name of moral, it is concerned with none but those comparatively few—and the wiser and better we become, always the fewer—which it erects into crimes. The more violent manifestations of some of our passions injuring others than ourselves, afford almost the only occasions for its interference beyond the range of wealth: and certainly no forced inequality of wealth can have any connexion with, can any way facilitate its means of combating the evils of such occasional impetuosity of passion. On the contrary, equality limited by security, would be its most powerful ally in removing the occasions and the motives to such irregular attacks on happiness. No political institution or any branch of it, whether republican, monarchical, aristocratical, or mixed, is, for *its*

own sake, to be at all regarded: it must be considered as a mere means, the means to an end, that end the promotion of the greatest happiness, and that greatest happiness chiefly dependent on the distribution of wealth. The more ancient any institution is, that contravenes this object, that has stood in the way of this distribution, the more of human misery it must have caused, or of happiness it must have prevented, and the sooner it ceases to exist—those subject to it persuaded of its evil tendency and wishing its removal—the better. To assert then that forced inequality, tending, as has been shown, so powerfully to lessen human happiness, is to be permitted, in order to maintain any institution, whose very existence can only be justified by its tendency to promote that happiness, would be a contradiction in terms, and sacrificing the end to the means. The most powerful argument, and that hitherto peculiarly called *philosophical* or economical, in support of privileged castes in a community, has been their supposed tendency, by the expenditure of the great masses of wealth usurped, or otherwise acquired, by them, to maintain productive laborers, and thus support production. These privileged castes have made use of the word *security*, as if dependent for its existence on the existence of *privileged classes* and *excessive wealth*; and as any alarm applied to their sickly fears, would cause what to them was deemed insecurity, and as insecurity would annihilate production; so were these castes necessary and to be supported for ever, under pain of ruin to the community from want of production. The childishness of such wretched pretensions having been shown, aristocracy falls under the weight of its odious and insolent selfishness.

For what other purpose then could it be necessary to maintain *forced inequality*, or any degree of inequality beyond what is called for by security? Is it to uphold *truth*, to perpetuate the belief in a certain system of doctrines, of morals, of philosophy? First, of philosophy, of physical truth. Of all the benefits we derive from physical knowledge, the most important by far is the power which it ultimately gives us of turning to use, in the shape of articles of wealth, the materials and energies of nature, making human labor more available in the production of the means of enjoyment. The other uses of knowledge, the pleasure of the intellectual pursuit and the raising of the mind above superstitious fears, which are almost always founded on an ignorance of the laws (or regular course) of nature, are surely in no way dependent on excessive inequality of wealth. On the contrary, excessive inequality narrows and lessens these sources of happiness from wealth, and converts them, in the hands of a few, into mere means

for upholding their exclusive objects whatever they may chance to be. Were it otherwise, these subordinate benefits of knowledge, pleasure of the pursuit and freedom from superstition, though great in themselves, are yet so small compared with all the enjoyments derived from all the objects of wealth, that were they even increased by a forced inequality, the sum total of happiness, the common ultimate object of knowledge and distribution, would be lessened thereby. As mankind wish, from their very nature, to preserve and increase their happiness, and as knowledge is the means of this happiness, there is no fear, if left to themselves, that they will neglect the preserving and increasing of this useful knowledge. Whether, and how far, society ought to interfere with individual effort in the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge, is another and an important question, which will be discussed in a separate chapter. We have now simply to prove, that whatever other measures, if any, may be necessary for that purpose, forced inequality of wealth cannot be of the number, that measure necessarily counteracting the greatest mass of blessings that knowledge can procure. There may be numberless institutions and expedients, not involving any forced inequality, but all tending on the contrary to equality of distribution of wealth, for the diffusion of knowledge and for extending its bounds: of these, in as far as they bear on our subject, we shall treat. But let us carry in mind that, whatever benefits these may promise, however speciously they may soothe our moral and intellectual feelings, if they offend in this main point, and if this forced inequality, this violation of security, be necessary to their existence, the public good requires that they should cease to exist. As to further acquisitions of knowledge, we may state an impossible case, and suppose that no further advance, or but a very trifling advance, could be made without forced inequality of wealth. Even in such a case, a community would act much more wisely, by turning to account and, by just distribution, making the most of the knowledge they had, than seeking more, in such a case *unprofitable* or *pernicious* knowledge—pernicious in its exclusive application to the interests of a few. Society benefits by the *diffusion*, not by the *mere existence*, of immense masses of knowledge, as of wealth; by the number of persons made happier by them. That physical truth, or real physical knowledge, cannot be discovered, demonstrated, or perpetuated without the aid of forced inequality of wealth, of inequality not demanded by security, scarcely any one will at present contend, the whole current of experience and every-day facts are so entirely opposed to such a notion. Any thing extraneous that diverts

the mind, in the pursuit of new or the demonstration of old truth, must so far detract from the accuracy of the result. Inasmuch as considerations, not bearing on the point in hand, must weaken the attention and lead to false conclusions, and the forced inequality or any inequality of wealth being eminently irrelevant topics, how can they have any other than an injurious operation in discovering or diffusing knowledge? Almost all useful discoveries have been made by persons in moderate or lowly circumstances; the pressure even of want having been frequently the original impulse that launched genius on its wings. Excessive wealth almost annihilates all motives to exertion. Competence may be requisite to remove disturbing considerations; but here the influence of wealth ceases; and there is no greater foe to competence than forced inequality. Any awe or respect, that makes us admit, or believe, or rather pretend to believe, any proposition, without full conviction grounded on satisfactory appropriate evidence, is altogether pernicious to the discovery or communication of truth, and ought to be anxiously guarded against. The evidence, and nothing but the evidence, ought to influence the mind. As little can forced inequality of wealth be requisite to perpetuate, as to discover or to diffuse, physical truth. Useful knowledge or truth once known and diffused, may possibly, by the forced inequality of wealth aided by every species of violence, cease to be known: but if there be any infallible method of perpetuating useful truth, it is by an opposite process, by excluding force, and by confiding the deposit of knowledge to the keeping of as many as possible who are interested by partaking of its advantages. In fact, except by the most extraordinary rapine and abuses of security, no useful knowledge has been ever lost to mankind. Violations of security have been the constant foes of the discovery or preservation of knowledge.

If forced inequality of wealth do not tend to discover, to diffuse, to perpetuate physical knowledge, the knowledge of mechanics, of chemistry, of the objects of nature or natural history; will it tend to improvements in *morals*, and ought it to be maintained for the advancement of morality? Morality, that is to say, the direction of our voluntary actions to useful, to the most useful purposes, requires adequate *motives* to set it into action. On the just or unjust, the wise or unwise, the forcible or the voluntary distribution of wealth in a community, depend, much more than upon any other or all other causes combined, the nature and the energy of these motives to good or evil. 'Tis the worst of folly, or the worst of insincerity, to affect to separate morality from wealth, from the consideration

of those solid influential motives to good or evil conduct, which the possession or the want of the materials of happiness, supplied by wealth, affords. For what, in the ultimate resort, on almost every occasion, is the great contest between morality and immorality, between law and crime? for what, but for the possession of the objects of wealth? Wealth at the same time *supplies the motives* to vice and virtue, and is the *object of pursuit*, and the *instrument of reward*. Where force is excluded, and reason must win its purposes by persuasion addressed to competence, there will exist the maximum of motives for the practice of the social and personal virtues. But just such is the state of things under the natural distribution of equality limited by security. Forced inequality can never therefore be any thing but destructive to morality. The useful purposes to which morality directs our voluntary actions are simply those which promise the most happiness; all circumstances and consequences, immediate and remote, being considered. There may be other systems of constraint and terror, and even of voluntary deliberate mortification, which hypocrites, who live on the enjoyments which they extort from the ignorance and misery of others, may call morality, or virtue. But as all such practices deliberately destroy happiness without the expectation of a greater equivalent, or sometimes even making a pretended merit of renouncing the expectation of such equivalent, they must be deemed vicious or immoral in the highest degree. If such practices were moral, mankind would be irrational to be moral, to give up their sentient nature. No doubt forced inequality of wealth may be necessary to maintain *such* systems; nothing but force, in some shape or other, can maintain such systems of morality; and as they deliberately sacrifice human happiness in the gross and on principle, it will be quite immaterial to urge the additional happiness lost by unjust and forced distribution of wealth.

To render our argument complete, to meet our opponents on that ground where silence might be construed into a surrender of the universality of our principle in their favor, we ask, Should any degree of inequality not demanded by security, be maintained for the support of what are called *spiritual* doctrines, or creeds, for belief in *any thing* beyond the strict severity of evidence adduced to support it? The absurdity of any compulsion, whether in the way of wealth or otherwise, in support of any such systems, mussulman, jewish, or christian, is a thousand times more flagrant than in support of the ordinary physical truths of natural science. All knowledge or pretended knowledge is interesting to mankind, and ought to

be attended to, in proportion to the extent, the certainty, and the proximity of the advantages it promises to afford. Is this, the spiritual species of study or speculation, judged important by mankind? they will naturally, from a regard to their interest, attend to it. Is it not judged by mankind to be of any leading importance to them? they will not, and *ought not* to be compelled to attend to it. But mankind may be ignorant, vicious, and not know its importance. Granted. And have not mankind been equally ignorant, and unacquainted with the importance of all the leading truths of physical science? And was it ever proposed, or was it ever desired or dreamed of on the part of the discoverers or the admirers of physical truth, *not generally deemed important*, that they should be impowered to propagate or maintain it by means of forced inequality of wealth, or by any other forcible means whatever? What are the appropriate means to make men perceive the importance of any species of knowledge or of any pursuit? What but reason and persuasion? If one man, or one set of men, say, that what they call physical truth is important and ought to be attended to, why may not other men, or sets of men without end, assert the same of their notions, and all of them demand force to maintain their contradictory pretensions? In physical science such absurdities have never been heard of; or at least are no longer heard of in Europe. Who ever heard that forced inequality of wealth, or any other force, was necessary to convince mankind of the importance to their welfare of such propositions as that “animal heat is abstracted from the air,” that “this fluid which we breathe is composed of two or three different kinds of air,” that “water is composed of two kinds of air,” and that “many stones are mostly composed of pure lime, air, and water?” Yet these are facts as important as curious: and who is alarmed lest the world should not be convinced of their importance without the aid of force to add to their evidence?

Well then—nothing of force, nothing but persuasion, is to be made use of to induce men to admit the importance of any doctrines; and least of all of spiritual doctrines, and creeds; which with strange inconsistency their advocates assert to be the most important of all speculations. If they really are so, surely nothing but the free use of their reasoning powers is requisite to communicate this persuasion to their fellow-creatures; and they have by their own account an infinite advantage over the supporters of physical truth, whose speculations they deem to be so comparatively unimportant.

Persuasion then alone is to be admitted, to exhibit to men the *importance* of spiritual doctrines. What more is necessary to demonstrate to mankind their *truth*? Physical truth, it must

be remarked, as well as all other species of knowledge but what is called spiritual, entirely relies, and of necessity relies, on the simple exhibition of evidence, on the use of the senses, and the comparing and judging faculty, for its reception. It has no other natural or allowed mode whatever of establishing itself in the minds of men: nay, this even has been frequently withheld from it. How different the means of persuasion in the hands of those who advocate the truth of what they call spiritual things, in the maintenance or diffusion of which they say they believe that God himself, the maker and moulder of all who are called upon to believe, is interested! Evidence they must have, at least in their own opinion, for truth cannot be unaccompanied by evidence. Here they are on an equality with the teachers of physical knowledge. But in the application of that evidence to the mind, how vast the superiority of the spiritual teachers! In their opinion, the Creator of all was the author of these doctrines, unfolded them for the good, the happiness, of mankind, and co-operates in their diffusion. With the usual natural evidences in one hand, like the supporters of ordinary truth, but, unlike the supporters of ordinary truth, with the co-operation of him who guides human reason on the other, how can they fail of success? Though ordinary physical knowledge may fail by the mere exhibition of evidence to convince; how can super-human knowledge, aided by the divine influence and co-operation, over and above the intrinsic force of its own evidence, ever fail of convincing? Impossible. If such doctrines be true, *appropriate evidence* will command assent to them, as to other physical or moral truth, from all ordinarily organized beings. But over and above this, there is divine influence, in the case of spiritual doctrines, giving tenfold efficacy to ordinary human means of persuasion. And as we have shown that it would be the extreme of folly to permit any forced inequality of property or any other species of force, to aid in the discovery, maintenance, or diffusion, of unsupported human knowledge; so would it be incredibly more absurd to permit any such interference to aid that whose pretensions are divine. The genuine and the loud voice of history, and of every day's experience, declares, that in proportion to the absurdity of spiritual doctrines is the demand for force to maintain them; that force is a mere succedaneum to make up for the deficiency of evidence; and that all doctrines, requiring any such aid for their support, demonstrate their own weakness, uselessness, and falsehood. Such doctrines are weak, because it is one of the distinguishing attributes of truth to rely fearlessly, even to presumption, on its own powers of persuading; they are useless, because, if their importance to

human happiness could be shown, men would as willingly attend to them as to any other means of well-being: they are false by their own showing, inasmuch as they acknowledge themselves incompetent to operate conviction without the extraneous, corruptive, and terrific means of wealth and force. Allow to any one man or set of men on the face of the earth, wealth and force, to discover, uphold, or propagate what they call truth; and what possible reason can be given that any other man or set of men whatever, from the lama of Thibet to the African fetiche-man, should not be favored with similar means to uphold and propagate their supernatural notions? Truth, physical, moral, or spiritual, requires, admits of no means of persuasion but the exhibition of appropriate evidence, and the removal of, or the abstinence from, force.

These illustrations of some of the objects, for the sake of which it has been alleged that forced inequality of wealth ought to be maintained, as they are perhaps the most plausible of such objects that could be put forward, must suffice. The same reasoning, it is thought, will apply to any other object whatever claiming forced inequality of wealth for its support. So much, so great an overbalance, of our happiness, depends on the just distribution of wealth, that no promised advantages from other sources can compensate for its loss, were the promised advantages real: whereas, it is thought that every one of them will on inquiry be found utterly fallacious, or abounding in active mischief.

At the head of this section it is said, that all other species of inequality beyond what is required by equal security, should be *repressed* by society. By this expression it is simply meant that society should exert no force, should lend no factitious aid, in support of such species of inequality. The principles of this inquiry exclude force altogether. The simple withdrawing of unjust protection or support is not force: 'tis the removal of force. Equality of wealth limited by security, or that inequality which security demands, requires no exertion of force, nothing but the *removal* of force, the *abstinence* from force: all its operations must be voluntary; its sole means are those of persuasion.

What proportion of the products of their labor ought the laborers to pay for the use of the articles, called capital, to the possessors of them, called capitalists?

IN section 6 of this chapter it has been shown that the entire

use of the products of labor is the strongest stimulus to universal production that can be given. It was shown also how very feeble an encouragement even this entire use of the products of his labor, would give the unprovided laborer of civilized society, where every thing around him was appropriated, and where nothing towards making his labor productive could be by him procured without the rendering of a satisfactory equivalent through the medium of voluntary exchange. The only article the laborer has to offer for the use or the purchase of these preliminaries to production, land, house, clothes, tools, materials, food, is still a portion of his labor. But so great is usually the proportion of his labor demanded, for the use or advance of these preparatory articles, by those who have appropriated them under the name of capitalists, that by far the greater part of the products of his labor are taken out of his disposal, and consumed by those who have no further share in the production than the accumulation and lending of such articles to the real operative producer. The idle possessor of these inanimate instruments of production, not only secures to himself by their possession as much of enjoyment as the most diligent and skilful of the real efficient producers, but in proportion to the amount of his accumulations, by whatever means acquired, he procures ten times, a hundred times, a thousand times, as much of the articles of wealth, the products of labor, and means of enjoyment, as the utmost labor of such efficient producers can procure for them. In section 6. it was promised that this amount of compensation, exacted by capitalists from the productive laborers, under the name of rent or profits, as claimed for the use of land or other articles, should be inquired into.

At first view it would appear as if the immense deductions from the products of labor from this source alone,—independent of the forcible abstractions of political power for present use or for compensation to the representatives of wealth formerly wasted, under the head of national debts, independent also of the numberless expedients of insecurity, all tending to withdraw from the laborer the products of his labor,—would be more than sufficient to render hopeless any approximation to equality of possession and enjoyment of the articles of wealth, even under the shield of the natural laws of distribution. The rule of free and voluntary exchanges would appear, on a first view, to operate tremendously against the mere unprovided productive laborer, with no other possession than his capability of producing: for all the physical materials on which, or by means of which, his productive powers can be

made available, being in the hands of others with interests opposed to his, and their consent being a necessary preliminary to any exertion on his part, is he not, and must he not always remain, at the mercy of these capitalists for whatever portion of the fruits of his own labor they may think proper to leave at his disposal in compensation for his toils? Is this situation of the productive laborer irremediable? even under the shield of free labor, *entire use of its products*, and voluntary exchanges? Are there no limits to these taxes on industry, to these exactions of capitalists? Is the amount of these exactions altogether arbitrary, or are there any natural limits to its excess?

There are two points of view under which this most important matter may be considered. First, are these deductions from the laborer of the products of his labor just? do they tend to increase production, to increase the enjoyments derived from production?

Second, useful or not, can they without preponderant evil, without the employment of force which would annihilate all production, be avoided?

That every abstraction made from the laborer of the products of his labor, whether by open force or by the indirect compulsion of want extorting a species of voluntary acquiescence, must proportionally decrease his motives to production, and consequently the amount of production, is sufficiently apparent. The effect in discouraging production is beyond dispute. It signifies not the hand, whether rich or poor, or by whatever name called, that abstracts any part of the products of labor, or prevents their acquisition; in proportion to the amount of products withheld, whether called profits, or taxes, or theft, or any other mode of loss, will be the discouragement to reproduction. The necessity of maintaining existence alone, not the cheerful desire of increasing happiness, will become the prevailing stimulus to labor, as the use of its products is withdrawn from the producer. This being so, what is the proportion of the products of labor withdrawn from the laborer by capitalists alone? and what would be the additional motives to production if these defalcations ceased to exist?

These defalcations vary in different countries, in the same country at different times, and according to the species of labor from which they are subtracted: but they appear to subtract at least one half of the products of labor from the use of the producer, even where capital is most abundant and the competition amongst capitalists—as far as such competition can aid the laborers—most active. First, the laborer, say the

mechanic at woollens or cottons, earning about two shillings a day or about thirty pounds a year, pays for his house or lodging about five pounds a year. He has evidently no other fund out of which to pay this rent than the produce of his labor, whether deducted by the capitalist for whom he labors, or by labor paid to another. Next comes the claim of the employer who owns the buildings in which the mechanic works, the unwrought materials which he is to fabricate, and the machinery (the tools) with which he must operate, as well as the wages to be advanced until the wrought article is exchanged. The amount of this capital, fixed and circulating, may be from thirty to a hundred pounds for every laborer employed, the average profit on which may be set down at ten pounds. There can be no other source of this profit than the value added to the unwrought material by the labor guided by skill expended upon it. The materials, the buildings, the machinery, the wages, can add nothing to their own value. The additional value proceeds from labor alone. The spade may as well be called the parent of the grain instead of the laborious arm that wields it, as any of these articles constituting capital, can be called the parents of the manufactured article. 'Twas labor that gave to all these their value as wealth, before they came into the hand of the mechanic; and by his additional labor alone can their value be still further increased. In the usual course of things, then, the productive laborer is deprived of at least half the products of his labor by the capitalist; the amount of his labor being thirty pounds, and his rent and the profits on the stock that is said to employ him, being fifteen pounds.

'Tis of no avail to say that the operative laborer does not understand the machinery by which the fruits of his labor are thus subtracted, that he regards the operation as inevitable, and takes what he can bargain for as the most that the nature of things will allow him. The owner of the capital most frequently understands as little of these matters as the working mechanic. But the ignorance of the laborer does not increase the absolute quantum of remuneration left him after the demands of capitalists are satisfied. According to this amount of remuneration will his future exertions—the necessities of existence excepted—be. No doubt, if the productive laborers acquired knowledge, and could trace the immense abstractions made, under the name of profits, from the products of their labor, they must see the injustice of such an arrangement, and endeavour to become themselves possessed of all the articles under the name of capital, or of the means of commanding the use of such articles, necessary to make their

labor productive. Knowledge of the fact might add to the discouragement; but the smallness of the compensation, however produced, is its substantial cause. No words can make up for the defect of real products, for the absence of enjoyments, which are necessary to stimulate production. Whether withheld by the niggardliness of nature, or the justice or injustice of man, the unproductiveness of enjoyment from labor, must diminish the desire to produce and the amount of production.

“Without this capital in the shape of machinery, materials, &c.,” it will be insisted, that “mere labor would be comparatively unproductive; and therefore it is but just that the laborer should pay for the use of that, without which, by whomsoever owned, his mere productive powers would be inefficient.”

Doubtless the laborer must pay for the use of these, when so unfortunate as not himself to possess them: the question is, *how much* of the products of his labor ought to be subtracted for their use?

Two measures of the value of this use, here present themselves; the measure of the laborer, and the measure of the capitalist. The measure of the laborer consists in the contribution of such sums as would replace the waste and value of the capital by the time it would be consumed, with such added compensation to the owner and superintendant of it as would support him in equal comfort with the more actively employed productive laborers. The measure of the capitalist, on the contrary, would be the additional value produced by the same quantity of labor in consequence of the use of the machinery or other capital; the whole of such surplus value to be enjoyed by the capitalist for his superior intelligence and skill in accumulating and advancing to the laborers his capital or the use of it.

The difference of the amount to be paid by the laborer for the use of the capital necessary to enable him to exert his productive powers, according to these two different measures, is immense. It is the difference between almost perfect equality, and excess both of wealth and poverty. Let it be illustrated on the calculation just made. The laborer pays five pounds a year for his house. The house cost fifty pounds, and is calculated to last fifty or one hundred years. By the laborer's measure of the use of this article of capital, he should pay one pound or ten shillings a year rent for the yearly loss in value, according to the time the house would be in consuming, with a trifling surplus to repay the trouble of the

owner—say five shillings a year out of each of a hundred houses, or as many as it would employ one man to superintend, amounting to twenty-five pounds a year—to enable him to enjoy as much as any of the operative laborers. Fifteen to twenty-five shillings a year rent, instead of one hundred shillings, would be for this item the charge on the laborer. For the use of the capital of his employer, it would be in about the same proportion, or something more in consequence of the more perishable nature of the capital employed; that part which consists in machinery not being liable to last as long as the house. If fifty pounds be the amount of the working capital, and if the average of its duration be thirty-five years, two pounds a year must be paid to replace this yearly waste, and for the trouble of the capitalist—greater than that of the mere house-owner and requiring more skill and time—say ten shillings instead of five are to be added. Fifty shillings a year profit instead of two hundred shillings, would be for these remaining items, the charge on the laborer. Adding the rent and profits together, the laborer would have to pay sixty-five to seventy-five shillings per annum, for the use of one hundred pounds capital, instead of the three hundred shillings, or fifteen pounds, the half of the whole amount of the products of his labor, which he now pays. Were the laborer employed in agriculture, the value of the land and stock necessary to render the powers of the agricultural laborer productive would have to be estimated, instead of the manufacturing capital; and the charge for its use would be something less. Were the laborer the owner of his own capital, the five shillings a year compensation to the owner of the house, and the ten shillings a year compensation to the owner of the capital, would still be saved to him, the care necessary to preserve his own capital being rather pleasurable than painful to himself and requiring no remuneration, the real wear and tear being all the necessary expense that he must incur. Were this one hundred pounds capital the produce of his own labor, it would be of still less cost; and one half the yearly amount of labor now paid to the capitalists, would be sufficient to replace in the laborer's hands the several items of capital by the time they were respectively consumed.

Such being the measure of the *laborer* of the value of the use of the capital necessary to make his labor productive, what is the measure of that value as made by the capitalist? Before the invention of machinery, before the accommodation of work-houses in which to labor, what was the amount of produce which the unaided powers of the laborer produced?

Whatever that was, let him still enjoy, with the additional ease and comfort in the production which the superiority of the tools and the protection of the buildings afford. To the maker of the buildings or the machinery, or to him who by voluntary exchange acquired them, let all the surplus value of the manufactured article go, as a reward for and stimulus to his superior intelligence in the fabrication or acquisition of them: for the advance of the material on which he works, let the laborer pay in the same proportion, according to its value and the time he retains it, as without the material neither buildings nor machinery could be turned to account, and the merit of appropriation and accumulation is as great in the case of materials as of buildings or machinery. His improved dwelling-house being one of the items preserving his health and strength as well as the articles kept therein, and thus contributing with the other capital to make his labor more productive, or to increase his healthful time for labor, let the rate of the profit of other capital determine this likewise. Or let the whole capital for which the laborer pays, rent and profit, be regarded as one common instrument to add to the productive powers of his labor; and let the several owners of this capital share between them, in proportion to its amount and perishableness, the additional value thus given to the labor of the ignorant producer. Let the laborer enjoy with more ease and comfort what he formerly enjoyed; but let all the rewards of superior intelligence be secured to those possessing it, the accumulators of capital.

What says justice, what says utility, to these rival claims? Equality pleads altogether in favor of the productive laborer. Security stands neuter, prohibiting to either party the use of compulsion. If the measure of the laborer prevails, what is the consequence? Accumulation beyond the means necessary to enable every laborer to make his labor productive, will not be urged on by such irresistible motives as now prevail; but this point attained, the desire of further accumulation would become comparatively weak, being excited by little hope of enjoyment, either in the way of vanity or comfort, beyond that possessed by operative laborers; the chief recompense for accumulation being the substitution of mental and gentle muscular exertion for more efficient, perhaps more healthful, bodily labor. As to real comfort, that of the operative laborer would be so much increased, that the accumulator would not lose so much by being reduced to his level as present appearances might indicate. The richest capitalist would be but reduced to a situation intermediate in point of *wealth* between

his present situation and that of the present degraded laborer. In point of real *happiness*, the situation of the laborer and capitalist would be perhaps equally improved. But in proportion as motives to accumulation beyond this point, for mere vanity and distinction, lost their force, motives to that degree of accumulation necessary to render labor productive would be strengthened and would increase. The whole of the products of labor being ensured to the producer, the utmost energy would be employed in production, and necessarily in the acquisition and retaining of those means or instruments indispensable to render labor productive. The yearly produce, and consumption of the products of labor, to increase enjoyment, being the real object of rational effort, in comparison to the extent of which productive power, the extent of accumulation is as nothing, and accumulation being considered merely as a means to this great end, the universal desire of enjoyment and of production as the only path to lead to enjoyment, would ensure to every one the possession of the capital required for such purposes. Every year, as human labor became more productive by machinery or otherwise, the rewards of labor would be increased: houses, machinery, dress, food, would be improved, not for a few accumulators or capitalists, but for all. Capital would be increased in a tenfold ratio, though in masses almost equal and universally diffused, because every one would be interested in its accumulation, and would be able to accumulate it as far as really useful, that is to say, as far as worth the trouble by rational men of producing it. The mass of national wealth would be immensely greater than at present, though no person might possess ten times more accumulated capital than his neighbour. All the increase of happiness proved to arise from equality of distribution, would prevail; and men would produce for the sake of the *absolute* comforts to be derived from wealth, not for the sake of mere *relative* comforts, of a comparison of their superiority with the wretchedness of their fellow-creatures.

If, on the contrary, the measure of the capitalists prevails, what is the consequence? Whetted by the stimulus of the gratification of unbounded desires, of superiority without assignable limit to the destitution around him, the desire of accumulation supersedes with the capitalist even the love of enjoyment. To inequality of wealth there is no bound: it becomes the ruling passion: the distinction which it confers, the envy which it excites, urge men on to acquire it by any means: talents, virtue, are sacrificed to it. Every expedient which force and cunning can use to appropriate the fruits of

other men's labor, and with this view to turn the mass of mankind into ignorant contented drudges, is erected into a custom or a law. A universal and always vigilant conspiracy of capitalists, of necessity the most intelligent, exists every where, because founded on a universally existing interest, to cause the laborers to toil for the lowest possible, and to wrest as much as possible of the products of their labor to swell the accumulations and expenditure of capitalists. Yet such is the rage of these men for distinction, for expenditure as an instrument of distinction rather than of any direct enjoyment, that the products of the labor of thousands are swallowed up for no other end than to gratify such unsubstantial desires. What accumulated wealth there is in such a community, is gathered into the hands of a few; and as well from its bulk as from its contrast with the surrounding poverty, it strikes every eye. The productive laborers stript of all capital, of tools, houses, and materials to make their labor productive, toil from want, from the necessity of existence, their remuneration being kept at the lowest compatible with the existence of industrious habits. The mass of national wealth, though its individual heaps might be a thousand times greater than under nearly equal distribution, bears no proportion to what it would be if smaller portions of capital necessary to make labor productive, were possessed by the productive laborers, by *all*. The extremes of luxury and magnificence prevail. The evils of inequality are pushed to the utmost. The desire of accumulation reigns unbounded: production is stimulated chiefly by want.

In point of fact, neither the measure of the producer nor of the capitalist prevails; but a measure between the two, formed out of the conflict of their opposing interests, and varied by a thousand casual circumstances in every society. The measure of the capitalist of the value of the use of his capital, pushed to its extreme, would annihilate production from its zeal to accumulate or to appropriate to itself the products of labor. The measure of the laborer, without the universal diffusion of knowledge and justice, could not prevail. In proportion as force and fraud have been removed in the progress of the development of wealth, the tendency has been towards the measure of the laborer: and every expedient, legal or otherwise, employed to counteract this tendency, has resulted from selfishness or ignorance, and lessened the mass of enjoyment. The amount demanded for the use of capital depends more on the mode of its distribution than on the absolute quantity accumulated. Whatever may be the amount of the capital accumulated, whether large or small, if it all remain in the

hands of the producers, the price demanded for the occasional use of any portion of it would necessarily be at the lowest, from the few persons unprovided with capital, and of course the feeble competition for the use of it. But where all the capital of the community is in the hands of men called capitalists, and scarcely any remains in the hands of the producers, there will the price of the use of it be very high, whether the absolute quantity of capital be large or small, from the multitudes, the great majority of the community unprovided with capital, and of course the immense competition to obtain the use of it. The greater the supply of capital amongst the capitalists, the lower of course will become the price of its use, the numbers of the unprovided and the competition remaining the same. But the absolute amount of capital in the hands of the capitalists of any community, affords no guarantee to the efficient producers of wealth that the remuneration of their labor will be increased, that a greater proportion of its products will be left in their hands at their own disposal. Under systems of insecurity, capitalists will not find or deem it their interest to permit their capital so to increase as to reduce materially its profits or the cost of its use. When accumulating to this point, the desire of enjoyment shows itself in increased luxury of expenditure. In foreign wars, by means of loans, capital is expended by political power: it is utterly consumed and annihilated; and in return its owners acquire, under the guarantee of political power, a claim on the products of the annual labor of the working community: whereas had this capital been applied to the maintenance of productive labor, instead of being consumed in loans, and thus taken out of the market of competition; instead of entailing a burden on productive labor, it would bring down the profits of stock, and thus tend to throw more of the products of labor into the hands of the producers. The burden without equivalent, the interest on the loan, would be altogether saved to the industrious community, and for their labor capitalists would besides be compelled to pay them more liberally—no new expedient being devised to check this natural tendency of things.

Our second question with respect to the deductions from the products of labor taken by capitalists for the use of the articles constituting their capital, was “useful or not, can these deductions be avoided without the production of preponderant evil in the employment of force?” If the simple removal of restraints and the consequent diffusion of knowledge, be not sufficient to abate these deductions, they ought not by any other means to be abated: for, no other means

than those of force remaining, the employment of such an instrument would annihilate production. All institutions and expedients contravening the rules of distribution here laid down being removed, the producers being permitted to follow their real interests, and the acquisition as well as the enlargement of knowledge being facilitated to all, those deductions would soon be reduced to the lowest compatible with reproduction, and the producer would gradually recover the entire use of the products of his labor, or the nearest approach to it which the ultimate and extended interests of all producers would permit. The different modes of production and distribution, by which producers as rational beings, under the shield of equal security as specified under the name of the natural laws of distribution, might accomplish this object of enjoying the whole of the products of their own labor, will be pointed out. Enough at present to get a glance at the mighty evils spread over the producers, wherever the capital necessary to make their labor productive is accumulated in any other hands than their own.

SECTION 15.

General inferences from the foregoing premises. Statement of the "Natural Laws of Distribution," or general rules or principles, the observance of which is necessary in order to attain the greatest happiness derivable from wealth.

IF we have entered with great earnestness and minute detail into the proof of the propositions at the head of the several sections of this chapter, it has been with the view of establishing a few simple, intelligible and most important rules, to serve as first principles in the distribution of wealth. As we have hitherto proved directly their truth, that is to say, their accordance with the organization and circumstances of man and their tendency to promote the greatest happiness to be derived from wealth; so shall we frankly and unhesitatingly follow in subsequent chapters wherever truth may further lead us, in the development of all the other consequences interesting to mankind, that appear to flow from an undeviating adherence to these simple rules. These are what may be called the *natural laws of distribution*. The observance of these rules or laws will lead, without effort, to the enjoyment of the greatest portion of the benefits of equality that can be had without preponderant evil, *i. e.* without violating security, and with security curtailings, and ultimately annihilating, production itself. Every

person exercising them is of course bound to respect the same rights in every other member of the community. The grand secret demonstrated is, that it is the *interest* of all communities to substitute reason and voluntariness, for force, in the distribution of wealth, as well as in all their other concerns; that in the distribution of wealth, as in every other department of morals, the duty and the interest of individuals coincide, mingle with, and form the aggregate of national happiness.

In the preceding sections what have we proved? First, it is evident that if we wish to extract from wealth the greatest happiness it is capable of affording those who produce it, we shall be of opinion that "all labor ought to be free and voluntary as to its direction and continuance."

All labor should be "free" from external compulsion as to its direction and continuance. On all unappropriated articles labor ought to be free, because, no appropriation having been made, no rival claim can be set up; no consent is to be asked. On appropriated articles labor is to be free from all external compulsion, the consent of the appropriator having been obtained. Why render this consent necessary? Because without it *force* must be employed; and the employment of force annihilates, as far as it goes, the motives to reproduction, and consequently production itself. Without it the producer could not enjoy the products of his labor. Without it the laborer himself would establish a precedent which would lead to the abstraction from himself of the product of whatever his labor might appropriate by giving it a value or adding to its previously acquired value.

All labor should be "voluntary" as to its direction and continuance; that is to say, not only should no external compulsion restrain its action on any unappropriated or conceded appropriated article; but even to direct it to any of these, no motives but those capable of moving the *will* through the reason, the affections, or both, should be employed. Man can only be induced to act through the will or by force: there is no alternative. Delusion is still voluntariness, and knowledge is its appropriate cure. While knowledge, not force, is employed to remove the delusion, no force should be used directly or indirectly to support it: if the laborer do not choose to labor at all or in any given direction, if he refuse to obey his interest and to listen to persuasion, let no force be employed to compel him; leave him to the punishment of nature: such is the dictate of even-handed justice, of utility seeking the greatest happiness.

Perhaps the word *voluntary*, used in its widest signification, embracing the different meanings above used, might be

sufficient for our purpose, and supersede the use of the additional word "free." If the meaning be more clear by the employment of an additional word, its use will not be regretted. For the lengthened proof of this first rule or law of distribution, the reader is referred to the five first sections.

What is the second rule that the preceding facts and inferences have proved? "All the products of labor," it has been shown, "ought to be secured to the producers of them."

The object being to promote happiness, and of course the greatest quantity of happiness; and this quantity depending, other things being equal, on the quantity of articles of wealth produced to promote that happiness; that quantum of use of the products of labor ought to be enjoyed by the laborer which will call forth this greatest happiness and greatest production. True, that the additions by use of wealth, to the happiness of the producers, will decrease continually in their pleasure-producing qualities: but exactly in proportion to the decrease of the enjoyment from the production, will be also the decrease of motives to continue that production. Decreased energy of motive requires increased excitement: but as the produce of the last hours of labor always affords less and less enjoyment than the preceding, there is *more* necessity, instead of less, for the use of those products to continue the stimulation of these continually decreasing tendencies to exertion. There is doubtless a portion of exertion, that necessary to existence by means of food, which absolute want will command: there is also a degree of exertion so oppressive to the over-wrought faculties, that no pleasures of enjoyment will keep them long engaged to that extent. But within these two extremes are placed all the degrees of industrious exertion: and as *habit* will not supply motive, but merely keep up the tendency to be at all operated upon by appropriate motives, and as these motives are apt to flag towards the termination of exertions, hence arises the more commanding necessity for the use of the last products of labor than for any of the intermediate products, every preceding portion of which furnishes a stronger incitement to an increased tendency.

No doubt, in the present artificial and fortuitous combinations of society, from the monopoly of knowledge and the numberless and ever-varying expedients in which force and fraud are the agents of insecurity, the laborer is *compelled*, by the necessity of living, to exert his productive powers beyond that first produce, which if left to himself would be abundantly sufficient for his support: nor is it probable that, if left to himself to consume the whole products of his labor, he would persevere in that unremitting though under the new circum-

stances richly-requited) toil, which is now exacted from him under the pain of destitution and death. Under the present system of things, the producer is, as to *happiness*, at the very lowest point of the scale at which he can be kept consistently with the continuance of his efforts. As to *production*, the expedients of insecurity restrict the acquisition of skill and the use of capital (the materials of production) to so few, and render such numbers utterly useless to production, that with one half the labor which is now extracted from the misery of a few, four times or perhaps ten times the quantity of production on the whole would be obtained from the active energies of an equally-informed and skilful community, all enjoying the whole of the products of their individual exertions. The accumulation of the general capital of the community—for a few accidental exceptions, to a small amount, would cause no perceptible derangement—in any other hands than those of the real operative laborers, necessarily arrests the progress of all industry but that which will leave the usual remuneration of capital which the time and circumstances afford, to the holders of the capital. Though millions might be made happy by employment on the existing capital,—land, food, houses, machines,—of any community, if rendered skilful and permitted to use them at a profit, say one fourth, or any proportion, less than that which a very few skilful laborers of the same community could be *made*, by limiting, by direct and indirect means, their enjoyments to nothing, to yield to the holders of the capital; yet as long as that force-supported organization of things continues, by which one set of men possess the productive powers alone, and another possess the physical means of putting those productive powers into operation, so long will the latter, the capitalists, use the means in their power to render the labor and the happiness of all laborers subservient to their greatest interests; so long will the happiness of the whole human race be sacrificed, if necessary in the estimation of capitalists, to produce an additional quarter per cent. profit. The laborers in their place would do the same, being all equally the creatures of the circumstances surrounding them. As long as two hostile masses of interest are suffered to exist in society, the owners of labor on one side and the owners of the *means* of laboring on the other, as long as this unnatural distribution is forcibly maintained—for without force wielded by ignorance it could not be maintained—so long will perhaps as much as nine-tenths of attainable human productions never be brought into existence, and so long will ninety-nine hundred parts of attainable human happiness be sacrificed. To obviate these evils, by excluding force altogether from the distribution of wealth,

it is necessary to observe our second rule, "All the products of labor should be secured to the producers, of them." By means of it alone will all pernicious inequality be prevented from arising where it does not already exist; and where it does exist, it will be gradually exterminated, simply by renouncing the future employment of force in all operations respecting wealth.

It will not be supposed that by the word "secured," in the above rule, is meant to be conveyed any notion of coercion. To secure to the producer the products of his labor, no display of force is necessary. To abstain from the use of force, is all that is wanting. To protect the laborer in the repelling of force that would abstract the product of his toils, is the only meaning to be applied to the word "secured." For the lengthened illustration and proof of this second rule of equal security in respect to property or wealth, see sections 6, 8, 9, and 10.

There is still another rule to be deduced from the preceding sections, making with the two former what we call the "natural laws of distribution," or principles of security respecting property or wealth. "All exchanges of the products of wealth ought to be free and voluntary." In sections 7, 11, and following, this proposition is proved. Though the faculty of freely exchanging may be said to be implied in the entire use of the products of labor, it was deemed necessary to treat it apart, in order to afford room for those further developments which the important subject of exchanges demanded. Considerable space was therefore taken to show the utility of unshackled exchanges and the pernicious consequences of any forcible interference with them, of any other interference than that arising from persuasion and the diffusion of knowledge.

As in the first rule, principle, or law respecting the direction and continuance of labor, so in this respecting exchanges of the products of labor, the word "free," as well as "voluntary," is made use of. Exchanges must be free as referring to external constraint, and must be voluntary as respects the intelligent agent. Were the word "free," not made use of, it might perhaps be said, "All the exchanges that are permitted, ought to be voluntary; but there are many exchanges which it would be unwise to permit." To obviate therefore the possibility of misunderstanding the meaning, the second word is introduced; though the first alone in its fair signification might be sufficient to convey the whole intended meaning. In section 12, this rule of exchanges has been developed.

Our lengthened discussions, it will be seen, have had for

their sole object to remove all regulations and interferences with labor and its products depending on force ; and to substitute knowledge and persuasion for them in all matters relating to wealth, by means of intelligible and simple first principles or rules of action, the observance of which, constituting what is called *security* as to property, would lead of itself, without effort, to the utmost possible, nearly approaching to a perfect, equality of distribution of wealth, and thus to the greatest happiness derivable from it.

These rules of action, or natural laws of distribution—so called because they require no artificial or factitious arrangements for their support—as illustrated and proved in the foregoing sections, are the three above stated.

First. All labor ought to be free and *voluntary*, as to its direction and continuance.

Second. All the products of labor ought to be secured to the producers of them.

Third. All exchanges of these products ought to be free and *voluntary*.

The literal and impartial execution of these laws of distribution, will produce, without further effort, the greatest happiness to a community, to be derived from that portion of wealth, whatever it may be, of which it may happen to be possessed, or which it may be in the yearly habit of producing and consuming, and will ensure the greatest reproduction of wealth. The penalty attached by nature to the breach of these laws of distribution, or, to speak without metaphor, the penalty ensuing from the constitution of men and of things surrounding them, is, the loss of the objects of wealth and of the happiness to be derived from them, in proportion to the magnitude of the offence, to the extent of departure from these laws.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE EVILS ACTUALLY PRODUCED BY FORCED INEQUALITY OF WEALTH.

THE evils arising from a great inequality of wealth, from an accumulation, in the hands of a few individuals, of immense masses of wealth, the products of labor, whether fixed or not in the soil, are so appalling, and so minute and diffusive in their influence, on the *production* of wealth, on morals political and private, and of course on happiness, that they demand a separate and distinct exposition. It is one thing, to have shown the *benefits* that are necessarily attendant on a distribution such as the natural course of things, under the shelter of impartial justice between man and man, aided by the constant advancement and diffusion of knowledge, would produce. To exhibit the *evils* of a contrary course, of an attempt at forcing wealth into certain hands, or of maintaining it in those hands by partial regulations—and without such forced and partial regulations it can never be so maintained—will carry our main argument to the highest point of what we may call moral demonstration. For, if even the forced inequality of wealth were attended with some good effects, and with no positive evils, still our task would be to weigh the quantum of good arising from this forced inequality against the quantum of good arising from that unconstrained state of things—call it comparative equality or what you please—which has been advocated, and to note the balance; our judgement depending on its amount. But here, where the argument is already decided from the want of good effects arising from forced inequality, how irresistible will it be when to these are added a host of positive evils! Some of these evils have been unavoidably touched on before; but it is useful to bring them all together as an antidote to that unenlightened and short-sighted, and therefore pernicious, selfishness, which aims at indefinite grasping at the acquisitions, or, more properly and truly, at the future products of the labor of others. All the evils arising from excessive inequality of wealth, from that inequality which is effected either by direct force or by unequal laws, may perhaps be usefully referred to one or other of the following heads:

I. Of its moral evils.

1. Excessive inequality of wealth, that is to say, all inequality over and above that which is necessary to support the natural laws of distribution—free labor—entire use of its products—and voluntary exchange—diminishes the sum total of human enjoyment, by subtracting from the masses of happiness of the greater number.

2. It does *not add* to the happiness, on the balance of its effects, of those few who possess the larger shares.

3. It engenders *positive vices* in those having the larger shares, in the excessively rich.

4. It excites the admiration and the imitation, and in this way diffuses the practice of those vices of the rich in the rest of the community, or produces in them other vices arising out of their relative situation in respect to the excessively rich.

II. Of its economical evils.

1. Its yearly income is consumed by *unproductive* laborers, and is therefore so much *annual loss* of the productions of the national industry.

2. It encourages such arts and trades, in the exchange of its income, previous to consumption, as are the most insecure and unequal in their remuneration, and therefore the least tending to national welfare.

III. Of its political evils.

It necessarily leads to the usurpation of the powers of legislation, as well as of the executive and judicial authority, by those unqualified by education to exercise them aright, and with interests hostile to the general or national interest.

SECTION 1.
Of the moral evils produced by forced inequality of wealth.

If such be the evils arising, in the very nature of things, from an excessive inequality in the distribution of wealth, from that inequality which is brought about by absolute violence, by fraud, or by the operation of unequal laws interfering with the freedom of labor, the secure enjoyment of the whole of its products, and the perfect freedom of voluntary exchanges; and if the remedy for these evils, beautiful for its simplicity, consisting solely in the removal of restraints and pretended encouragements, and in the utmost possible diffusion of every species of *real*, which must be therefore *useful*, knowledge, be in the power of every community that has the knowledge and virtue to will it;—how strongly should we be attached to that

fearless discussion of moral, political, and economical truth, which has led to such results! Not in vain will the baneful experience of past ages have been accumulated for us; not in vain will past ages have erred and suffered;—their experiments, carried on through successions of generations and centuries, in moral, political, and economical science, will be seized by us, and the good extracted from them, as we extract what is useful from the physical experiments of the early chemists. But let us first prove the evil effects that have been pointed out.

After what has been already said, it will require no extent of illustration, no marshalling of particulars, to prove our first alleged evil imputed to an excessive or forced inequality, to any portion of inequality not demanded by security, in the distribution of wealth. Who will deny that excessive inequality must diminish the sum total of human enjoyment, by subtracting from the masses of happiness of the greater number, in as far as that happiness consists in the pleasures dependent on the possession of wealth? If any number of heaps of any article be exposed, and a little be taken from each, nothing is more clear than that each individual heap will be lessened. Just so it is with happiness: we cannot measure directly the sensations and other feelings that constitute happiness itself; but we can measure the physical means, the instruments by which these pleasurable feelings are excited. These means being lessened in each, the aggregate of individual, which alone constitutes the general, happiness, is diminished. Were the case, as some people argue as if they supposed it was, that the excessively rich derived their means of expenditure from any *independent sources*; that houses, coaches, silks, wines, palaces, and pictures, were periodically rained down to them from heaven, or supplied by the pretty childishness of eastern genii; did there exist in nature any other means of producing or increasing wealth, but by labor superadded to raw materials, or to the productive powers of nature in the growth of animals and plants; were the riches of the rich any thing more than the annual or other periodical products of the labor of the rest of the community;—*then*, and in this imaginary state of things, it might so happen that the wealth of the excessively rich might exist without a deduction, exactly correspondent in extent, from the portions of the rest of the community. It follows then that excessive inequality, being attainable only by deductions from the products of the individual labors of the whole of the rest of the community, must lessen the sum total of the enjoyments derived from the wealth of that community. To justify this inequality, caused by force or unequal laws, it would be neces-

sary to show that the additional happiness enjoyed by those having excessive wealth is so great, as *more* than to counterbalance the individual deductions from the happiness of those who have produced the wealth, the society at large. But so very far is this from being the case, as already shown in the 8th and 9th sections of the last chapter, that we shall find, that

The second evil arising from that inequality of wealth—which can only be produced by violence or unequal laws, and which renders exertion unnecessary for the continuance of the possession of wealth,—called here, *excessive* inequality, is, that *it does not add to the happiness even of those few possessing the larger shares.* This result arises from several facts always recurring, in the way of antecedents and consequents, called “laws of nature,” observed in the play of our physical organization. Inequality of wealth, acquired in any other way than by means of the voluntary exchanges of successful industry, or the free gift of wealth so acquired, is on an immense probability of chances, attended with this effect, that as it renders exertion *unnecessary*, so it renders it *unpractised*. Exertion, implying an effort attended with some degree of discomfort before its ultimate object can be produced, requires to be stimulated by some adequate *motive*. To set a stone in motion, some impulse, some communication of motion must be applied. To urge a mere sentient being into action, some inducement, as of food, must be held out. To urge into exertion a sentient and thinking being, capable of distant views, of looking into consequences, *motives* must be supplied. Now what are these motives, and where are they to be found under the ordinary social system of competition and individual exertion? They consist chiefly in the pursuit of the objects of *wealth, power, and reputation*, to gratify our physical wants and wishes, to gratify our passions, and to gratify our moral or sympathetic feelings. Look now to the situation of the excessively rich. He is already supplied to repletion with those objects which are the main-springs of human conduct, which serve as *motives* to human exertion. Every physical propensity has at hand the means of inordinate gratification. Does a wish arise? it is gratified: volition is all that is required; exertion is superfluous. Excessive wealth gives also *power*, or the means of influencing others. The possessor of excessive wealth has an equivalent always at hand, to offer, in the way of voluntary exchange, for the services of his fellow-creatures, by means of which he makes them subservient to the gratification of his passions. In fact, the senses not being capable of excitement beyond a certain point, and being speedily satiated, excessive wealth, looking out for means to keep up excitement to pro-

long the feeling of existence, naturally and almost necessarily directs itself to the influencing of others to the gratification of its passions. The possession of excessive wealth is therefore, *ipso facto*, operating on beings constituted as we are, the possession of *power*. The pleasures of reputation also, or of the good opinion of others; or, of what is more prized by the bulk of the rich, of the envy and idle admiration of the surrounding crowd, is a necessary consequence of wealth. That deference or tacit acknowledgement of superiority, at all events of superiority in possessing the means of happiness, so universally conceded to the rich, is to them *reputation*; is willingly construed by them into something more substantial and better than the deference paid by a few to talent or virtue. If we want then to stimulate to action the rich, if we want to supply them with motives to exertion that has ever so little of the apparently arduous in it, we find that all the usual motives to human exertion are snatched out of our hands. Wealth, attended with power and reputation, they already have. To obtain *what*, should they put forth superfluous energies? For what purpose become the wretched rivals of the creatures, in their eyes unfortunate, on whom they look down as toiling for pitiful portions of those good things, of which they feel themselves abundantly, and without effort, possessed? So entirely do these circumstances operate in inducing this state of mind in the excessively rich, that they look upon it as mean and sordid to be compelled to any useful labor for acquiring the good things of life. Idleness is looked upon as their right, their prerogative, and becomes a sickly matter of pride and triumph. What is the consequence of this state of things? How does it affect the happiness of the rich? Here we must notice another law of our nature. Without the constant exercise of some at least of our faculties, corporeal or mental, there can be no permanent contentment, no real happiness. Without an *object* before us, an *aim* and end of our exertions, we cannot be happy. Such is then the situation of the excessively rich: without motives to exertion they cannot put forth any of the energies of their nature: for them, these motives cannot be found. Without these motives, there is no exertion; without exertion, no continued happiness: life becomes a mere alternation of feverish, mostly sensual, excitement, and of listlessness; and in this respect the abuses of the distribution of wealth lead to the same results with the occupations of the savage. Excessive wealth, where exertion is not necessary to continue the means of gratification, will, as long as man is constituted as he is at present, be unaccompanied with exertion; and therefore without contentment, without permanent happiness. Accidental circum-

stances will operate on a few individuals of every class and profession, taking them out of the general rule and raising them above the level of their fellows. But were these exceptions one in ten, they would not invalidate our general position,—that the excessively rich are condemned to a want of *aim*, of *action* in life, and therefore to a want of happiness.

Let not the effects of this position be misrepresented: nothing can be further from its tendency than an insinuation of hypocritical comfort to the poor and the wretched, intimating that their physical privations should be cheerfully endured, inasmuch as the rich are still more wretched than they. No: in the scale of discomfort, the wretchedly poor are undoubtedly much more to be pitied than the excessively rich. But our system, far from advocating the necessity of either of these states of existence, demonstrates the pernicious effects arising from both. The one evil engenders and supports the other: wherever excessive wealth has existed, excessive poverty has almost always reared its palaces and pampered its caprices. While excessive wealth always and necessarily lessens the number of the middling orders in possession of moderate capitals, it almost always reduces to *comparative* beggary, if not to absolute beggary, the vast majority of society. It is only in a state of society where acquisitions by violence and unequal laws, have been engrafted, as it were, on a state more or less *approaching* to free labor, free exchanges, and free discussion and diffusion of knowledge, that excessive inequality of wealth has existed without excessive misery of society at large.

The excessively rich then, as a body, being without motives to exertion, are condemned to inaction and listlessness: they know not how to pass away, or (very energetically speaking) to *kill* their time: they feel the void, the wearisomeness of existence; for them has been formed the word *ennui*, to denote the wretchedness of a continual want of sensations, physical or mental.* Hope has no brightening prospects for them; desire, no wish, by exertion, to be accomplished. What are the expedients to which they are necessarily driven in order to fly from this vacuity of thought and feeling? To renew and repeat eternally the pleasures of the senses? To enjoy an eternal banquet of tastes, of sounds, of forms and colours, of odours, and of all the varieties of feeling? Alas! nature interposes and baffles the schemes of contentment, not to say of happiness, from such continual excitements. It is a *fact*

* The veriest pang the wretched find,
Is rapture to the dreary void,
The leafless desert of the mind,
The waste of feelings unemployed.

always recurring, and what we call a *law* of nature, that the nerve excited beyond a certain time or a certain degree, loses the power of enjoyment till relieved by rest and abstinence. Were our organization differently constituted; were it possible to call forth, to renew desires, as quickly as the objects of their gratification could be presented; had we, like the inmates of Mahomet's paradise, ever-springing and ever-unsated appetites, this scheme would succeed. But, as things now are, the greater portion by far of the 24 hours of each day not devoted to sleep, must be filled up in a way unaided by sensual pleasure, in order to enable the nerves to recover their tone and capacity for these enjoyments. Nay, this law of our nature, this fact of our organization, goes even further. Not only are rest and abstinence required to recover the capacity for a renewal of sensual pleasures; but if we presume to push these pleasures to excess, if we go a step beyond the point of gratification by way of forcing nature to more intense or lengthened enjoyment, she indignantly repels us from her bosom, and lassitude and disgust and loathing infallibly succeed, and even the capacity for enjoying future sensual pleasures is more or less impaired; not to speak of remote constitutional effects in predisposing to disease and lessening the duration of life. Supposing that wisdom or prudence avoids these latter evils, how are the unoccupied rich to fill up the dreaded daily void spaces of their existence? In sauntering, trifling, gossiping, in worthless pursuits, or in pernicious pursuits, say the experience of all ages and nations, and the very nature of our organization. Happy are they amongst them, who can make to themselves an interest in vying with their grooms or coachmen in the care of hunting dogs, or the fashionable mode of brandishing their whips, and guiding their brown or gray horses. If extravagance of foolish expenditure do not accompany these pastimes, time is at all events *killed* by them, and the dreaded feeling of the vacuity of life is removed. After the idlers and the foolishly busy, come the *perniciously* busy, professed sensualists, intriguers, gamblers, &c. Those who require stronger excitements to keep awake the feeling of existence, are of this class; and numerous and to be pitied they are, their pursuits being justly denominated *vices*, from the miseries which they entail on themselves and others.

Why may not, it may be asked, the excessively rich fill up their vacant hours in intellectual pursuits, or in works of active usefulness or beneficence? That but a very few do so occupy themselves, is an indisputable fact. To the reason already given, the want of *motive to exertion*, in pursuits whose

object is *remote* and *not directly selfish*, must be added another, arising from the mode of education of the excessively rich. Surrounded with dependants, no want or wish left ungratified, an over-high estimate of their own importance, and an undue selfishness, are necessarily engendered: the rest of mankind are looked upon as inferior beings: to their wants and circumstances, to their privations and modes of life, the attention, the sympathies of the pampered young of the excessively rich, have not been directed. Seldom indeed therefore will they be prepared by education, to be operated upon by such high moral motives as those of beneficence. Were this even the case, something more than the *will* is wanting to do good: intelligence as to the mode of effecting it, is equally necessary. What promise does the education of the excessively rich, give of the development of this intelligence? In early childhood surrounded by conventional forms and systems, by those above them, their parents, whose sentiments must not be disputed, by those beneath them who assent to every folly and propensity of their little superiors, the great spring of mental improvement, *curiosity*, is never called forth. The excitement of this spring in youth, in very early youth, is necessary for the development of the comparing and reasoning faculty, to conquer that love of rest, that inaptitude to exertion, which, like rust, grows upon us by the operation of external circumstances, if not timely prevented by the early formation of a *habit* of curiosity and inquiry. Before school education begins, such children have mostly acquired an inaptitude to mental improvement: and it is in vain to use, by way of exciting them, so remote and delicate a motive of action, and to the young, enamoured during the day with the mere motion of the animal spirits, unconscious as yet of the weight of time, so very *incomprehensible* a motive of action, as the filling up of the idle hours of life or the acquisition of the means of extended usefulness.

We may conclude, then, that the excessively rich is not as happy as the moderately rich; because, in sensual pleasures, nature will not permit him to go beyond what the moderately rich has the means to gratify; because he has no uniform aim or object of exertion in life which the moderately rich and the occupied possess, to maintain their station or to advance it; and because long leisure hours are occupied with silly or pernicious pursuits, while the few hours of leisure—after exertion—of the employed, are turned to pleasure, though the walk, the air, the sun, the skies, may be their sole invigorating causes of delight.

But it is time that we should advance another step in our

argument; for we have undertaken to show that not only is excessive wealth unable to make the excessively rich happier than the moderately rich, but "*it engenders positive vices in the possessors of these excessive shares of wealth.*" The vices produced by excessive wealth, under the name of the vices of luxury, have been, in almost all countries and ages, the themes calling forth the reprobation of moralists. It is true that exaggeration has been abundantly scattered over their declamations on this subject; that they have almost proscribed the use of wealth; that they have almost denounced enjoyment or pleasure itself, in consequence of the palpable vices and miseries which their excess engenders. Ignorant of the physical and mental organization of human nature, ignorant of the modes of producing, accumulating and distributing wealth, and their comparative effects on human happiness; looking always on their subject but at the one side, urged by unsocial antipathies, frequently by superstitious dogmas or theories; no wonder that wealth and happiness were denounced as vices, or snares, or species of theft, to be winked at by morality, instead of being boldly put forward as the only intelligible objects of human existence: no wonder that austerities, and privations, and even (by the extravagantly fanatic) self-torments, have been put forward as virtues; to form a contrast to the selfishness and cowardliness of excessive wealth. But real, enlightened morality, founded on the nature of man, and his relations to surrounding objects, and on the consequences of his actions to himself and others, needs not the treacherous and pernicious aid of prejudice, or error, or falsehood in any shape, to entitle her to the respect and the admiration of mankind. Casting aside therefore the assistance of exaggeration, let us soberly point out those vices which are the peculiar products of excessive wealth. Stealing, lying about the ordinary concerns of life, stinginess at least towards their equals, are not the vices of the excessively rich: but sensual excesses, a disregard of all the personal virtues of prudence, an irreclaimable selfishness arising from an over-estimate of their own importance, and of the superior value of their own happiness, want of fortitude to bear the ordinary evils and casualties of life—these are the vices inseparable, in a great majority of cases, from the possession of excessive wealth. That sensual excesses are vicious, merely, like all other vices, because they tend to misery, no one, I believe, will dispute: that those who have the means, without effort, of indulging, as it is called, in these excesses, will be more apt to yield to them than those who are not so well provided with the means of enjoyment, (or if provided by means of exer-

tion, giving a substitute and a habit of other pursuits,) cannot be disputed. Amongst the poor the necessities of their existence, amongst the middling classes the defect of sufficient means, limit respectively the possibility or the probability of sensual excess; while amongst the excessively rich there is no restraint to the headlong gratification of appetite but enlarged views of distant evils; which enlarged views—on the one hand—are in no way confined to the rich; while on the other hand, they have the least aptitude to be influenced by them. As to the restraining motive of public opinion, the influence of religion, of the laws, these are, not to say equally operative on the rest of society as on the rich, but much *more operative*. There remain then greater means of gratification with the rich, and therefore, other things being at least equal, greater excesses and abuse of sensual pleasures. If the indulgence in sensual excesses be characteristic of the excessively rich, what is there in their situation that should teach them habits of *personal prudence*? They that *want* will be little inclined to waste, because by waste they lose the very means of enjoyment: they that have no wants will be apt to be indifferent to waste: they whose wants are not only satisfied to repletion, but whose very wishes are anticipated, require a strong external motive to lead them to reflect on the remote evils of imprudence and waste of every description. Where are the very rich to find this motive, in opposition to the calls of immediate gratification? The calculation of consequences requires effort, the very naming of future evil is grating to pampered ears and appetites: how much more the weighing the probability of its approach! But the want of prudence in all their arrangements brings, in the course of time, regret and discomfort, though the cases should be but few in which it produces absolute ruin. To obviate this natural tendency of excessive wealth to extravagance and imprudence of all sorts, entails and settlements—mind always at the expense of the innocent—have been justified; though many other pernicious objects, besides these, have led to their establishment, and many other important pernicious effects have resulted from them. The tendency of excessive wealth to produce improvidence, cannot be doubted: and though the want of prudence is not so great a vice, as not being attended with so great evils, to the very rich, as to the moderately rich, not to speak of the poor to whom it would be perdition; yet it is necessarily incidental to excessive wealth; and vicious, in as far as it tends to induce misery to themselves or indirectly to others. In a national point of view this extravagance—though the immediate incomes would be dissipated—would be salutary as leading to

equalization of wealth, if iniquitous laws, framed by the rich, did not protect them from the effects of their own vices by screening their property from the just demands of the industrious. The sensual excesses and the improvidence of excessive wealth, are necessarily accompanied with a *want of fortitude* in bearing the casualties of life. To excel in any thing, exercise and habit are necessary: the whole range of human ingenuity is employed to remove every source of pain and disquiet from the very rich: to avoid every *appearance* of pain or discomfort is the study of their lives; and in the education of their infants this principle of warding off immediate physical evil is entirely followed out. What is the consequence? As they are not permitted ever to run the risk of experiencing physical evil, they cannot acquire the habit of enduring it with fortitude. Fortitude, like the strength of a particular muscle, must be acquired by exercise, by early habit. Who does not know that the child of the peasant will laugh at the shower or danger that make the child of indulgence shrink with uneasiness and apprehension, as the peasant himself would laugh at the imaginary wants and privations of the rich? Enduring pain, enduring loss *firmly*, would perhaps cease to be virtues, if the casualties inducing pain and loss could be banished from life or from the lives of the very rich. But, this state of things being out of the question, and cowardliness, doubling every evil at the moment of suffering—not to speak of the permanent horrors of anticipation—is a misfortune arising from acquired voluntary actions, and therefore a vice consequent on excessive wealth. It is not said that circumstances may not be supposed through which, *in spite* of these tendencies, an excessively rich man may be a hero, above pain and danger: but legislators, moralists, and economists, must not become writers of romance, and mistake the casual exception for the general rule. Neither is it necessary for the argument to assert that a state of things could not be devised in which these tendencies of excessive, unoccupied, wealth, might be counteracted. If such states of things could be contrived, they would be more cumbersome and uneconomical than the simple removal of those circumstances which induce the tendencies. Now therefore, as the result of excessive indulgence without effort and of the want of habits of prudence and fortitude, there necessarily arises in the minds of the excessively rich an undue regard to their own happiness and feelings, as compared with those of their fellow-creatures. Supernaturally illuminated must be that mind, which conceives the happiness of those for whose comforts no provision is made, and whose deference and admiration he has been all his life

accustomed to receive, to be of equal importance, in the scale of things, with his own happiness! When the excessively rich suffer ever so slight a pain physical or mental, every one around, not to speak of paid servants and expectants, sympathizes, or seems to sympathize, with him: when the poor man suffers, sympathy is regarded as an act of benevolence, not of expected good manners. The constant operation of this unequal sympathy must inevitably produce in the minds not only of the excessively rich themselves, but of the bulk of mankind, their enviers and admirers, an over-estimate of the importance of their happiness as compared with that of the rest of their fellow-creatures. But this over-estimate is the very vice of selfishness: for if we do not attach the same importance in our reasonings and intercourse with our fellow-creatures to their happiness that we do to our own, how can we act justly towards them? it will be selfishness counteracting selfishness, falsehood and evasion plotting against and countermining each other, instead of the liberal, the short, and the really wise course of equivalents mutually satisfactory. It is true, that on ordinary occasions of the transfer of small parcels of trifling articles of wealth, the very rich are frequently lavish. When this arises, as it mostly does, from thoughtless imprudence, or from the small comparative value, to the giver, of the thing given, it is quite consistent with selfishness. The same person that will fling away things, the value of which is as nothing to him, will pertinaciously refuse the surrender of the smallest *real* enjoyment, though ever so incompatible with the comforts of others. Witness the mis-called pleasures of pursuing game, which in almost every country in the world have been seized upon for the exclusive amusement of the very rich, though attended with the laying waste of provinces or the sweeping away of the products of industrious labor: witness the inequalities of laws made by the excessively rich in their own favor in every part of the world: witness all punishments by fixed fines which are mere burlesque to some, but ruin to others. In private life, this principle of selfishness, though not so capable of demonstration by any recorded acts, is apparent to every one that will only scrutinize his own feelings and habits. Why that deference which we almost mechanically pay to the feelings and wishes of the rich in preference to those of the poor? would we not look upon it as presumption in the humble in circumstances, to expect those courtesies which we are emulous to pay, whenever an occasion offers, to the very rich? No matter our motive: it may be mere sympathy in their enjoyments, the cheerful reflection of their pleasures on our own minds,

or the sordid desire of conciliating favors, that induces this deference on our parts. The question here is, What is the inevitable *effect* on the characters of the rich? Is it possible for them, as a class, not to over-estimate the importance of their own happiness, not to follow the vulgar train of thought on this subject? Now, if they do fall into this error of selfishness, of over-estimating the importance of their own happiness, what is the consequence? and wherein consists the vice of this error? It consists in the loss to the excessively rich of the pleasures of benevolence, in the loss to the rest of the community of the pleasures to be derived from the practice of beneficence and justice. These are some of the evil effects of selfishness on which we shall not now enlarge: the picture might be filled up with a host of cruelties to others, instead of the mere privation of good offices.

These immoral tendencies, then, being inherent in excessive, unoccupied, wealth; the tendency to sensual excesses from the constant means of gratification, the tendency to imprudence from the remoteness of the evils to be feared from prodigality and waste, the tendency to want of fortitude from the pampering of all wants and wishes and non-exposure to pain, the tendency to selfishness from the combined operation of these previous circumstances and from the universal deference and partial sympathy which the very rich experience; shall we find in their situation the source of any good qualities to balance these defects? The only quality of this sort I can perceive is, *polish of manners*. This obviates, in their intercourse with each other, the effects of their overweening selfishness; but is too often a mere matter of convention, which, even in the comparative trifles with which it is conversant, lacks the charm of sincerity. Politeness, with the really virtuous, is "benevolence in an agreeable dress;" and the charm even of benevolence, particularly in every day matters, it heightens and improves. But this sort of politeness is reserved for those who are good as well as polished. Intellectual excellence, as far as that may be a source of happiness to the very rich, is but sparingly shared by them with the middling orders, to whom exertion of all sorts is necessary. The freedom from the fears of want amongst the very rich, is scarcely any source of happiness, as such wants have never been felt or contemplated: the occasional presence of such fears, if at all contemplated, might indeed call forth exertion: but comparison with others is used only as a source of self-complacency.

Our next position is, that "*excessive wealth excites the admiration and the imitation, and in this way diffuses the practice of the vices of the rich, amongst the rest of the community; or*

produces in them other vices arising out of their relative situation to the excessively rich." On this point nothing is more obvious than the universal operation of the most common principle of our nature, that of association. The wealth, as the means of happiness, of the excessively rich, is admired or envied by all: the manners and character connected with the abundance of these good things, always strike the mind in conjunction with them, and the approbation excited by wealth, naturally spreads itself over its adjuncts. Can those qualities not be delightful which are joined with such delightful things? If we cannot acquire the wealth of the very rich, may we not resemble them at least in manners and conduct; and thus obtain their sympathy or partake of their good offices? Shall we not thus raise ourselves into a species of equality with them? To gamble, to play the fastidious epicure, to steep in sensuality, are genteel vices, above the vulgar, show a *noble* spirit and unlock to us the affections and the gates of the rich. There is no counteracting this principle of our nature. As long as excessive wealth is an object of desire, of admiration, so long will those qualities, good or bad, which the possession of excessive wealth engenders, be connected with it in desire and admiration. Now, does it tend to the happiness of society, i. e. of the individuals who compose society, that such qualities as sensuality, imprudence, pusillanimity, and selfishness should be viewed through a fallacious medium, and palliated, and excused, and followed, rather than reprobated and shunned? Can it tend to the happiness of society that its wealth, the produce of its industry, should be so distributed as to raise such qualities as these in the public estimation, by ensuring their practice on the part of the most influential of its members? From the false glare through which these qualities are viewed, there are many even who regard them rather as amiable weaknesses, as mere venial faults, than as vices, the more dangerous because *treacherously* pernicious. The *immediate* effect of these vices is soothing; they fly from pain, and care, and danger; they shut their eyes to the future, and thus all enlarged views, all high and distant excitements, all moral judgements extending to a comparison of the *remotest*, as well as the immediate, effects of actions, are lost. There is an additional evil to the admirers and imitators of those qualities of the over-rich, which does not apply to the rich themselves. If the rich are sensual and improvident, they have the means of being so: if they are selfish, it is overlooked and even excused in them, and their claims to superior regard are mostly allowed, notwithstanding: if they are pusillanimous, they are under no necessity of bearing more than the

ordinary unavoidable ills of life. Not so in all these respects with their imitators: *their* selfishness is every where repulsed and humbled by the equal claims of those around them; *their* sensuality and extravagance waste health and property, the means of existence perhaps of themselves and others; and *their* pusillanimity has to dread privations and losses,—besides those of physical nature and of ill-regulated passions—from which the excessively rich are for the most part exempt.

Besides the imitation of these injurious qualities practised by the rich themselves, it is a curious infelicity attending the existence of excessive wealth, that it generates other vices in the rest of the community, not dependent on imitation, and of which the example is not necessarily set by the rich themselves. An *over-anxious pursuit of wealth*,—as the one thing needful, to obtain not only physical pleasures, its more appropriate object, but as the means of power and reputation, to the exclusion of all other means, such as those of genius or virtue, constituting personal merit,—is eagerly instituted by all, and becomes the moving spring of society. “Get wealth, if possible, honestly; but at all events get wealth,” becomes an established maxim. A pernicious preference of wealth as the only substantial good, in preference to those sources of happiness which are independent of wealth, becomes a characteristic feature of society; and those other qualities, moral and intellectual, cheap and abundant multipliers of happiness, which do not immediately tend to the increase of wealth, are not only undervalued and neglected, but sometimes treated with affected scorn, as appendages of poverty, or at all events unfashionable intruders. Will it be said that moral and intellectual qualities are *now* beginning to walk on an equality with even over-grown wealth? This is to be attributed to the influence of opinion, in spite of the influence of wealth, and to the gradual increase of the number of possessors of moderate portions of wealth, thus lessening the influence of the excessively rich. The *tendency* of excessive wealth always remains the same, however temporarily counteracted by other causes. Were there none of these excessive unequal masses of wealth, were there double or ten times the absolute wealth in society, but divided into smaller masses, this evil of the over-estimate and over-anxious pursuit of wealth would not exist: because, when in small masses, wealth is necessarily expended in wants and conveniences, and nothing is left for influence; and what is shared by many, excites not undue admiration. Consequent on the over-anxious pursuit of wealth, are the *servility* and *corruption* to which excessive wealth gives rise throughout the community in which it exists. Wealth becomes the only me-

dium of influence; and for wealth every thing is sold. Truth, honor, the affections, the person which should be the prize of excited regard and love, political rights of immense but remote utility, nothing in life so sacred as not to find its price in money. Hence a universal rushing into every vice and crime, attended with the hope of impunity, that promises to attract this universal good. Where excessive wealth does not exist, men have not the means to bribe their fellows to the meannesses, or the cruelties, of iniquity: for so distasteful is vice, so much does it excite the re-action of the injured, and the opprobrium and ill offices of society, that it will not be practised without such an equivalent as excessive want, ungoverned passions, or excessive wealth have to bestow; and amongst these, the last is much more operative than the other two, being very often their most prolific parent. Corruption then of the poor, and servile acquiescence in the pursuits, good or bad, of the excessively rich, are the necessary results of forced inequality of wealth. To support existence, to satisfy immediate want, a man will do what he would disdain to do were his immediate wants gratified: on this poverty, on this want therefore, excessive wealth operates with a tremendous effect, reducing all to slavish selfishness: for physical wants are the most imperious of our nature, and until they find an easy and regular mode of gratification, 'tis in vain to expect a feeling or sympathy for others, to look for benevolence or any regard to justice. As the mass of the community become easy in their circumstances, this effect is less apparent, the influence of excessive wealth is reduced, and it is forced to direct itself to less revolting modes of control. But these enormous masses have a constant tendency to prevent or retard this ease of circumstances; and their influence is not thereby eradicated, but directed to other objects and rendered on the whole less pernicious: it endeavours to accomplish by corruption, by the equivalents of wealth, what in a less advanced state of society would be effected by the force of the servile hireling. A David, in modern times, could not, for a small bribe, procure the murder of the husband of her whose beauty excited his desire, but would expend thousands in purchasing the courtly acquiescence and utter blindness of the husband: and thus through all society would wealth operate in *buying* vice. So universal, so notorious, so inevitable, is this effect of excessive wealth, that nothing is more common than for the haughty corrupters themselves, to affect or to feel contempt for the tools and creatures of their own systems and temptations, and to justify the use of such means from the absence of all those moral qualities which their very employment had

eradicated; or rather which, under the existence of such a state of things, could never have been excited.

If such be the *moral* effects of excessive wealth, if it not only diminishes the means of happiness of the rest of the community, if it not only does not make the excessively rich happier than the moderately rich, but if it render them less happy by exciting in them peculiar vices; and if it diffuses those and other vices through the mass of society; let us see whether its *political* and *economical* effects are of that redeeming nature to counterbalance or form a set-off against these evils. Let us see whether there is any thing in the existence of very large masses of wealth, which has a peculiar tendency to the reproduction or the accumulation of wealth, or to the support or well-being of those who produce it. Let us see whether its political effects tend to the formation of wise and equal laws, to the production of the greatest quantity of national happiness, as that happiness is derived not only from wealth, but from all other its productive sources. So very different are these from the experienced effects of excessive wealth, that our next proposition establishes the contrary.

SECTION 2.

Of the economical evils of forced inequality of Wealth.

OF this class of evils, the most palpable, but the most misunderstood, or most strangely misrepresented, is, that *the yearly income of excessive wealth is consumed by unproductive laborers, and is therefore so much annual loss of the productions of the national industry.*

Why is one species of labor called productive and another unproductive? Because the one species of laborer produces a visible and tangible article of the matter of wealth, in lieu of and to replace that portion of wealth which he received by way of equivalent for his labor; while the other produces nothing visible or tangible, gives no article of wealth back in exchange. Two men get two shillings each for their day's labor: the one produces at the end of the day a tangible and useful basket, the source of future economy and comfort, and which will procure in exchange any other equivalent object of desire: the other produces for his two shillings, bows and grimaces and obsequious answers from time to time, which, when the motions are over and the day is past, would, if put up to auction, hardly find a purchaser, as there would be

nothing but the remembrance of them to give as an equivalent: the two shillings, or their worth in meat, drink, or clothing, have been in this latter case consumed without return, and society is so much the poorer; but in the case of the maker of the basket, production has been going on at an equal pace with consumption, and the wealth of society is not by such consumption diminished, but in general increased, as something more is generally produced to be accumulated under the name of capital. In the same way, by every thing consumed by the rich themselves and by every one of their dependants, of those amongst whom they divide their wealth, without a tangible equivalent of the matter of wealth produced by their labor during the consumption, the wealth of the society is daily decreased to the whole amount of such consumption. Suppose that one hundred pounds per day, or between thirty and forty thousand a year, are expended by one of the excessively rich on the food, clothing, furniture, equipages, &c. of the whole of his family—I say that the whole of this wealth is lost, *without equivalent*, to society. The impertinence of the lacqueys, the haughtiness of the masters, and perchance their extreme elegance of manner, and the sight of the prancing horses and gay clothing, is the *only equivalent* society receives. In the way of wealth, this consumption absolutely yields no equivalent: it is as much lost as if it were thrown into the sea. What might, by another mode of distribution, be the happy support at the expenditure of one hundred pounds each per annum, of three hundred and sixty-five industrious families, *reproducing within the year the same or a still greater amount of wealth*, is consumed without return by one luxurious family of twenty or thirty persons. What then? do not the excessively rich feed the productive laborers? could they, the productive laborers, live, and produce, and consume, and enjoy, if there were none such? They could indeed; and it is they alone who feed and clothe and pamper the rich. Who ever heard that the excessively rich ever gave his wealth to the productive laborer, without exacting a return, an equivalent fully equal in value to the portion of wealth he gave in exchange? If the excessively rich give to the productive laborer of corn, or hats, five shillings, for a bushel of corn to the one, or five shillings for a covering for the head to the other; would not the same producer of hats, or of corn, be equally benefited if the *excessively poor* had made a similar exchange with him? Is the money, the medium of exchange or the representative of value, or the article of value given itself in exchange, more valuable because it has come out of the hands of a rich man, or a rich man's domestic, than

if it had come out of the hands of the poor? Is gold given in exchange more heavy, or corn more nourishing, because they have passed through the hands of idleness? In neither case is the seller obliged to the excessively poor, or to the excessively rich, for the exchange, any more than they are obliged to him; every voluntary exchange implying a preference of the thing received, *on both sides*, to the thing given. Away then with the insulting, the pernicious absurdity, that the excessively rich support the poor! They *give* nothing to the poor: they merely *exchange* with them, just as the poor do with each other. It is to themselves and their dependants that they *give* what they have gotten in exchange from the industrious, who go on reproducing as they consume. But by themselves and their dependants, to whom they do give, what is produced in return for their insatiable consumption? Nothing. In the way of wealth absolutely nothing. Hence, in an economical point of view, hence the very vice of the consumption of the excessively rich, that they *do give away*, and waste and consume for nothing, with their unproductive retainers, that, which the labor of the productive classes brought into being. Were the whole or any portion of this given to productive laborers, were it laid out judiciously in any really useful employments, the wealth of society would be so far, and by such application, increased. But every article of wealth consumed, whether of food, clothes, furniture, &c., without the production of an equivalent, of an equal mass of wealth, is so much, in an economical point of view, lost to the community. 'Tis no matter to say that the unproductive consumers enjoy: enjoyment is not production: enjoyment is not the tangible material of wealth. Do not the productive consumers, the industrious, also enjoy? ay, and much sweeter and healthier, not to say more useful, enjoyment than the idle? The consumption of the productive laborer never decreases the wealth of society, because he never consumes but on the condition of reproduction. Not so with the unproductive: every atom of wealth consumed by him is so much deducted from the general stock. 'Tis not to the question to say that wealth is produced only to be consumed. True, but why may not those who consume be busy and useful and *reproduce* while they are consuming? instead of being idle and unproductive? The excessively rich consumes or gives away *for nothing* the materials of wealth, of enjoyment, procured from the industrious classes in exchange for his thirty or forty thousand a year. He gives this annual mass of the products of industry away for nothing: for nothing in the shape of wealth—yes: but for nothing in any other shape? far from it: of what use would then be wealth to him? What then is the equivalent he insists upon getting?

the excitement and the gratification of sickly fancied wants, the pampering, to the very extinction, of every appetite, the lustre of glossy, often fantastic apartments and furniture, the wear and tear of equipages, the obsequious attendance of servants. In a word, the only equivalent he gets in the last resort, or wants to get, is enjoyment alone. These and such like sources of enjoyment, are the only equivalents which the excessively rich, the unproductive consumers, get for their wealth, that is to say, for the yearly expenditure of their income. Now while the rich and their dependants are consuming these products of human industry, are annihilating so much of national wealth, are they at the same time employed in reproducing any equivalent in the shape of wealth? While the fruit which one hundred days' labor had been employed in producing, is in a few minutes consumed, while the charioteers and the cattle, plump and spirited, are consuming the corn and wine, created by industry co-operating with nature, what equivalent, in the way of wealth, is produced by the consumer of the fruit, the charioteer or the horses respectively? Has the charioteer at the end of the day any thing tangible to show that he has a value in exchange equal to the good things he has consumed, to enable him to perform his feats at the whip? What land have the hunters been plowing to add to its capacity of producing useful crops, in an exact or superior ratio to the fruits and materials they have consumed? Or, what magic power of labor and productiveness has the devourer of the costly fruit itself, in which one hundred days' labor are concentrated, to reproduce after his meal an equivalent of other fruit or other materials, equal in exchangeable value not only to the fruit but to all the other objects of his daily consumption? Reverse now the supposition: suppose that the owner of this mass of excessive wealth died, and that instead of leaving the mass in one hand to be expended, as usual, in what are called luxuries, he left it to be employed in productive labor; what would be the result? The society would be every year thirty to forty thousand pounds the richer. At the end of each year the whole income would remain in existence just as it was in the beginning, or would be increased: and three hundred and sixty-five families, consuming in the mean time a hundred a year each, might be made happy. The annual amount of the revenue we shall suppose to be gathered in as before. Exchanges take place and the money is converted into articles of consumption as before; but into *different articles* of consumption. No more fruits of one hundred days' labor, no more rare and costly wines, no more gorgeous trappings, are now demanded or taken in exchange: but substantial food, and clothing, and comforts for the in-

dustrious, are procured in exchange for the income. None of these good things, none of these articles of wealth, would be given away without a substantial equivalent. The sleek and beautiful race-horse offers his services and chances of glory and gambling; but as these will not reproduce in corn or other articles an exchangeable value equal to his consumption, none of the store of hay or corn are spared for his use. The footman comes with his bows and his capacity of brushing a coat or putting up the step of a carriage; but as these qualities will neither produce chairs nor hardware, his services are dispensed with as affording no tangible return. Even he who would wish to succeed to the sublime merit of eating in five minutes the fruit of one hundred days, and in similar useful occupations, is asked unceremoniously what product of his labor, what article of wealth he purposes to give in return for this enormous consumption. He gives the ready answer of the quack, the juggler in political economy, and says that he will give bread to the poor laborers, who produced the fruit, &c., by his condescending to eat and consume them. What should we reply to the modesty of the offer of such an equivalent? If the horse and the footman are required to produce an equivalent, in the matter of wealth, for what they consume, why should not a similar demand be made of this infinitely more expensive consumer? Suppose that an intellectual ape could speak, and offered his services to become infinitely more patriotic and useful in the employment of the poor, by consuming ten times the quantity of expensive fruits and wines in a day, that the candidate for excessive wealth could consume; should we not be bound in fair reasoning to give the preference to the ape, as the greatest patriot and most enlightened consumer of the two, as keeping a greater number of the industrious busy in supplying him? Neither the ape nor the idle human consumers of wealth, produce any thing while *they are consuming*; and the more of such unproductive consumption is permitted to dogs, horses, apes or men, the more is the national wealth wasted. If fruits without end are not bought for the monkey to consume, will that annihilate the laborers, the tools, the manure, and the land, which were the means of producing these fruits? or will that annihilate the wealth which must be in existence in order to procure by exchange these articles for the monkey's use? If this value be not given in exchange for fruits for the monkey's, or the noble's, use, will it therefore lie idle and not be exchanged for other articles, to be more wisely employed? But, the laborers in the habit of producing the particular fruits will be thrown out of employ. Be it so: they must probably direct their future agricultural labors to products more generally in demand. The *direction*

of the expenditure will be changed, and of course of the labor for the products of which it affords a demand. Let it once be known that the race of the apes will not require any future supply of costly fruits, but that the value of what they used to consume will be given only to productive laborers in exchange for their industry; and no more such costly fruits will be produced. But if the same value is still expended, the same quantity of labor called into exercise, though no fruits be demanded; what a difference as to the mode of disposing of the useful articles purchased, instead of the fruits! The consumer (monkey, king, or bishop) devours the fruits without return: no trace remains of the ingenuity and labor employed in their production. But the value of the fruits, given to the productive laborer, is not so lost without return: from *him* is demanded a full equivalent: by him is a full equivalent produced, and society is enriched by the full amount of *his* consumption, reproduced and perpetuated, or increased, by his labor.

It is clear then that the expenditure of excessive wealth, indeed of all income consumed by unproductive laborers, is annually lost to society; no return, in the shape of wealth, being afforded by it. So much sophistry has been employed on this head by the luxurious and the timid, seeking to establish a fancied unreal merit for the possessors of excessive wealth, and thence a sympathy in its support; that numerous objections to this simple truth might be stated and exposed. Real utility is the only basis on which any particular distribution of wealth, or any other human institution, will henceforth depend. It is wise therefore, rejecting all fallacious supports, to seize and rely on those which are true and good. These, as far as the distribution of wealth is concerned, it is our object to point out and illustrate. Happy were it a frequent question amongst the rich, "In what way do I benefit society, what equivalent do I afford it for the excess of the matter of wealth consumed by me, without reproduction, over and above what productive laborers consume? If I give no return in the way of reproduction, let me in some other way contribute to the public good."

'Tis true that the supposition just made, that the owner of a mass of excessive wealth, of thirty or forty thousand a year, should leave it to be distributed in productive labor instead of being devoted to mere consumption, is not of very probable occurrence. 'Tis true also that the overseer could not be satisfied to receive the income and so distribute it, the distribution increasing and the capital accumulating by the whole amount of the income every year, without an adequate remuneration in the way of salary to be enjoyed and therefore consumed. With such circumstances however, though the fiftieth

part of the income would be sufficient for the overseer, and though he would be a productive laborer and therefore entitled to an appropriate reward, the supposition is no way concerned; its object being simply to demonstrate the fact, that the consumption of excessive wealth is an annual waste and loss, while the consumption of the industrious causes no loss of the matter of wealth. A more natural supposition would perhaps be, that the owner of the excessive wealth, wishing to make it useful, should simply order that it should cease to be collected, and should be left in the hands of the industrious who produced it. What would be then the effect? Additional comfort and happiness to all the industrious, and additional production, though not by any means to the extent in *point of accumulation* with the first supposition. Each industrious family, finding fifty to one hundred pounds or more per annum saved from its former outgoings, would experience a new stimulus to exertion. As sentient beings, they would be stimulated to increased enjoyment, from their increased means of enjoyment; as industrious beings with habits of exertion formed, they would increase their industry and consequent accumulation. While the whole of the excessive income, *in the hands of one family*, was consumed in fine and rare articles of wealth called luxuries, superadded to essential comforts, and therefore comparatively unproductive of happiness; in *the latter case*, not more than one half or a third of the divided income would be consumed, and that in matters of substantial comfort, while the remainder would be paid to productive laborers, who would reproduce for what they consume in adding to the houses, machinery, food, or some of the materials which constitute individual and national wealth. The effect of this annual accumulation of only half the income in increasing national wealth would be immense. As far as the additional expenditure of half the income by the industrious, operates in the way of increased consumption without increased reproduction, such consumption by them would be loss of wealth to the community, just as the same consumption, though of different articles, by the one rich family. The difference is simply as to the effect of this expenditure in creating happiness amongst the many families or in the one, and the different *habits* that may be formed by the different artificers producing the articles respectively for these different species of consumption. The great difference as to *accumulated wealth* would be centred in the half or two thirds of the income, converted every year, to accumulation through productive labor, by the industrious, (and thence leading to increased population and multiplied happiness,) which by the excessively rich would be consumed, without return, along with the rest of the income.

It is freely admitted that some portions of excessive incomes may by possibility be spared from immediate consumption, and devoted, by the rich, to accumulation, through the medium of the employment of productive labor. Such occurrences certainly are possible; but as certainly they very seldom occur. As a class, the rich, particularly the very rich, are proverbially spendthrifts. They are even by the unreflecting, by the many, rather despised if they are not so. What business have they, it is asked, to save, to *hoard*? let them leave savings to the poor and the struggling. 'Tis a well known fact that, encouraged by the too general prejudice that mistakes profusion and sensuality for generosity, and stimulated by the excitements surrounding them, the sum of national wealth is rather annually decreased than added to by them. They annually consume what is annually produced for them, and the tendency of the whole of the very rich, as a body, is, in every country where they exist, rather to lessen the national wealth, or capital, by over-expenditure, by expending what does not belong to them, than, by abridging their expenditure in articles of enjoyment, to add to the capital for the employment of productive labor. It is not *by means* of these, but *in spite* of these, immense unproductive consumers, that the materials of national wealth, that a national capital, has been accumulated. Industry has sprung up in spite of their tyrannous exactions; has by degrees accumulated its little savings, till at length it has so increased as to be able to supply, from its overplus of accumulation, the defalcations caused by the extravagance of the unoccupied rich. Were it not for the accession of wealth by marriage, by the operation of unjust restrictive laws on the free exchange of wealth, by the provision made for younger members out of public plunder, very large unoccupied consumers could not long exist, at least could not perpetuate to their descendants their immense incomes. The deduction then to be made from our general proposition, "that the expenditure of excessive wealth is an annual loss to society of the whole of the articles consumed," is very small; and is much more than counterbalanced by its waste of the savings of the industrious.

If then any man wishes to know whether he is a productive laborer, or a mere consumer, in the great field of national wealth, let him simply ask himself, "whether he produces any thing of exchangeable value, during the day, the month, the year of his consumption, to the full amount at least of what he has consumed?" If he have produced nothing directly himself, has he by the making of tools, machines, &c., set productive laborers to work? or has he by any contrivances, by acting as carrier or agent between the producers and con-

sumers, or *by any other means*, enabled them, by concentrating their attention, to produce more than they would otherwise have done? If he have not been directly or indirectly instrumental to the reproduction of as much or more than he has consumed of the *tangible matter* of wealth, he is not only useless but pernicious to society—as far as the increase, nay the preservation, of the national wealth is concerned. What *moral* equivalents the excessively rich give to society for their enormous consumption, we have already seen.

We have now to show, that “*excessive wealth encourages such arts and trades, in the exchange of its income previous to consumption, as are the most insecure and unequal in their remuneration, and therefore the least tending to the national welfare.*” A luxurious man has not the capacity of increasing the size of his stomach, or the dimensions of limbs and trunk, so as to elaborate a greater quantity of food, or to demand a greater extent of clothing, than the poor or the moderately rich. What does he then? As he cannot increase in quantity, he will excel in *quality*: at all events he will use something *different* from other people and *more costly*, in order to distinguish himself from them in some way requiring less labor than moral or intellectual superiority. In those countries where there are no manufactures or commerce; where there is no comfort in the way of food, no neatness of dress, amongst the community; where not only the productive laborers have been unable to accumulate capital, but where there are even no middling orders with capitals (the produce of labor to facilitate its future progress); where there is no intellectual culture, no knowledge, no public opinion; there, as in all the East, and until lately in the despotisms of Europe, the rich expended in sumptuous clothing, in the childish ornaments of uncommonly glittering gems, and such optical splendors attached to their persons, vast portions of their wealth. But in countries where capital and comfort have, in spite of folly and rapine under the name of government, increased amongst the community; where the middling orders, under the name of plebeians, &c., have acquired the means of purchasing feathers and precious stones and similar gew-gaws, to vie with the excessively rich in the ornament of their persons; there the rage for the pomp of dress amongst the excessively rich becomes weakened. Why so? Because it no longer serves the purpose for which it was originally used; it no longer *distinguishes* the wearer; it no longer points him out to the gaze of the vulgar as an envied mortal, clad, and beautified with clothing, beyond other men. 'Tis curious to see the mean and brutal contrivances to which, by the aid of legislation, and under the cloak of morality, the rich have had recourse,

when they found themselves in danger of being outvied in finery of dress by the productive classes, by the industrious. They have been constantly in the habit of inflicting *sumptuary punishments*, through the instrumentality of what have been called sumptuary laws, on all those not belonging to themselves, or, to use a conventional phrase, not of *their rank*, or caste, who should imitate the finery of their dress; thus forcibly monopolizing to themselves the distinctions of apparel. Where such efforts have not been made, where no *law* has prohibited the competition, the rich (as in these countries) have fairly given up the competition of the distinctions of dress, and have resorted to other means of showing their superiority of wealth. Numerous horses and chariots, costly equipages, rich liveries, and constant *change* of exquisite materials for their own persons, become the means of distinction to the rich. These cannot be so easily imitated: a mock coach and horses cannot be made like a mock diamond, nor can ordinary or rational men overtake the velocities of fashionable changes of attire. In the article of food also, 'tis what is costly and exquisite, but at all events what is *uncommon*, what serves to distinguish, and, in their opinion, to raise, them above the rest of the community, that they use. Their furniture also, every thing about them, is liable, from the same principle, the desire of making their wealth the means of distinction, to the changes of taste or caprice: for if Grecian models were universal, the excessively rich would spurn them. Variety, even under the guidance of caprice, must be their idol: for, what is the main object of their lives but to excite, to keep up, by artificial means, those emotions for which the satiety of excessive wealth has precluded the usual excitements? The changes and the variety of external things are amongst the most effectual means, in their power, of accomplishing this object. In all their pleasures, then, variety, novelty, rarity, will be a main ingredient. What effect will this state of things produce on the species and character of the artisans with whom the rich exchange a portion of their income previous to consumption?

It will not call into being any productive laborers who would not otherwise have existed; it will create nothing. What will it do then? It will simply give a *new direction* to the labor of a given number of the productive classes; it will divert them from the production of ordinary and substantial things for every day use, to the production of those which are costly, rare, and liable to the changes of fashion. Were there none, or but little, of excessive wealth, there would be no demand for what had not real utility or permanent beauty according to the best notions prevalent at the time: mere novelty and caprice could not be indulged in at the expense of real comforts. But where all *real* wants

and comforts are supplied to saturation, without personal exertion, *unreal* wants *must* be excited, or there will be no mode of employing the superfluity of wealth : it would otherwise lie idle, or be given to productive laborers in exchange for useful works for the public good. Very seldom is the latter alternative of getting rid of surperfluous wealth resorted to, and still more seldom the former. It is employed then in what are called elegancies, luxuries, partaking more or less of caprice. The *ordinary* wants and comforts of society remain through ages nearly the same : the food and clothing and form and mode of constructing dwellings change but slowly ; they depend on physical circumstances of climate, natural productions, degree of intercourse with foreign nations ; all modified by the knowledge of the age. All these circumstances change but very slowly. The nature and form of the productions to which they give rise, partake of course of their steadiness of character. *Wants* remaining the same, it takes a generation to change the fashion of an article ; and during this slow revolution of demand, the productive laborers have time to accommodate themselves to the change. In most cases, the change being but in the form, as substituting a more healthful or agreeable species of food or clothing for one less agreeable or less healthful, the same laborers, without any perceptible increase of effort or skill, produce the new article when demanded. When the demand, in consequence of the increasing wealth of the society, is for *new* comforts, for food, clothing, or furniture, unenjoyed before, the old laborers are left to pursue their usual avocations, and a new class of productive laborers are called into existence to supply the new comforts, if produced at home ; or if produced abroad and imported from thence, an additional number of laborers are employed in increasing the quantity of the old articles, or in producing new ones suited to the wants of the foreign producers to be sent them in exchange. The quantity of woollens worn, or of malt liquors consumed, has not decreased in these countries (or, if it have decreased, the decrease is attributable to other causes) since the introduction of the cotton manufacture at home, or the importation of tea and sugar from China and the West India Islands ; and these are as extensive, as rapid, and as universally operating changes in national demand and supply, as have ever occurred over the whole face of any country. Whenever, from an increase of knowledge, or a change of habits, good or bad, a nation discontinues the use of an article of general consumption to replace it by any other article, the change, the progress of knowledge or of new habits, is always so slow, that the habits and skill of the industrious change with it. There are therefore these two favorable circumstances

attending the producers of articles of substantial use and universal consumption, that the demand is constant, is almost invariable, and the remuneration little liable to fluctuation, and, under just social regulations, would be always equitable. The habits induced by such circumstances are regular and moral: the people's wants being regularly and fairly supplied by the exertion of industry, the temptations to vice are removed; there are no *motives* to lying, stealing, and mutual annoyance, in a well-supplied community; and therefore these vices are of rare occurrence, and form exceptions to the general aspect of things, being called forth only by accidental and extraordinary circumstances. Every one, having *something*, the produce of his labor, to be protected by the laws, will co-operate in maintaining their salutary operation. Crimes, or offences against the laws, will be more unusual even than vices, because they require still stronger temptations, or motives, to commit them. The *regularity* of the supply of the people's wants and comforts, will ensure a correspondent regularity in their habits; and such regularity of habit is much more valuable than what is called natural disposition, which can in fact mean nothing more than an excellent physical organization easily operated upon by social impulses.

Such being the effect on the morals and happiness of a community engaged in the production of substantial and useful articles of consumption for the mass of the people and for those possessing moderate incomes; what alteration will be induced in these circumstances by excessive inequality of wealth? by the employment of a portion of these laborers in the production of such *rare* and *costly* articles as the rich demand for their ultimate consumption? no *new* laborers being in this case called into existence—but being on the contrary prevented thereby from coming into existence—the change consisting entirely in the *substitution* of one set of articles for another in the *new direction* given to a portion of the productive labor?

Articles of luxury are necessarily rare and costly. Two circumstances necessarily attend such articles as their attributes or accompaniments. The *supply* of the raw material, the natural production, out of which they are formed, or which, sometimes, almost entirely constitutes their value, is irregular and uncertain, and the *demand* is equally irregular and uncertain, depending on the caprice or variations of fortune of the very rich. Precious stones and rare metals enter into the list of these articles; and every one knows how uncertain is their supply from the exhaustion or the accidents occurring to mines, fisheries, &c. Even when there is no caprice exercised by the buyers, still from the mere circumstance of increased price

lessening the number of those who have the means to buy at the advanced rate, the demand must be frequently lessened. If, without any caprice on the part of the buyers, the demand is frequently diminished from the deficiency of the supply, what must it be when the caprice of luxury happens to coincide with this diminished supply of the raw material, and thus almost (as frequently happens) to annihilate the demand for a particular article? Let it not be said, that these matters are too costly for the exercise of caprice, that their very value guaranties them from being lightly sought after or parted with. This argument, as applied to those whose pecuniary means are moderate, who cannot purchase unreal wants, mere superfluities, without the sacrifice of comforts, is unanswerable. But as addressed to the class of whom we are speaking, to the excessively rich, it is entirely inapplicable. On *some* sort of superfluities they must spend thier extra wealth, or let it remain unconsumed: the main object aimed at by the possession or display of them is *distinction*: this object can be equally attained by the possession of *any* set of them; and the change is recommended by the charm of variety. Where therefore there is no substantial reason of preference, and where many articles altogether differing in their nature, as pearls, rubies, and laces, will equally accomplish the object, lighter motives not founded in utility, must guide the choice. Now the influence of these light motives, not founded in utility, but on some fanciful associations of the moment, are just what are called caprice. There exists then, in the very nature of things, a constant source of caprice in the demand for all those extra articles of luxury called for by excessive wealth. If they were necessary or conducive to any palpable comfort, nature, or our organization, would constantly indicate the articles to be procured, and the demand would be, and for such articles is, constant. But where all wants are already gratified, and nothing left even for the adaptations of convenience, mere chance or caprice, that is to say, *inappreciable motives*, must guide the choice. The effect is that, one year, the productive laborers whose industry produces what are called Cashmere shawls, another year those who dive for pearls, another year or another period those who dig or search for diamonds, are called into active industry; and if the caprice causing the activity of the demand be intense, their reward is very liberal; for these freaks of demand must be supplied at once, or they are apt to turn their longings towards other and more speedily attainable frivolities. The urgency of the caprice enhances the demand for the peculiar species of labor, for the article, in request: and this naturally induces many to leave other lines of industry and engage in the more liberally paid, new,

branch. At length, however, the sickly ardor of fashion relaxes, the bauble, become old or familiar, ceases to please, and the trade in the superfluity so lately active, is now comparatively at a stand. On the fixed and moveable capital employed during the great demand, there must be more or less of loss in transferring it to other employment. Such trades are a species of lottery, a gambling concern. High prices attended the fever of the demand; the producers were well paid, enjoyed much, probably foolishly, intemperately, from the irregularity of the supply, and from want of previous habits of arranging expenditure to such liberal payment. Sudden demand begat habits of imprudence and dissipation: sudden ceasing of the demand throws many into absolute want, or reduces the payment of the wages of all down to or below the price of ordinary labor, or produces at the same time both these effects, each in a minor degree. Privation of customary enjoyment, misery to a less or greater extent, are caused by these changes: want always, on a number of persons, begets vice. If sudden over-payment begat excess and intemperance, sudden lowering of wages engenders falsehood, theft, cruelty. The savings of high wages are not reserved for the wants of a future reduction; but the remembrance of them imbitters actual privation, and engenders a feeling of injustice. The inclination, the ability, to work remain as before; but employment, without any fault of the laborers, is taken away from them. How have they deserved this? To repair the injustice, they will prey on the produce of the industry of others. Unoccupied, with disposable energies liable to any direction, they yield to any impulse, to which, projects engendered by themselves or others of a political, fanatical, or any other description, may give rise. Idleness, voluntary or forced, of the rich or of the poor, is the fruitful parent of misery and vice.

In a community where there is a considerable portion of wealth distributed in moderate shares, where a middling order exists as well as an order of excessive wealth, and where even the poorest classes are possessed of many of the comforts as well as the necessities of life; it is not pretended that any very large proportion of the productive laborers of the whole community would be affected by the evils here pointed out. To the whole of the community, particularly to the industrious producers, the main evil would be in the spectacle and the example of misery, vice, and crime. If the society be otherwise extremely prosperous, the constant demand created for useful articles by the productive classes, may be so great as to absorb and supply some sort of employment to the cast-off laborers at the worn-out trades of the excessively rich. Be it always observed, that excessive wealth can claim none of the

merit of this remedy alleviating the evils which itself has produced. It is not by means of excessive wealth, but in spite of excessive wealth, that these evils of its engendering are remedied. In the very nature of excessive wealth, the evil is inherent: for if excessive wealth could throw aside its caprices, and expend in necessities and real comforts all its income, it could not longer be distinguished from moderate wealth, and would cease to be an object of insatiable pursuit. Were the excessively rich wise, they would cease to be excessively rich, for their own happiness and that of the community. In those countries where the community is poor, and there are no middling classes, as under despotic governments, the evils are of tremendous extent and without mitigation. Where they are mitigated, it is from the benefits of industry and productive labor affording regular employments, and absorbing those unemployed laborers whom the caprice of wealth, at irregular intervals, renders idle. Regular employment begets regular habits. So very small are the means of saving of the productive operative classes, that without a regularity and economy of which the more fortunate can scarcely form an idea, it is impossible that any savings can be made from their small earnings. Irregular habits are their greatest enemies; and therefore all trades which imply an irregularity of demand and employment, such as those which are peculiar to the excessively rich, are inimical to the morals and happiness of the productive classes, and thence of the rest of the community.

There is moreover a periodical waste of fixed capital employed in those trades to which the caprice of fashion directs that capital. This, it is true, may in part be made up by savings of the profits while the trade is flourishing. But seldom is this the case: for, not to insist on the general law that irregular gains, whether in the shape of profit or wages, lead to irregular and improvident expenditure; the capitalist can form no sort of calculation as to the period that the demand may last, and of course all his measures are liable to the original vice of the peculiar line of supply in which he is engaged. 'Tis all caprice and uncertainty.

It is plain, then, that not only is the ultimate consumption of the yearly income of excessive wealth, an annual loss to the community of a portion of the products of labor, most of which would be converted by a wiser distribution into an eternal accumulation of capital; but even that species of industry which it peculiarly encourages, in its exchanges previous to consumption, is of all species of trade and labor the least conducive to the public good.

Let us now pass on to the last of the evils, the political, said

to arise from that distribution of the products of labor, which leads to excessive wealth in the hands of a few. Let us consider its *political* effects, its effects on the administration of the laws, on legislation, on all our social institutions.

SECTION 3.

Of the political evils of forced inequality of wealth.

UNDER this head we shall point out but the following overwhelming evil.

Excessive wealth necessarily leads to the usurpation of the powers of legislation, as well as of the executive and judicial authority, by those unqualified by education to exercise them aright, and with interests hostile to the general or national interest.

The object to be aimed at in legislation, to which every political as well as economical regulation should tend, is, to promote the greatest happiness of the community, i. e. of the greatest number of the community. Now is there not *one essential* requisite to be possessed by any persons undertaking to make regulations having this object in view? without which neither knowledge nor activity is of any avail, but rather become the means of mischief? Is it not an essential requisite that the makers of these regulations should have a sympathy, a fellow-feeling, an identity of interest, with the community, that is to say, with the greater number of the community, for which the regulations are formed? Or, if it be impossible that they should have this identity of interest, or at all events this lively sympathy, is it not necessary that they should be under the real and bona-fide control of those whose interests they represent, of the produce of whose labor, and of all of whose rights, they exercise the disposal? Or rather, in order to accomplish this undertaking—supposing always the undertakers to be possessed of such appropriate knowledge as the age allows—is it not necessary for the security of the community that this *double* guarantee should be imposed? that *sympathy* and *accountability* should both of them be required from those intrusted with the solemn charge of making laws and exercising the judicial and executive powers?

If this be so, if these be plain political truths, how shall we find them to apply to the excessively rich? Have *they* a sympathy, a fellow-feeling, an identity or, even in any obvious respect, a community of interest with the community, with the *greater number* of the community? First, as to their

wealth, (in as far always as not obtained by free labor or voluntary exchange, or not requiring active industry for its preservation,) it stands in direct contrast to the poverty of the greater number of the community, even to the moderate means of the active members of society possessing capital. Their wealth, acquired for the most part by original spoliation and perpetuated by injurious laws, not acquired by industry, by free competition and voluntary exchanges, is a constant source of pride to them, and of envy to those who do not possess it. Their wealth, their annual consumption, is a defalcation from the wealth, from the means of enjoyment, of the rest of the community: they stand in direct opposition to each other: they cannot both be enjoyed at the same time by each. The whole rental of a country is five millions or fifty millions or five hundred millions a year, it matters not which. This income, these disposable rents, or values, the produce of labor, are divided, under the system of excessive wealth, amongst fifty or five hundred or five thousand individuals in enormous shares of one hundred thousand pounds per annum each; while under the system of free exchanges they are divided amongst five thousand, fifty thousand or five hundred thousand individuals of one thousand pounds a year each, or amongst double that number of five hundred pounds a year each, or ten times that number of one hundred a year each. We have already decided the question, as to which mode of distribution gives the most *happiness*: the question now is, how it affects the sympathies and the notions, well or ill understood, of the interests of the parties. No high-sounding moral maxims or comprehensive political views of expediency, influence or can influence the excessively rich as a body. A few individuals of them may rise above the impulses of their class; but to those few, with the rest of the heroes and philosophers of society, we must confine the influence of motives that estimate self as impartial individuals would estimate it. The excessively rich, as a class, like all other classes in every community, must obey the influence of the *peculiar* circumstances in which they are placed, must acquire the inclinations and the characters, good or bad, springing out of the state of things surrounding them from their birth. Having always possessed wealth without labor, they look upon it as their right, and their family's right, always to possess it on the same terms. Not only do they look down on the productive laborers of the community as beings below them, but they affect a marked superiority over those who purchase wealth by means of accumulations produced by successful industry and voluntary exchanges. All history, and the state of things at present in

every country of the globe, prove this invariable disposition of excessive wealth appropriated to particular classes. The right to happiness, and the demand for consideration on the part of all the other members of the community, they look upon to be quite subordinate: they mistake the great end of human society to be, to maintain them in their immense possessions: whatever has not wealth, shares none of their sympathy. "The poor and the struggling," the rich say, "have been accustomed to their situation and do not feel its apparent hardships." Although this is as true applied to a competency as it is false as applied to poverty; yet even if entirely true, it would not alter the fact as to the want of sympathy between the excessively rich and the other members of society. To uphold, to perpetuate, and to increase, their wealth and influence, their wealth, as the chief means of their distinction, is their ruling object, at the expense of whoever may be affected by it. How is this to be accomplished? By labor, by industry? Those they despise. By a shorter mode; by seizing on political power, and upholding a system of things, varying with the circumstances of different countries, and calculated to *keep down* the rest of the community, they endeavour to *perpetuate* their own superiority of wealth from the participation of that unceasing envy with which they are surrounded.

In point of wealth then, instead of having a sympathy with the rest of the community, the tendencies of the class of the excessively rich are of a quite opposite character. Pride, disgust at wretchedness, apprehension of loss, rather generate *antipathy* to the laboring and industrious classes of the community, than any sympathy or community of interest with them. "An enlightened despot," we are eternally told, "would govern like a god, because it is his real interest to do so*." Very true, perhaps: but is it of the nature of despotic institutions to produce these enlightened and benevolent men, or directly the reverse? An enlightened possessor of excessive

* No allegations are more devoid of practical utility than predicting what would happen if an acknowledged impossibility were first accomplished. "If a hyæna were deprived of his ferocity, he would be as useful as a sheep or house dog." Yes, as soon as nature changes, and a hyæna can be made any thing else but a hyæna. But if the hyæna had one thousand subordinate hyænas under him and co-operating with him, the docility and gentleness of the master hyæna would be of little use, unless all his co-adjutors went through the same change of nature, or unless the master beast was gifted with omniscience and omnipresence, so as to be able to do without the assistance of these subordinates.—Still however we have not done with our new-modelled and miracle-made hyæna. A *very small part* of the blessings of just (universally elective and representative) government, will be found comprised in the amelioration of the characters of the national agents for matters of government, or even in the utility of the regulations

wealth will regard his wealth as an accident, as a means of dispensing happiness, and will estimate the claims and the feelings of the poorest as his own. Be it so. But does the possession of excessive wealth, acquired and enjoyed without effort, tend to generate these enlightened views, to throw the mind open to the impulses of respect and love to those beneath it? Till those tendencies of despotism and of excessive wealth are altered—which from the nature of things, while the constitution of man and objects around him remain as they are, cannot be—till they are altered, it is but a wanton insult to the poor and the oppressed to say that despotism and excessive wealth, *if wise, would be good*. No doubt, if wise, they would be good; in which case they would cease to be despots or to crave excessive wealth: but it is impossible that they should be wise. In point of wealth, there is evidently a contrariety of feeling and interest between the excessively rich and the rest of the community. How stands the case with respect to those other features in the characters of both, in which wealth is not directly concerned? Are the habits and the pursuits of the excessively rich so much in accordance with the habits and pursuits of the rest of the community, as to generate a sympathy and regard for each other's happiness in spite of the tendency of the inequality of wealth? No: but they tend to aggravate tenfold this inequality. Mark the difference of the moral and intellectual qualities, of the habits, of the manners, the whole character, of the rich and the poor, of the very rich and the industrious, of the productive and the immensely over-fed unproductive classes. In all they are unlike to each other; in their virtues, in their vices, in their pleasures, in their pains, in their occupations, in their amusements. Do they ever associate together? the very rich with the poor? For what purpose should they associate? The pursuits and the conduct of the rich man, if followed one day by the poor, would involve him in ruin for life; while to the rich it is but a day's

they make. By far the greater portion of these blessings will be found in the salutary effects produced by the exercise of political rights by the individuals of the community, *on their own characters*, in that acquisition of *knowledge, activity, and enlarged sympathy* with indefinite numbers of their fellow-creatures, (those of the same nation always, frequently those of other nations,) which the constant exercise of political rights has a necessary tendency to produce. Of this host of benefits, we are only now beginning to have a perspective view—of the extent to which they may be carried by wise institutions (universal representation and election being but the A B C, the mere primer, of just government) few have thought at all, much less formed any accurate notions. So great are they, that even wiser laws without them—an impossibility—would produce less happiness than less wise laws with them, or with other institutions as a substitute for them—if to be found—and producing similar effects. But these matters cannot be enlarged on here.

pastime. The niggardly parsimony which to the rich is a matter of contempt, is necessary for the poor man's existence: and yet the generosity that the poor practise towards each other, *in comparison to their means*, is such as should make most rich men blush; though, the actual sum given being small, the rich affect to despise it, and think they are more generous because they give numerically more. How can the very rich exchange thoughts or feelings with the poor? Were all the wisdom and benevolence that poetry ever blended together stamped on the character of the poor, what attractions could they possess for the rich, unaccompanied with those *manners*, mostly conventional, with which excessive wealth associates all claim to respect? The influence of *manners* amongst the excessively rich, is all-commanding; and this influence must necessarily continue: for hazardous, energetic, and doubtful pursuits being out of their course of life, their time being unoccupied, and demanding light amusements to fill it up, *substance* being banished from their occupations, *form* and *manner* must be substituted for them. Such is one of the main principles, that have given birth to the manners, forms, and ceremonies of the excessively rich Chinese, as well as of British, however differing in their detail. Some mummery is necessary to fill up time, and to form a substitute for the reality of emotion: and these *manners* become the criterion of fellowship.

If difference in intellectual, difference in moral, qualities, difference in manners, preclude association and sympathy between the very rich and the poor, how do these circumstances operate between the rich and the middling orders, the moderately rich? The same circumstances operate, but in an inferior degree. Friendly intercourse and association between the active industrious classes and the excessively rich, there is none, until by means, of whatever description, the thriving amass such wealth as to be admitted into the superior class. Then, with an imitation of the manners of the great and of their lavish expenditure, a ticket of admission is easily procured, deficiency of merit or intellect being no bar to the union. The active classes have not *time* to associate with the idle. The unoccupied rich are without understanding, without interest, in those occupations of the active which engross their leading thoughts and desires. Occasional intercourse in matters of business, in the exchange of wealth, in which the class of the rich always affect the character of givers and obligers, takes place between them: but the intercourse of friends, the intercourse of equals, never, or most rarely, occurs. The tone of mind of the two classes is quite opposed to each other: the one serious and active, the other gay, or wearing the face

of gaiety, and enjoying: the one accumulates, the other expends and consumes. As similarity of pursuits, of character, and manners, is requisite, at least to a certain extent, to beget sympathy and mutual regard between different individuals and different classes; and as a marked contrast of pursuits, of character, and manners, exists between the industrious and the class of unoccupied rich, so is it impossible that there should be much sympathy between them. The industrious classes have more knowledge and better manners than the poor or the working classes. But still, the unoccupied rich look on the industrious as at an immeasurable distance from *them*. With the mere poor, they will not risk the contamination of their breath: with the middling orders, they will condescend to speak; but as to inferiors—their tone, their manner, every thing betrays their consciousness of the superiority of wealth. Amongst thousands of illustrations—many of which must be familiar to every one according to the accidents of his intercourse with the world—of the want of sympathy between the very rich and the industrious classes, few are more obvious and decisive than the comparative estimate which is made by the rich of *debts of honor*, and *debts of honesty*, or tradesmen's debts. A debt of honor, what a rich man borrows from another rich man, to make good any engagement, no matter how immoral, contracted on the turf or in the gambling-house, must be paid, or the character of the class is lost. But a debt of morality and honesty, contracted for useful articles consumed, and on the payment of which a decent family partly depend for support, for which a full and satisfactory equivalent has been given, may be paid at convenience, and all tricks to elude such payments are rather encouraged and applauded than repressed. The good and the high-minded, to be sure, always prefer the claims of justice, of real benevolence, to those of honor; but the good and the high-minded are the minority in every class, the majority being the creatures of the palpable circumstances surrounding them. Where are then to be found the sympathies of the very rich? of those who have nothing else to do but to find food for pleasurable sensations and emotions? Have they no sympathies to exercise? they, to whose unoccupied time such a new stock of never-ending gentle pleasures must be particularly valuable? On whom, then, are they expended? The sympathies of the very rich are called forth and expended on those whom they regard as their *equals*, and on them alone. It could not, it cannot be otherwise: we are not blaming the rich for these tendencies of their situation; we are merely investigating facts, and tracing them to the circumstances by which they are produced. With the excessively rich, the excessively rich sympathize: all their

pursuits, their pleasures, their virtues, their vices, their manners, their peculiar system of rules of honor, as substitutes for the diffusive morality of utility; all these produce amongst them, an *esprit-de-corps*, which makes them regard each other as the most important class, as those for whose particular happiness society is, and ought to be, constituted. With each other's pleasures and pursuits they are interested. These constitute the world to them. What sympathies the rich have, (though their situation—while most in want of them—is at the same time most unfavorable to the evolution of *any* sympathies,) the rich confine to themselves.

Such being the inevitable tendency of excessive wealth, when made the patrimony of any class, to narrow the range of human sympathy to the comparatively few of the same class or situation in life, what is the consequence? how does it affect our argument? Is it peculiar to the excessively rich, that their hopes and fears are excited and engaged for what is interesting to those in similar circumstances with themselves? By no means. There is not a class or corporation in society to which the same rule will not apply. The poor, the middling order, the higher order, the priests, the lawyers, all contract sympathies with each other, to the exclusion, more or less, of the rest of society; and the measure of this exclusion depends on the number of points of contact remaining between them and the community at large. Those who are entirely independent of all others, have the fewest points of contact with them.

It has been shown that the object of the distribution of wealth, of all wise legislation respecting it, ought to be to produce the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Who sympathize the most with the greatest number? The poor certainly, the productive classes; for their own pursuits, manners, and amusements, must touch them most. If therefore the poor had knowledge, the best knowledge of their age, as to the *best means* of promoting their own happiness,—to them, as sympathizing with by far the greater number, ought the formation of regulations for the general good to be intrusted. To the class of excessively rich, as sympathizing with but a very few, they ought last of all to be intrusted. But there is another quality besides an identity of interest, or mutual sympathy, which is necessary, which is indispensable, for the formation of useful regulations: it is *knowledge*. Very seldom have the poor, the great majority of the productive classes, knowledge: if a few of them have hitherto acquired knowledge, they have been almost universally raised above their class, and have ceased to be poor. Seldom therefore, from this radical defect, can a poor man—in the present state of society—be

a fit person for the important task of legislation. If want of knowledge precludes the poor; want of interest, of sympathy, excludes the excessively rich. Whom therefore ought society to choose, whom would they of necessity choose, under a natural arrangement? Those, possessing the requisite knowledge, that sympathize most largely with the community. Poverty, equal to that of the majority, as denoting an identity of interest and consequent sympathy, would be the greatest recommendation, provided it were joined with adequate knowledge. Excessive wealth, as being the most opposed to identity of interest and sympathy with the mass of the community, is the most unfit to be intrusted with the making of national regulations, though *it possessed appropriate knowledge*; because its interest, as a class, would misdirect its knowledge; and the more knowing such men, the more skilful they would be in shaping and rounding systems of exclusive laws. The poor being necessarily excluded from want of knowledge, the excessively rich from want of sympathy, and misdirection of knowledge; there remain those, whose situations give rise to a fellow-feeling of interest with the greater number, to an equality of knowledge with the foremost of the age in which they live, and to a direction of that knowledge for the benefit of the greater number. These are not to be found, either amongst the very poor or the very rich of the community, but are to be selected in the large intermediate space between the two; always bearing in mind, that want of wealth superior to what the majority of the community enjoy, *other things (qualifications) being equal*, is a recommendation, as securing an extended sympathy instead of a disqualification. The more of this sympathy, the less need of counter checks*.

The excessively rich, then, are the worst qualified to make equal and just laws for the happiness of the community, or to exercise the judicial or executive powers. They are the worst qualified, because their pecuniary interest is opposed to that of the rest of the community; because their pursuits, their characters, their manners are so opposed; because excessive

* Let it not be supposed that any thing like a persuasion exists, that it would be useful that the rich more than the poor should be ineligible to any office. Whomsoever the community wills, to them ought the power to be delegated. The question here is simply, "Whom, as being best qualified, would it be most wise to elect? Almost the worst, freely elected, would be ultimately more useful than almost the best without election. As the individuals here pointed out are the most fit, for legislative, judicial, and executive offices, so would they be by rational men freely elected. The rich and the poor are equally liable to corruption; the only difference is, that the corruption of the rich is much more costly than that of the poor. The folly is, the trusting any thing to the honesty of either rich or poor. Remove the means of vice, if you sincerely wish men to be virtuous."

wealth begets excessive indolence, and annihilates the motives to exertion; because a great majority of those amongst them that have knowledge, misdirect that knowledge to the exclusive benefit of the class to which they belong; because an administration conducted by them is necessarily graduated to the scale of their own wealth, and is thus the most *expensive* that the community can be brought to bear; and because the wide-spreading influence of excessive wealth renders accountability a farce.

But, things being so, what has been, what must ever be, the conduct of the excessively rich in every community where an arbitrary inequality of wealth is maintained by force, or by unjust and therefore unwise laws? The excessively rich, every where, and from their very nature, seek to possess themselves of those very important functions, for the useful exercise of which they are the most incompetent. Whence arises this phenomenon? Simply from the education of the very rich, and the circumstances surrounding them through life. The unoccupied rich are without any active pursuit: an *object* in life is wanting to them. The means of gratifying the senses, the imagination even, of sating all wants and caprices, they possess. The pleasures of *power* are still to be attained. And who have appetites so keen for those peculiar pleasures which power can give, as the excessively rich? From their very infancy they have been habituated to habits of command, to deference on the part of those around them, to the feeling of their own superiority. Who refuses them obedience, is an object of their displeasure. The gratification of their desires, of their volitions, is so habitual, so necessary to them, that the want of gratification, the withholding of obedience, is felt as a hardship, a restraint, an intolerable evil. Those who resist, are looked upon with a sort of moral aversion; they are esteemed as doing what is *wrong*; for, right, and the gratification of the desires of the rich, are in their eyes equivalent terms. It is one of the strongest and most unavoidable propensities of those who have been brought up in indulgence, to abhor restraint, to be uneasy under opposition, and therefore to desire *power* to remove these evils of restraint and opposition. How shall they acquire this power? First, by the direct influence of their wealth, and the hopes and fears it engenders; then, when these means are exhausted, or to make these means more effectual, they endeavour every where to seize on, to monopolize, the *powers of government*. Where despotism does not exist, they endeavour to get entirely into their own hands, or, in conjunction with the head of the state or other bodies, they seize, as large a portion as they can of the functions of legislation. Where despotism does not

exist, or is modified, they share amongst themselves all the subordinate departments of government; they monopolize either directly or indirectly the commands of the armed force, the offices of judges, priests, and all those executive departments which give the most power, require the least trouble, and render the largest pecuniary return. Where despotism exists, the class of the excessively rich make the best terms they can with the despot, to share his power, whether as partners, agents, or mere slaves. If their situation is such as to give them a confidence in their strength, they make terms with the despot, and insist on what they call their *rights*; if they are weak, they gladly crawl to the despot, and affect to glory in their slavishness to him for the sake of the delegated power of making slaves to themselves of the rest of the community. Such do the histories of all nations prove the tendencies of excessive wealth to be. How should it be otherwise? For—and mark it well—if the majority of the rich, the vulgar herd of them, do necessarily desire, from a mere love of domination, the possession of power, those amongst them who are of more energetic temperament, who feel a want of occupation, of incident, of action, have no other mode left them of exertion, of distinction, but the struggle for political power. If the mob of the rich seek it as a means of sickly domination, the active seek it as a theatre of occupation, to break in upon and rouse the inanity of their existence. In fact, there is no other theatre of exertion open to such spirits, no other theatre affording sufficient stimulus to their unoccupied, their accumulated excitability. The desire of bettering their situation, of acquiring, by useful means, more of the comforts and conveniencies of life, is the great stimulus to exertion to the mass of every community. To the influence of this all-inspiring motive, they are inaccessible. There remain, as high and energetic motives, the love of reputation, of *glory* literary or otherwise, and the love of *power*. Which of these will be most likely to allure the active amongst the rich, those who have broken from the bondage of the self-sufficient lethargy of their class? That surely which will cost them the *least effort*, which can, with similar quantum of effort, be, with the most certainty, accomplished. Who sees not which of these, *intellectual or moral glory* on the one hand, or *power, mere unadorned power* on the other, the excessively rich can the most easily and certainly appropriate to themselves? To equip and to incite them to the race of moral and intellectual glory, what are their advantages over the rest of mankind? Habits of gratification, of adulation, of indolence, producing mental incapacity and moral deadness, distinguish the intel-

lectual or cerebral part of their organization, to be operated upon. The materials to operate with, the motives to exertion, do not exist for them. Wealth they have to excess; good opinion of the living, envy, admiration, follow as a consequence of their wealth, as the shadow follows the apparent motion of the sun. The good opinion of those who are to be born when they are no more? And is such a motive, so light, so distant, so opposed to all palpable sensual pleasures, to operate on the creatures of momentary excitement; so as to make them run a race of labor and difficulty, on equal terms, with those on whom they have been accustomed to look down, who are ardent for the pursuit, urged on by necessity, and the desire of distinction yet unacquired? To run a race, in which wealth gives them no advantages, in which the influence of wealth unfolds no new truth, gives birth to no energy of expression? Near them is a path of pursuit, that of *power*, for which their education and habits make them eager, which is within their grasp, which procures them more *visible, palpable*, homage than any intellectual superiority, from which those beneath them are excluded, and in which of course they have almost no competitors, which require of them no extraordinary effort, and in securing which wealth and its influence are all-powerful. This then is the career, the career of *power* in opposition to the career of industry, of virtue, or of intellectual superiority, to which the situation of the rich imperiously summons them. The necessity of their condition forces on them this career in preference to every other, as well to preserve what they have, by whatever means, acquired, as to fence themselves round with new securities against the jealousies and intrusions of the mass of the community. Does not all history abound with the regulations these men have made, the expedients they have devised, whether in sacerdotal, self-called republican, aristocratical, despotic, or mixed governments, to preserve eternally in the hands of the rich all the high and lucrative posts of legislation and administration? to keep these riches and these powers always in their own hands, and those of their descendants? to turn mankind and the control of the voluntary actions of their fellow-creatures, into an article of *personal property*? to exclude all voices but their own from regulating the destiny of nations, and of every individual's domestic comforts? Have they not in fact every where excluded the rest of mankind from any influence in the management of their own affairs? Have not the class of the rich almost every where outraged truth and morality, and the respect which they affect to pay to a Supreme Being, by clothing themselves with lofty *titles* and attributes, either im-

possible for human attainment, or altogether inappropriate to their particular attainments and characters? Have they not made hereditary, and transferred to their unborn offspring, this puerile vanity of misnaming, this insult to truth, to the equal capacities and what ought to be equal rights of their fellow-creatures, with the view of hedging them round with prejudices, as if of another race from the mass of the community? Have not their foolish pride and ignorance made, in every country, the most of them sincerely to believe that their *blood*, the stream of their life, had something *noble* in it, some physical quality, something superior to the rest of mankind, thus aiming to turn nature into a pander to malevolence? Have not expedients for perpetuating property, for keeping it in large masses even to the exclusion of the majority of their own family, been almost every where adopted by this class of men? Under the name of *rights* or *privileges*, have not these possessors of excessive wealth usurped advantages over all other classes, *sometimes* to the full extent of throwing the burden of taxation, the whole cost of supporting the administration which they alone were permitted to wield and to enjoy, on the productive classes? *always*, to the extent of securing to themselves some advantages, entirely independent of personal merit, withheld from the rest of the community? Nobility, priestcraft, and all similar institutions, are but instruments, varied according to time and circumstances, in the hands of the excessively rich, to perpetuate their superior power to command the means of happiness, and to repress the equal and just competition of the rest of the community.

Wealth, as the means of happiness, is the great object of human competition. All minor distinctions, such as titles, legislative usurpations, powers of influence by preaching, judging, &c., are merely instrumental and subsidiary, and if unaccompanied or unfollowed by wealth, the physical means of happiness, would become tiresome, and cease to be objects of pernicious desire. The radical defect in the constitution of society, that which must necessarily engender every other evil, is the excessive inequality of wealth. Wherever this radical evil is permitted to exist, no free institutions, no just laws can be made, or, if made, can be long supported. Without it, titles and aristocracy would be stripped of their false clothing, and would be so ridiculous that their owners even would be ashamed to wear them. Without its influence, no man would dare to assume the power of making laws to dispose, of the produce of the labor, of the actions, and of the lives of rational beings, without being authorized by them so to do, and without being accountable to them for so tremendous an exercise

of power. Without its influence, no assembly of *self-constituted legislators* would ever have insulted mankind, the least advanced beyond barbarism; still less would the drivelling absurdity, of hereditary law-understanding and law-making, have been dreamed of. Were it not for the solid advantage of acquiring the physical means of enjoyment through the instrumentality of wealth, the exercise of powers would become to the excessively rich so burthensome, from the thought and activity they require, that, after the novelty of the occupation had worn off, they would universally fly from them. Even at present, with all the inducements of perpetuating or preserving a little longer those usurpations over the equal rights of mankind—now so apparent to all eyes but those of the interested—excessive wealth delegates in most instances, for scanty remuneration, to the active classes, all the labor of the offices it assumes, and exercises itself the guidance alone. Whatever view we take of human affairs, the forced and excessive inequality of wealth meets us as the nurse and the supporter of human imbecility and degradation; equally pernicious in its moral, economical, and political effects.

All this excessive, this injurious, inequality of wealth, has arisen from violating in a thousand ways, according to the different circumstances of different communities, by force and by fraud—fraud always supported by force—the natural laws of distribution, *free labor, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges*, proved in the first chapter. Had these laws been adhered to, this enormous inequality with all the evils in its train, evils to the excessively rich as well as to the rest of the community, could never have occurred. Till all laws respecting wealth shall be formed on these principles, there will always exist in the bosom of society a focus of disorganization, of vice, and wretchedness. Till mere wealth ceases to be the prime object of pursuit, mankind will never make any essential progress in useful knowledge and beneficence. When the sanction of public opinion shall be, as it may be, directed to the acquisition of knowledge and beneficence, with the same intensity that it is now directed to the pursuit of wealth, then these will constitute personal merit, and will be, as they ought to be, the leading objects of human pursuit, the solid basis of human happiness.

CHAPTER III.

OF THE COLLATERAL BENEFITS OF THE NATURAL LAWS OF DISTRIBUTION, "FREE LABOR, ENTIRE USE OF ITS PRODUCTS, AND VOLUNTARY EXCHANGES;"—THAT IS TO SAY, OF EQUALITY LIMITED BY SECURITY.

HAVING established the truth and utility of those simple rules respecting the distribution of wealth, which are called the natural laws of distribution, and having shown the pernicious effects of a departure from them, it is time to redeem the promise made at the end of our first chapter, to follow wherever truth may lead in tracing the other consequences, the collateral effects, of these laws of distribution on the regulation of human affairs. Far from disguising the extent and the importance of these consequences, we are the first to avow them, because they all tend to good, to the increase of wealth, of good government, of virtue, and consequently of happiness, in society. But the very consequences which appear here the most useful, are perhaps those which the previous conventional notions of many may have led them hitherto, without examination, to reprobate. There is an effect, paramount to all others, the fruitful parent of good, which will diffuse itself over the whole of society, to be expected from following the natural laws of distribution. *They exclude force*; and, with force, they exclude fraud. Reason is the only successor to force; and she becomes by means of persuasion, and expression through the public opinion, the arbiter of public affairs, as well as of the private transactions of life. On no notion of self-denying morality opposed to interest, is this sacrifice of force to reason demanded; but it has been proved to be requisite for the equal security of all and of every individual, in order to effect the greatest production and most useful distribution of wealth for the happiness of all. Let us point out its effects in a *political, economical, and moral* view. And first as to its *political* effects.

It will be at once objected to the principles of equal security, that *they are incompatible with all the ordinary institutions of government*: for, if free labor and voluntary exchanges are to be without any exception upheld, how can the powers of government be exercised, which in so many ways necessarily interfere with private security? This effect is freely allowed;

and relied on as one of the most important collateral benefits of these principles. With *unjust* government, i. e. with government not having the greatest happiness in view, these principles are incompatible: of all *just* government, they are the unfailing support. It is through them alone, that are to be reconciled the hitherto jarring claims of the administration of government, particularly taxation, and private security. All the blessings of security can never be attained until it is *universally* respected; until the empire of brute force is universally abolished; until labor and the products of labor are universally secure to the producer; until no pretended exchanges are made without full and satisfactory equivalents. Neither by one nor by many, by private, nor by public robbers, in virtue of a public deed called a decree, a prerogative, or a law, or without any such pretences, ought the acquisitions of labor and voluntary exchanges to be invaded; nor an atom of property, so justly acquired, touched, without the full consent of the producer or owner, on the receipt of an equivalent by him deemed satisfactory. This we have already proved at length; nor can we conceive any departure from the rule capable of any sort of justification, or even palliation; and least of all the propriety of making any such exceptions in favor of rulers, by whom directly, or through whose instrumentality, all those pernicious attacks on security have been made, which have chained down communities to wretchedness and vice. Yes, it is by violating the security of the productive laborer and of the industrious exchanger, that almost all the miseries of society have been produced. The private plunderer, on whom, because he violated the real or fancied security of the rich, of these very rulers and their circle of friends, the most odious cruelties were unfeelingly exercised, has been comparatively guiltless of violating his neighbour's security. It is to the wholesale violations of security by rulers, with or without the ceremony of law, seizing, in whatever masses they judged convenient, the products of the annual labor or of the accumulated labor of the community, and retaining and consuming them without affording any satisfactory equivalent to the producers or owners; it is to these, varied in a thousand shapes, from the ruthless and direct seizure by the ignorant and lawless Turk, to the wily and all-pervading taxation, and to the endless expedients of extorting money, every one of them violating security, under the pretext of law, religion, public force, &c., of civilized plunderers, that the poverty, the misery, and the vices of communities are chiefly owing. Where private plunder abstracts from industry its tens, and in that proportion relaxes security and industry, public

plunder abstracts from the same industry its thousands, and annihilates the very hope of exertion. Against private plunder, mere district regulations would easily guard, a thousand times more effectually than systems of rule, despotic, corrupt, or ignorant, have ever yet done: the *interest* of the industrious, of the great majority, would lead to the formation and would ensure the execution of such regulations. Against the attacks of the private plunderer, there is a check both in the public and private strength. Against the attacks on security of the public plunderer, systematically organized and upheld by an overwhelming force, there are no means of defence, there are no checks but the prudence or the fears of the rulers. Is it then in favor of such enormous, such every-day violators of security, that we are to surrender our principles, while we maintain them in full force against the wretched, the comparatively impotent and innoxious private plunderer? Long ago the reader was warned to look to the *consequences* of our principles: he was told they were of universal application; and in no branch of their application do they lay the basis of public happiness on so firm and beneficent a foundation as in the present.

“If abstracting wealth, or levying money, by rulers, without giving an equivalent deemed satisfactory to every one from whom the value is taken, be a violation of security, how can governments,” it will be urged, “be supported? must they ask the consent of every one from whom they levy a tax? Either they and the blessings of order must cease, or the exercise of security in this unlimited sense must be given up, and with it the natural laws of distribution.”

Fortunately for mankind, security is reconcilable with legislation, taxation, and the most perfect execution of all useful laws. Nay, more, without the entire maintenance of the principle of security, without unreserved respect for the natural laws of distribution, no just legislation, no just interference with human wealth or human actions, can take place. Respect for the principle of security is the basis of all just government.

How is this to be accomplished? How is this problem to be solved?

Simply by means of the *representative system of government*. The principle of security, producing the greatest possible degree of equality and happiness, is absolutely incompatible with any other species of government. It is the touchstone of all just legislation. Real *bona-fide* representation of every person possessing or producing wealth, of every adult person capable of engaging in rational voluntary transactions, and of course

of being influenced by the laws made. This right of security is no metaphysical right, founded on abstract principles, but necessary to evolve, at the same time, the greatest production and the most useful distribution of wealth, the chief operative means of human happiness. Will it be said that even by means of representation, we sacrifice the universality of our principle? that individual assent to every act interfering with the labor, or its products, of any individual, would on our principles be necessary to constitute just government? and that individual legislation—which is an impossibility in large communities—would be rendered necessary? We reply, Even individual legislation and immediate self-taxation would imply a previous agreement of all *to abide by the decision of the majority*, in all those cases where the desires of the majority and minority are incompatible. Without this previous understanding, no mutual action, no system of co-operation could ever exist. It is a condition necessary to all communion. Any one disapproving of this condition, cannot belong to the society: and all that such individual could claim would be, free permission to withdraw from the society and to connect himself with any other; which permission would be so obvious and useful an individual right, that every community should sanction it. The very act, then, of voting in concert with others, necessarily implies a recognition of the principle of adopting the act of the majority for that of the whole. Now, under the system of representation the most extended, where millions or tens of millions of men co-operate together, nothing more than this admission is required to make the acts of the representatives of a community the voluntary acts of every individual in it. The majority of the united representatives carry with them the voices of the majority of their respective constituents, and the acts of this majority become the acts of all the individuals of the community. In those cases where the will and interest of the minority are not incompatible with those of the majority, they ought to be pursued and promoted, as well as those of the majority: 'tis only in those cases where they are incompatible, that either, and if either, of course the smaller, should be sacrificed. If, then, a majority of this great community, through their representatives, think proper for any purpose, useful or not, to appropriate any part of the products of their labor; though they may act foolishly as well as wisely in such appropriation, they can never be charged with violating by it the principle of security. This is the only secret for reconciling security with legislation, with the complete and voluntary execution of all laws, even of those which interfere with the products of labor,

instead of the continued execution of them through the terror of an armed host, supported again by violating the security of the community. This is not the occasion to enumerate all the blessings of representative government. Enough to show that no other is reconcileable with the principle of security. All pretended right to govern without delegation from the governed, assumed by a single person or by many, under whatever name, in as far as it presumes to interfere with the products of labor or the direction of labor, stands in hostility to security, to the natural laws of the distribution of wealth. Representation and election alone are compatible with it.

We cannot even *conceive* any other plan than that of representation for obviating the evils of insecurity. If any other could be devised, it would then be necessary to compare its good and evil effects with those of representation, and to give the preference to the most useful expedient. The system of *perfect equality* of property in a community, brought about by voluntary co-operation, would not obviate the necessity of representation in order to reconcile public contributions with security: for, not to say that these communities, necessarily small, not exceeding villages in size, must have internal regulations, they must also have connexions, in the way of exchange, with neighbouring communities or individuals, and must be as much interested in all works and institutions of national utility, as any other portions of the great national community amongst whom they may live. For these purposes representation is indispensable. Common objects must be attained by a great community, either by its own immediate acts, or by the instrumentality of others. If by others, without any power to that effect by the community, security is violated; if in consequence of powers given by the community, the representative system is brought into effect. There are no half-way expedients between voluntary and involuntary: there are no automatic motions in the rationale of government.

Still, a lover of perfect security may say, whether he be at the same time a lover of perfect voluntary equality or of individual exertion, "no contributions of property should be made, though judged useful by the representatives, except sanctioned by the individual free-will of the contributors." Under a just representative system, we do not conceive this second consent to be necessary to uphold the principle of security: for where real representatives decree the contribution, the object will be so palpably useful and the amount so small, the contributors so much at their ease and the public opinion so energetic in enforcing this high public duty, that defaulters would scarcely be found, though the law were merely an invitation to all

citizens to contribute in certain proportions, instead of an order to do so. If the object of the contribution be not judged useful, or the amount be deemed excessive, by the community, they can withdraw their representatives, or give them new instructions. But to urge so unnecessary an experiment, as this second individual assent, in the present state of men's minds, brought up and distorted under the miserable systems of selfishness, would be premature. The natural way of ultimately effecting this, will be by gradually diminishing the penalties for non-payment till they become so light that the recommendation of the representative legislature, backed by enlightened public opinion, will render all payments in reality *a second time* voluntary.

The first grand political benefit then, from which almost all others emanate, of an entire obedience to the natural laws of distribution, is, that they render necessary the universal establishment amongst all communities sufficiently enlightened to perceive its utility and of course to maintain its action, Representative Government. If many, with confined views, have thought that the benefits of representative government were so great, that they could not be purchased too dearly, even at the expense of security, how entirely will the argument be changed and strengthened, when it is found that security, instead of being opposed to representative government, is not only its firmest support, but is irreconcilable with any other political institution? that through representative government alone can the full measure of the blessings of security be enjoyed?

Let us proceed to another political advantage of security.

A community, respecting the natural laws of distribution, and enjoying all the individual happiness resulting from the greatest possible equality of wealth consistent with security, would be as little anxious to annoy their neighbours by war, as they would be inclined to submit to the unjust seizure of their property, the fruits of their labor, by others. Brought up in the exercise of laborious industry, accustomed to respect the acquisitions and the rights of others as they value their own, aware of the mischiefs of brutal force and of the unfailing and bounteous results of labor guided by intelligence; what motives should lead such men to rush like a banditti on their unoffending neighbours? They know well, that while plunder necessarily lasts but for a day, industry is the only permanent resource of a community; and that their plundering expeditions must necessarily be accompanied with a dereliction of their industrious pursuits. No standing armies would be maintained, nor thought of, by such a community; nor would they be neces-

sary. For external affairs, "let other communities manage their own concerns:" for the rest, reason and reciprocity are the only means of influence they wish for. For internal affairs, what member of the community has not health and strength, knows not the art of self-defence, feels not the blessings he enjoys, calculates not the rights by the maintenance of which these blessings were created and are upheld? And what member of such a community would not know his place, and would not hasten to co-operate, nay would not throw himself into the breach, to repel the aggressions of violence? Such a community, enjoying abundance, but at the expense of labor, uncorrupted by forced inequality and idleness, would be a mountain of brass against foreign plunderers, and would be too happy at home to turn plunderers themselves. What is in fact the machinery by which standing armies are supported and foreign wars perpetuated? Have they not been mere games of chess, at which the rulers and other owners of excessive wealth, in want of a stimulus to the vapidness of their existence, have been the players? compelling by every species of violation of security, the wretched poor to rush to mutual massacre, under the preposterous name of honor, to afford those above them the exhilarating pleasures of the incidents? So true is this, that an objection has hence been taken to the yielding of too much security and comfort to the bulk of a community, lest their warlike strength should be lessened, lest they should lose the taste for plundering their neighbours, and should cease to supply recruits for wholesale robberies and murders. Every one knows that these objections have been truly brought against wealthy luxurious communities. In as far as forced inequality of wealth generated corruption and pusillanimity, these objections were good: good only against the *distribution*, not against the *absolute quantity*, of the objects of wealth in a community: for as long as the natural laws of distribution are maintained, and wealth is acquired by labor and voluntary exchanges alone, all force and fraud removed, it is impossible that too much wealth can exist in such a community. Every increase of wealth is the reward of an increase of labor, or of intelligence, or of both combined. Were sciences and arts and the productive powers of labor so improved, that every individual could live (if he thought his time well employed in such exclusive productions) in a palace, surrounded with every really beautiful and useful convenience, clad in the finest and most agreeable tissues, supplied with an abundance of delicious food limited only by its effects on health and length of life; such a state of things, as long as the natural laws of distribution were followed to preclude

forced inequality, and as long as every enjoyment was the reward of exertion ;—instead of being a matter for lamentation and despondency, would be a just source of exultation, and productive of none but the happiest effects. It would fortunately dispose for attack, but it would render invincible for defence, invincible from interest, invincible from fortitude acquired by labor and education, invincible from scientific knowledge.

Such being the beneficial effects of the principle of security, on the frame of government, on the public strength of a community, what would be its influence on penal law, and the administration of justice? The unrestrained tendency of the distribution of wealth, being so much towards equality, excessive wealth and excessive poverty being removed, almost all the temptations, all the motives, which now urge to the commission of crime, would be also removed. From the wretchedness of the poor, want, envy, indignation, or from the idleness and pampered passions of the rich, almost all crimes, proceed. Equality limited by security, taking away the food of these desires and passions both from the rich and poor, their effects would cease. The poor, or rather the least rich, being neither stimulated by want, nor by a desperate hatred of the usurpations of the excessively rich, seeing all acquisitions open to all and the result of knowledge and industry, possessed themselves of competence and of the faculty, by industry, of procuring a comfortable subsistence, would feel no temptations to violate the honest and laudable acquisitions of others ; and all the fraud and force arising from this source, and exemplified in various crimes, would cease. Excessive wealth being banished, few of the richer members of such a community would live in total idleness. Public opinion would be so strong in favor of industry, of exertion, of occupation mental or bodily, that those few who from fortunate acquisitions might pass their time in mere idleness, in lassitude and want of emotion, would by shame and imitation be driven into some useful occupation, in experimental art or science, or in literature. The great mass of their fellow-creatures being more respectable in comforts, knowledge, and moral habits, would be more respected by them ; and thus from lessened motive on the part of the rich to abuse their superiority, and from a stronger front of opposition to that abuse from the altered state of the poor, both upheld by an energetic public opinion, the crimes as well as the vices of the richer classes would be comparatively banished. What would be the effect of this abatement of motives to crime? Not only all sanguinary, all cruel punishments, educating the people in hardness of heart, would be utterly banished, but the

gentlest punishments would be sufficient to make head against the remaining weakened motives to crime, and the punishment of shame would be every day more operative, and become a larger ingredient in the evil of every other punishment. This mild state of penal law would operate again on manners, and reason and useful sympathies would be constantly gaining new strength over the savage ignorant inclinations of violence.—If penal laws would be more mild, they would be also more certainly and easily executed, and without the exhibition of any public force.—What now prevents the due execution of the laws? The poorer classes, the great majority of every community, do not see the utility of the laws: their own security is so frequently violated by the exactions of these very laws themselves, and by the oppressions, direct and indirect, of the excessively rich; the punishments are necessarily so revolting; the temptations (in which they sympathize) so great to violate the laws, that the general inclination is to thwart their execution. Hence the necessity for an expensive and more or less inquisitorial system of police, and for an armed force to put down discontent. But under the system of security, upheld by the natural laws of distribution, every man would have something to protect, would be protected, and would feel a personal interest in the execution of the laws. The security of all being alike protected, the security of labor as well as of its acquired products, all would feel alarm at the invasion of the rights of any. Information would be given, culprits would be apprehended, witnesses would come forth, juries and judges would undeviatingly perform their indispensable duties, and mild punishments would require but a guard of ceremony for their execution. The laws would be executed: and certainty of execution would of itself almost annihilate crime. For, as the evil of every wise punishment must be greater than the good to be derived, in ordinary estimation, from the crime, the *certainly* of such punishment would take away all motive to the crime, and extraordinary cases of ungoverned passions, or miscalculation bordering on insanity, would be almost the only ones left to punish. The terror of the punishment to others—and even shame would then be terrible—would be always joined with a process of reform towards the offender. Thus would the laws execute themselves, and the public force, in this most important branch of government, might be almost dispensed with, and justice would no longer be sarcastically reproached with relying on violence and cruelty as the means of ultimate benevolence.

The next political benefit that occurs as arising from a strict

observance of the natural laws of distribution, is, that “*all the expenses of all the machinery of government, would be reduced to their lowest point; and all the wealth thus saved every year from unproductive consumption, would be expended in rewarding the exertions and increasing the comforts of the producers, or would be devoted to works, every where diffused, of public utility and enjoyment.*” It is evident that if all the members of a community contributed, either themselves directly, or through their representatives, what they thought necessary for the public purposes of government, they would give as little, and get as much in return, as possible. As in all other transactions, they would get the best article, the article they wanted, on the lowest terms that the actual market of appropriate talents could afford. They would not give one hundred pieces of gold to any person for performing a particular act or duty which another would perform equally well for one piece of gold, or perhaps for the reputation of the performance, because the first could make a more easy bow and would throw that valuable article into the bargain. Whether this cheapness would lead things to be better done, is another question, of which we shall not lose sight: that mere cheapness would be the consequence of our principles, has been reproached to them, under the name of niggardliness; and a thousand evils have been said to result from it—evils no doubt to the losers of the over-payment. The reason of the present wasteful and overwhelming expenses of government, is obvious. The persons who order directly or indirectly, and levy the contributions, are those who themselves consume, or oblige others by sharing with them the consumption of them. Thus a double error or vice is committed. Not only are they, the produce of whose labor and industry is forcibly taken to pay the contributions, debarred from the right of settling the amount, but the men who of all others should be the last permitted to exercise any such power, the consumers or distributors of the contributions, are the regulators of it. The consequence, naturally, and as long as human nature remains constituted as at present, necessarily, is, that the largest possible sums which the patience and privations of communities will permit the prudence of their rulers to abstract from the yearly products of their labor, is taken from them; and the largest possible amount of these sums is expended, not only unproductively as to any return in the shape of wealth, not only without any other possible equivalent to the community, but in a manner tending as directly as possible to destroy all the useful virtues, and to substitute the concurrent vices, of excessive wealth and poverty, with political degradation su-

peradded. The chief use, to which these enormous forced contributions are mostly applied, is to maintain a large armed force to overawe the discontents to which they give rise, as well as to afford the occasional amusement of war to the rulers. It needs surely no proof, that if the contributors awarded their own contributions, they would give as little and get as much as possible. And why should they not? Is not cheapness a universal blessing? cheapness of intellectual and physical exertion, as well as of the articles of wealth, the quality of the article bought being of course unchanged? The cheap undertakers, having less influence and being more under control of the contributors, having no other merit but the goodness of their work to recommend them, would be driven to perform the work best. As to abuse of trust, and speculation, remove the occasions, the facilities for them, simplify all duties, make officers elective and responsible, give publicity to their acts and proceedings, and strengthen in every way the effect as to reward and punishment of public opinion; such abuses and speculation will be reduced to their lowest term; they will scarcely exist. Even foreign seduction, were wealth to corrupt supposed unlimited, would be powerless against such measures. All officers being responsible and removable, not only the dread of punishment would deter them, but the impossibility of their affecting, *from the limitation of their powers and the short duration of their authority*, any thing permanently useful to an enemy, would indispose him from the folly of applying seduction where the seduced had nothing to give in return. What act is there, for instance, in the power of the American United States president to commit—suppose he disregard public disgrace and punishment—for which a public enemy could feel an interest sufficiently strong to throw away his wealth in bribing him? Power to do ill limited almost to nothing, responsibility *real*, not a mockery, line of duty clear and simple, acts and counsels public at the call of the community or their representatives, public opinion irresistible, term of authority short, and immediate power of reversal at the will of the injured community; who under such circumstances would be the fools to give or to receive bribes? 'Tis where responsibility is a mockery, where offices are for life with reversion to fools or not fools, and where facilities are permitted, nay are created, that corruption reigns uncontrolled. In minor offices, similar expedients would produce similar results: seductive motives would be removed, tutelary motives would be supplied: neglect of duty would be followed by loss of employment. Security, universally respected by the government itself, would become so sacred in public opinion, and public opinion would

become so necessary to happy existence, that the dread of its *excommunication* would be almost alone sufficient to maintain integrity, talent, and activity in public officers; and this public opinion would of course be influential in forming the characters of the officers themselves as well as the rest of the community. What is the real secret of the present iniquitous over-payments to all public servants? The excessively rich, whether few or many, by whatever name called, decree and levy contributions in contempt of the wishes of those whose skill and labor pay them. Even in England, where there is more accumulated wealth in the hands of capitalists, though not more yearly consumption for enjoyment, than in any other equally peopled community, more than three-fourths of the contributions are levied *directly* on articles consumed by re-productive labor. In all countries, all contributions are directly or indirectly levied on productive labor. There is no other yearly source of supply: neither nature nor wisdom can give it without labor. To induce the rich or their connexions to activity, to exertion of any sort, a stimulus proportionally strong must be applied; the magnitude of it depending on the average of the expenditure and acquired habits of these rich men. As they could not be induced to work for the value of the offices according to the rate of payment for such services in private life, the payment must be raised till worth their acceptance. Nomination being absolute amongst themselves, all competition is of course excluded. The result is in general, that with a part, a very small part of the excessive payment, they hire appropriate talent to perform the real duty—where there is any real duty to be performed,—and consume unproductively always, and almost always perniciously, the funds of which the laborious community is thus plundered. The pretence of less liability to corruption from over-payment, is a widely and mournfully ascertained falsehood. In every country, and from the known principles of human nature, the best articles are obtained where the real competition value and no more is given for them. Where the proper means to insure integrity are neglected, the only effect of excessive payment is to render necessary higher bribes or more of the matter of corruption in some available shape. Deliberately to pay beyond the real market value of any article, physical or intellectual, whether on the part of the community or of a private individual, might be passed by as a species of insanity merely, if the deep corruption of the motives and the deadly influence of the effects on public happiness did not call for an effectual restraint.

But there is another manner in which security would operate in reducing public salaries and payments of all sorts, to their

lowest useful level. The payment of public officers is every where regulated by the private incomes enjoyed by the rich classes of the community in which they are employed. If great inequality of wealth prevails, and private fortunes are large, public officers possessing power, will be anxious to be on an equality as to wealth, to be able to associate with those whom in every other respect they look upon to be their inferiors; and as they are drawn from these rich classes, their friends will think it quite reasonable that they should be put on the same level as to wealth with themselves. The natural laws of distribution, therefore, banishing excessive inequality from our community, and substituting numerous moderate fortunes, would *take away the desire* of excessive payments. They would no longer be necessary in order to make public officers equal to, to enable them to associate with, those deemed the most respectable classes. Thus the state of the distribution of wealth in every community regulates the payment of the public servants. Great inequality of wealth is the necessary basis and parent of every other usurpation and mischief, and of none more than of excessive, corruptive, and exhausting payments to public officers.

The next and the last beneficial political effect, that we shall notice as necessarily attendant on obedience to the natural laws of distribution, is, "*that all religious associations would become voluntary.*" Who is bold enough to say, that any established system of religion in Europe, that is now supported by aid of the public force, would continue to be upheld in its present state of expenditure, if that support were withdrawn, and if the voluntary consent of all, the produce of whose industry is now taken for its support, were rendered necessary for the payment? Were the force withdrawn that supports them, it is plain they would fall by their own weight, because the real industrious contributors do not receive equivalents by them deemed satisfactory, whether in a ghostly or a moral shape, or in physical decoration, music, or singing. If it be admitted that many of the present forced contributors to the luxuries of the haughty and pampered preachers of humility and abstinence, would not, as individuals, voluntarily contribute; is it pretended that the majority of the real representatives of a community would in obedience to, or in accordance with, the wishes of the majority of their constituents, levy the support of ecclesiastical establishments from the whole community? In Mexico, where the influence of the priesthood,—always in the direct ratio of the ignorance of the people,—is still tremendous, *perhaps* real representatives might so act. Even by so doing, however, they would not violate the

principle of security. If the Mexicans think proper to give half the yearly products of their earthly labor, to escape, by ceremonious expedients more or less ingenious, the eternal tormenting of their benevolent maker, through the instrumentality of his accredited agents, the priests; it would be a violation of security to prevent the Mexicans from so wise and pious an appropriation of their property. How long such wisdom and piety are likely to last under a representative government, is another question. Under such a system and free discussion, their true interest is likely to be soon found out. But surely there exists not another nation on the earth meekly fanatical enough to pay, if left directly to their own discretion, or indirectly to that discretion through their representatives, the sums now levied on them for the support of their priesthood, Mahometan, Hindoo, or Irish under the two-headed monster, a double establishment. What would be the result? Those that liked the heavenly wares, the ghostly consolations, the priests could give them, in exchange for the produce of their labor, would make a voluntary exchange for such an equivalent. Those who thought that wholesome and palatable food, neat clothing, and commodious houses, were more substantial blessings than promises of futurity, than lands or crowns or contemplations above the clouds to any extent, would probably keep the produce of their labor to themselves, and let the priests or apostles make tents or baskets or follow any other calling for their honest support, devoting their spare time, if so disposed, to the edification, ghostly or moral, of their neighbours. Many would unite together and contribute to the maintenance of whatever system of ceremonies, doctrines, or morals, their fears or their reason, or their mere early associations, might recommend to them, paying some of their number for the performance of the duties of their sect, or some of them performing such duties by turns without payment. The priesthood would be kept humble and diligent, or would be superseded by lay discharge of their most simple and easy, real duties: competition and emulation would amend their morals, and keep them active to preserve or increase their adherents. Real morality, the love of being and making happy, founded on the distribution of wealth and the diffusion of knowledge, and supported by motives of palpable, intelligible, interest, would flourish, contaminated by no hypocrisy. Even from the bitterness and folly of theological dispute and recrimination, truth would be elicited, and calm superior minds would be every where produced: but as the theologians would have no nation's plunder to fight for to brighten their zeal, no brutal force at command to give weight to their arguments or to exact their plunder, their

disputes would become as harmless, if not as innocently interesting, as the famed Arabian stories of the thousand and one nights. The genuine morality of utility and physical and historical truth, would ultimately work their way, and supersede the pretended morality of self-debasement, mortification, and ceremonies, and unintelligible as unimportant dogmas, and fictions of childhood. The cowardly and debasing tyranny which superstition, conscious of its weakness, every where exercises over the defenceless minds of infancy, —well knowing, and, strange to say, even admitting, that if it did not force its dogmas by the associations of terror before reason, even the unbiassed reason of children would never receive them, though God himself were their author and advocate —would for ever cease. Whatever was paid for religious associations would be *voluntarily* paid, and no attack on security would cramp the aspiring energies of industry. If it be said that no religion, neither the religion of Mahomet, of Confucius, or of Jesus, could support itself without attacks on security, by the forced abstraction of wealth, to pay its priests; it is replied, that no religion ought to exist on such terms; inasmuch as no religion can confer advantages to be at all put in comparison with the blessings of security: without them, the purest religion, the mildest, the most sublime, morality, would be but vain sounds; with them, whatever was lovely and true in religion would become the unconstrained belief and practice of every happy and enlightened mind. Moreover, the unquestioned experience of mankind, has proved the utter falsehood of the hypocritical pretence that religion cannot exist without robbery: for, in the contemplation of morality, robbery consists in the abstraction of wealth without the consent of the rational owner, whether the law, the church, or the wretched private thief, be the purloiner. In the United States of America, in every dissenting communion in every part of Europe, religion not only exists, but is infinitely more holy, resting on the voluntary support of its communicants, than where force is employed to levy its revenues. The Quakers are the only sect who have been *as yet* wise enough to be their own priests, and save the expense of a separate order, who having no real duties, to the occupation of a tenth of their time, to perform, must invent imaginary ones. The money thus saved by the Quakers, they devote to the decent maintenance or industrious establishment or aid of the less fortunate members of their communion: and are Quakers, *without priests*, the least moral, the least religious, the least intelligent of all sects? Are they not the most so, though *without priests*? as were the early Christian communities. As

real knowledge is diffused amongst the members of all other sects, and as they see how very simple, short, and easy are the really useful duties of their priests, they will imitate, *in this*, the conduct of the Quakers; and the change will be as salutary in its effects on their own intelligence and morality, as on their mental and economical independence. Not only has experience proved that religion can exist, without interfering with the natural laws of distribution by violations of security; but it has increased and flourished, as during centuries in Ireland and in Greece, under, and in spite of, the forced abstraction of its own resources from its own communicants, to enrich a rival and hated priesthood, or to feed the force that enchained it. Does British policy support by forced contributions the Hindoo priests of the East or the Feliche system of the Negroes of the West Indies? and is there any one that fears that, in consequence of the mere not granting of that support, these two systems of religion will immediately cease? No: even with knowledge and power against them, they hold their ground: and shall not that religion which comes from God, and is supported by God, with the aid of the most improved human talents, preserve itself *without* robbery, while every vulgar superstition holds up its head *in spite* of robbery? Who ever thought of instituting and paying by forced contributions separate orders of men for preserving the knowledge of mechanics, chemistry, or medicine? Who ever thought of paying these but by the voluntary contributions of those who derived benefit from them? Who stupid enough to think that our machines and utensils would be better made, that our fractured limbs or our agues would be better taken care of, if the machine-maker or the doctor were supported by forced contributions, and supply and attendance were to depend on their sense of duty, instead of being regulated by our voluntary payments? Who stupid enough not to see that all improvements in the arts of life and medicine would cease under so monstrous an arrangement? Who stupid enough not to see that all our knowledge on these subjects would go back and be lost under so abominable an arrangement, were it possible by any penalty of law to exclude all competition? And who stupid enough to consider all the chemical and mechanical arts of life, and all the blessings of health, of less importance than the reveries of plundering theologians? If priests, like doctors, or philosophers, or bellows-makers, have any thing to give to the members of a rational community worth exchanging for the products of the labor of the industrious, they will receive, like all other men, under the reign of security, a full equivalent. They must improve their wares in order to make

their trade flourishing under such a system. Unfortunately, where priests have to do with ignorant communities, it would seem the worse their wares the better their trade; first brutifying the minds of infants, and then riding the beasts they have made. But the sun of knowledge has arisen, with "healing under his wings."

Let us now notice a few of the most striking beneficial effects which would result, in an *economical* point of view, from upholding equal security, as dictated by the natural laws of distribution.

Perhaps the leading economical benefit is, that *production would be increased and capital accumulated with a rapidity and to an extent hitherto unknown.* The influence of security in increasing production, the means of enjoyment, and in increasing happiness by the just distribution and increased consumption by the whole productive community of these added means of enjoyment, has been already shown. It remains to show, that the increased accumulations of such a community would proceed in an equal ratio with their increased consumption. It is plain that if all that was produced by labor in a year were consumed within the year, no accumulation could take place. Capital is nothing mysterious: 'tis nothing else but that portion of the products of labor which is not immediately consumed. For *ultimate* consumption, or what is in this case called, *use*, are all articles whatsoever, that are not immediately consumed, produced. No rational beings would produce but with a view to consumption or enjoyment, immediate, or permanent, or remote. Ripe fruit is consumed the day it is produced and matured, shoes and other articles of clothes are consumed within a few months after their production, the grain of one harvest is consumed within the succeeding year till industry directs the slumbering energies of nature to the production of a new supply. A spade, a pick-axe, a chair, a table, a loom, are consumed, or, as we say in this case, are *worn out*, in a few years, according to the use and the care bestowed on them. A house, if well built, will not be consumed or worn out in fifty years: a good painting will not be consumed or decayed in many centuries: public buildings of a massive structure, as bridges, senate-houses, porticos, temples, may abide the consumption or use of thousands of years: while statues, the fairest works of art, seem to smile at decay, and have outlived the immortality of the immortal gods, whose representatives they are, the embodied creations of pleasing *human* qualities. Whatever is not made for use, is made in vain: of this sort, under the influence of despotism and insecurity, are the pyramids of Egypt—vain memorials

of immense exertions! while the beautiful remains of the architecture of ancient Greece, that have survived the barbarism and superstition of ages, seem to await the reinspiring touch of freedom and security to become again the theatres, for all the citizens, for all the members of the community, of patriotic and scientific exertions, where the love of knowledge and of virtue will be associated with the magnificence of the surrounding scenes of nature and of art. An apple then, consumed in a minute, and a statue enduring for thousands of years, are equally products of labor, and made solely for enjoyment, by means of their use. Doubtless the more durable any article, the less comparative labor bestowed upon it, and to the greater number of men and succeeding generations of men it is the means of comfort, whether by means of shelter as a building, by means of passage as a bridge, or by simple contemplation and association as a statue, the more useful it is. If an apple could give the renewed pleasure and nourishment of eating for fifty successive days, it would be fifty times as valuable or as useful, though its *exchangeable* value would decrease. The beneficial consequence would be, that so much human labor would be set free for the production of other objects of desire. What then is capital? and how is it distinguished from the other yearly, or monthly, or daily, products of labor? Sometimes the distinction arises simply from the *use* to which the products of labor may be applied, the *hands* in which they may be placed; but more commonly from the *permanence* of the article produced. All buildings, bridges, cities, inclosures, laying out and reclaiming of lands, ships, machinery, pictures, statues, and other desired works of art, though as much the products of labor as the apple, are distinguished as capital simply from their permanence, though in daily use and in the course of a more or less gradual consumption. Flour, milk, shoes, hats, meat, coats, gowns, laid in by a family for current use, are not capital, but materials for consumption: while, in the hands of the flour-factor, dairyman, or milk-vender, shoemaker, hatter, butcher, tailor, and mantua-maker, they form respectively the stock or capitals of their trades. In the one case, the use was immediate consumption, *without any view to any further exchange*. In the other case consumption by the owner is excluded, and exchange is the sole object, or at all events is the sole use, of the possession. Sometimes that partial use, which does not amount to the wearing out or scarcely injuring of the article, as the use of silver-ware, may render an article at the same time an object of use, or consumption, and capital or stock, or, as it is sometimes called, capital-stock. What then is the most

accurate idea of capital? It is "that portion of the products of labor which, whether of a permanent nature or not, is capable of being made the instrument of profit." Such seem to be the real circumstances which mark out one portion of the products of labor into capital. On such distinctions, however, have been founded the insecurity and oppression of the productive laborer, the real parent, under the guidance of knowledge, of all wealth, and the enormous usurpations over the productive powers of their fellow-creatures, of those who, under the name of capitalists or landholders, acquired the possession of these accumulated products, the yearly or permanent supply of the community. Hence the opposing claims of the capitalist and the laborer. The capitalist getting into his hands, under the reign of insecurity and force, the consumption of many laborers for the coming year, the tools or machinery necessary to make their labor productive, and the dwellings in which they must live, turned them to the best account, and bought labor and its future products with them as cheaply as possible. The greater the profit of capital, or the more the capitalist made the laborer pay for the advance of his food, the use of the implements or machinery, and the occupation of the dwelling, the less of course remained to the laborer for the acquisition of any other object of desire. With this explanation it is a self-evident proposition, that the higher the profits of capital—*other things remaining the same*—the lower must be the wages of labor: and as capitalists averred that manufactures and trade (or exchange of commodities) could not be carried on without such profits as they desired, the consequence was, that law every where lent its aid to the cupidity of force and fraud—ignorant as to public effects, sharp-sighted as to its own sinister interest—to keep down the wages of labor. The capitalist dazzled the world with his profuse expenditure and masses of accumulation; while the privations of the real producers were disregarded, or unthought of. It became a part of the standing policy of the commercial system *to keep down the wages of labor*; not by fair competition, free labor, and voluntary exchanges between laborers and capitalists, but by any means that might be deemed best adapted to effect this very *moral and benevolent* object.

Now in order to render articles cheap and in great abundance for the enjoyment of the community, it is not necessary either that the wages of labor, the real remuneration to the laborer, should be comparatively low, or that the profits of stock should be comparatively high. This is a matter between the capitalist and the laborer, with which the public has nothing to do. The circumstances that really influence the abundance

of the objects of wealth are these; abundance of materials to work upon, abundance of tools or machines to work with, and knowledge of the mind as well as skill of hand to elaborate out of these the objects desired. The natural course of things should seem to be, that every productive laborer should possess his own materials, his own supply of food while working, his own tools, his own dwelling, with appropriate skill and knowledge to guide these elements of production. It is hard to see how the seizure, or the possession, by any person out of these producers, of all the materials, food, tools, dwellings, and the monopoly of all the knowledge, leaving them the skill of hand or other organs, necessary for preparing these articles of wealth, should tend to render them cheaper, or produced in greater quantities: but it is very easy to see how such a circumstance should render them dearer. All these articles, knowledge excepted, constituting the capital, thrown into the hands of one, will enable him by the stimulus of immediate want to compel the others to work: but they must work for him, and of course at the lowest rate possible. Will such lowness of remuneration add to their alacrity of mind? will it increase their activity of exertion? will it increase their skill of workmanship? will their tools be better made than when made under more invigorating circumstances? If the materials to work upon be the same in both cases, all the other circumstances influencing production tend much more to improve the processes, and to increase activity, under high than under low wages, and of course under low than under high profits. As to the effects of the two cases on happiness, it is simply this, that while high profits make one individual splendid and perhaps (morality in both parties being the same) twice as happy as the average of productive laborers at low wages, low profits and high wages would raise the happiness of the one hundred or one thousand well-remunerated laborers to very nearly an equality with that of the capitalist, moral sources of happiness being still supposed the same in both. But happiness, without respect of persons, being the sole legitimate object of the moralist and legislator, it is clearly their duty, as one hundred or one thousand to one, to favor, by all means consistent with security, that state of things which would lead to the most ample remuneration, whether paid in wages or kind, to the productive laborer. Now under the auspices of the natural laws of distribution, what would be the progress of mechanical or agricultural industry, in the very commencement of these pursuits? Occupation by improvement being the natural title to unoccupied land, any man having the means to work with, and to whom the produce of land was an object of

desire, would appropriate as much land as his necessities demanded. To expend his labor in merely inclosing, with a view to future possession, a larger tract than he could cultivate, would be absurd, because, if his labor were spent on mere inclosing, he must starve: in order to live, he must render the land productive of food. The competition of others, and the mere distance of the benefit to be derived from mere inclosures, would prevent them, even if the necessity of food by cultivation did not interfere. If again he inclosed more than he wanted, what would be the price of such inclosure? Just the labor it cost, or its value, a full equivalent and no more: for, why should those who can get, by the labor of inclosing, new land, give more than the value of that labor for land already inclosed? This is clearly its natural value, so that inclosing more land than was necessary for use would not be thought of. The incloser or inclosers of the land must have been possessed of the means of existence, food, clothes, dwelling, and of the tools and seed to work with, or else they could never produce. What must be the amount of their production? A year's supply: but a supply of food, enough not only for their own use during the year, but for procuring, by exchange, those articles of clothing, furniture, or other objects of desire, which they could not make for themselves, or which they found it more convenient (costing less labor or being cheaper) to get in exchange, would constitute this supply; land would be exchanged, that is to say, the labor laid out in land, in convenient parcels, just like any other commodity; the whole of the products of labor would go for remuneration to the producer, and for whatever he gave away, he would receive a satisfactory equivalent.

But from idleness, want of skill, or accident, some other individuals might want food, tools, &c., and not being possessed of any equivalent fabricated by any other exertion of industry, might be compelled to sue for food to those who by cultivation had procured it. They would give their *labor* for the articles they wanted. Be it observed, however, these cases would be exceptions to the general rule, which is that of equality of physical powers and accidents. This small number of exceptions, again, would be kept down by two circumstances; the voluntary support and supply by the friends or family of the most of them in case of accident, and the facility of acquiring the means (tools, &c.,) of independent cultivation. The remuneration of such laborers would scarcely be different from that of the family with whom they worked; enjoyments would be in common, and the difference would consist almost entirely in the possession or non-possession of the little stock.

But this very principle of independence would be continually prompting those laborers, in case of any unpleasantness of treatment, to direct their labor to the inclosing and cultivating of land for themselves: and increased assiduity and economy would soon supply them with the simple means out of the produce of their labor. The facility of acquiring new lands, and the love of independent possession, are the invincible counter-acting checks to any great depression in the reward of the laborer under that of the owner of the land. To this must be added, in every stage and state of society, as in every other species of trade, the competition of other employers, affording, under the reign of equal security, another effectual restraint on inequality. 'Tis true, the owner would not hire laborers without having some interest, without gaining something by the operation: he must get some equivalent, which can only be a part of the produce of labor, over and above the replacing of the things consumed. The labor of the laborer would necessarily produce this: but the chief part of the surplus would go to the laborer himself: a small part, along with the vanity of being owner of the increased stock of the whole, would be abundant remuneration to the employer for the advance of food and whatever other necessities might have been demanded by the laborer. The employer, it must be recollected, if he can find no equivalent ready made for his over-production, is necessitated, under pain of the loss by decay of that over-produce, to give it in exchange for something *to be* produced by labor: in order to perpetuate his stock, he must continue it by re-production through labor. Here then is an equal necessity, a mutual or reciprocal interest binding the laborer and employer. We may leave these reciprocal dependencies, these rare exceptions on both sides of wealth and poverty, to balance each other, and rest assured that they will disturb little the tendency to equality of remuneration from the equality of natural powers.

If such would be the progress, as to capital, of the producers of food, agriculturists, there would be still less tendency to inequality amongst the mechanics. It very seldom takes a year, as in agriculture, of continued labor, to bring to perfection any manufactured article, more frequently a month, a week, a day. So much the less dependent on the owner of capital would the mechanic be, whom accident or folly had left without his proper stock of the means of living while at work. The acquisition of a few articles by exchange of his manufacturing labor, with economy, would soon replace the little he lost; and he too would soon again unite capitalist and laborer in his own person. It is not meant to say that there would be no permanent class of laborers

under the free operation of the natural laws of distribution ; but that mere laborers altogether destitute of capital would be extremely few and very well remunerated, receiving the whole produce of their labor, a small compensation deducted for the loan or advance made them. In such a community, would there be no capitalists, such as we now see them, engrossing the accumulated products of the labors of thousands? There would be very few such. But in such a community, would there be no accumulation of capital? Its accumulation would be immense, and greater than under any forced or fraudulent distribution ; so that there would be a profusion of capital without capitalists. How could these things be? The great body of the productive laborers would be capitalists, themselves, owners of the capitals (improvements, food, tools, seed,) necessary for the cultivation of their small spots of land, of which they would be of course the entire owners : and the great body of the manufacturers would also be capitalists as well as laborers, each man owning his own little stock to enable him to work. Though the interest of such men, working for themselves, would lead them to exert all their energies to increase their enjoyments, which they could only do by increasing their production, part of which for their own convenience necessarily becomes fixed or accumulated and is called capital ; although they would accumulate *much more* capital than would be done by unequal distribution ; yet does it not follow that their *absolute* accumulation of capital should be great. That depends on the quantity of materials afforded by nature, on the knowledge possessed by the community, on the tools and machines to work with, and the skill of operation to employ all these to advantage. Whatever be the state of these things, whether deficient or flourishing, the increase of capital will, under all variations, be infinitely greater where the enjoyments and the skill of nearly the whole community are on the alert for its accumulation, than where the grandeur of a few capitalists only is interested to increase their display, at the expense of the comforts, and to the depression of the energies, of the rest of the community. Whatever may be the state as to knowledge, &c., the accumulation will be immeasurably greater, or where the capital is widely distributed, or where the productive laborers are capitalists, than where capital is confined to the hands of a few. Without knowledge and materials, as on the mountains of Iceland or Greenland, even security and just distribution could not do much ; while insecurity would make the desolation of man equal to that of nature. So immense, under favorable circumstances of materials, skill, knowledge, &c., and under the shield of

equal security maintained by giving free scope to the natural laws of distribution, is the progress of the accumulation of capital, that in one generation, along the banks of the Ohio and Mississippi in the American United States, inclosures, villages, manufactures, towns, *whole states*, have been created by labor. These constitute the wealth of a country, in whatever hands, whether in those of the few or the many, they may be placed; while the quantum of happiness depends on the distribution. The same lands, under Spanish insecurity and immense land-owners and capitalists, had slumbered unproductive for ages. These are the extremes, it is true, of the operation of the two principles: but let us ever bear in mind, that in exact proportion as we follow the dictates of the one or the other, will the result be, both in happiness and accumulation.

In regulating the profits of stock there is a double competition: the competition of great capitalists with each other, altogether inefficient, under the expedients of insecurity to good purposes; which is the only competition now exerted; and the competition of all the productive laborers possessing their own capitals, with these great capitalists. With the productive laborers, capital, over and above what is wanted for domestic use, would be but the means of making their labor more productive: their great dependence would be still on their labor: their possession of capital would be made subservient to this object, to increase the value of their labor; and as they would possess nine-tenths of the capital of the community, the holders of the remaining portion would be forced to pay their laborers a fair remuneration nearly adequate, or bearing a fair proportion, to the remuneration of the laborers possessing capital.

The competition of the great capitalists must be useful to the community as against themselves, however little it may benefit the productive laborers. The wish of great capitalists is of course, like that of all other men, to make as much out of their means as possible. This object they would accomplish, partly by arranging their profits amongst themselves, partly by keeping down, by any means in their power, with or without the aid of law, the wages of labor. Arrangements to keep up profits are always defeated by private competition: when they are kept too high, the demand slackens, the less rich or active feel the loss most by the falling off of their trade; they therefore undersell their fellow-capitalists, and profits are reduced to what the demand will pay. If the demand be great and profits keep high, new adventurers, where the law is not absurd enough to prevent it, spring up, and bring down the

profits by increasing the supply to the level, or nearly the level, of other trades similarly circumstanced. Defeated in combination as against the public, capitalists are the more energetic in coaxing and deceiving that public, to aid them in their combinations against the productive laborers: the prices of articles must be raised ruinously to the public, they say, if wages be not kept down. The real public, the vast majority of every community, are and must be, it is evident, producers as well as consumers; and it cannot be their interest that labor should be wretchedly remunerated. But the influential few are mere consumers, living in idleness, through various expedients, on the labor of the community. These yield to the vulgar call of the capitalists for low wages, to make cheap goods. In vain all experience tells them, that the most flourishing manufactures have always afforded the most ample remuneration to the laborer, and that increased alacrity, skill, and improvements of all sorts, leading to increased and cheapened production, must necessarily be the result of such ample remuneration. The idle consumers have universally joined the capitalists; and local and national laws, attacking the foundations of security, production, and happiness, by forcing labor without a satisfactory equivalent, every where exist. The consequence has been, that almost all the products of labor, but what were necessary to keep the laborer alive, being consumed by the idle and the capitalists, the production of wealth and the accumulation of capital have in many countries been entirely repressed, and in all have been comparatively feeble to what they might have been.

Thus favorably to industry would operate, under the natural laws of distribution, the two species of competition, of the great capitalists with each other, and of the laborers possessing capital with these mere capitalists. But there is a third species of competition which, it has been said, would defeat all these expected results, and keep down eternally to the lowest necessary for existence, the wages, or real remuneration, of the productive laborer;—*the competition of the laborers with each other.* How horribly cruel and contradictory, however, is it in those who hold this language, and believe that there is in the nature of things an impassable limit to the remuneration of industry, to institute additional artificial combinations of force and fraud against it; as if they distrusted their own assertions! If this restraint be sufficient to keep the bulk of mankind in wretchedness, why institute any others? Though it were true, that excessive production and excessive accumulation could only be purchased on such terms, at the cost of the ample remuneration and consequently

of the happiness of the great mass of society, the productive laborers; yet would it by no means follow that production and accumulation ought to be purchased on such terms. Better not produce and not accumulate at all, if production and accumulation bring with them a balance of misery to the majority of those concerned in the operation. But what would be the effect of this competition amongst the laborers on their own remuneration, under the natural laws of distribution? In the first place, universal present experience, as well as history, proves the utter falsehood of the assertion, that this competition of laborers keeps down wages to the lowest level necessary for existence. In the non-slave provinces of the United States of America, where the natural laws of distribution are the *most nearly* followed, and where this, like every other species of competition, is the most active; instead of bringing down the wages of labor to the lowest, they are no where so high. The industrious laborer becomes regularly, in a short time, out of the savings of his remuneration, a little capitalist: whence the cheering spectacle of the scarcity of servants and mere laborers in the United States of America in the midst of her unrivalled prosperity. These productive laborers possessing capital, are able to furnish out their children, when they begin to work for themselves, with all the necessities for industrious exertion, without selling themselves to great employers; or, when they die, they leave of course to their children their acquired stock. Compare in this respect England and Ireland. The competition of the laborers is certainly equally energetic in both countries: yet the laborers of England would rather risk life in the struggle, than submit to the incredible privations of the Irish peasant. If competition were the cause of the lowness, the English peasantry ought to be as wretched as the Irish. In Russia there is *no competition* amongst laborers: they are fed by the benignity of the lord or noble, and sold with the land; frequently separated from the land, the wife and husband, father and child, sold to different purchasers: in Russia, the peasantry are perhaps a little less wretched than in Ireland, under the lauded English constitution. In France, Spain, Italy, different parts of Germany, in every part of Europe, and almost of the world, competition is equally active, for the rulers every where have deemed it their interest to encourage the competition of the poor. Yet all possible varieties of remuneration for productive labor, exist in these countries. The competition of the laborers then, alone, is not sufficient to keep down remuneration to the lowest. Other causes, the observance or non-observance of the natural laws of distribution—free labor,

entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges—stated above, have chiefly operated, and have influenced as ten to one, or perhaps as one hundred to one, the result, in preference to mere competition.

Nevertheless competition amongst the producers does every where exist, and must every where exist, and ought every where to exist; but under the broad shield of equal security. Under this shield, what would be its operation? It would keep down prices to the community, just like competition for profits amongst capitalists, to the lowest at which the best workmen could produce their wares; getting remuneration equal to that afforded, by the circumstances of the country, to other productive laborers. If even amongst capitalists, whose numbers are so few, the principle of competition, under free trade, is so strong as completely to guaranty the public against any fancied terrors of monopoly or combination, how much more powerful would be its aid to the public, where the number of competitors would be so much enlarged as to extend to the whole community? But it is a mistake to suppose that the public would derive *all* the benefit from this competition. When by new discoveries, increased skill, or greater cheapness of raw materials, articles come to be produced at less cost; at first, the makers derive almost all the benefit, lowering their prices no more than just to undersell their neighbours; till competition enters, and by degrees reduces the profits, whether they may go to the productive laborer or the mere capitalist. The ultimate effect is, that all parties are benefited, the public and the producers. When the processes become known, the public permanently derive such a benefit in the way of cheapness, or, what amounts to the same, in increased utility of the article, as may be expressed perhaps by eight-tenths of the whole,—the remainder, no foreign disturbing causes intervening, going to the permanent remuneration of the producers. Has not such actually been sometimes the case in the improvements of English manufactures, even in spite of the overwhelming expedients of insecurity pressing down the operative laborers in favor of capitalists, and all the idle consumers, with their endless claims on the products of labor? Have not articles been wonderfully cheapened to the public, have not great fortunes been made by capitalists, and have not the wages of labor been sometimes raised, and *all at the same time*? The public gaining so largely, can well afford to leave a portion of the value of the increased products, as remuneration to the producers. Hence we may judge what would have been the effect under the shield of equal security.

There are two very evident modes in which competition

amongst productive laborers may operate; and one or the other of which will preponderate in proportion as equal security is preserved or violated, as the natural laws of distribution are maintained or departed from. Both of these modes may and do operate together. The one is the effort amongst the producers to produce more of the articles in a given time, or to make them better, by increased skill or any other means. The other is the effort to force a sale of goods or labor by underselling, by selling for a less remuneration than will repay the cost of production with the usual enjoyments to the producer. The one is the invigorating, the other the depressing, species of emulation: the one is the rivalry to excell, the other to depress, each other. Under the influence of insecurity, where the exhilarating motives of entire possession of the products of labor, and voluntariness in their disposal, are removed, the feelings of dependence and want will urge their wretched victims to strive with each other for the mere means of living. But under the shield of security, confidence and alacrity necessarily spring up, every inventive energy is called forth, hope is substituted for fear; and every one looks forward, by exertions of skill or diligence, to increase his enjoyments. This competition necessarily terminates in an increase of capital to the productive laborers; for, as there are some modes of enjoyment which require no accumulation, nothing but immediate consumption, such as articles for eating and drinking,—so are there others which imply the co-existence of capital with consumption, such as furniture, dwelling, implements. To acquire these articles of permanent use or enjoyment, is to acquire capital. To wish to excell in durability, neatness and even elegance of these articles, as well as of clothing, becomes a subsequent object of desire. Productive laborers can accomplish these objects in no other way than by an accumulation of capital. The race is, who shall earn the most, to enjoy the most, not only of perishable but of lasting commodities, or of capital; the desire for which, once excited, goes on to an indefinite increase, and the natural limits to which, both under security and insecurity, will be noticed hereafter. Under equal security, or the natural laws of distribution, the limit to accumulation is the value of the time and exertions of the laborer expended in the way of accumulation, compared to what they would produce *in happiness* if expended in any other manner. Under insecurity, there is no other limit to the accumulations of capitalists, urged on by the mere competition for distinction, than the impossibility of further exactions from the productive laborers, unchecked by any necessity of personal exertion in the production. The mode by which, under the influence of security, the com-

forts of the productive laborers would be gradually increased, is the following: In the competition to produce more and better, for the sake of a better remuneration, in the shape of advanced price or wages, the most assiduous, skilful, or fortunate succeeds: though he sells cheaper, if his improvement be great, and thereby benefits the public, yet his object is to benefit himself, till competition reduces his reward to something very moderate for his improvement. But, during this time, he has been better paid, and other producers around him, in other lines, have also been better paid for other improvements, respectively made by them in their occupations, and even all the competitors are induced by nothing but better remuneration to enter into the competition of the most improved productions. During all this time, the *habit* of increased enjoyment, from increased remuneration, has been acquired by all the active, intelligent, and their fortunate competitors; and the ultimate result is, that while society reaps the chief benefit in a cheaper supply, there is at the same time a permanent advance in the remuneration of the producers. Men clinging closely to habits of frugal enjoyment; they become necessities; and consumers are well satisfied to leave a modicum, some proportion, of the benefit arising from their improved industry, to those who so essentially benefit them by the production of cheaper articles, leaving them the means of more extended enjoyments. Under equal security, society or the public are all, or almost all, producers as well as consumers; so that the industrious under their character of consumers, and not the idle, would mutually afford each other all the benefits of improvements in science and art. Now, through the tortuous expedients of insecurity, all these benefits are monopolized by the idle. But in a thriving community, such as real security would produce, as soon as a certain quantum of the former comforts have become the necessities of life to a very large body of improving producers, this quantum comes gradually to be looked upon as the fair remunerating price of ordinary industry, and all productive laborers acquire it by acquiring at the same time the industrious habits necessary to ensure it. Nor are the over-active and intelligent displeased with this result; as not only are not their comforts reduced thereby, but the field is still open to them for new improvements. Let their invention be still on the stretch, let them be active and intelligent still: the secrets of finding out and turning to use the unconscious energies of nature for facilitating production and enjoyment, lie above, around, and beneath them: they are, as far as we know, exhaustless; one advance, one improvement but prepares the way for another; and in this course the probability of success is never lessened. This invigorating competition of

security keeps the general intellect of producers awake, for they will be paid for being awake; and while the mass of the industrious are advancing in the scale of remuneration to the amount of the first improvements, genius has already explored a new road, and new facilities of production are rewarded with still increased remuneration. The consumers can afford this; for the supply is cheapened, industry in all lines becomes more productive, and the laborers retain but a part of the benefit they have earned for all. And if one or two untractable articles remain unmoved by the general improvement, they are deserted for the fabricating of those that pay better, till the few that remain employed in them find their remuneration about the general average of productive labor. Thus would the natural laws of distribution cause capital to be accumulated in the hands of *all*, instead of those merely of a few capitalists. Capital would abound, not gorgeously displayed in the magnificence of a few, but modestly dwelling and diffusing health, contentment and joy through the bosoms of every private family.

If thus an immense accumulation of wealth, or of capital, would take place amongst the productive laborers, the process would still be carried on with undiminished energy by those amongst them whose savings were the greatest, and who (their tastes leading them that way) undertook the new employment of transporting articles from the places in which they were made, as most convenient for these purposes, to the places where they were wanted for consumption. Others would employ themselves in those places to distribute the goods to the consumers. Thus, for the convenience of all parties, would spring up the class of factors, carriers, merchants, and shop-keepers or retail dealers; saving the immense loss of time, trouble, and consequent expense, to both producers and consumers, of seeking out and sending to a distance for every small article they wanted to get in exchange for the products respectively of the labors of each. The habits of frugal enjoyment and steady accumulation, which the previous industry of those men had given them, would continue to operate; and all their efforts would be directed to increase their capital to the demands of their trade. But the tendency to excessive wealth, engendering pernicious inequality of fortune, would be constantly checked by the competition of new rivals springing up every day out of the flourishing productive classes, active, intelligent, and possessed of the means of competition. The accumulation and the abuse of great capitals would be still further, and always, checked by the joint-stock associations of those whose means were not sufficient, or whose inclinations did not lead them, to leave their own trade, and set up for themselves. On ordinary occasions, however, the competition of thriving and intel-

ligent rivals would be abundantly sufficient to prevent pernicious inequality.

How then could great manufactures and great enterprises of commerce be carried on without great capitalists? It is great *capitals* that are wanted for some few undertakings, not great *capitalists*. Provided the capital is produced, it signifies not whether it comes out of one or fifty hands. Capital being every where diffused by security, a hundred or a thousand shares would be raised for any useful purpose, amongst shrewd and active men; and those in whom they had the most confidence would conduct the concern as long as the conductors retained that confidence; and those conductors would esteem themselves amply recompensed by a remuneration equal or very little superior to that of their associates, in addition to the gratification of the esteem, as evinced by the trust reposed in them by these their associates and equals. If the operation were in a manufacturing establishment, the joint-stock would buy the machinery and erect the buildings; or the one or the other might be hired from those who had made them. Ordinary manufacturing establishments requiring but moderate capital, would be carried on as now by individuals. Whether the subscribers to the joint-stock would receive their shares of yearly benefit from the concern, in the shape of wages, or profits, would be quite immaterial to the community. It could only be received in the shape of increased wages where all of the contributors were employed in the manufacture. Such establishments would be an efficient check on the efforts of great capitalists—of whom very few could exist from the eternal competition of intelligent men with small capitals—to depress injuriously the wages of labor. Where the manufacture was such that each productive laborer could finish at home a part of the fabric, he would purchase the materials, in whatever state of preparation, and sell them, when completed, either to the consumer if the market were small, or to a factor if the markets were remote and it required skill to select them.

Where the establishment was one of commerce, particularly of foreign commerce, a larger capital would be required, and the concern would most frequently be conducted by individual hands or by a few, from a peculiar knowledge of the wants and productions of remote nations which such business requires, and which industrious producers have not facilities to acquire. Where a foreign trade—which very seldom happens—could not be carried on without larger capitals than the union of a few individuals in a mercantile house would produce, resort would be had to shares, as in the case of manufactures, and all the spare capital of the thriving producers would naturally employ itself in this way when holding out higher inducements than

the employing of the same capital in internal improvements, mines, canals, bridges, and such works, whether to facilitate universal industry and interchange, or to advance a particular branch of industry. The savings of prudent sharp-sighted men, like these industrious producers, would not be rashly ventured in foreign speculation, till every thing around them at home was assuming the features of garden culture and domestic comfort. The real internal happiness of the members of such a community, depending on increased production, and consumption, and freedom, and activity of interchange, would not be sacrificed to the glittering display of a forced foreign trade. No laws on the subject would be necessary: the interest and intelligence of the industrious would produce the result in the most useful manner. A working, thinking, people would not be led astray by projects in the air, but would exercise a deliberate judgement. On the other hand, when a fair prospect of success presented itself, they would cheerfully embark, anxious to exchange the surplus productions of their community for whatever useful articles any other nation could produce at less cost of useful labor. These voluntary associations of small capitalists would be dependent on no bounties, would demand no monopoly or exclusive protection: the meanest individual in the state might enter into active competition with them—a check necessary to their own interest, their own good management, if not called for by still higher considerations.

An admirable effect arising from these joint-associations of numerous small masses of capital, whether in the line of manufactures or commerce, would be, that they would act as *insurance companies*, guarantying from utter loss, and possible misery, those hardy pioneers of industry and prosperity who first essay unexplored roads. In case of failure, even complete, which would seldom occur, the loss to each contributor would be but small and retrievable; and the splendid wealth of a great capitalist of to-day would not be followed, not only by his own destruction but that of numbers connected with him, to-morrow.

Thus, by the operation of these numerous circumstances, is the capital of the community rapidly accumulated in masses the most favorable to enjoyment, and all pernicious inequality is prevented, simply by not imposing restraint, or, in other words, by following the natural laws of distribution. Of the two modes in which the competition of the productive laborers would operate, we have traced out one, the active and exhilarating, as it would occur under the shield of equal security. What would be the result of the other mode of competition, the depressing, such as would arise, and such as prevails almost universally, under the influence of insecurity? Would more capital be accumulated by the whole community under inse-

curity, and universal low remuneration of labor, than under its ample remuneration? The short-sighted vulgar amongst the rich, think that whatever is saved from the wages and enjoyments of the industrious mass of a community, is saved to capital; forgetting that nine-tenths of these savings—admitting them to be effected by such means—are immediately consumed in unproductive and hollow show, or pampering sickly unenjoying appetites, by the rich, and that a very small part is converted into permanent capital. It is the glare of the consumption, the unproductive part, that makes the show: that which is saved, which goes to capital, which perpetuates itself by the remuneration of productive labor, is not regarded, is not seen. It is visible to those only who frequent the abodes of lowly industry. Hence the industrious manufacturer, who lives frugally, and converts all his savings to the accumulation of capital by the increased employment of productive laborers, is little admired by these pretended advocates of capital. What they really want is enjoyment, not capital further than is necessary to enjoyment, the enjoyment of the few at the expense of the many, the heartless glitter of the few at the expense of the real misery of the many. It was observed before, that if capital could be purchased at the expense of insecurity, it would be purchased infinitely beyond its value; it would be insane in a community to give drudgery and misery for perfidious baubles. But how stands the fact? Can insecurity, and the consequent depressing competition of laborers to underwork each other, produce capital in abundance?

We think it has been already made evident that, under the influence of security, no depressing competition can take place amongst the productive laborers. The competition will be to excell, and to enjoy permanent as well as immediate pleasures, those demanding capital as well as those consumed by the touch. It is therefore here assumed that insecurity must be the parent of the depressing competition. Those who have acquired, by whatever means, large masses of land or of articles fabricated by labor, fearing to lose what they have, or anxious to acquire more, or to make their wealth subservient to the pleasures of power, or from some similar motives, have almost every where laid restraints on the free development of industry, and have also instituted various modes of legal robbery, forcibly carrying away without any equivalent the products of labor. Not satisfied with these cowardly iniquities, and to prevent if possible the industry of the poor from acquiring any thing, by means of labor, for its own well-being, they have even dared to take into their hands the regulation of the wretched remuneration left to the poor, under the name of wages, after these previous restraints and exactions. They have

forcibly, as well as barbarously, put down the little remnant of competition left between themselves for high profits and the poor for high wages, and have decreed that *they* shall be the arbitrators of the remuneration of their competitors. Habitual deceivers universally come in the end to be deceived. Many of these legal plunderers therefore may have arrived at the point of thinking, so agreeable to their perverted interests, that all these takings away without equivalent, these restraints and forcible lowering of wages, are moral and wise, and of course extremely pious, or agreeable to the will of God. Be they so. But what is their effect on the productive laborers? The effect necessarily is, that the exhilarating competition being rendered by such means impossible, the feeble efforts of the producers are directed to get a *preference*, to be allowed the glorious privilege of working in order to obtain the means of prolonging life in various degrees of privation and wretchedness. It is true that in no country, not even the most barbarous, such as the rule of Turkey over her slaves, rendered still more atrocious and insulting, as in the case of the Greeks, from a difference of religious creed, have these legal robberies, restraints, and regulations been acted upon to the letter. They would absolutely annihilate production. Power therefore has always more or less listened to the selfish suggestions of prudence. In order to have something to seize upon, it must allow the productive slave or laborer the faculty to produce; always watching, however, the ripened fruit or the matured production, lest he should purloin it to his own benefit. In some industrious countries, at the periods of their advance and prosperity, these obstacles to the progress of wealth, though in existence, have been suffered to slumber, and the exhilarating motives have been permitted to lead the laborers more or less to the competition of enjoyment. This has happened when the profits of stock, in peculiar lines of direction from peculiar causes, were high, and when the competition amongst the few great capitalists for labor was such as to lead them, for the sake of present personal gain, to waive, during the continuance of this great competition, and in these flourishing trades alone, the exercise of their tremendous powers of depression. As soon as competition and high wages brought forward an abundance of laborers for them all, the old expedients for keeping down the remuneration of productive labor were again resorted to, but with more or less of diminished energy, from the habit of comparative freedom which the producers had enjoyed during the rivalry of their employers. Again, under other circumstances, when these restraints and regulations have been for a time regularly enforced, such are their depressing effects that it becomes unnecessary to continue their open exercise. The

hopeless habit of submission to low remuneration, privations, and wretchedness, is formed; apathy and ignorance seize on both laborers and masters; and poverty, and the competition to underwork, become so habitual that they are looked upon as the law of over-ruling destiny. Hence it should excite no surprise, that *comparative* prosperity, particularly of *capitalists*, has sometimes occurred during the existence (but during the slumber) of those restraints; or that during periods of national decline, the active display of such restraints, particularly in the line of regulating wages, has not been observed.

Under the depressing competition of producers, the employers are self-punished. Their calculation was, that whatever could be saved from the laborers would go to enrich themselves. This might be the case if man were a machine like the loom, uninfluenced by moral, and operated upon by mechanical, causes alone. The production being then a given quantity, whatever the employers took, the sum total of the produce would not be lessened. But this is not the case: man is liable to more, and more subtle, agencies, than the mere machine. Suppose him to be producing abundantly: deprive him by restraint, by plunder legal or otherwise, by grave regulation, of half the produce of his labor, and the amount of the whole produce begins immediately to decrease. The motives of enjoyment and independence, which led him to improve his skill and sharpen all his faculties, have ceased to exist: he is dissatisfied, careless, hopeless; he works no more with the usual alacrity, the produce is for another; he is jealous and envious of that other; he looks on his employer as his enemy, and grudgingly gives him extorted labor: he has no pleasure, because he has no interest, in seeing admirably finished work: as the object of the employer is to extort as much from him as possible, it becomes his fixed policy to give as little and as bad work, and to idle as much, as possible. Thus is the whole quantity produced always lessened by every increase of the short-sighted avarice of the employers. Too ignorant or too selfish to see the real causes (want, in various ways, of security) of the falling off of the produce, they impute it to the awkwardness, the ignorance, the perverseness, of the laborers, to that ignorance, perverseness, and awkwardness, which were their own work. Production goes on decreasing: the lower the wages, the less valuable even compared with the wages, the work done. The productive laborers are miserable, and the employers are punished. Instead of seeing the real causes of the mischief, they exclaim against the idleness, the dishonesty, the depravity of the laborers; and force, the ready and eternal resort of ignorance, is employed, to repress the vices and keep down the demand for unmerited

high wages for such men. As the employers have influence in making the laws, and the productive laborers have none, new restrictions, new penal laws, more barbarous and absurd than the preceding, are enacted; and the employers are forced to console themselves with the exercise of vexatious tyranny in lieu of their decayed profits. Meantime the producers take measures to defeat these iniquitous laws; they endeavour by a counter-force to make head against the violences instituted against them: they resort to plots and combinations of violence, to defeat the violence of power, which seeks, under the name of law, to repress their spirit, and with their spirit, their industry, for ever. They endeavour by unjust violence towards their own members, and sullen threats against their employers, to keep down the depressing competition of low wages. They follow the vile example, which, by *ex-parte* laws of their own making, their employers give them, of issuing decrees forcibly to regulate the wages of labor. While the laws of the state and of corporations keep down labor, the laws of their little associations endeavour to support it. Regulations of the most vexatious description, and summary punishments the most brutal, are enforced by them, to uphold their wages. The law punishes the productive laborer who will not work for the regulated hire: the combination law punishes him who dares to work under the wages regulated by the mechanics themselves. Thus is a community converted into a theatre of war: hostile camps of the employers and laborers are every where formed; and that alacrity and energy which, under the influence of equal security, are expended in multiplying productions by means of increased knowledge, skill, and application, are here devoted to contrive the means of mutual annoyance and persecution, legal or not legal; and in the mutual rage of the parties, not only capital, but lives are sacrificed: capital, the means of reproduction and enjoyment, is wantonly consumed by fanatic ignorance; and murders, in spite of the law, and by the law, are committed, to revenge the alleged injustice of the parties on each other. Such is the state to which society is reduced under the depressing competition for low wages. When these counteracting measures of violence are not pursued by the productive laborers to counteract the legal robberies and violence of the selfish and short-sighted employers, the laborers of a community sink into listless wretchedness; and industry and prosperity are banished, with the freedom of exertion and of competition that are necessary for their development.

It is evident then that the depressing competition of laborers for lowness of wages, whether it ends in the annihilation of all

hope and exertion, or in the establishment of counter-combinations and mutual rancour and violence between the laborers and employers, is almost equally fatal to the hope of accumulating capital. The laborers look with an evil eye on the accumulations of the capitalist; the capitalists survey with jealousy the savings of the poor. The competition of low wages or decreased remuneration, is as unfriendly to the accumulation of capital, as the exhilarating competition for increased remuneration, by means of increased and superior productions, is favorable to it. An equal and uniform regard to the natural laws of distribution, "free labor, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges," will, alone, ensure the greatest accumulation, as well as the greatest production of wealth, by upholding every where the exhilarating to the exclusion of the depressing competition for wages. So natural is the presumption in favor of the tendency of excessive wealth to accumulate capital beyond the tendency to the same effect of the natural laws of distribution, as well from the more glaring effect of large, though thinly scattered, masses on the eye, as from the sympathy of all the aspirants to wealth in favor of the envied holders of these large masses, that too much care cannot be taken to counteract, by exposing, so very common and so very pernicious an error. Hence the reason for the length of the preceding observations.

There are other benefits of an economical nature, arising from the operation of the natural laws of distribution, to which we can now only refer, as they will come before us on a future occasion; such as their tendency to produce in the greatest abundance all works of magnificent, as well as of unostentatious, public utility, and to call forth the efforts of genius in the fine arts, connected with utility, to the exclusion of what is useless or devoted to the selfishness of private luxury. Let us now hasten to consider a few of the *moral* effects resulting to a community from following the natural laws of distribution.

The great and paramount moral blessing, consequent on equal security, produced by the natural laws of distribution, is, "*that excessive poverty and excessive wealth being removed from society, the peculiar vices of luxury and want would almost cease.*" The vices of the very poor and the vices of the very rich, mutually productive of each other, and necessarily generated by the circumstances surrounding each of the classes, are the great moral sources of human misery. The middling class, those who are above want and not exposed to luxury, are comparatively, and many of them absolutely, moral, commanding their own passions, and endeavouring to diffuse happiness around them. If the middling classes are not, in most communities,

as perfect as the theory of their situation would make them, the reason is, that they live in the midst of, and of course exposed to, the contaminating atmosphere and the touch of the vices of both poor and rich. The rich above, and the poor below, court their imitation of heterogeneous follies and vices; and having themselves, in common with all the rich, at longer or shorter intervals, necessarily sprung from the poor, many of them have been educated more or less in their peculiar vices. Hence we should form but a very inadequate notion of what men, similarly circumstanced as to wealth with the present middling orders, would be, under the influence of equal security, by comparing them with the present middling orders of any existing community. And yet, from the mere circumstance of an approach to equality in their condition—that equality brought about and maintained by their own continued exertions—they are justly spoken of as the class that supplies the materials for whatever of commanding intellect, attractive virtue, and persevering activity, society can boast.

What was mentioned above as to *crimes*, may be repeated here as to *virtues* and *vices*. As most of the crimes that desolate society have their origin in excessive inequality of wealth, the greater part of them emanating from the continued or sudden pressure of poverty and wretchedness, so do most of the virtues and vices of men proceed from the same source. All crimes are vices; that is to say, no actions *ought to be* declared crimes by the law and marked out for punishment, which were not vicious antecedently to the law, which were not productive of preponderant mischief to society; and moreover, those vices *only*, which are at the same time the *most mischievous* and the punishment of which would not bring after it a train of evils preponderating even over the mischief of the vices, ought to be erected into crimes. Thus necessarily limited, we see at once how impotent the mere restraints of law are, to generate a virtuous community. Very few are the actions which it can regulate. By attempting too much, by its eternal restraints, it has hitherto done more to perpetuate poverty, vice, and wretchedness amongst mankind, than to produce good. Henceforward, guided by the best wisdom of the age and nation, continually improving, and therefore changing, like the other sciences, directed to the impartial production of happiness, under the system of representation, it will become the beneficent guardian of every blessing, rather than the stern avenger of crime, the jailer of exclusive privileges and usurpations.

How should the wretchedly poor be virtuous? Who cares about them? What character have they to lose? What hold has public opinion on their actions? What care *they* for the

delicate pleasures of reputation, who are tormented by the gnawings of absolute want? How should they respect the property or rights of others, who have none of their own to beget a sympathy for those who suffer by their privation? How can they feel for others' woes, for others' passing-light complaints, who are tormented by their own substantial miseries? The mere mention of the trivial inconveniences of others, insults and excites the indignation, instead of calling forth their complacent sympathies. Cut off from the decencies, the comforts, the necessities of life, want begets ferocity. If they turn round, they find many in the same situation with themselves, partaking of their feelings of isolation from kindly sympathies with the happy. They become a public to each other, a public of suffering, of discontent and ignorance: they form a public opinion of their own, in contempt of the public opinion of the rich; whom and their laws they look upon as the result of force alone. If superstition lend its hypocritical voice to lull or frighten them into a belief that such things ought to be, it succeeds only at the expense of every active and intelligent principle of human nature; and all hope of amendment dies with the loss of the feeling of wrong. In the practice of falsehood and dishonesty towards the rich, the wretched keep each other in countenance; and the *habit* of falsehood and dishonesty once formed, they are practised indiscriminately whenever the slightest motive of gain presents itself. They feel the physical pains of want, they see the rich indulging in sensuality. Mere sensual enjoyment they look upon as the end of life, restraint as the most drivelling of follies. Intemperance and excess, as often as they have the means, are greedily indulged in: why refrain when pleasure so seldom comes? Involuntary restraint is the law of their existence and their misery: unbridled gratification the solace and oblivion of their woes. From whom are the wretched to learn the principles, while they never see the practice, of morality? of respect for the security of others? from their superiors? from the laws? The conduct of their superiors, the operations of the laws, have been one practical lesson towards them, of force, of restraint, of taking away without their consent, without any equivalent, the fruits of their labor. Of what avail are words, or precepts, or commands, when opposed, when belied by example? The rich teach the poor beneficence, by exacting, and turning to their use, what the poor have earned by the wearing down of their badly-nourished muscular powers. In vain may the rich levy still further exactions on the poor, to enrich some of their own body for endeavouring to persuade the poor that it is their duty to submit to every exaction, to kiss meekly the rod of their

superiors, and to dread torments even after death, if, while they live, they dare to murmur or violate the security of their masters. Such idle words and remote terrors, from such interested lips, voluptuously enjoying the very things which they call worthless, but which they have by heartless plunder obtained, may confuse and destroy the understanding of the poor, and imbue them with the wretchedness of superstitious fear; but will never teach them humanity, justice, truth, or fortitude. The jargon of theological doctrines may excite furious unsocial antipathies, bitter in exact proportion to the uselessness and unintelligibility of such doctrines; but can never supply *motives* to virtuous conduct. Motives arise from *things*, from *surrounding circumstances*, not from the idleness of words and empty declamation. Words are only useful to convey and impress a knowledge of these things and circumstances. If these states of things do not exist, words are mere mockery. To enforce their vain exhortations, well do these pampered idle priests know, that the immediate terror of cruel punishment must be held out by the law in their support; and this cruelty of the law tends still further to harden and to root out humanity from the minds of the people.

In all points the reverse would be the morals of the industrious producers of a community, who were taught from their childhood, not by vain words, but by facts, respect for the security and comfort of others, by the undeviating respect paid by the law and all around them to their own security. Enjoying the full produce of their labor, nothing being taken from them without a fair equivalent, they would respect the acquisitions of others. Their wants satisfied, they would esteem it a wrong that others should be distressed, and would feel it soothing to their injured feelings to relieve them. The temptations to theft, to fraud, and lying, being removed, these vices would not be necessary, and would not be practised. There would be no public opinion of suffering, to wage war against the public opinion of the well-fed and the powerful. Vice would find no sympathy, because it would be the interest of no one to shelter it. Kindly feelings and beneficent conduct would expand. The sphere of enjoyment, like the heat of the sun, would be multiplied a hundred fold by the reflections from the cheerful hearts and smiling countenances of encircling happiness. Virtue would consist in blessing and being blessed; and all voluntary useless mortification would be spurned as insanity. But as self-restraint is indispensable to real permanent happiness, and as the interest of fanatics and hypocrites to mislead would be removed by the ceasing of their power to plunder, men, intent on happiness and on the greatest portions of happi-

ness through the whole of their existence, would look anxiously into all the remotest *consequences* of their actions; they would investigate the effect on happiness of every *habit* which they might form, and would acquire such dispositions of fortitude, self-command, and universal sympathy, as would render them capable, and therefore deserving, of happiness in any possible state of existence. The absurdity of purchasing happiness hereafter by submitting to misery here, would be held in derision. Industry, the daughter of equal security, the parent of these and of almost every good, supported by labor, and enlightened by knowledge, would be held in universal honor. *Not* to labor, *not* to contribute to the grand mass of human weal, would become a matter of shame, of reproach: not to be usefully employed, whether through the mind or the hand, in the production of satisfactory equivalents for existence, would be as discreditable—though in some cases accumulated wealth might render such labor not necessary to existence—as it is now fashionable to lead a life of trifling vicious idleness. Every active talent, every research, every speculation tending to usefulness, would be nursed into life. Knowledge of the mind would be in demand, as skill in the hand, and all other useful faculties. Ease of circumstances would enable all to afford an equivalent for the elements of knowledge by means of education. Knowledge would no longer be monopolized to support the power and wealth of a few, but would be diffused, like cheap cottons, as one of the means of happiness to all.

Equal security being incompatible with excessive wealth, activity of mind and body being in honor, the vices peculiar to wealth would almost disappear. Heartless, impotent, un-enjoying sensuality would be left without the materials for its wretched excesses. Temperance would be proved by the most vulgar arithmetic, to be the means of adding an hundred fold, both in intensity and duration, to all our pleasures, even moral or intellectual, as well as physical. No stupid admiration of mere glittering useless trappings of wealth, would be seen; utility would be the touchstone of every thing. The excessive and voracious pursuit of wealth, as the mere means of influencing the minds of others, without reference to its peculiar enjoyments, would be deemed a ridiculous disease; for its powers of influencing, alone, without appropriate moral or mental qualities, would be gone. Pride, caprice, and oppression, would find no congenial soil to take root, in the midst of a society of active, intelligent, and independent men. Those of the rich, not usefully employed from higher motives, would be shamed into some line of active emulation. Their leisure time would be devoted to preparing themselves for the high duties of legisla-

tors, judges, teachers, or to extending the bounds of science or improving the processes of the arts: or, by the cheap performance of those honorable duties, requiring intellectual activity alone, they would reduce to the lowest the expenses of government and instruction. In adding, by way of experiment, observation, and experience, and by just comparisons and reasonings on these data, to the bounds of physical and moral knowledge, an endless field of exertion would be open to them; and the number of the intelligent increasing every day in the community, the stimulus in the way of respect, gratitude, and admiration, for such services, would be every day more intense and efficient. *Not* to be enlightened would become disgraceful to the rich. Intellectual pleasures once enjoyed, the habit of mental labor once acquired, the continuance of the pursuit would become a want, and for its own sake one of the greatest sources of the happiness of life. Thus would that degree of inequality, which equal security would, under individual competition, induce, become instrumental in diffusing knowledge and virtue through the community, instead of the vices which excessive wealth, under insecurity, now engenders.

In such a state of society, where the operation of law would be simply to restrain force and curb all attacks on security, instead of becoming itself the habitual and most grievous oppressor, where no wealth was abstracted, no payments were made by any but voluntary contributors, where no excessive wealth, no enormous powers, nor any power without responsibility, were given to the public administrators, where real duties demanding the exertion of active talent were attached to every situation, instead of a vain and corruptive pomp, where no means were left of lavishing the public power or the public wealth on favorites and connexions, what food would be left to nourish the ambitious aspirations of any lover of mere power or splendor? When a great prize of mere power and luxury is set on high, no doubt it will attract competitors; and the community instituting such prizes must expect to be tormented with the passions which they excite. But when appropriate knowledge and activity are requisite for every situation, *these* qualities, instead of the schemes of ambition, will be cultivated by those who aspire to them. To obtain the approbation and admiration of their industrious and independent fellow-citizens, will be the object of the lives of those who seek public employment; for on the suffrages of such men will the nomination to public employments directly or indirectly depend. And are such a community likely to be dazzled by the display of splendid vices, by mere theatrical exhibitions of oriental baubles, without use, sparkling stones and brilliant tissues? Are such men likely

to lend themselves to be made the instruments, the tools, of ambitious plotters? What motive could be held out to them? They are not starving; and the risk of punishment or even disgrace would a thousand times outweigh any promised hope of pay or plunder. They cannot be oppressed, while the products of their labor and the free use of their faculties are secured to them by the laws. Instead of tools for such insane projects, would not the plotters dread and find an enemy in every man whose rights or earnings they meditated to take away by force? In a community founded on security, following the natural laws of distribution, the mere exhibition or proposition of violence, on any occasion, would mark out the object as infamous. The very basis on which the community rests, the foundation of their industry, the first principle of their morals, is voluntariness and satisfactory equivalents for every thing. And amidst such men, will *force* be an instrument likely to overawe or to dazzle? Will not the very name of its employment be so odious, as to brand with the epithets of fools or madmen those who dream of wielding it in contempt of the overwhelming strength of all the community? Faction and ambition must cease under the influence of security, because the prizes of wealth and power, without labor, will not exist to inflame their cupidity, because they will be supplanted in the public estimation by other pursuits, because wretched and ignorant instruments will not be found to work with; and because every individual of a happy community would feel himself personally interested to suppress them. These pernicious vices arise from the competition of those who absolutely enjoy the public plunder and oppression, with those who wish to seize upon them. Take away the terrific and corruptive lures to fight for, and the vile competition between faction and ambition on the one hand, and despotism and corruption on the other, will naturally expire. But under the shield of the law, restraining falsehood and violence, the energetic display of opinion and discussion of truth would universally prevail; and the necessary emulation of those who sought political importance, would be to enlighten and sway the public opinion by means of reason, instead of seeking to overawe it by force.

A view of the effects economical, political, and moral, arising more or less directly from undeviating adherence to the natural laws of distribution, might be pursued at great length, as their operation includes and affects almost the whole of human actions and institutions. Enough perhaps to have pointed out here their most obvious and striking effects. It is not pretended, they would remove vice, remove crime, remove

moral misery, and thus make human associations or communities paradises of the poets ; still less that they would remove physical evils, any more than they could banish occasional monstrous productions of organization. But they would reduce all these evils to their lowest term, would render uncommon and disreputable those vices which are now supported by circles of perverted interests, would lay the basis for permanent and always advancing ameliorations, would elevate the great mass of a community into industrious, intelligent, moral, and happy beings, and would multiply inconceivably the chances of superior virtues and talents, to make tributary new portions of matter and energies of nature to human enjoyment, tending to raise man to a situation a thousand times perhaps more elevated beyond what he now is, than his present state in civilized life surpasses that of the wretched savages living on the raw fish of the shores of New Holland, or in New Zealand devouring each other.

One cheering circumstance above all, attends the improvements in human affairs brought about by the just, or what we have called the natural, in opposition to the forced or factitious, distribution of wealth. Whatever advance is made must be permanent ; there can be no retrograde movements to poverty, vice, and degradation. The change being founded on the interest of the individual members of the community, not on enthusiasm, force, or terror, and the natural laws of distribution once in operation ensuring their own preservation, there can be no fear of losing the benefits gained. Hitherto, by neglecting this enduring basis of social institutions, the establishment of partial good has been but temporary. The factitious distribution of property has created interests, has put into activity power and influence, in opposition to the public happiness ; while the perverseness of man, and similar childish fancies, have been put forth, as causes of those catastrophes, which were owing to nothing but the want of knowledge and wisdom in the framers of the institutions. Without the aid of excessive wealth, without excessive inequality of distribution and the arrangements thence ensuing, it is impossible that aristocracy and despotism should exist : their naked deformity and undisguised absurdity would be an effectual antidote, amongst civilized communities, to their establishment. Without the natural distribution of wealth, without the greatest possible equality of wealth consistent with security, it is impossible that representative institutions should long continue. Ancient legislators, aware of this truth, but not knowing the natural means of inducing, without force and by means of equal security, that basis of equality which they

wished, adopted the strange and tremendous error of instituting *forced* equality, of founding liberty on slavery, industry on eternal violations of security, the happiness of the citizens on the subjection or degradation of all excluded from that title. Such heterogeneous elements necessarily produced eternal conflicts. The representative system, the inevitable consequence of the establishment of equal security, was unknown. The secret of sharing with millions the blessings of self-government, and thus elevating *all* to an equality of happiness with the favored freemen of a few cities, was by human wit undiscovered. So intimately connected and dependent on each other are these two great blessings, equal security and representative or self-government, that the establishment of the one necessarily includes that of the other: the penalty at all events of not adopting the one, is the loss of the other. Without equal security, representative government cannot continue: without representative government, security cannot continue. The principle of insecurity, involuntariness, and plunder, is essential to monarchy, aristocracy, and any mixture of them: pure representative government alone is compatible with security. It is true, that despotisms have sometimes supported themselves on their own domains as they are called, without levying almost any impost on the community. But what was the original seizing of these domains but an attack on security? what but continued attacks on security the forced levying of the produce? And, though the government itself might chiefly subsist on the produce of these government or national lands, on what but plunder, arising from attacks on security, could its agents, its subordinates, depend? Having power *without responsibility*, were they even ever so independently rich, is it in human nature not to abuse, that is to say, not to use, that power for self-interest? This very independence of a government, existing without supplies from the community, is perhaps more pernicious than even attacks on security: *they* may irritate to resistance and inquiry; but the other, wearing a show of right, tends to perpetuate itself as a private possession. Such was in part the feudal system, in which the land being first usurped, the dominion of the human beings on it was attached to the dominion over the land itself. Men, like trees or other animals, were mere appendages of the soil; as they are now in Russia. Without an abundant supply of the products of human labor whether coarse or refined, according to the different stages of civilization, governors will not take the trouble to govern. The question is, Shall this supply be voluntary or forced, the greatest that can be extracted, or the least

that is necessary? If voluntary, it will be the least; if forced, the greatest, except at the extreme point where insecurity absolutely destroys its own resources.

But to return: It is evident that the *elements* of subversion would be wanting where that approach to an equality of comforts prevailed, which the natural laws of distribution would induce. There would be no class of unemployed owners of immense portions of land or capital; there would be no class of wretched dependents or idle paupers ready to enlist themselves under the banners of the ambitious rich; and there would be no splendid prizes of monarchy or aristocracy to fight for. Improvements would be permanent, because they would contain within themselves, in the interests of all classes of the community, their own support, the materials for their continuance. But wherever absolute forced inequality, or insecurity generating inequality, is suffered to exist as a part of any political arrangements aiming at permanent good, there is an opposing evil principle, a counteracting source of mischief established, which will either neutralize the good principle or will overthrow it, if it be not itself expelled from the system. If we wish to preserve the human frame in the greatest health for the greatest number of years, we do not begin the process of preservation and happiness by inoculating the body with a germ of the plague, or by constraining with ligatures the healthful play of any of the vessels: our first object is to remove all counteracting causes of disease. So in the frame of society; without the removal of all sources of insecurity, the happiness of the community is every moment liable to the attacks of an internal self-consuming disease. These removed, its progress is assured. An undeviating adherence, therefore, to the natural laws of distribution, upholding the principle of equal security, will tend more than any possible artificial arrangement to the accumulation of capital: and this is the great collateral effect, in an economical point of view, from the principle of security, that it is equally operative in increasing the *accumulation* of the useful products of labor as it is in increasing their *production*.

It is time to notice an objection which will be made to the laws of free labor and voluntary exchange; an objection however, which, it will be seen, becomes another instance of their useful operation.

“If acquisition, by means of *free labor* and *voluntary exchanges*,” it will be said, “be the sole useful, and therefore the sole just and moral, title to the possession of the articles of wealth, or property, what is to protect the actual possessors of wealth, particularly of masses of hereditary land, in the en-

joyment of their revenues? Would not such principles unhinge the rights of property?"

The consequence following from these natural laws of distribution as to the absolute nullity of *original title*, or right, on the part of the acquirers by force or fraud,—by any means but those of free labor or voluntary exchanges,—to the parcels of lands, coins, or other commodities which they or their descendants may possess, is admitted in its fullest extent; and this principle is made the basis of all future, as it ought to have been of all past, acquisition. But such concession as to the nullity of *original right*, can decide nothing as to the expediency of upholding or interfering with the present, the actual distribution. To support property acquired without force or fraud, the *utility of the acquisition* is sufficient: no benefits to society, as has been proved, can at all come in competition with those resulting from the protection of such acquisitions by adhering to the simple, natural rules of distribution.

To uphold these and the happiness resulting from them, is society instituted, are, or ought, all laws to be made. This is the great moral, or useful right of property; which is above all laws, founded on those universal rules of justice, to which all laws, if just, must be subservient. To speak of property as the creature of the law, is mere metaphor. As well might *man* be called the creature of the law, because his actions are regulated by it. Property, rightful property, is the creature of labor. To protect man and his rights, of which the free use and disposal of his labor and its products, is the chief, all just laws were made by man. The mind of man is the parent of law, as his labor, is of property. Very small, it is true, is that proportion of property, which in the present state of social improvement as to physical knowledge and morality, could exist, under the system of individual competition, without the protection of laws. But *bad* laws are as destructive to property as no laws at all. *Good* laws are one of the modes, and the most efficient mode, of preserving property and regulating its enjoyment: but there are two cases, in which property might exist without the aid of law. First, where knowledge and private morals were so improved, as to render unnecessary the punishments of law for its support; next, where private vigilance and strength protected its own acquisitions. But to support property acquired by force or fraud, by robbery on a larger or a smaller scale, by any other means than those of labor, skill, exchange for a satisfactory equivalent, or free gift, requires a longer and more intricate process. The *utility of the actual distribution* must in such cases be proved, in defect of the utility of the

original acquisition or original right. It must be proved that all evils of insecurity arising from the original injustice of the acquisition, have ceased to exist; that such voluntary transfers have been made, such habits formed, such expectations excited, amongst the present possessors, as more than to counterbalance the extinguished evil of original injustice and of any other existing mischiefs which such possessions may cause to society. We are now speaking, not of rules to guide lawyers, but of the supreme laws of morality for the guidance of legislators. If the evils of the original injustice have ceased to exist, if no peculiar injury is caused to the structure or frame of society or social institutions, by these masses of property more than by others, the right to the enjoyment of them ought to be equally upheld by society. But as it is impossible that enormous masses of wealth could have been got together and perpetuated by individuals without the aid of law, or of vicious institutions made and perpetuated, whether by law or custom, supporting force or fraud; it becomes the imperative duty of every community to root out of their laws and institutions whatever may have this injurious tendency, interfering with the natural laws of distribution. For any loss arising from the simple withdrawing of protection to force or fraud, no compensation should be made, any more than for the abolition of the right of the few to assault the many; because no compensation could be given by the community without preponderant mischief, without increasing excessive wealth and its pernicious influence, and without continuing under another name the previous robbery of the community, out of whose future labor alone the compensation could come. Were the strict rules of equal justice followed, compensation should rather be made to the injured for passed wrong: but as the very magnitude of the wrong would make that impossible, and as the demand would lead only to the perpetuating of malignant passions, it is more useful, and therefore more just, to forget the past, except as a guide to the future. In the same way, in the case of slavery, where the *majority* of the population consisted of slaves, compensation, except to a very small amount, could not be given to the owners, as it could only come out of the labor of the slaves; and the slave-owners compensating one another would be but a childish operation. Where the slaves are but few, as in Columbia, or where a nest of slave-owners is connected with a large community, as in the United States of America, there it would be generous and wise in the free citizens to contribute, by means of a tax or otherwise, a fund, for a moderate compensation to the slave-owners, to remove the moral pollution from amongst

them. The compensation should come from the other citizens, the freemen, the community and legislature, who had authorized and upheld the wrong; and not from the slaves, who had been its victims. To *them* indeed would the greatest compensation be due for past wrong—if justice were done. In England, the tax on West India produce, particularly on sugar, ought to be devoted to the sole object, exalted above all other considerations, of purchasing, by lot, at a very moderate value, not fixed by the owners, the emancipation of the slaves in the colonial islands under her protection and real domination.

Instead of an evil, then, to society, 'it is one of the greatest benefits, necessarily to arise from respecting the natural laws of distribution, that they unveil the true and only useful right and title to property, and compel those whose original claim is deficient, to show that the further support of it by law is not incompatible with the happiness of the community in which it prevails. The possessors of such property, relieved from the supposed necessity of advocating violence as identified with their own importance, will be more inclined to resign their admiration of mere force as an instrument of controul, and to cultivate the arts of reason and persuasion; thus resigning one of the most ungracious features of excessive wealth.

CHAPTER IV.

ON THE ACQUISITION AND DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE, AS ONE OF THE MEANS OF INCREASING PRODUCTION AND ENJOYMENT, AND SECURING THE PERMANENCE OF THE NATURAL LAWS OF DISTRIBUTION.

HITHERTO, in speaking of labor, we have always included in that term the quantity of knowledge requisite for its direction. Without this knowledge, it would be no more than brute force directed to no useful purpose. In whatever proportion knowledge is possessed, whether in whole or in part, by the productive laborer, or by him who directs his labor, it is necessary in order to make his labor productive that some person should possess it. In the sub-divisions of occupations and of labor itself, it becomes at times so separated from labor in complicated society, that we must consider it apart, in order to estimate its relation to the production of wealth and happiness, and to guard against the mischiefs to which even this noble instrument has been perverted.

In the early and rude states of society, man has almost nothing to distribute. Without knowledge of the qualities of the things around him and the useful purposes to which they may be turned, without knowledge of the laws of nature or of those events which, under similar circumstances, invariably follow each other under the name of cause and effect, he has not the capability of producing wealth, though he may live surrounded with all the rude materials which, in the hands of knowledge and active skill, would abundantly supply the articles of wealth and enjoyment. Without a certain portion of knowledge men cannot live; at least they cannot live in larger numbers than the scanty produce of the chase, or fishing, or of wild fruits or roots, disputed with the lower animals, and spread over a boundless tract of land, can supply: and even so to continue existence, requires as much knowledge as the lower animals possess, or rather more, to make up for the deficiency of strength in man. To enable men to live in numbers, in society, they must either domesticate animals, if those fit for the purpose are near them, or must learn the art of raising and protecting, by inclosures or otherwise, the fruits

of the earth. For either of these purposes, *knowledge* is required, to guide labor to production. By this first acquisition of knowledge, man saves his race from wretchedness and perhaps annihilation; and with less labor, and less painful labor, enjoys a happier existence. Food and shelter are the two great means of comfort, as well as of existence, to man. Shelter is stationary, as of huts or houses, or accompanying the person as clothes. As man suffers pain from various circumstances and incidents, he naturally endeavours to remove them, or to obviate their effects: as he gets the experience of new means of enjoyment, he endeavours to secure, to perpetuate, or to enlarge them. Hence his observation and invention are again called into activity, to devise the most durable and agreeable modes of supplying his food and shelter. This leads to further acquisition of knowledge, of the qualities and uses of bodies, called, when acting on an extended scale or with great effect, the powers or energies of nature, as well as of the *laws* of nature. The mind that observes and devises, has the laborious hand, supported by the muscular frame, ready to give substantial form and existence to its conceptions. Thus industry is developed; supposing always that security has permitted and sheltered its expansion. Besides the variety of food and modes of shelter, there are other senses, those of sight and hearing, through which pleasure may be received by the construction of articles calculated to operate pleasantly upon them. Peculiar colours and forms and imitations of things please the eye, and successions or combinations of sounds the ear. The desire of pleasure from these sources excites curiosity, leads to observation and experiment, and the secrets of nature begin to be explored, for the sake of lighter and more delicate gratifications than the mere healthful prolonging of life. The utility of a discovery attracts the notice and interests the feelings of all, particularly of the intelligent of the community, and renders them kindly disposed and inclined to serve as well as to admire the inventor. The mere exercise of the mind, in observing, judging, and inventing, rewarded at times by success, becomes itself habitual, and a source of most interesting enjoyment. The utility of all real knowledge, (of the qualities and uses of things and of the laws of nature as ascertained by experience,) the pleasure of reputation, and of the mere pursuit itself, uniting together with the progression of events, render at length the acquisition of knowledge desirable for its own sake. Knowledge becomes a source of power. Inquiry is directed into the effects of men's conduct on each other and themselves; rules of morals and legislation are laid down; and the operations of the intellectual

faculty itself come to be investigated. The man of knowledge and the productive laborer come to be widely divided from each other: and knowledge, instead of remaining the hand-maid of labor in the hand of the laborer to increase his productive powers, to guide its distribution so as to raise to the highest its capacity of giving enjoyment, has almost everywhere arrayed itself against labor, not only concealing its treasures from the laborers, but systematically deluding and leading them astray, in order to render their muscular powers entirely mechanical and obedient. It could not be expected, while these multifarious branches of knowledge were being acquired by man, setting out from the post of mere helpless ignorance, that he should have been able to raise himself at once to the calm and lofty examination of the direction of all these means of happiness, of all the propensities of the beings like himself surrounding him, to the production of the greatest possible quantity of enjoyment for all. Individual interests and casual sympathies and antipathies produced the first social combinations, and self-defence, rendered necessary by insecurity, led to retaliation; and knowledge allied itself with trained force to oppress, as well as to delude, the laborious producers of wealth. The possessors of knowledge, and the possessors of force, sought every where, by the shortest and frequently by the clumsiest roads, to advance their own individual interests, without any refined or comprehensive view of making the labor and faculties of others subordinate to theirs. From the operation of every thing around them, they would naturally think that the necessities of man, like those of other animals, made it imperative on him to follow the common practice of "eat or be eaten," of using his force and knowledge for his own direct and exclusive well-being; urged by self-interest, more or less modified, to increase that knowledge to render his force more efficient.

Knowledge being such an instrument, so capable of being detached from labor, and opposed to it, it becomes necessary to this inquiry to trace its operation, and, if possible, so to order things, that its greatest development may not only be consistent with the wisest distribution of wealth, but that they may mutually support and tend to increase each other.

There is a striking peculiarity, a striking felicity, attending knowledge as a source of happiness. Wealth, the produce of labor, is necessarily limited in its supply: whatever may be its absolute quantity, the more that one or a few members of the community possess, the less is left to be distributed amongst the remainder: the excessive wealth of the one class, is the immediate cause of the excessive poverty of the other.

Not so with the pleasures derived from the acquisition, the possession, and diffusion of knowledge. The supply of knowledge is unlimited: the possession of an excessive quantity by one individual, so far from being inconsistent with the possession of equal quantities by other individuals, facilitates and leads the way to the possession of equal quantities by all. The more it is diffused, the more it multiplies itself, and the more its enjoyment is increased by mutual communication. Every acquisition to every individual, instead of diminishing the power to himself and others of future acquisitions, makes them more easy and certain. The intelligent man, amongst the ignorant, can have no pleasures of communication and intercourse: amongst the intelligent, his enjoyment is at the highest. The pleasures of acquired knowledge are increased, and the chances of its future extension multiplied in exact proportion to its diffusion.

In the earlier stages of society, labor and knowledge naturally accompany each other. The most intelligent becomes the most industrious, to turn his knowledge to account. The perfection of civilization will reunite labor and knowledge. In the course of the progress from rudeness to civilization, it was perhaps unavoidable, it was certainly quite natural, that labor and knowledge should be widely separated: the processes of labor became more varied and complicated, and required more of nicety and skill; the progress of knowledge embraced more objects, and required more time and attention for its acquisition. Even labor and knowledge were again respectively subdivided into minor departments, the follower of the one frequently ignorant not only of the advances made by the others, but even of their existence. The processes for diffusing knowledge, founded on an acquaintance with the mechanism of the mind itself, and requiring a considerable advance and accumulation of facts before they could be simplified, were necessarily unknown. But the continued operation of the same causes, that led to the gradual development of every subordinate branch of art and science, produced finally the art of arts and the science of sciences, the science of society, of human happiness, or the *social science*, laying down rules for art to practise, to educe, out of all these detached improvements of labor and knowledge, the greatest possible sum of happiness for the whole of the co-operating members of a community. In the earlier stages of society, labor and knowledge accompanied each other, because they were both simple and easily understood. In improved civilization, under the influence of perfect security, they will again re-unite, improved and mature, to part no more, because the

happiness of all demands it; and because the very progress and development of the social art has unfolded the *means*.

If notwithstanding the very partial manner in which security has been any where enjoyed, if notwithstanding the long and dreary separation through almost the whole of the past progress of mankind, of labor and knowledge, if notwithstanding the absolute hostility carried on hitherto between labor and knowledge and labor and force, the progress of both industry and knowledge has been, particularly of late years that restrictions have been relaxed, and in proportion to their relaxation, rapid and extensive; what bounds could we even in imagination set to this double progression of knowledge and industry, if impartial security were universally maintained, and if labor and knowledge co-operated together and cheered each other? what other bounds, than the existence of our planet and species, under the same physical laws that have governed them as far as history or tradition or organic records extend?

This intimate union between knowledge and labor, or industry, becomes the more indispensable, when we reflect on the great tendency of impartial security to produce *happiness*, both directly and indirectly, by the great abundance and equality of wealth to which it leads. Men, it may be observed, possessing the comforts and conveniences of life, above the sordid temptations to theft and falsehood, learning practically and by imitation both the arts of life and the practice of social, domestic, and self-regarding duties, active and happy in the exercise of their avocations, in the enjoyment of every innocent pleasure, (i. e. not accompanied or followed by preponderant evil,) and in the interchange and mutual gratification of kindly feelings, would have little time or inclination to seek for knowledge out of their sphere, satisfied with that state of things, and not doubting its continuance, which secured them so many blessings. That great danger may arise to security, and consequently to production and happiness, from this over-confidence and contentment engendered by security itself, cannot be disputed. Whether in times of ignorance (though the physical sciences and the arts of life might have been to a great extent successfully cultivated) security could have maintained itself, though once fortuitously established, it would be difficult to determine. Perhaps the very establishment of perfect and equal security, presupposes such an advance in civilization and social science, such an ample experience of the results of past combinations, that the very same wisdom that establishes the natural laws of distribution will necessarily be able to obviate all causes counteracting their

continuance. Perhaps, though the *fortuitous* establishment of the natural laws of distribution might be followed by overconfidence, and neglect of that knowledge which is requisite for their continuance, yet the *deliberate* establishment of these same laws is necessarily followed by an always aspiring desire of increasing happiness by means of knowledge, as well as by every other attainable means.

Enough for the friend of human happiness to know that such a source of *danger* to security exists: enough for him to know, that without the diffusion of knowledge, not only of each mechanical art to the artist, but of moral and social knowledge *to all*, the blessings of equal security will be constantly in danger. Enough for him to know that the diffusion of knowledge is essential to the maintenance of the natural laws of distribution, to ensure all his attention to so momentous a subject. He will not rest satisfied with the general assurance that security and ease and competition will call forth and remunerate all useful knowledge, but will point out the means that must be adopted to secure to every member of the community that degree of social information which is essential to the *maintenance* of the natural laws of distribution, on which the happiness of every community must depend. The important interests of mankind are no longer to be left to the fortuitous march of events, to the forbearance of the powerful or the knowing, but must be supported by the *knowledge* as well as the *habits* of the great mass of the individual members of every community. In their own keeping alone, can their destiny be securely placed. When thus guarded, the impossibility of disturbing it, and substituting sinister interests for the general good, will be so apparent, that the project will no more occur to any sane being of attempting it, than of attempting to impede the operation of the physical laws of nature, as of the sun in ripening the fruits of the earth. Assuredly the community that is wise enough to establish, from a conviction of their utility, the natural laws of distribution, will also be wise enough to diffuse and perpetuate, through all its members, that knowledge, which is essential to its support. Let us see what the *means* are by which this is to be accomplished; and what are the *effects* to be expected from knowledge, on the production and distribution of wealth and on the happiness thence resulting. We may observe as to the effects of knowledge, or the modes in which it would operate, that it is in three ways intimately connected with our subject.

It devises the means of constantly improving the arts, rendering labor more productive in quantity, or quali-

ty, of its productions, or in both, and thus indefinitely increasing wealth as a means of enjoyment.

It indefinitely increases the enjoyment to be derived from these materials of wealth, by teaching the effects of food, air, heat, &c., on our bodies, and the mutual effects of the actions and passions of ourselves and others on each other and ourselves, ensuring the practice of prudence, comprehending self-restraint, fortitude, and benevolence.

It keeps the blessings of equal security from the natural laws of distribution constantly under the mental contemplation of the members of the community, and thus renders any retrograde movement to insecurity, misery, and vice, impossible.

Such are the certain effects of knowledge as it relates to wealth. No one will probably contend that knowledge diffused amongst the members of a community living under the natural laws of distribution, would produce any other effects than these, or to the exclusion of these. We come then to the means by which this desirable distribution of knowledge, as well as of wealth, is to be accomplished. There are three obvious modes of diffusing knowledge, constituted as communities now are.

The first is by means of *institutions*; which form that state of things and of action surrounding individuals, begetting their *habits* and the information connected with them.

The second is by means of *writings*, or *discourses*, private or public, addressed to the *adult population* or any portion thereof.

The third is by means of *education*, addressed almost exclusively to the *young*.

SECTION 2.

Of social institutions, as one of the means of diffusing or suppressing knowledge.

Of all the means of diffusing useful knowledge, that which effects it by domestic, political, or other social institutions, when those institutions are founded on reason and truth, is the most certain in its operation, and the most permanent. As far as it goes, it is the most complete instrument, preserving

itself by its own operation: but its operation has been hitherto very limited as to extent of knowledge: more frequently, indeed, it has served to corrupt, to extinguish, or to shut out knowledge from the productive and useful members of a community. Under the head of institutions are comprehended all the tactics and operations of domestic, religious, and political establishments, all the circumstances and states of things arising from these, by which men are surrounded, and in the midst of which they have been brought up and live; reading and writing, and what is commonly called education in its limited sense, being excluded. Let an English child be sent, at a year old, to Turkey, and a child of the same age from Egypt, or Asia Minor, to England. The young Mussulman, on being settled in an English family, becomes pledged by a couple of persons calling themselves its god-father and god-mother, on going through a simple ceremony, to think in a certain manner, without doubt or inquiry, on certain subjects deemed of paramount importance to its happiness. No matter that reason says, the more important the subject, the more impartial ought to be the inquiry, because the greater the evil of a false judgement. No matter that the shades of the future opinions of the child must depend, like the color of its clothes, on the particular family into which it may be introduced. All sects agree in nothing but in exercising these iniquitous and tyrannical restraints over the *minds* of children, extending to their minds that insecurity which is reserved in so many ways for the physical exertions of their bodily powers. Thus gagged to mental imbecility, from the multifarious relations which these dogmas of uninquiring faith put forth to all surrounding objects, fearless curiosity, the parent of all knowledge, is repressed, as something vicious. The young Turk mingles with all the daily household scenes of the family with which it lives. It imitates the actions, it acquires the sentiments, by degrees it joins in the occupations, of those around it. Whatever knowledge is required in the practice of the arts which it is taught, it becomes possessed of; and this knowledge, thus daily learnt and practised, and combined with so many associations, becomes fixed and indelible. *Habits* of activity, of industry, of cleanliness, of truth, of temperance, of sobriety, of honesty, of mutual kindness,—or the reverse of all these,—are formed by imitation, and by the influence of the opinion, leading to the good or ill offices, of those around it. These habits, renewed every day, grow up with the child and form a part of itself, its character: imitation and sympathy form them without any direct instruction. The conduct and opinions, again, of those around it, are necessitated chiefly by the comfort or wretchedness in which they live, arising from the wise or unwise distribution of wealth.

Whatever knowledge beyond what was essential to its occupations, its associates possessed, would, in whole or in part, be acquired by means of conversation, induced by accidental circumstances, as curiosity sought, and as good-nature and a capacity to communicate might prevail amongst those who were possessed of the knowledge. Whatever places of worship its guardians frequented, it would frequent: whatever ceremonies or forms of a religious, legal, or social nature it witnessed habitually, would operate on its mind, in common with those of its associates. The rewards and punishments, private or legal, would operate variously on its mind, as mildness or barbarity prevailed. Again, according to the different station in life in which it was brought up, it would assume a peculiarity of character, from peculiarity of situation and circumstances. As it grew up, it would share, if a man, in all the political combinations which its station, under the arbitrary regulations of society, permitted. If a woman, it would be condemned almost every where to eternal childhood, and inequality of almost all rights and enjoyments of body and mind. *He*, then, we shall suppose, would be initiated into corporation mysteries, freehold rights, and the varied forms of elections, real or pretended, of the British system of government. As a juryman, perhaps a client, an elector, he would act, and learn by acting, the play of these legal or constitutional social machines: his political character would be formed by them; and he would judge of their utility according to his interests, his intellectual capability, and the degree of information he possessed. Thus would the sentiments, the habits, and the knowledge of the Christian citizen of Britain be acquired by the transplanted infant of Mahometanism, simply by the operation of the surrounding *institutions*, without any education of books when young, or of discourses, oral or written, when advanced to manhood.

The young Christian transported to Turkey, would, *by a similar process*, become as certainly a sincere follower of the last and greatest of the Prophets, as the young Mussulman had become the disciple of Jesus and of Christian establishments. He would be exposed to the influence of Turkish institutions: and though, perhaps, no god-fathers or god-mothers would go through the ceremony of engaging with the sprinkling of water, that his mind should, under the restraint of brutal force and terror, be compelled to believe on trust, and without inquiry, all the dogmas of the Muftis, yet would the *influence of circumstances* cause the effect to take place, as certainly as if a hundred sponsors had made the deliberate and vicious immolation of human reason. *There is but one God*, would resound on all sides; and with this would be associated an undefined horror of those monsters who worshipped three gods, or di-

vided or compounded the divine nature; as if it could in any way affect the happiness of the author of nature, or could be to him any thing but a matter of indifference, how his creatures speculated as to his essence or attributes! as if he could not, and would not, as a benevolent being, infuse in them right notions on this point, if more necessary to their happiness, than any other truths, physical or moral, the discovering of which brings with it its own reward, by the additional means of happiness which it unfolds! No matter: it is necessary to the interest of the priests, if not of their dupes, that these dogmas should be deemed of more importance than the world's wealth: how else could they succeed in monopolizing this wealth, or such immense portions of it, to themselves? Thus initiated as soon as it can articulate, the young transported Christian partakes of the meals, observes the ceremonies, witnesses and joins in the daily pursuits of the family with which it lives. Its opinions are formed by those of its elders around. Whatever it sees done, it imitates; whatever is thought right to be done by others, is by it also, the most helpless and ignorant, thought right to be done. It mingles in the pursuits, it shares in the pleasures, it participates in the sympathies of its associates. Are they easy in their circumstances, though surrounded with a race of wretchedness, whether Turkish or Christian? He imbibes their notions of superiority, their contempt for labor, their love of the empire of force, and their undoubted conviction that slaves, particularly Christian slaves, ought to spend lives of toil to promote the pleasures of their Turkish masters. He and his connexions, living at their ease, would be envied and probably preyed upon by a wretched population: alienated from the people by their wretchedness, he would still further, perhaps, learn to hate them for their vices of dishonesty, and of falsehood to promote the purposes of dishonesty, the necessary consequence of their wretchedness; and his tyrannical conduct, violating at every step their security, would still further tend to perpetuate their vices with their miseries. No voice of a scrutinizing and benevolent philosophy would whisper to the young Mahometanized Christian, that all these vices of the poor were necessarily produced by the wretchedness caused by the insecurity in which they lived, and that as long as the fruits of their labor were taken from them without satisfactory equivalents, their vices must continue, and must be increased, by the alienation, contempt, and ill offices, of the more wealthy. The young Mussulman sees what is called justice arbitrarily administered; and always in the habit of witnessing the giving of presents to propitiate the judge, he never doubts the propriety, or inquires into the effects, of these

presents, any more than the uneducated Briton does into the similar effects of law-taxes and expenses in Britain. Justice, therefore, is always made subservient to interest, and is never rightly administered but when no sinister interest happens to interfere : and this too, the young Mussulman learns from all around, is the undoubted and rightful prerogative of power. No forms but those of religion,—whose chief object is to make him believe that every thing is just as it ought to be,—no establishments, social or political, demand his co-operation ; at the same time to assist in and to learn the regulation of their motions : no juries, no elections, excite his judgement, his activity, and thus give him an interest in the play and preservation of the political machine. Adulation, cunning, ferocious courage, are the qualities, mixed in various proportions, which procure a delegation of power from those who possess it in a higher degree, whenever mere caprice is not the sole distributor. He sees no responsibility on the part of those intrusted with power : he contracts the notion, that irresponsibility towards those over whom it is exercised is a necessary appendage of power ; and force soon constitutes right in his mind. In order to obtain the sympathy and the services of those around him, he must put on the qualities in demand, virtuous or vicious, of his associates : unknown to himself, he adopts them, and becomes the creature of his situation. From such a community,—with security, industry would be banished. Responsibility and equal justice unknown, the young Mussulman feels no check to the exercise of every impetuous passion as years develop them within him : he imitates in this respect his associates, and, with the scymetar and the turban, he puts on the ignorance, the ferocity, and the whole character of the Turk.

We may suppose a third case. Suppose a child, no matter whether Christian, Turk, or prematurely devoted to the Grand Lama *, to be introduced into a community of rational beings living under the influence of equal security. He sees every person enjoying the produce of his labor : he sees nothing taken from any person without a satisfactory equivalent. He is thus imbued, as his life lengthens year by year, with the first principles of justice : he is taught an industrious employment ; he respects industry, he respects peaceful labor, because

* The difference between their system and that most approved in Europe is, that whereas *with us* God came down to this planet and lived for a *few years*, say 30 to 50, in a man ; *with them* God is now living constantly in a man, and when the one man dies, he changes his abode to his successor, to afford to the pious, a constant visible example of the divine virtues—seclusion, indolence, and ignorance—in a shape not too bright for human faithful eyes to behold.

he sees them practised and respected on account of the benefits they produce. Every one around him practises honesty and speaks truth, because the motives to dishonesty and falsehood are removed, from the easy mode of satisfying want by means of industrious pursuits; falsehood being merely an auxiliary vice to facilitate unjust acquisitions. The neatness, the order, the skill, practised by those around him, he sees and imitates. He partakes of all the feelings of the family, and the associates with whom he lives: but as all force is excluded, and voluntariness is requisite in every transaction respecting the objects of wealth, so—naturally and necessarily—is the same principle extended to every operation of the mind. Though he participates, therefore, in the feelings of others, he also learns by degrees to *judge* of them; that is to say, of their propriety, and the consequences of indulging in them. There is no class of men interested, by forced abstraction of the products of labor, to force his judgements, on moral or physical things, into a particular direction, in contempt of inquiry. While curiosity is called forth and gratified by the animated scene around; credulity, as the source of precipitation and of practical error, is repressed. To believe any thing, physical or moral, without appropriate evidence, is regarded as a weakness, nay a vice, inasmuch as it leads to mischief. In a community founded on security, a good reason can be given for every thing: inquiry, therefore, will be boundless; it will extend to every subject; and as truth means nothing more than seeing things and their relations as they really are, in order to know how to make them most useful, the mind that is left without bias must choose, on the evidence before it, that which it ought to choose, that which seems most true. Our pupil, living amongst those whose wants are gratified, to whom the sight of distress is painful, and who are possessed, more or less, of the means of removing or alleviating it, is in the habit of witnessing acts of kindness, of gratitude, of devoted attachment: his sympathies are excited; he feels the pleasures of benevolence; he is formed, with as little trouble, to virtue, as a slave is to treachery. As he grows up, he is called to partake in all the institutions, political, judicial, administrative, of the community. These call forth the exercise of his faculties; and the power they give him, and his mode of exercising them, render him to himself, as well as to others, an object of respect. He feels the force, he partakes in the awarding, of *public opinion*. It becomes a new incentive to the practice of industry, and of every thing deemed reputable. To whatever line of active exertion, whether intellectual, or in the way of the fine or the more useful arts, accidental circumstances or peculiar aptitude

may lead him, he devotes his pleased attention, supported by the universal activity around, by the disreputableness of idleness, by the happiness of useful activity, and by the elevating approbation of an intelligent and virtuous community. The reward of public esteem, public admiration, and public honor, developed by free competition to its greatest efficiency, would call forth and reward, in whole or in part, numberless exertions in producing master-pieces of the arts, in advancing and applying the sciences, in discharging judicial, executive, and various other political offices; for the development of which, as of every thing, a mere sordid pecuniary payment is now depended on. Living in such a community, where the influence of mere wealth was reduced, from the equality of fortunes, to its lowest level, where public opinion became the substitute for the influence of wealth, and where talents and virtues were the essential means of attaining public approbation, who shall limit the excellence to which the pupil of such a state of things, domestic and political, may attain, in whatever pursuit he follows? Must not his life in such a community be as useful as happy? Can he fail of acquiring at the same time useful information and moral habits? In a community where the laws or the customs of the people assign to every individual a particular occupation, curiosity is useless, as every inclination must bend to the preconcerted arrangement: but, here, where every pursuit is open to every individual, and where every one is secure in the enjoyment of the whole fruit of his exertions, curiosity will necessarily be directed to every thing which may be made useful to the individual; and knowledge will be sought for to enlighten the judgement on the choice of what so nearly concerns the happiness as that of an occupation for life.

A person brought up with that freedom from injurious restraint which security implies, both as to mental and muscular effort, would be prepared to profit, at maturity, by those public institutions for the regulation of the common affairs of the community, in which all the adult population would as a matter of course concur. In the regulation of the affairs of his own district, in the regulation of national affairs, he would take a part. In discussing these affairs, his judgement would be enlarged; with the enlargement of his judgement his sympathies would necessarily expand. His own individual good would always be considered in connexion with and subordinate to the general happiness: he would learn practically the rules of justice. Not only in legislative, but in judicial and administrative matters, he would be called upon, as elector, or elected, or in some other useful co-operating capacity, to take a part. The judging of what had in all these respects been

done, would keep up, by its relation to his own interest, the constant excitement of activity. No stagnation of thought would ever oppress his leisure hours. Whatever time and interest could be spared from the pursuits of useful industry of mind or body, would be devoted to moral or physical inquiries connected with private or public interest. The exertion of mind necessary to enable him to take a share, with that aptitude which an improved public opinion would demand, in the conducting of social institutions, would lead him to more useful practical knowledge, than discourses and books without end in the absence of such institutions calling forth such interests.

Such is the mode of conveying knowledge and forming character, by means of *institutions* alone, without any regular preceptors, without any systematic instruction. As we find that errors of judgement, antipathies, and vices of conduct, formed in this way until manhood, are, for the most part, indelible through life, though opposed by the clearest demonstrations of reason and interest; the *habit* being once formed and become a part of the agent—we must see the immense efficacy of the mere establishment of the principle of security in forming the characters, the intellectual and moral habits, of a community. But as all men now living have been brought up under systems, more or less flagrant, of insecurity, and as so much sinister interest exists favoring this insecurity; would the natural laws of distribution, if once established, and if in all branches of their legislation and conduct respected by any community, be self-sufficient? adequate to their own support? Ought nothing more to be done in the way of diffusing knowledge, by such a community, beyond the establishment of the facilities and inducements for acquiring it, which such a state of things would present?

By the governing part of a community, even where security prevailed, except at the immediate requisition of their constituents, nothing more ought to be done. By the intelligent members themselves of the community a vast deal more ought to be done, and would in the present state of information be done, both in the diffusion of knowledge to the adults, and in the education, or training, of the young. The reasons are these. The free inquiry resulting from security, would always bring forth, without any interference of the government, whatever useful knowledge was possessed on any interesting subject by any member of the community, from the desire of doing good, of reputation, of swaying the public opinion, of the love of truth, and, in many cases, of pecuniary profit. The interference of mere power is always uncongenial

to the interests of truth, which should stand on its own merits alone. When pretending to prop truth by its authority, the exercise of power creates a bias, a disturbance of mind, necessarily pernicious, because not produced by any additional evidence appropriate to the case. In upholding equal security, equal freedom of thought, of expression, and of action, the government does all that it can usefully do towards the enlargement of the bounds of knowledge, or its diffusion amongst adults. Universities and colleges under government patronage have been almost always seats of sinecures, idleness, exploded errors, and mere tools to uphold whatever the ruling party judged it expedient to uphold. These are, no doubt, to be regarded as means chiefly calculated to direct the minds of *the young* : but they operate also on the whole people, as what they teach, and not only so, but what they teach, *as taught by themselves*, (no other teaching, though more effectually performed, of the very same doctrines, by any other hands, being held of any avail) is made a necessary passport to many of the honors and emoluments which the state has to bestow. Truth is necessarily progressive, but these institutions are as necessarily chained down to systems, seldom the best, but the most useful to the governors, even at the age when they are established ; but always lagging behind succeeding ages. 'Tis no extenuation of these to say, that whatever knowledge has prevailed in countries under their yoke, has had its origin there. No doubt: when they monopolized the privilege of teaching and of decreeing what was truth, where else could the commodity be had? Of whatever quality, it must be obtained at these privileged marts, or not at all. The real and the only rational point of comparison, is, between the knowledge that would necessarily spring up from the wants and curiosities of men under the influence of equal security, and that which these institutions under insecurity produce. Assuredly, it is better that insecurity should vouchsafe even such establishments, than that it should absolutely proscribe all knowledge but what, falsely so called, it causes to be drilled mechanically into infants to prostrate their minds and bodies to willing slavery. On many occasions, the darkness would perhaps in many places have been even greater, if these had not existed. As long as the products of labor must be forcibly abstracted from communities, better no doubt that some part of this plunder should have the name of being devoted to the diffusion of knowledge, than that it should all be spent in unproductive consumption. It is perhaps, in absolute despotisms, one of the *least pernicious* ways of laying out such plunder. *Physical knowledge*, tending to what is called the glory of the

governors, may even in such a state of things advance: but from want of interest, arising from insecurity, on the part of the great mass of the community, even *its* advances can never be rapid or really useful. In communities partaking but in a very moderate degree of the blessings of security, such establishments impede efforts, which but for them would have been in active operation, and thus repress, both in quantity and quality of knowledge, ten portions for one which they create. The real remedy is to let all plunder, all insecurity, cease. The government of Turkey, of Persia, of China, of any of the Eastern nations, could not perhaps fail to do good, as they certainly could not make matters worse, by instituting any sort of establishments for the acquisition or diffusion of knowledge. The very curiosity such things would inspire, must be productive of some benefit. In spite of absurd restraints, something useful might emerge. But in Europe, where security is partially enjoyed in ever so limited a degree, knowledge can derive no benefit from power to compensate for the evils of its baneful alliance.

Of the two great branches of human knowledge, physics and morals, the one is absolutely arrested in its growth by government interference. On this, the moral branch, the guidance of the actions of men, every government supposes itself perfect, as in law, religion, morality, political economy, &c. They frequently persecute and punish, whether directly by the infliction of evil, or indirectly by withholding benefits, those who presume, not only to make improvements, but to *think* differently from what they have established. Their interest being in this department opposed to all change, their interference must be always and in the highest degree pernicious: but, as to physics, it is their interest (when they are sane enough to see it) that those subject to them should be as knowing, as skilful, and as productive as possible of the means of enjoyment, for *their use*. Still, notwithstanding the interest of governments and their love of glory, even physical knowledge is every where repressed by them. Certain systems must be taught and learned. Utility is not the touchstone of what they disseminate. Teachers well paid and indolent are jealous of the unlicensed, meddling with their pursuits; and odium is by them always directed to innovation. In consequence, the truth is, that almost all advances even in physical science, and almost all efforts to diffuse knowledge, by publications immensely varied, have been the work of volunteer laborers, in every part of Europe. Were nothing known, or nothing diffused, but what these establishments effected or permitted, we should be now in little better than

the darkness of the middle ages. These establishments have been reluctantly dragged on by the spirit and improvements of these later times.

Now if under the limited portion of security which some European nations have enjoyed, and in spite of these opposing establishments, such rapid advances have been lately made in almost every department of knowledge, caused by the wants and curiosities of men, their love of power, of reputation, of activity, of doing good; what progress might we not expect under the equal protection of perfect security, putting every thought and faculty into motion, by awarding to every one the whole fruit of his literary as well as his economical exertions? And this knowledge, in a community respecting security, would be necessarily and exclusively directed to increase the means of happiness, physical and intellectual, directly or indirectly connected with the agency of wealth, or dependent on it. As the great end and object of all *physical* knowledge, is to add to the quantity of the articles of wealth, or to facilitate their production; so is it the great end and object of *moral* knowledge so to regulate our appetites, affections, and the influence of our actions on each other, as to educe out of these increased physical means the greatest possible quantity of *happiness* for all.

But this matter must be resumed, when we speak of knowledge as diffused by *education*.

Meantime let us pause for a moment on the immense effect, hitherto too lightly considered, of mere *institutions* in forming the human character, entirely independent of literary instruction to young or old, rendering men active or indolent, ferocious or gentle, intellectual or brutish, as the train of actions or circumstances dependent on them, varies. If little attention, in proportion to their importance, has been bestowed on the effects now every day producing, and in past times produced, by these manufacturing engines of human character; still less thought has been directed to the immense benefits which social institutions, in accordance with the principle of security, must, henceforth, inevitably produce on all human beings, self-subjected to their beneficent influence.

An objection must here be obviated, though coming from those who have, of all men, the least right to make it. The supporters of old institutions (all of them founded on the principle of force—force in levying the means of their existence—compulsion in rendering necessary the assent to certain opinions) object to the improvement of the human character by means of institutions, as tending to drill men into machines. These objections have been made with particular earnestness

to the proposals and establishments of Mr. Owen; whose object is to render labor more efficient in the increased production of useful things, and, by a more economical use and wiser distribution, to make these useful things more productive of happiness. It is freely admitted that, were this *moral* objection well founded, there could be no advantage produced by the mere multiplication and equal distribution of the objects of wealth, which could be adduced as a set-off against it. The benefits of free exercise of the judgements *of all, on all* propositions, on which they are called upon to entertain any opinion, particularly if that opinion necessarily leads to action, and of perfect voluntariness of action, are so transcendantly great, and so equally indispensable to the continuance of wealth, of knowledge, and benevolence, that it is quite evident that any institutions, the support of which implied a dereliction of these advantages, would be too dearly purchased. In as far as any institutions, old or new, require such a sacrifice, they stand plainly condemned by the principles of this inquiry. No institutions are here advocated but such as operate on the *will* of intelligent agents, through their understandings.

Now as all old institutions, political, social, or domestic, are founded on principles the reverse of these, namely on repressing the exercise of the judgement of those who learn, or who are subjected to them, in deference to the mandates of those who framed them, and in thus leading the will, either by perversion of the understanding or by absolute compulsion; it does seem strange that the admirers of such old institutions should perceive and remonstrate against the deformity of their own principles when connected with new institutions. 'Tis to be hoped that their eyes will be opened as to the evil effects of compulsion, however applied, in all institutions whether old or new. This principle as to the necessity of voluntariness, in all institutions, being admitted, the business here is to point out the immense influence of these institutions, on whatever principles established, in diffusing knowledge or perpetuating ignorance, in forming habits of vice or of virtue, even in the absence of all immediate instruction, verbal or written, to the young or to the adult.

Human actions are produced by *desires* operating on the *will*. What generates, what gives rise to, these desires? The circumstances surrounding the actors. What is meant by these circumstances? The state of plenty or destitution in which they are placed with respect to the comforts and conveniences of life, the degree in which they are dependent on the will of others for pleasures or pains. On what again

do these casualties, wealth or poverty, freedom or slavery with respect to voluntary actions, depend? On what but on the *institutions*, the different expedients, devised and upheld by the rulers possessing the public force, to maintain wealth and power so distributed as may best coincide with their particular views? By these expedients, or institutions, men's actions are restrained and regulated: to some, power over others is given; from others all power is taken away, nothing left but the most abject submission, and, attendant on abject submission, abject want. When institutions supported ultimately, as they all have been, by force, keep men in such situations relatively to each other, their wishes or desires necessarily spring up out of their relative situations. It is evident that no mere words, no precepts or commands, as such, can alter these circumstances, can supply any *motives* to action: they may point out to the attention the motives actually existing, but they can call no new ones into existence. Nothing but the relations which a man bears to the persons and things surrounding him can effect this. Words and precepts then can be of no use as motives to action, except in as far as by operating on the understanding and will; they may tend to produce a change in these circumstances. But in order to change these circumstances, they must change the institutions that give rise to them.

Various are the institutions or expedients, that men wielding the public force have had resort to, to generate motives for the guidance of the actions of their fellow-creatures in subserviency to their wishes. First of all, are what are called the political institutions, which in fact frequently include all the rest. Of these political institutions, that of paramount importance is the determining who are to exercise the powers of governing the community, of making permanent or temporary regulations, applying and executing them, which affect in every possible way the industry and the actions of the individuals constituting that community. The exercise of the power of governing has a two-fold operation; the one perhaps fully as important as the other, though almost entirely overlooked. The first operation is, as to the perfection of the work to be done in relation to the happiness of the community, of the regulations made and the mode of applying and executing them: the second operation is, as to the effects to be produced on the character and habits, intellectual and moral, of those who exercise, or who are debarred from the exercise of, the powers of making, applying, and executing the public regulations; the perfection of the work done, the moral influence on the agents that do it—such are the two

distinct operations produced by political institutions. Though the nature of the human mind and human interests incontestably evinces—confirmed by the uniform experience of history—that all human regulations tend to the exclusive interest of those who make them, and that of course no regulations tending to the *benefit of all* can be expected except where *all interested* are concerned in the formation of them: yet let it be admitted that this position is not true, and that the best laws for all could be made and executed by partial interests; still only half the good effects which the science and art of government is capable of producing would be thereby produced. This may be illustrated by the analogy of other sciences and arts,—say chemistry, say mechanics, say agriculture. The operations of all these arts may be carried on by people utterly ignorant of the principles of knowledge on which they are founded, as ignorant as the horses or machinery employed. All they want in order to produce their perfected work is to be drilled to the particular part of the operation which they are doomed to perform. So with a perfect system of laws made by other hands than those whose actions and interests they are to regulate. The laws may produce a mechanical effect, and the people may be drilled to act their particular parts of subordination, as they may be drilled to perform their part in mechanical or chemical operations. But let one link of the machinery be wanting, let the directing mind be absent,—which of these drilled automata can supply the missing part of the machinery or of the directing mind? Here such creatures are of no use: the iron or steam might as well be depended on for assistance as they. But this is not all, nor the greatest, but the least, of the evils of such partial training. By it, the *general intellectual power* of the drilled animal, whether for mechanical, or legal, purposes, is equally enfeebled. His judgement, never exercised, pines and perishes. The exertion of any other faculty than that of attention to the one operation, tending to distract the mind from mechanical velocity and regularity, must be suppressed; and the perfection of the whole production of the vast machinery, animate and inanimate, comes to depend on the sacrifice of all intellectual disturbing powers, and on reducing mind and matter alike to the pliability and undeviating production of the machine. What is it that renders the law-makers, those who guide the public affairs of communities of men,—what makes statesmen, as they are called, men of more comprehensive views, of more improved intellectual power, than other men excluded from their means of information? What but the habit of exercising these powers? of exercising

their judgement on these measures? of learning in the school of legislation and public action—such as they are—what others are excluded from learning? Is it wished to make all mankind as intellectual as these few, in this universally interesting science? Give them the same opportunities, admit them into the same school, give them a share in the making and the executing of the laws which concern their own welfare; and the same circumstances will give birth to the same results. But do you wish to make the community *at large* much more honest, more moral, than the present race of statesmen? still bring them up in the school of legislation; for on them, as to disposition to promote the public good, must the operation of the circumstances of such a school be altogether different from what they are on *the few* to whom their operation is now exclusively confined; and this without supposing an atom more of inherent tendency to virtue in the many than in the few. Let the many be as blindly determined to pursue their own interest in preference to any other, as the few can be: what is the consequence? If wise enough as to the means, they pursue this interest in the most effectual manner. But what is this interest of the many? 'Tis the very and the sole interest which enlightened wisdom guided by benevolence would wish to promote. The many, from the very nature of their feelings, promote, as far as they see how, the only rightful interest, their own. The few also pursue their own; but this being opposed to the interest of the many, is the wrongful, the sinister, interest, and ought to be repressed. Here then, by extending to the utmost possible degree the faculty of co-operating in the power of making, applying, and executing laws, we not only improve, nay create, intellectual aptitude in that department as well as in every other in which the mind can exert itself, but give that intellectual power a necessarily favorable direction; while the basis of morality is laid by, showing the tendency of co-operation to produce universal good and happiness. Nor is there found to be any cause for the fond and antiquated terror lest all becoming wise enough to make machines and laws, there would be no hands left to supply the one or to yield obedience to the other. While machines were kept in motion and laws enacted for the benefit, solely, of the presiding minds in the one or the other of these departments, it was no doubt wise (as the contrary mode of conduct would have frustrated the object in view) to keep the living part of the machinery ignorant of the secret springs which regulated the machine and to repress the general powers of their minds, lest by searching they should find out that

they were made to toil for others, and that the fruits of their own labors were by a hundred contrivances taken away from them. Under such circumstances, and to men having such objects in view, the spread of intellectual culture was doubtless, whether in a work-shop or in a political machine, to be deprecated. But under the influence of security, the more knowledge every individual in every department possesses, the better; because the more clearly he would see that the actual combination produced more of comfort to all concerned than any other that could be proposed; or if he could propose any better for the happiness of all, he would feel confident that it would be adopted. His motives to exertion, instead of being diminished, would be increased by his knowledge; for he would see that industry was as necessary to production as production to happiness, and obedience to the public regulations, ordained by those whom he co-operated to authorize to make them for the good of all, and whose mal-administration he could at all times co-operate to remedy, was but obedience to what he had contributed to establish as most conducive to general good, meaning thereby the mass of individual good. Those political institutions, then, which are founded on the basis of self-government, by means of representation and election, are the most powerful instruments for diffusing knowledge; in the first instance, of what it most concerns men to know, their moral relations with their fellow-creatures; next, of physical nature, sciences and arts, from excited curiosity and activity; both one and the other species of knowledge called forth from the double operation of these institutions, in producing the best regulations, and in serving as a school for the evolving of virtue and talent from the adult population.

Under the head of political institutions, no measure perhaps would be so prolific in benefits, too numerous and important to be here discussed, particularly in the way of diffusing knowledge, as the widening and rendering local the basis of representation, each county or department of two or three hundred thousand individuals having its own legislative assembly, and every legal, general, act requiring the approbation of a majority of these, besides the concurrence of the general representatives, one from each county or department, convened in the capital. Part of the unemployed portion of every seventh day, now set apart for moral contemplation—too often mere idleness or vice—would be appropriately, peacefully, delightfully, and morally, employed, by all the people, in their share of these political and most interesting duties, as well as in other modes of improving in knowledge and the arts of

happiness. To detail all the modes, by which political institutions might be made conducive to the diffusion of knowledge amongst a community, would be to draw up a constitutional code with a commentary directed to this object. Enough here to direct the attention to the yet almost untasted benefits to be derived from this source. Giving the whole people an interest in their institutions, and enabling them to understand and appreciate the utility of them and of all public measures emanating from them, are surely the infallible means of putting out of all hazard the principle of equal security and the natural laws of distribution included therein, or deduced therefrom; and thus insuring the greatest production.

Under the head of *institutions* connected with the diffusion of knowledge, or suppression of knowledge, or with the diffusion of dreams and absurdities more baneful than ignorance, stand pre-eminently forward, and next in importance to constitutional codes, *national establishments of religion*, or superstition, as they are variously called, religion by their votaries, superstition by all the world besides. The effect, direct and palpable, of these establishments, necessarily supported by force, on production and knowledge, no one disputes. The question here is, whether such forced establishments could be made, or ought to be made, useful instruments, for diffusing real knowledge and increased activity in producing the means of happiness amongst a community. Experience and reason unite in demonstrating that for any such purposes any such establishments are worse than useless. As a support to political institutions, they tend to distract the mind by introducing arguments and associations utterly irrelevant to the point at issue. A constitutional code, or any other law, old or new, ought to stand on its own merits, that is to say, on its tendency to promote the happiness of the community. If it cannot stand this test, it ought not to stand at all. Ought an injurious code or law to be permitted to continue its mischiefs, because a man in a time of ignorance, Mahomet or any other, who said he went in a swoon or dream to what he calls the seventh heaven, wrote, or is said to have written, in a book, or to have spoken what others wrote for him, that such code or law ought to be upheld? If Mahomet, and still more if God, whose sentiments Mahomet says he speaks, had any good reasons in favor of the code or law, surely such reasons could be given; otherwise omniscience is converted into stupidity, and despotic commands are *needlessly*, as well as most perniciously, substituted for the beneficent operation of persuasion. All motives therefore which such establishments can present for the adoption or non-adoption of any regulation affecting the happiness of

any community, are either arbitrary and irrelevant, or if relevant are to be referred to the utility or inutility, the effects in happiness or misery, of the proposed regulation. As a means of impressing or diffusing useful knowledge, they cannot be usefully employed.

It has been already shown, in the first chapter, that no force can be employed, that no forced contributions can be raised, consistently with the principle of security, to support these establishments *for their own sakes*, for the preservation of those peculiar fancies, which they call knowledge, of which they profess to have the key, any more than similar establishments to perpetuate the peculiar fancies of modern astronomers or political economists. If the maintenance and diffusion of all other science, in which God is not peculiarly interested, may be safely left, and if it have only prospered while left, to the support of its own intrinsic evidence; how ludicrously absurd to assert that a species of knowledge, in the maintenance and diffusion of which God is said to be peculiarly interested, cannot by similar means be supported! Truth of all sorts, under the shield of impartial security, will work its own way, and can derive no sort of benefit from the aid of force.

It is a possibility, and but a possibility, and therefore stated that it may not be said to be overlooked, that under the best constitutional code (that which determines who are to co-operate in the making, applying, and executing, public regulations) the worst, or at least very pernicious, regulations may be made. The formation of a wise constitutional code for a great community, requires perhaps more comprehension of mind and wisdom of combination, than the formation of any minor regulation. The very same powers of mind applied to the very same objects, must be employed in the one case as in the other. How very improbable, then, that a community, wise enough to adopt the best constitutional code—the most difficult work—should be wanting in wisdom to adopt useful subordinate regulations—matters of less difficulty! But if, under such a system, they should be adopted, how easy and certain the means of ameliorating them, where the interests and the knowledge of all are constantly alive to learn and adopt whatever promotes the public, composed of the mass of individual, good! It may be almost universally observed, however, that where such deplorable anomalies exist, there is in reality a defect in the constitutional code, a want of comprehensiveness, of universal justice, which affords an opening to the mischiefs of the subordinate regulation. For instance, let the constitutional law say, “Every adult human

being, knowing how to read and write, shall be entitled to vote in the choice of provincial and national representatives." The rights of whole classes of men, white or black, reduced in communities calling themselves free, to slavery, and the rights of half mankind, women, are saved by this comprehensive constitutional law. Wherever therefore grievous violations of justice seem to take place in consequence of subordinate regulations and in contempt of wise constitutional laws, it will almost always be found that the source of the mischief lies in the want of wisdom in the boasted constitutional laws themselves.

But—to digress no further—suppose, notwithstanding the institutions generated by constitutional laws, that pernicious regulations do exist in a community, such as field or domestic slavery, enormous taxation and a host of revenue laws to maintain it, restrictive systems of commerce, laws of primogeniture, or other laws interfering with the division and free exchanges of property, the exclusion of women from civil, necessarily following their exclusion from equal political, rights, with a hundred other enormities that might be named; we have to inquire what effect these several minor institutions produce as to the diffusion of knowledge and the progress of production.

Under the Turkish system of despotism, blacks and whites, men and women, are impartially, under certain contingencies, converted into articles of wealth under the name of slaves. Under the United States system of liberty, professing to be founded on reason and the equal rights of all men, and under the British system of liberty, founded on the long collision of different parties for power and their gradual subsidence into the chaos of usurpations, expedients, and contradictions, called the British constitution (which, not being any where printed or written, every one interprets to mean, like religious mysteries, whatever he pleases), slavery is established against one great branch of the human race, because they differ in a few physical circumstances, chiefly colour, from those who make them, like horses or dogs, articles of property. 'Tis true both the United States and Britain have prohibited the future extension, the addition, by importation, to the absolute number of slaves. But the actual mass of slavery, of misery and vice, remains in the slave provinces of the United States, and of Britain in the West and East Indies, just where it was when the abolition effort began, or perhaps has rather increased since that period. What now is the effect of such institutions, upheld equally by despots and self-called freemen, on the extension and diffusion of real knowledge,

or of such knowledge as tends to add to the powers of production, to render the articles produced more productive of happiness by ameliorating the physical or moral constitution, or to secure the continuance of equal security and the natural laws of distribution? It is a curious fact that the institutions of slavery are apt to be less atrocious under despotism than in free states. In despotisms, slaves being used more for pomp than industry, are not required to work so hard as where the object of the master is the exchangeable value of their labor: they form a part of the state, of the family, and from the pride of the owner are frequently better clad and fed than the ordinary population around them. But where freemen make their fellow-creatures slaves, it is to exact hard labor, real useful products, from them: the rights and enjoyments of the masters and of the whole free population, are so desirable and throw so dark a shade over the situation of the slave, the contrast is so tremendous, that the most energetic employment of cruelty and terror is requisite to maintain the revolting system. Hence men themselves free, are more atrocious tyrants over their slaves than the slave owners of despotism. And well are they punished for such foul institutions. All that intellectual energy, which, under other circumstances, would be devoted to the extension of the bounds of knowledge or the diffusion of what was known in one or other of the three above-mentioned modes, is now necessarily directed to frame and uphold expedients for retaining the slaves in slavery. What little mental power of observing and judging also is left the slaves, is expended in counter-expedients to lighten their work or to break their chains. The policy of the slave-owner is of course to keep the slave as ignorant as possible. It would be impossible to devise an institution more destructive of knowledge as to improvements in sciences and arts. How stands it as to improvements in the physical and moral condition of the community? What but mutual alienation, mutual hate, can exist between master and slave, where all is power and enjoyment on the one side, all is forced submission and destitution on the other? Can they be honest, who can have no property, whose labor can acquire them nothing? Why should they speak truth, where the benefit of speaking it is only for masters whom they justly execrate? How can they who are tormented, or who are in the hourly dread of being tormented, have other feelings than those of hypocrisy and revenge? The pleasures of sympathy and benevolence cut off from the master from the absence of the *necessity* of exercising them, he seeks other means of happiness, and wallows in sensual pursuits, in cruel sports, and the indulgence

of brutal passions. The master is only less wretched and immoral, less devoid of prudence and humanity, less limited in intellect, than the slave. Compare such a man, his habits, the state of his mind and consequently his happiness, with that of him who has never obtained any thing from his fellow-creatures but by mutual voluntary exchange, persuasion, or the sympathies thence ensuing; and say, is it rational to persevere in upholding the institution of slavery for the almost annihilation of the happiness of the slave-owners, supposing that the slaves themselves had no more feelings and were no more worthy of consideration, than the plants they cultivate?

All institutions, then, supporting slavery, or in as far as they have that tendency, are not only incapable of being made useful for the increase of knowledge and production, but are amongst the most effectual engines for the ultimate annihilation of knowledge, production, and happiness.

Under no head perhaps so appropriate as that of field or domestic slavery, can be introduced the institutions, almost universally prevailing, whether in despotisms or republics, respecting that half of the human race which hypocritical sensuality calls the most lovely, the most innocent, and the best portion of it, women. Man is to woman the most lovely and joy-exciting creature in the universe, as woman is to man: therefore as to loveliness, and similar nonsense, the account is balanced. Nature has given woman less strength, and has subjected her to enormous physical inconveniences and pain from which men are exempt. Are these reasons why man should add to these natural and unavoidable evils, artificial restraints and evils that may be avoided? or should he not rather endeavour to balance them, and render a compensation for natural unavoidable evils, by artificial advantages, that happiness might be ultimately equal to all? But let us look to the absolute effects as to the diffusion of knowledge, of the domestic, civil, and political, slavery, in which women are held. First, one half of the knowledge and of the happiness to be derived from it, that might be enjoyed by all adult human beings, is wantonly sacrificed, by withholding from women the means equal to those enjoyed by men, of acquiring knowledge. In whatever way this knowledge may operate, whether as giving pleasure in the immediate intellectual culture and activity, whether as a source of the only useful power and influence on mind, or as acquiring gratification from new articles of wealth, the effect is the same; the sacrifice is wanton; 'tis like deliberately consigning one half the wealth of a community every year into the ocean. Next, the general intellect of the whole community, male and fe-

male, is stunted or perverted in infancy, or more commonly both, by keeping from women the knowledge possessed by men. The first years of childhood must be every where, from physical conveniences, under their controul: falsehoods instead of facts, false reasonings, and pernicious habits, must be instilled in proportion to the ignorance of the tutors; and the whole of after culture, even when judiciously directed, is frequently insufficient to undo the mischiefs of early false associations, instead of being free to direct its whole energy to the implanting through the senses and judgement, useful facts and truths and habits tending to happiness on the, at least unperverted, mind. Third, the intellectual improvement of men and every possible advance in knowledge (art and science) are chained down and arrested by the imperious necessity for mutual happiness from associations, the most near and intimate that human nature allows, between men and women. By the maintenance of ignorance in women, one half of the human race is opposed in interest to, is in never-ceasing conspiracy against, the intellectual superiority of the other half. Women must make the most of the good qualities they possess to acquire influence over and happiness from men, as men do with respect to women, as well as towards each other. What's the consequence of this universal law of human nature? The alienation of women from mental pursuits necessarily throws all their exertions into the physical line,—beauty, dress, manner, arts of exciting desire or associations connected with it. All sensual things and things of immediate domestic concernment, in which they can share, are necessarily put forward and preferred by them to intellectual pleasures, to things of public or national interest, in which they cannot share. Thus, possessed of the means of exciting the strongest of human propensities, all this influence is directed to the triumph of passion and feeling, of immediate enjoyment and short-sighted and selfish pleasures, (or at most confined to the domestic circle,) over the pleasures of enlarged benevolence and comprehensive knowledge. The ignorance and the local selfish views of women are a balancing force always in operation, to bring down to their own level the expanding sympathies and aspirations for knowledge of men. Whatever, *not them*, man sets his heart upon, is with them *a rival*; and every art of malicious ignorance (for knowledge ceases to be malicious) is put into motion to decry its value. The incessant action of this fatal domestic machinery too surely accomplishes its purpose. The ignorant and the short-sighted sensualists amongst the men, lend their weight, to court women's favor, in decrying qualities unprofitable to them; and thus are

the stronger half of human kind justly punished, in the diminution of their own virtue and knowledge, for depriving the other, the weaker, half, of the means of acquiring them.

The only and the simple remedy for the evils arising from these almost universal institutions of the domestic slavery of one half the human race, is utterly to eradicate them. Give men and women *equal* civil and political rights. Apply the principle of security, impartially, to all adult rational human beings; and let property on the death of parents be equally divided between all the children male and female. Then would be seen a double emulation of knowledge and consequently of virtue; an emulation between the two sexes at school and in after life, and an emulation on the part of women in adding their influence to the rewards of public opinion in the general encouragement of intellectual qualities instead of their general depression: and sexual pleasures to both parties, instead of being diminished, would be increased a hundred fold, inasmuch as they would be stripped of all their grossness and associated with intellectual and expansive sympathetic pleasures. By the annihilation of this one iniquitous institution of the domestic slavery of one half of a community and substituting a perfect equality of rights and duties, the progress in acquiring and diffusing knowledge would be more than doubled.

Wherever we turn our eyes over the machinery of society, the irresistible effects of *institutions*, or of those states of things and circumstances in which mankind find themselves placed with respect to each other, both as affecting knowledge and production, arrest the attention. Constitutional laws, state religious establishments, institutions of slavery, the relative situation of women, have been glanced at: it might not perhaps be unprofitable to pass before us all social institutions with this view, would it not lead too far. There is one however, the disposal of property on the death of the owner, which is so very influential as to knowledge operating on production, that it cannot be here passed by.

Equal security awards to every one the free disposal of his labor, the exclusive use of all its products, and the right of voluntary exchange. But a man having by labor or voluntary exchange accumulated a great deal of these products, is drowned or by some other casualty dies. What shall be done with what he has accumulated? Shall it be left the prey of the first comer? That, amongst other evils, would be holding out encouragement to the destruction of the owner; for the chance of seizing his goods would be establishing the rule of brute force, or endless litigation. Shall it be seized by the

state for real or pretended public uses? That oriental legislation would defeat itself; for where could Government agents be found to watch all casualties and to anticipate private seizure and embezzlement? Property, the accumulated products of labor, being no longer capable of conferring happiness on the owner, now dead, ought to be distributed amongst the living, whom it can benefit, in that way which will tend the most to increase production and happiness. To find out this mode we must attend to the circumstances under which a person possessed of property usually dies. If under age, he has no property; it belongs to the parents who have provided for him. If advanced in life, he has, ordinarily, a wife and children, or both, and they have been in the habit of enjoying with him and considering themselves as the joint possessors of whatever he acquired. To take therefore from them his acquisitions, would be robbing them of what common use has already made as it were a joint stock, of what they have co-operated to produce or preserve, of what all their expectations have led them to anticipate the continuance of, or the ultimate possession of what they most stand in need, of what they have the greatest facilities for purloining or retaining, of what therefore could not without vexatious restraints innumerable be taken from them, and of what the deceased would, in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of one thousand, wish them to possess. By securing it to them no one loses: by giving it to any others, they feel all the miseries of disappointment and loss. Every other family must have had a parent: and as all the families in the community must be provided for, the most simple and *self-executing* mode of providing for all, is to secure to each family the products of the parent's industry. By thus adjudging to the family the property left at the death of a parent, a bond of connexion, of co-operation and sympathy is formed amongst all the members of families, and encouragement is held out to such associations, without which the helpless young of the human race could hardly be reared and the race preserved. Adjudge the property out of the family, and one of the strongest incentives to this most useful association and to co-operation and mutual kindness during its continuance, is destroyed. But in what proportions shall these articles of wealth be divided amongst the children of the possessor? in equal or unequal shares? If in equal shares, the power of making a will by the proprietor is superfluous. If in unequal shares, who shall determine the proportions?

Arrived so far, we must look here, as on all other occasions, to *effects*. What effects on future production, and on knowledge as tributary to production—that production being

here always supposed to be rendered by the wisest distribution most conducive to happiness—will be produced by equal and unequal divisions respectively? First, as to the *wants* and the *capacities for happiness*, of all the children of a family; we have already proved them to be equal, for all social purposes, in all cases of ordinary organization: therefore inequality of distribution would diminish happiness. Should any be defective in organization, acquired wealth would be the more necessary to compensate for the loss of happiness capable of being derived from personal exertion. But as on the other hand the well organized not only can enjoy more, but can make their capital more productive, these circumstances of the healthy and infirm may be left to balance each other, and the rule of equality will be untouched. Second, as to industry and production; by giving almost all to one and leaving the others nearly destitute, the effect is, that the favored relinquishes industry and lives on the contributions he makes others pay for the use of the articles of wealth accumulated, whether in the shape of food, clothing, or implements; while those not favored are discouraged, as well as disenabled from active exertion, by the want of those instruments which are necessary to make their efforts effectual. The ordinary effect of unequal division of wealth (we speak here of the real accumulated products of labor, not of mere demands, without any equivalent given, on the products of the labor of others) is to make the favored idle through want of excitement, their wants being already gratified, and the unfavored idle through necessity; and to make both parties vicious, the one arrogant and dissolute, the other crouching and obsequious and ready by any means but those of industry to acquire wealth. Every approach to inequality must have a tendency, as far as it goes, to the production of these mischiefs. Third, as to knowledge; the effects of inequality of division will follow its effects on industry. The industrious have every possible motive, under the influence of security, to search every where for the means of making their labor more productive to themselves of happiness, or of diminishing its irksomeness or difficulty. But all these means imply an increase of knowledge: as inequality takes away the stimulus to industry, or much relaxes it; in proportion to the degree in which it prevails, must those motives be deficient which urge to the acquisition of knowledge connected with the pursuits before it. And inasmuch as when the mind is once excited and curiosity is on the wing, it is pleased with whatever acquisition of knowledge it may light upon, *general knowledge* is increased and made productive by this excited activity, particularly those branches

of that general knowledge which lead to increased production.

If then equality of distribution on the death of the producer or accumulator (i. e. of value according to convenience, not of the absolute division of every article) be attended with such useful effects, as to maximizing the happiness of the family, as to increasing production and knowledge; why has the power of making wills or of dead men legislating for living men, been so generally established? Why also, it may be asked in reply, has the slavery of the blacks, and of women, been established? Because the *whites* in the one case, because the *men* in the other, made the laws: because knowledge had not been obtained on these subjects, the *whites* and the *men* erroneously conceiving it to be their interest to oppress blacks and women. Men of advanced age, i. e. parents, have been universally the law-makers, the ignorant and often the vicious law-makers. What *reasons* have been given for establishing this strange power, by means of wills, of regulating by anticipation the actions and enjoyments of future ages? We shall see. They have been various, and absolutely contradictory.

Will you permit a man, because he now possesses a piece of land, or a quantity of silver, or brass, or gold, to determine what is to be done with them for ever, or in a thousand years, when no memorial can exist of his name, except the chance of its preservation to record his mandate as to the disposal of the property in question? By no means say all: quite absurd: how should he know in what way this property can be made most productive of happiness—the only use of any property or of any *thing*—in one thousand or in one hundred years? In order to form an accurate judgement, a man must have before him accurately all the circumstances of the case: but no man can say what will be the circumstances of any case in ten years, nay in ten months; nor of course is it possible for him until the time comes and the circumstances are ascertained and out of dispute, to form any useful judgement. No prudent man would bind himself, *come what may*, to dispose of property in a particular manner at any future period, however near. His views might change, his judgement might improve, or what he thinks probable may not take place or may not continue to exist. He makes no unalterable dispositions for futurity, except such as are necessary to procure the co-operation of others, such co-operation being necessary to promote the object in view. How then should he think, without madness, of dictating to any useful purpose the disposal of property after his death, in a thousand years? All the exchanges, and the two-fold benefits to which they give

rise, gratifying always both parties voluntarily exchanging and ameliorating the article by its transfer to a new owner more able than the last to make it useful, are lost by this mandate for the eternal fixation or disposal of property. What is the benefit a living man could derive from the vain desire of usurping power over the actions and enjoyments of future generations? Simply the pleasure of the contemplation of the exercise of such fancied remote power. What is the evil the exercise of such power may produce to others who may come after him? Vexations and misery to any extent: for if the disposal be useful, there is no need of a mandate; posterity will for its own sake preserve the disposition. Weigh then this pleasure, the evil of the loss of this pleasure of imagination against the evils to any extent and to any number of persons, that may arise from the exercise of such power. They are as an indefinite number to one, or rather to an incalculable fraction of one.

So far then all are agreed. The best wisdom of the living is the only rational rule for the guidance of the affairs of the living, who, if endowed with equal intellectual power, must be wiser than their ancestors, having had the benefit of their experience. In barbarous times alone have such efforts been made to direct property and human actions into one line for ever. All that is now asked for in British Legislation, is that the *parent* acquiring property may be at liberty to leave all his children destitute at his death, or to leave his property in whatever proportions between them and others his caprice may dictate; this power to extend no further than to the children of the living.

By the laws of free labor and voluntary exchange, the basis of this inquiry, every man who fairly acquires, may freely use or alienate for whatever consideration may seem to him meet. Such is the greatest encouragement that the nature of human affairs permits, the greatest stimulus that can be given in the way of motive to voluntary exertion, for the increase of production. If a man do not choose while he lives to exercise this power of exchanging for whatever he may deem an adequate equivalent, the inference is, that it most promotes his views of his own happiness not to exercise it. What more can he demand of society? A power which he does not choose to exercise during his life to be extended to him over the living after he has ceased to live. This power being altogether unnecessary and superfluous for the encouragement of production, must be judged of by other principles. Those are, as we have seen above, the *effects* to be produced on human happiness, by the different modes in

which this property may be distributed. In favor of an equal distribution amongst the children, are an equal expectation and capacity of enjoyment, the promotion of industry, and the acquisition of knowledge. What plea has the parent against these?

The mere childish pleasure of power, of dictating to posterity, is at once dismissed as a *vicious* pleasure, as one accompanied with preponderant evil, and which would be superseded in a well-constituted mind by the view of the pernicious effects on human happiness which the general exercise of such power would produce. In a well-constituted mind, the pleasure to be derived from the exercise of power will depend on its utility, or tendency to promote happiness, alone; that is to say, on the preponderant mass of good to the agent, to others, or to both, to be derived from its exercise.

All the benefits put forward in favor of the limited power of making wills to bind even the immediate descendants of the testator, may perhaps be found under some one of the three following heads.

The power of making wills—absolute as to shares though not as to time—serves, it has been said, to afford an additional and useful stimulus to productive industry and accumulation.

It serves as a means of promoting the moral and punishing the immoral conduct of children, as well as of gratifying parental partialities or attachments.

It is a means of perpetuating wealth, and thence power, influence, and the means of physical and other enjoyments, to the descendants of certain individuals.

The first assumed advantage is a mere pretext, a fiction, a falsehood. Need we more to prove it so than the fact, that amongst the industrious producers and accumulators of wealth the cases are very rare where this power is used? in such contradiction does it stand to the equal claims of want, affection, and beneficence. To the few immense accumulators and ambitious, who seek what are called political advantages, or the usurpation of the powers of legislation by one part of their families and the support of the remainder by the public plunder which this usurpation throws into their hands, and to the few, whom diseased intellect or wayward circumstances have placed at war with their offspring, is the exercise of this tremendous power confined: so entirely superfluous and unthought of is it as a useful stimulus to the production of wealth. Wealth is sought for, for the sake of the pleasures and advantages its possession confers to be substantially used and enjoyed, and for the sake of the interest and animation of

life which the mere pursuit occasions; and it is accumulated for the sake of the *distinction*, the envy, and admiration, which its possession excites. Were the motive of arbitrary dispositions at death, over and above the power of unlimited transfer during life, a generally operating motive in the production of wealth, it would be generally exercised. Not being so, but, when exercised, springing for the most part from different motives, it cannot be considered as worthy of any attention in this respect. If the desire of the legislator be sincere to increase production, the way is simple, namely, to remove all existing restraints on equal security and the natural laws of distribution and to diffuse knowledge, not to superadd a chimerical motive, a temptation to absurd and unjust displays of power, a vain or pernicious hope of restraining the actions of others after death, which this power implies. It will be seen hereafter that in those few cases in which it does operate as a motive to immediate immense accumulation and is accordingly unsparingly exercised, its effects are in every possible view pernicious to human happiness, and on a balance of all its consequences, *ultimately* most destructive, even to the production and accumulation of wealth. Its sole effect as to capital is, not to increase the mass of the whole capital of a community, but to favor its accumulation in large masses, in a few hands at the expense of the general comfort and independence. There are motives enough with the rich, and too many unjust facilities are open to them, particularly those possessing political power, in the pursuit of wealth by any means: to them a *restraint*, not such an additional spur, is wanting. It is to the poor productive laborers, to whom this motive can never apply, that new inducements are wanting. This power, where it ought to operate to be useful, produces no effect: where it does operate, in adding to accumulation, its effects are pernicious. No factitious motives are wanting to promote accumulation: the natural motives are sufficiently strong; aided as they are by the other numberless expedients of insecurity, they generate that exclusive pursuit of wealth which is the bane of civilization and which religionists and moralists affect to deplore. Institutions should restrain this inordinate desire, not supply fuel to its already devouring flames. It is motives to *production* (to produce and live on the products of his own labor), not to *accumulation* (to produce nothing, but to live on the products of the labor of others), it is rewards for the operative laborers, not for capitalists or accumulators, that are wanting in society. If the power of making wills increased the desire to accumulate, it would on that account be most pernicious.

The next assumed effect of the power of leaving to children unequal portions of wealth, "that of promoting their morals and gratifying parental fondness," will as little bear examination as the former.

To repress injurious conduct of a child towards its parent, the parent possesses superior strength and superior knowledge and an absolute command over all the means of happiness or misery of the child. Besides all these, as soon as a child, from being able to look into consequences, is made liable to the penalties of law as regards other people, he is also, and more coercively, made liable to such penalties if offending against his parent. Until manhood, the parent is bound simply to support the child. Every possible means of influence (short of brutal cruelty, rarely cognizable, and not effective to any good purpose,) which one human being can possess to mould the character of another, the parent possesses over the child. Over the parent the child's *power* of influence is nothing: its *right* extending but to support and freedom from brutality. With such tremendous odds of influence in the hands of the parent, possessing all the immediate, certain, intense, intelligible modes of influence; will it be gravely said that more power is still wanting to the parent, that new motives must be sought for, and that they will be found in the remote, and to a child utterly unapt and unintelligible, threat, that on the death of the parent his share of unappropriated property shall be lessened? Unparalleled ignorance of the minds of children! What care they, or what are they able to apprehend, about masses of property, about events depending on remote contingencies? For the *immediate* enjoyment of taste in consuming a basket of peaches, or any other fruit or thing which they might think exquisite, they would sign away all the reversions and remote probabilities in the universe: property to them means enjoyment, and the nearer and greater the better. Of all motives to operate on children, those which are remote, uncertain, and indistinct, are the most worthless; and except they are associated with terror—(which these are not)—and therefore for other reasons not to be employed—the most inoperative. If a parent fails in producing the wished-for effect on the mind of a child, it is for want of *knowledge*, not of power, that he fails. The materials of salutary, nay of illicit influence, are redundant: want of selection and guidance are the points in which he fails. If then, for these reasons, such motives are *useless* in educating, in forming the characters, of children—and other reasons would show them to be as pernicious as useless—is it for influencing the mind when it is fully developed in grown per-

sons and when the education is completed, that this power of unequal distribution after death is called for? Ready to enter on the world and to act in life, there stand the children, formed by the circumstances which the wisdom, the folly, or the neglect of the parent has caused to operate upon them. The creatures of the parent's formation, who but the parents should derive good or evil from the instruments they have made? If they have brought them up to idleness, to intemperance, to faithlessness, to cruelty, whom so meet that these vices should punish as the artificers who have made them? Whom so meet that the opposite virtues should reward and bless? Would you reverse this order of nature and of useful moral discipline? Before we trouble ourselves in looking out for new means of influence to throw into the hands of parents over such instruments, by them formed to whatever they are; let us see how they have hitherto employed their all but omnipotence over the fate of these beings, and what extent of power remains to them. Those who have employed their power well, neither need nor ask for any additional means of control. Those only who, from misuse, have proved themselves incapable of exercising it aright, are the claimants of additional portions of it. But even without moral influence, what means of controul have these incapable or guilty parents still left? The power of withholding, even to the means of existence, while they live, every object of desire possessed by them, from their children. The additional power of *giving* to any they favor, while they live, to any extent, withholding, to the extent of destitution, from the rest. The protection of the laws even to a greater extent than others are protected, from the misconduct of such children. To promote what *moral* and *justifiable* object, ought powers greater than these—where no *crime* can be proved or imputed—to be intrusted to one human being over another adult like himself? The fact is, these powers are already *too great* for moral purposes, as affecting the characters of parents or of children; but other preponderant evils would be produced by any attempt (except under Mr. Owen's views, which we shall come to presently) to lessen them. The legitimate instruments of moral influence are, knowledge and reason, the interest of mutual exchanges, mutual co-operation and mutual benevolence. For what purpose then can be sought for by parents the power of prolonging beyond their death the destitution of a child, whose whole previous life might by the conduct of such parent have been rendered destitute? For no other purpose than that of favoritism on the one side and antipathy on the other. What is favoritism?

Favoritism is the preference of one child to another for reasons which an impartial spectator could not discover, or would not approve. In love affairs, where the favoritism is mutual, where the feelings to be gratified are dependent on the most slight associations, where the object in view is solely the happiness of the parties concerned and none others are influenced, and where the assent of both parties interested must be obtained, it matters not much whether the causes of liking are apparent, would bear strict scrutiny, or not. But in the case of a parent, favoritism to one is injustice to all the rest of the children, and it is the signal for the lighting up of every malignant passion and foul contrivance. Instead of deliberately giving means of influence to favoritism, the wish of benevolence would be to see it banished from families altogether. Alas ! there are too many means of cherishing this demon of family discord without looking beyond the tomb for nourishment to pamper it. Largesses and gifts without number, to the whole amount of what a parent possesses, he may freely *give* to gratify his fondness, ever so unreasonable, without assigning any cause. But attached to these largesses, is this salutary caution; *they cannot be recalled*. If neglect or contempt of the parent should follow on the transfer, they must, by the parent, be borne. Hence the useful prudential check to the excessive transfer of property to favorites during life. But after death, at the expense of others, when he, the dotard, will run no risk of ingratitude, when on the innocent all the evils of the misuse of the unequal inheritance will fall, then will the reward of cunning, perfidious, obsequiousness be to be reaped. And is it wise that the state of things should be deliberately made to be such? that the most alluring motives should be upheld for the practice of the most detestable vices, falsehood, perjury, and at the hour of death, of scenes of influence, or force, at the discretion of the expectants, not to be named? It is time to open the eyes of parents to the cutting mockery of this most pernicious power. It leads them on to an abyss of unintentional guilt and misery to others, and of ultimate dependence as to themselves, from which they may, too late, wish to be extricated in vain. Kindness while living according to real deserts, and equal justice at death, are the simple substitutes for favoritism and the power of unequal distribution: substitutes tending as necessarily to the moral conduct and happiness of all parties, parents and children, as their opposites do to vice and misery.

The next effect, gravely put forward as a beneficial one, in favour of the power of arbitrary distribution of a parent's property amongst his children at death, is "perpetuating, or

aiming to perpetuate, wealth and thence power, influence, and enjoyment amongst the descendants of the possessor."

Were not the possession of political power anticipated as a necessary consequence of the possession of excessive wealth, and were not the state of things such, as to constitutional institutions, as to justify this anticipation; it is impossible that a practice so hostile to human happiness in almost all its effects, could have been tolerated amongst rational beings. But where any hereditary power, such as that of legislation, is possessed by the holders of excessive wealth, or where their influence is necessarily great with the holders of political power, there the policy and seeming mystery of the system become apparent. *The hereditary possession of wealth, is one of the most tremendous and efficient expedients ever devised for depriving mankind of the benefits of self-government.* It is not only a useful but a necessary expedient for the support of aristocratical power. Strip aristocracy of its wealth; and who would not laugh at the claim of a parcel of paupers—or of men only equally rich with the rest of the community—to make laws for their fellow-creatures, without being delegated by them so to do? But put the head of a family already in possession of excessive wealth, in possession of political power also; and are not all the members of the family provided for? provided for without lessening an atom the family possessions? provided for at the public expense, at the expense of the productive classes of the community? Where any sort of aristocracy exists, that is to say, any inequality of rights exists amongst the adult sane members of a community, particularly where the monstrous usurpation exists of law-making without delegation, all the machinery of government will be made to correspond with it. Establishments will be made and offices created for the employment, or under the pretence of employment, for the salarizing of the younger branches of these families; and the payments of these salaries will be regulated by no other rule than the rule of expenditure to which these families have been accustomed, and which it is worthy of their dignity to accept, limited only by the capability or stupidity of the people in affording the supplies. As all the members of a family must be supported, and as their habits have been formed, and their desires always directed to associate, with the elder branch, and as this branch engrosses all the paternal wealth, the community in which such iniquitous distributions are permitted must bear the burthen of supporting all the other branches on an equality of association with the elder. Permitting the injustice of parents, it adopts as its own the younger branches—O wise community! O happy younger branches!

—provides offices for them ; and those offices are the powers of ruling them, of government in all its departments—those excepted perhaps which require intellect and labor. If, on the one hand, the private injustice of unequal distribution of wealth can never exist to any injurious extent, except where facilities of providing for the younger branches out of public plunder (with or without color of law) present themselves ; so, on the other, wherever these facilities of large useless establishments and over payments—i. e. any thing beyond the least that will get the work well done—exist, there will inequality of distribution of private wealth immediately, if by the laws permitted, take place. The one evil cannot exist without the other : the one is a necessary support of the other. The plain and indispensable remedy is utterly to abolish both ; both the power of unequal division of property amongst children, and the existence of useless or overpaid offices. The existence of either one or the other of these abuses permitted, a conspiracy is necessarily and eternally on foot in the bosom of society for the introduction of the other. Knowledge and a right direction of it, by active exertion, to promote preponderant good, being two great desiderata for human happiness ; in order to obtain the most of them, all the means for calling forth and rewarding talents and virtue at the disposal of a community, ought to be open to all and not to be thrown into the hands of a few ; particularly public employments, in which always public approbation should constitute a very large portion of the payment. While the perpetuating of wealth in certain families secures to them all public offices and rewards, it renders them proud, presumptuous and incapable, and these offices and rewards they look upon as their patrimony ; shutting out all competition, sometimes by insulting positive regulation, at all times by an equally efficient system of mutual sympathy and mutual co-operation amongst the members of the rich families. Thus are the great mass of the community deprived of the exciting influence of those premiums for the development of talents and virtues which their own industry has created : and an overwhelming interest is established in the midst of them, monopolizing those premiums without the slightest call on those acquiring them for the display of any talents or virtues whatever. In short, the mass of public rewards, which, if rightly arranged and open to all, would be a great school for the unfolding of the whole of the national talent and virtue, is converted into an institution for the perpetuating of vice ; if selfishness, indolence and ignorance are to be regarded as vicious. Thus the whole of the pretended third advantage imputed to the power of making unequal distributions of property amongst children, resolves itself into the evils of excessive wealth,

which have been already treated of in the chapter on that subject. The whole of the accumulated property of a community, ought to be thrown as much as possible into the general theatre of competition for the development of useful activity; regard being had always and solely to security to ensure constant reproduction. Equal security (not the pretended security of a few) being provided for, equality of distribution, and equality of chance of obtaining by merit, should be the rule followed, in order to render wealth most conducive to happiness.

Fear has been ignorantly expressed, even by sincere advocates of the happiness of their fellow-creatures, lest the equal distribution of property amongst children on the death of the parent, should lead, in case of land, to so minute a division as to be incompatible with the most useful cultivation, and even with the happiness of the occupiers. The wretchedness of the small holders (renters) in Ireland, has been brought forward as a proof of this fatal tendency of minute division.

'Twere enough perhaps, in refutation of these idle fears, to refer to sections, 8, 9, 11, &c., of the first chapter, showing the paramount blessings of equality, except when limited by security, as expressed in the natural laws of distribution. Security saying nothing on this subject, or being in accordance with the principle of equality, all the reasons for equality plead in its favor.

Where real property, real ownership, is communicated, and not rack-rent tenantry as in Ireland, where the expedients of insecurity are removed and knowledge is diffused, where the successors to small shares of land can alienate; what is to hinder, either by combination of the occupiers or sale to capitalists, the gathering of the land into parcels most convenient for economical cultivation? Whether the produce of the land is what is called "disposable," or all consumed without exchange by the occupiers, is matter of perfect indifference, the only rational object of production being the greatest happiness of the producers. And if all the producers, that is, all the inhabitants of a country raise their happiness to the highest, what more is to be desired? Knowledge and the possession of comforts, are the only efficient, as they are the sufficient checks to an excess of population beyond the means, not to say of existence but of happiness.

The evils then arising from the power of unequal distribution of wealth by will amongst children, being obvious, the pretended advantages of the practice mere fallacies, it is to be reckoned, amongst the existing minor institutions of society—constitutional institutions being of the first importance—as one of the most pernicious, as affecting the distribution of wealth, production and knowledge.

Of the numerous minor institutions under the head of law, revenue, police, &c., whose operation is most extensive on distribution, production and knowledge, the state of *judicial procedure*, or the expedients devised for carrying the laws into effect, the institution of that particular mode of taxation, or forcible abstraction of the products of labor, called *tithes*, the institution of the usurpations on what ought to be equal rights, called *game laws*, and the effects in these respects of *over-taxation*, of what is called *national debt*, or a pretended claim on the labor of all future generations, and their necessary accompaniment and support, *iniquitous revenue laws*, would well merit our attention. But the inquiry would lead so far, and many of them have been by enlightened men so fully developed, that we can only allude to their operation, lest it should be thought that their effects were overlooked or underrated. In as far as the operation of these is injurious, and almost to their whole extent they are injurious, they afford practical lessons of injustice and every species of immorality to the whole community, practical schools for the formation and diffusion of pernicious notions, and at which the habits of the people must, whether they will or not, be formed. General vague declamations, in the mouths of priests or philosophers, about truth, justice, beneficence, will not weigh a feather in forming the character in opposition to practical demonstrations and examples of falsehood, rapine, and cruelty. Under bad institutions, what is called the teaching of morality is nothing more than the inculcating *habits of submission to oppression*. All real knowledge and genuine morality, that is to say, the morality which is founded on an equal regard to the happiness and consequently to the rights of all, are systematically proscribed as inconsistent with such institutions.

From the conjoined operation of all these institutions, major and minor, on a community—supposing no oral or written addresses to adults or school education existed—would the character, including the moral habits and the knowledge of a people, be formed. By these all their actions, all their wants, are liable every moment of their lives to be operated upon. There is no external knowledge addressed to children or to adults, which can counteract their influence: the knowledge must destroy the institutions, or the institutions will blot out the knowledge. If then it be thought desirable that habits of industry, of truth, of fortitude, of temperance, of prudence, of beneficence, of mental cultivation, be universally formed amongst communities of men, as a basis for the greatest production and maximum of enjoyment from wealth, the first attention of the wise will be directed to the existing institutions

which stand directly in the way of the formation of those habits amongst the people, and which implant habits diametrically opposed to them. Institutions and the interests they engender, operate in comparison with mere knowledge, as things operate, compared with the words which represent them, as the taste of a peach or the sting of a wasp does compared with its description. In order to clear the way, to afford an opening for the commencement of the diffusion of useful knowledge and moral habits amongst a community, all counteracting institutions should be removed; every thing which impedes the greatest equality of the distribution of wealth consistent with security, or, in other words, which is incompatible with the natural laws of distribution, ought to be removed. Then would be seen the incalculable effects which real knowledge, addressed to the adult, and to the young in the way of education, in facilitating and increasing production and forming moral habits, the elements of happiness, would produce. Then would begin, not the perfection of the human character and of social condition, but the *commencement* of their forward career. All the skill and activity which are now employed for mutual competition and annoyance, would then be employed for mutual co-operation to the common good.

Almost all the useful knowledge that has been hitherto diffused and the improvements that have been made, have been done in spite of existing institutions. In the early ages of the existence and the associations of the human race, before the art of writing was discovered, and even through subsequent ages before the further improvement, the art, by means of printing, of diffusing writings through a community, was discovered, the formation of human character necessarily depended altogether on the existing institutions. In all countries, these institutions were necessarily the result of fortuitous circumstances, and were almost universally the work of ignorant force or fraud, or a combination of both; the object always being so to order things that the successful party might enjoy power and all means of pleasure at the expense of the mass of the community. It could not be otherwise: mankind, till late ages, have had very little knowledge on physical subjects; still less on extensive moral combinations. Seldom has a feeble effort been made, founded on imperfect knowledge, by a whole community, as in ancient Greece, Italy, &c., at self-government; soon, marred by that same want of knowledge and the consequent usurpations of some aspiring body of men over the rest of the community, the institutions were perverted. It is but of late that, even in theory, has been admitted the first principle of social justice, that "the sole

object of all institutions and laws ought to be to promote the happiness of the whole of the community, or, where there was any incompatibility, that the happiness of the greater number should be always preferred to that of the lesser." Hence the almost universal prevalence of institutions by which the happiness of the mass of the community, is, as well through ignorance as by system, sacrificed to the supposed interests of the few who happen to possess the political power. It would be indeed surprising if institutions, the motley mixtures of the results of force, fraud, and ignorance, should, except by chance, have operated favorably to the interests of the whole or the majority of the members of communities. As soon as, in spite of their pernicious operation, knowledge shall have penetrated amongst those subjected to them, they must all be remodelled with a view to universal happiness.

This, and all other good, must be effected by the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge. The first mode of exciting, diffusing, or suppressing knowledge, by means of *institutions*, being disposed of in the few preceding illustrations, we pass to the second, by means of *instruction*, verbal or written, addressed to the adult members of a community.

Though it would have been sufficient for the general argument to point out the evil effects on production and happiness of the *perverted notions*, misnamed knowledge, engendered by existing institutions, as exemplified in a few of them; yet when it was considered that this might be objected to as a partial survey, the reasons for and against such institutions were inquired into, though at the expense of space and perhaps of strict appropriateness to the subject of this chapter, the diffusion of knowledge.

SECTION 3.

Of instruction, verbal or written, addressed to adults, as the second means of diffusing or suppressing knowledge. Obstacles to its progress.

HERETO mankind have been governed by the unreflecting habits formed by *institutions*, with the necessary supplement of force always at hand to restrain their aberrations. Henceforth rational beings must be governed by reason. Since the invention of the art of printing, a new and altogether incalculable power of operating on mankind has been silently

working its way. The individuals happening to possess power in different communities, have more or less aided its progress as a new means of support or gratification to themselves or annoyance to their enemies. This power is that of increasing knowledge, the improvement of human reason: when diffused and expressed, on matters of general interest, it becomes that moral force, before which all other is doomed to yield, the force of *public opinion*. In former ages this moral engine, even if its capabilities had been known to a few, could not have been called into action, from the prevalence of vicious social institutions, and from the want of diffusion and quick communication by the press. It is now on the point of governing all civilized communities. It is becoming alike the arbiter of public and private morals, and the modeller of all institutions. When formally expressed, it will be the legal ascertained *will* of a rational community regulating its own affairs.

There is no species of knowledge, to the acquisition and diffusion of which the ignorance and jealousy of men, happening to possess the governing powers of communities, have not opposed themselves. The reason is, that their power was necessarily founded upon or associated with the ignorant notions of physical as well as moral events and reasonings, which prevailed at the time their ascendancy over their fellow-creatures commenced. The less they knew of governing mankind by their interests, the more were they under the necessity of supporting their power by pretensions to superior knowledge and frauds of all sorts, always ultimately supported by brute force. Of these one of the most common, was the pretension to an intimacy with and delegation from supposed superior beings, still preserved in the impertinent absurdity of modern times, as "by the grace of God." Under such a partnership, these men frequently promulgated, to increase and perpetuate their influence, systems of physics, and morals, or of morals embracing more or less of physics, as a support to, or sometimes as forming part of, the laws and institutions which they framed. Hence those who succeeded the first active founders, necessarily ignorant and indolent from want of motives to exertion, would revenge, if they could, any doubt or disrespect shown to any part of the ill-arranged machinery on which their power was built. Hence almost all great discoveries in physics, astronomy, the form and structure of the earth, of the human frame, &c., have been persecuted and their discoverers denounced as impious or seditious. The priests of all ages, as the universal dealers in juggling and absurdities for the sake of the plunder they produce, and the tools and sycophants where they cannot be the partners of

masters, of the rulers, have been the most bitter persecutors of knowledge, truly regarding it as their most fatal enemy. The application however of numerous subordinate species of knowledge to the comforts of life, and consequently to their own comfort, could not but be seen and felt at times by the rulers, though the prevailing insecurity rendered it inoperative for the general good. Hence its tardy and occasional development in what are termed the arts, supplying the means of domestic convenience or of idle pomp and unbridled sensual indulgences to these rulers. Here and there the priests or rulers, to confirm their domination and increase the blind admiration of ignorance, endeavoured themselves to cultivate in secret some branches of knowledge, using it for their own purposes, but carefully concealing it from vulgar contact: such pretended knowledge was mostly grimace and pretensions, guarded by mystery: very little real addition was thus made to knowledge. In this way warred, in every part of the earth, institutions and power with knowledge, till the discovery of the art of printing assured to knowledge the ascendancy. Since that time, knowledge has been gradually gaining on brute force and institutions hostile to security. Still however on certain legislative and moral subjects, and even on physical subjects when connected with these, knowledge is persecuted: *opinions* are persecuted. In Spain and other countries, there was a particular tribunal set apart, called the Inquisition, for the tormenting of those whose opinions differed from theirs who wielded the engines of the Inquisition. In England, the Inquisition is incorporated into the body of the common law, and thus artfully concealed. The common judges, in their character of Inquisitors, incorporating an enormous mass of puerile dogmas, visions, and dreams, regulations made by able barbarians for a barbarous state of society, followed by sweeping abrogations of these same laws, poetry, history, real or pretended facts, physical truths and falsehoods, good and bad moral precepts and allegorical fables, contained in what they call their holy books, into the body of what they call the "common law of the land," (i. e. whatever they think proper to call law,) torment at their pleasure, under the name of blasphemers, any persons who even *peak irreverently* of this heterogeneous medley of wisdom and folly, truth and fable: as if it were a characteristic of the whole or any part of this interminable system of common or even written law, that it could not be freely discussed, and as it is, in point of fact, its different parts and its whole mass were not every day most freely discussed, and most irreverently spoken of! Fortunately however for knowledge and mankind, so little was known or even dreamed of, at the

time these holy books were penned, by the compilers of them, that very few branches of the tree of physical science have been withered by their touch. Within the last fifty years, chiefly from the impulse of the mere hope of rational political institutions, so much activity and ardor of inquiry has been put forth, and science and art have made such conquests over the external substances and powers of nature, in rendering their properties and energies subservient to human use; that the productive powers of labor in preparing the physical means of well-being have been multiplied in some lines two, in others a hundred, and in others even to a thousand fold, and objects have been accomplished which were thought beyond the possibility of human power. These mighty physical improvements have taken place of late years, because those in possession of the political power of communities, without being an atom more disposed to promote the general good when opposed to their apparent particular interests, have been intelligent enough to perceive that the more sciences and arts were improved, and the more the productive classes of the community produced, the more would there remain for them, from which in a hundred ways, to extort plunder. Hence in England and other countries, many of the ancient restrictions on security have been removed; this prospect of more extensive plunder by taxation, operating at least as *one* out of the many motives that produced, in different times and places, the gradual relaxation of barbarous laws or of the open abuse of force. But the productive classes, the great majority of the members of civilized communities, have been hitherto very little if at all benefited, even in physical comforts, by the increased productive powers of labor. In the shape of *profits*, in the shape of unrelenting taxation, the increased productions of their labor have been taken away from the producers, and bestowed on certain idle, most frequently pernicious, unproductive classes, generally leagued with those in possession of political power. And in such ignorance have these productive classes been kept of their own interests and of self-respect, and so universally has the pernicious economical dogma been upheld of the necessity of *low wages* to flourishing manufactures, and the no less foolish dogma of the prosperity of a country depending on the mere number of its people, that no prudential foresight could be by the productive classes exercised in the way of limiting the increase of children to the probability of an adequate maintenance. Until knowledge on moral, particularly legislative, subjects, is diffused, this will be the deplorable issue of the utmost possible improvement in the physical sciences and arts and in the increased productive powers of

labor, that the unproductive in larger numbers will be pampered with larger surfeits of sensual indulgences and sloth; while the producers will, from the contrast between their poverty and the lustre of the luxuries they have manufactured for the unproductive, be the more despised. The true remedy then for the deep and variously ramified evils of society is to improve and diffuse political and other *moral* knowledge. The two reasons for this are quite incontrovertible; first, physical knowledge has comparatively no enemies or obstacles: second, all improvements in physical knowledge will be quite unavailing without correspondent advances in moral science or knowledge.

What then, it may be asked, remains to be done, but that those who conceive themselves possessed of political and other moral knowledge not yet diffused, should endeavour to diffuse it? Are not the same *means*, writings and discourses, open for the diffusion of moral, that have been used for the diffusion of physical knowledge? Do not the same *motives* present themselves, pecuniary profit, love of influence, love of reputation, love of intellectual activity, and sometimes, or mingled up with these, benevolence?

It is certainly on the diffusion, by individual effort, of moral knowledge, that all hopes of human improvement and happiness must be founded. From existing institutions the most that can be expected, is a mitigated hostility. A free unobstructed course is all that knowledge would ask, or ought to accept of, from any institutions. From the moment that authority interferes, and pretends by its fiat to render truth more plain, from that moment an improper bias is thrown on the judgement, and the result must be, *prejudice*, in the exact ratio that authority supersedes the exercise of the judgement. It may not be useless, however, to bring together the most prominent of the obstructions that still stand in the way of the diffusion of moral truth amongst the adult members of almost every existing community.

The first obstacle comes from the ignorance, the prejudices, and particularly the poverty caused by the insecurity produced by existing institutions.

The great majority of all communities are, by the present machinery of society, absolutely debarred from any exercise of judgement whatever on the wretched substitutes for knowledge presented to them before manhood: and in point of real knowledge, that is to say, useful, physical and moral facts and deductions, they are, even in this memory and repetition system, taught almost *nothing*. All the little really useful knowledge they acquire, is worked out by the incidents to which they are exposed.

by the operation of the surrounding institutions, and other circumstances not under the controul of these institutions. So undoubted is the fact of the extreme ignorance of the great majority of mankind, that until lately it was esteemed foolish or criminal to endeavour to substitute knowledge for this ignorance; and there are still those who openly maintain, and many more who secretly strive for, the perpetuating of this ignorance. Even those, interested in the support of old institutions, useful or pernicious, who profess a wish to remove this ignorance, consent to its removal only on the express condition of weaving into the new plan of what they call education, an uninquiring admiration of every opinion which they patronise, an entire prostration of the energies of mind, and, through the mind, of the physical strength and productive powers of the people, to their systems—regulated of course with a view to the eternizing of their domination. Too many even of those who think many existing institutions unwise and who have no view to political power or pecuniary profit, still mean no more by enlightening the people than making them believe without doubt or inquiry, *their peculiar notions*. The conduct of these men is more unreasonable than that of the possessors of power: for, why have not men in power as much right to make prostrate the understanding to their notions as any other men? and if they find fault with the system, why practise it? *Nothing*, implying judgement and influencing conduct, should be taught by any body, without stating the grounds, without inviting doubt and examination, without cautioning against the vice (falsehood) of pretending to be convinced and to assent, without comprehending the propositions: and no sort of disapprobation ought to be shown where inquiry led to an opinion different from that of the instructor. How far the jesuitical policy of instruction is wise, as to its patrons, and likely to be followed with the desired effects, we have not time to inquire. What is certain is, that in this state of ignorance or imbecility, are now found the minds of the great majority of every community on their entrance into life. Such are the minds on which those must operate who seek to diffuse moral truth, that is to say, what those to whom it is addressed shall, on examination, believe to be true.

Now, the obstacles arising from this ignorance have not been sufficiently attended to. It is with the powers of the mind or the brain as with the muscular powers. If they have not been exercised when young, and susceptible of any impulsion, they acquire either a habit of rigidity, of inapitude to motion, or an unfavourable direction of motion. It seems, indeed, that even when the muscular powers are found least susceptible at ma-

ture age, the defect is chiefly to be found *in the mind*: for, let the mind be roused, let desire to succeed and consequent attention be once called into life, the inaptitude or false motions of the muscles will gradually give way, strength will penetrate into the fibres with exercise and hope, and the facility and quickness of success will surprise the agent. Therefore, wherever the mind, the judging faculty, has never been roused into action and exercised, no resource is left to operate on any part of the human machine, and least of all upon the mind itself. The exercise is an effort; is a new thing: the pleasure of the exercise has never been experienced, and is not believed to exist: no good has ever been derived from it, and therefore it will not be believed that any can be derived. Address the senses, the passions—yes: but the faculty of reasoning is immovable. Such is the difficulty of rousing ignorance, where any train of thought requiring the least exertion, is necessary to enable it to see its own interest. What must it be where superadded to ignorance, certain propositions, the province of the judgement, have been forced upon the memory, and with these have been implanted associations of *terror* and *antipathy*, attached sometimes to the very name of any thing new in the way of knowledge, particularly moral knowledge? In every part of the world, the ignorant are taught to attach nothing less than infallibility to the notions on political and other moral subjects which those in power have thought proper to imbue them with. Never having been taught to *doubt*, they cannot conceive the possibility of forming more than one opinion on one subject, and that opinion of course the right one, and that opinion of course their opinion. And the greater the ignorance of those men in power, and the more pernicious the absurdity of the notions impressed, the greater of course is the necessity to guard those whom they teach, with such adjuncts of terror, antipathy and infallibility. When to these obstacles in the way of reasoning with the minds of ignorance and folly (the road being supposed open to address them by way of discourses or writings) is added another arising from the *poverty* of the great majority of every community, depriving them of the means of finding access to any information, verbal or written, which might be addressed to them, may not the friend of the “plain and simple truth” be well discouraged? Amongst the middling and higher classes, the obstacle of poverty of course does not exist. But the obstacles of prejudices, growing out of the interests and the associations of their professions and classes, are equally inveterate. The noble, the lawyer, the priest, have been severally subjected to and live by institutions repressing all freedom of inquiry, and drilling them,

without examination, to the reverence for and support of certain dogmas, regulations, and establishments : and one of the leading associations in which they all agree is, that those who dispute their notions, ought, if possible, to be tormented till they cease disputing them. This necessarily arises from their having taken up their opinions without inquiry : for, if they knew any reasons, they would find pleasure, from vanity, love of intellectual activity, or desire of doing good, in showing the truth and utility of their opinions and practices. There remain then to be operated upon, with some fair probability of success, the middle classes of the industrious whose pursuits do not necessarily beget peculiar interests or prejudices hostile to impartial investigation. Even amongst the interested and prejudiced classes, there are to be found individuals more influenced by the general interests than by those peculiar to their own body.

Another host of obstacles to the diffusion of moral knowledge arises from the circumstance that every part of this field, unlike the field of physics, is already occupied by a set of men, who derive wealth, possess power, and claim infallibility, in consequence of the notions they entertain and are in the habit of disseminating on these subjects. Go to the most important branch of morals, legislation, to the most important limb of this branch, the constitutional (that which determines who shall make, apply and execute the laws), and you will find it every where in possession of a parcel of mountebanks who will admit of no reasonings, whose whole support and never varying reply is, "It is established ; it is the constitution, we have power, and like any other pirates we'll keep what we have as long as we can." On the *utility* of the powers which they exercise, these men permit no discussion. Sometimes they publish their will, in the shape of an edict or law, consigning to torments, most frequently to death, those who point out the evils arising from their system of rule. Mostly their arbitrary will is executed without the formality of any edicts. Sometimes, as in England, they denounce banishment on all who twice express *disrespect* of them or their proceedings. Now, till men can as freely discuss the utility of the political existence of a jury, a king, a president, a noble, a representative of the people, as of the culinary convenience of copper kettles ; moral truth, the most important for mankind to know, cannot be elicited. The natural difficulties of the inquiry are quite enough without superadding artificial difficulties. Suppose that people were liable to be thrown into prison, tormented to death with cold, damp, and privations, bereft of the earnings of their industry, because they endeavoured to convince as many as

they could in all possible ways, by speaking and writing, that copper kitchen utensils were pernicious to health, to length of life and consequently to happiness, and suppose that the makers of these utensils had the power of punishment in their hands; would there be much chance of the improvement of culinary vessels while such a system of persecution lasted? Yet such exactly is the case with the holders of political power. If their system is useful—no matter whether founded yesterday or ten thousand years ago—truth, which is merely showing things as they are, will confirm it: if not useful, it ought not to exist beyond the time that the majority of those liable to its operation are convinced of its inexpediency. If the office of president, king, or any other, be a useless office; if the analogy between the body natural and the body politic be mere poetical nonsense, and if the business of what is called government, would be better done, with more real responsibility, by the six or seven ministers, each in his department and each elected by the community at large, than by a nominal *one* pretending to do every thing and really doing nothing; if the attempt to do the whole legislative business, national and provincial, of a large community, ten, twenty, or thirty millions of human beings, by means of *one assembly* (whether sub-divided or not) meeting for a part of the year, or the whole year, in the capital city be a mere cheat and impossibility to useful purposes; the sooner the real bearings, the effects of these institutions, what they produce and what they fail to produce, are shown, the better. If it be injurious to physical science to show all the combinations of arsenic, and all the effects which these combinations produce on organic and in-organic bodies; *then* will it be injurious to moral science to show all the effects, good or evil, of *any institution* in existence or proposed. Or if one set of men show only their evil effects—which would never happen under the influence of free discussion—another set of men, and particularly those who conduct and live by them, would show their good effects. Respect paid to any thing pernicious, established or not—the yielder of respect believing it to be pernicious—is a vice: disrespect is a virtue.

From the political branch of moral science, if we proceed to the judicial, or the ethical (that of private morals), we shall find in the same way, almost every where, the ground occupied by pretenders to infallibility. Already systems are established: their advocates share the public wealth and wield the public power, or are upheld by it. The bonze, the mufti, and the European priest and lawyer, are all of them equally indignant that any part of their systems should be called into dispute. What care they for their effects except as far as

they yield themselves the means of enjoyment? Why should they have troubled themselves about their effects on the happiness of the community? They find by their own experience that they produce happiness to themselves; and therefore they must be good. What business is it of theirs, to show the inquisitive and the idle what their effects are? they exist: therefore they are good; therefore those who say they are not good, are ill-disposed. All the lives of these men have been employed in getting their respective systems—mostly nonsense, or worse than nonsense—by heart. The *utility* of their systems, as to the happiness of the majority of the community, never entered into the contemplation of them or of their founders; nor, if it had, were they prepared to form a right judgement on the subject.

In the United States of America, though they have retained the enormous and ever-accumulating load of the British law-manufactory and judicial procedure systems, and notwithstanding the pernicious influence of the lawyers, who form majorities as well in the general congress as in most of the state legislatures; nevertheless the freedom of moral discussion is almost complete. The general spirit of liberty has kept the lawyers in check: knowledge will gradually complete the work. Also, as to private morals, there is no set of priests maintained by force and plunder leagued with the public power: every one that chooses to employ him, pays his priest as he does his doctor: whatever absurd laws remain in any of the states against perfect freedom of canvassing the dogmas or precepts of any of these priests, or conforming to any of their mandates, are made by the people themselves through their real representatives, and are therefore to be removed by enlightening the people as to their true interests. Under this just equality amongst the priests of all sects, it has been objected that fanaticism has much prevailed. Fanaticism in America may provoke a smile, but breaks no bones, torments no victims: the remedy is free discussion, which the whole community has no right to take away from any *one man* because there is no incompatibility of interest. In one instance, through the craft of the lawyers to throw all political power into their own hands, the priests are unfairly dealt with, being denied the common rights of citizens, of being *eligible* to seats in the legislature. The influence of these men, *as men*, in the legislatures, would usefully counteract the influence of the lawyers, and would direct their own attention and ambition to useful knowledge instead of puerile and utterly unimportant dreams and quibbles. The favor of God is only to be had by doing good to *men*: to God, nothing that man can do, can be of any direct service.

In England, Scotland, and Ireland, and most other countries of Europe, certain notions on ethics or private morals, mixed up with an endless train of speculations, fables, and reveries that have no more connexion with moral conduct than they have with mechanics, are retailed by certain men, who are paid out of the products of the labor of the industrious, whether they adopt these notions, or choose to pay, or not. Every one who discusses moral subjects, runs the risk of being persecuted by these men, who are more or less in league with, or supported by, the possessors of political power. Formerly these men had every where their own courts to try and punish, *themselves*, all who differed from their opinions, or withheld their exactions. Now, these iniquities are abridged, there being only remnants of these courts, with mitigated powers of injustice.

How different in all these respects the pursuit of physical science! Though there are (and very injuriously) some teachers, paid out of the public wealth and enjoying unjust immunities, in this department of knowledge; yet are their instructions mostly confined to the young; and they have no aid from political power to torment those who do not believe in their experiments, who do not admit their deductions, or who teach by writing or discourse, systems altogether opposed to theirs. Human wants and conveniences and the sharp-sightedness of rulers, have at length established almost every where freedom of inquiry, if not equal facilities of teaching, in physical science. Hence its rapid progress since this partial freedom has been established.

So necessary however to human happiness, and so attractive is the pursuit of moral science, so interesting is the just distribution of wealth and the simple but sublime right (founded, as all other rights and duties ought to be, on utility alone) of self-government, as well in man's private as social capacity; that, as in the age when untutored reason sprang from the cold embrace of the superstitions of a thousand years, so now that she is comparatively mature and wise from experience, men will every where be found ready to yield whatever blood and torments, political, legal, or religious persecution may still demand, till moral science shall be as unshackled as physical science, till *nothing* shall be esteemed too sacred for the uncompromising scrutiny of reason, and till all support shall be withdrawn from all institutions, old or new, but their *perceived utility*.

There are still other obstacles of no mean amount, opposing the discovery or diffusion of moral knowledge. In physical

knowledge almost every useful discovery has a fair chance of receiving an adequate, sometimes a much more than adequate, pecuniary reward, either by its immediate application (guarded if wished for, though at a totally uncalled for expense, by patent) to some of the arts; or by adding to the chance by means of reputation, of being employed, or attracting pupils, as a public teacher. In moral discoveries, on the contrary, there is scarcely ever any possibility of such application to any of the useful practical arts as could be turned into a source of pecuniary profit. The well ordering of the intellectual and moral machine, a school, by *new* processes (for if by the old it would be only superior management) may perhaps, with a few other instances, look like exceptions: though even in schools, real improvements are effectually, though indirectly, repressed by existing institutions. As to moral teaching, it is altogether monopolized by the ghostly dealers in creeds and spiritual brimstone. Mankind are so imbued with the follies and extravagancies of these men, are so much disgusted with the very name of moral science from the horrible and repulsive associations thrown by these men around it, and are so exhausted with the forced drains of wealth—all for the sake of morality—that they have neither means to pay, nor inclination to listen to new pretenders on the subject. There remains then, as the only way of remuneration common to physical and moral science, publication by means of the press, of books, pamphlets, newspapers, &c. In this way it is, that whatever good has been done, in the way of sapping old established errors by the diffusion of knowledge, has taken place; that profit may have been gained by the diffusion. In the way of novels, poems, and historical memoirs, a good deal of profit has been made; and there is a considerable literary trade in reviews, magazines, and newspapers. These are all however mere means of *diffusion*, and must, more or less, consult and follow the public taste to increase their sale. Still, they have been, as such, mighty engines of good. They have created a new species of occupation and amusement, a mental activity, an expanding interest in the lot of our fellow-creatures, which is on the constant look-out for new moral facts, and anxious to see their application to purposes of public utility. Not coming forward in the shape of regular treatises on moral and political subjects, but mixed up with matter of imagination and description, they have at the same time attracted, by not wearying, the attention of their readers, and have lulled the alarms of the possessors of power. Seldom have regular and serious works on moral subjects been

sources of profit: the readers are comparatively few who can command time or attention to judge of new truths, or systems of truth, in moral science: therefore, supposing the chance of torment and loss by persecution saved, such works must generally leave their authors more fame than profit. Those of the original small number of readers who adopt the new truths and interweave them with historical or fictitious narrative, will be the reapers of the profit of the discovery. So influential have newspapers become by applying moral science to passing events, that they have acquired, by way of eminence, the title of the *public press*. One branch of moral science, political economy, exciting less the fears, than the hopes of extended physical enjoyments, of rulers and those connected with them, and confining itself to the almost mechanical consideration of wealth, has been pretty freely canvassed; still perhaps with more of reputation than profit to those engaged in it. The most profound and celebrated writer on legislation, in this or any other country, has devoted a long life and an ample fortune to his favorite pursuit.—Such are the sources of aid, in the way of pecuniary profit, to the discovery and diffusion of moral truth: for all discussion must ultimately lead to truth.

Another peculiarity in favor of physical over moral knowledge is, that a secret in physical science does not necessarily require to be widely diffused, in order to be useful to society. The knowledge of a particular process in any manufactory, though known to but a few manufacturers, and by them kept secret, might still ameliorate the quality or cheapen the production of articles of enjoyment so as to benefit all using the articles as well as the makers. But moral benefits, being for the most part to be obtained by the amelioration of institutions, and almost all ameliorations requiring a sacrifice of wealth, power, or reputation for infallibility, on the part of those supporting and supported by them, they can only be changed by the public voice, after a long contest, influencing those in power to make or permit the amelioration. If the enemies to the use of the power of steam demanded that it should not be employed till a great majority of those able to judge on the subject were convinced of its effects, and demanded its employment, would not some sinister interest be suspected, particularly if they at the same time had establishments worked on other principles, and endeavoured to prevent any discussion at all as to the effects of steam? Yet no more than this is asked of the opponents of moral improvement, that free discussion should take place, and that when the majority of those interested, judged any proposed changes im-

provements, they should then and not till then, take place. Even under free institutions, no amelioration of them could, or ought to, take place, till the majority of those interested demanded it; though under such institutions, the agents of the community would be the most anxious to promote discussion, or to invite and adopt ameliorations; or if they opposed what was deemed useful by the community, they would be immediately displaced by more faithful agents. This comparative slowness of operation to produce practical good is therefore inherent in moral truth; though under institutions founded in security and free discussion, the process of diffusion and persuasion, by means of the press, might be incalculably accelerated.

Another obstacle to moral science arises from the peculiar difficulty of its cultivation. Whereas physics deal in things that can be seen and felt and made objects of the senses, and can be subjected to every variety of experiment; in morals scarcely any rational experiments have yet ever been made; all has been the result of the fortuitous shock of passions and interests; and it requires the nicest discrimination to refer the moral effects to their real causes. The unorganized matter of physics is without feeling, and may therefore be decomposed as much as we please to prove the particular effect of every component part of the aggregate cause: while in morals all are acting in masses, and we can neither simplify the alternate agent and patient, man, or the numberless co-operating circumstances that are acting upon him. Even when we are sure of the direction in which the cause operates, we can rarely do more than approximate the quantum of the effects. We have no accurate weights or measures for moral quantities. And yet this, necessarily the latest as the most difficult species of knowledge, is just that which the audacious perverseness of rulers, has every where assumed to be perfect—perfect in proportion to the ignorance of the ages, in all other matters, in which it was introduced! Henceforth, under the institutions of security, by the removal of all *interests* opposed to improvement, there will be no more difficulty in trying any rational experiment, (and none not deemed rational will be entered into by communities of men where their own happiness is at stake,) than is experienced by individuals in physical matters where their private interests are concerned. Besides these larger experiments, when the various existing obstacles shall have been removed, moral experiments on a small scale, as on a community of boys, or private associations of men, literary or otherwise, will be made; with a view, if successful, to their application on a large scale, provincial or national.

As if all these obstacles were not enough in the way of the acquisition and diffusion of moral knowledge—the ignorance and prejudices of the people and of peculiar classes, the persecutions of these classes possessing power, the want, for the most part, of pecuniary recompense, the necessity of convincing numbers, even a majority of the influential in a community, before effecting any good, the very great difficulties of the pursuit—as if these were not sufficient impediments, the craft of rulers has erected another obstacle; and *taxation* has tremendously opposed itself to the diffusion of knowledge, doubling or trebling the price of books, particularly of the political press. Fiscal rapacity, anxious to extract the largest sum out of every given source of revenue, has perhaps arrested the arm that would make use of taxation to put down moral inquiry, by the consideration that excess of duty in this branch, as in every other, would lead to determined secret trade, to literary smuggling, by which more contemptuous discussion would take place and the duty would be lost.

Such being the obstacles to the discovery and diffusion of moral knowledge amongst adults, what hope can remain of its useful application to the distribution of wealth, or to the engendering of such habits as will increase the enjoyments to be derived from the absolute quantity of wealth which a community may be in the yearly habit of producing? Physical knowledge is little concerned in the distribution of wealth, but increases indefinitely its production: moral knowledge must regulate its distribution. This species of knowledge, however, from the impulse given by what is already acquired, in spite of all obstacles, must go on increasing till it extinguishes the empire of force in human affairs, and substitutes that of persuasion. The interests of mankind will ultimately insure the free discussion of moral subjects, and particularly their application to the production and distribution of wealth. Every year the adult population will become more accessible to reason and their own interest, till they perceive and admit the crying injustice (amongst so many other prejudices) of forcing the minds of children into an uninquiring assent to their opinions, or to any opinions on any subject, beyond what the evidence produced would demand of unbiassed minds. From that time, when human beings shall begin to be thus educated to truth alone, according to the evidence, without any pre-excited partialities for any opinions, will the progress of instruction to adults be rapid and influential to an extent hardly now to be conceived. Moral and physical truth will proceed hand in hand; and their utility will be seen altogether to depend on their intimate union.

The third mode therefore of diffusing knowledge, so influential in the production and distribution of wealth, by means of *education* previous to manhood, remains to be inquired into.

SECTION 4.

Of education, strictly so called, previous to manhood, as the third mode of diffusing knowledge.

THE all-pervading influence of *institutions*, over all the members of a community, the hitherto partial, but ever-increasing influence of *instruction* or disquisition addressed to the *adult* members of a community, having been inquired into; it remains to see what can or ought to be done, in the way of *education* before entrance into life, towards the diffusion of useful knowledge; particularly of moral knowledge, of such as will make physical knowledge productive of preponderant good by leading to the universal reign of *equal security*, and of the utmost equality of enjoyment compatible therewith.

Numerous have been the questions raised of late years on the subject of early education. For a long time it was altogether opposed as a most alarming evil by those interested in, or prejudiced in favor of, establishments as such, independent of their utility. Though all open opposition has ceased, yet have the friends of education done little even with the aid of their new instruments derived from Lancaster and Bell. The reasons of the failure are obvious. Its partisans were too sanguine, and expected too much from it as a *single* instrument of good. Many of them were as *viciously* determined to make use of the new instrument, to diffuse, *without inquiry*, their peculiar views on moral subjects, particularly theological, as were their opponents: hence the contest was, who should have the drilling of the machines by the new mode: whether to truth or to error, they were still, and equally, to be drilled: the object was not to give the people knowledge for their *own sakes*, but to swell the numbers of the future partisans of some unimportant dogma. Another cause of failure was in the nature of the new instrument of teaching itself: it has been found that youths drilled ever so well to the system at the head seminaries, could not superintend establishments similar to those where they were educated, from want of enlarged views and a *general knowledge of the human mind*: when any thing unexpected occurred, they had no general principles to guide them. There is moreover a radical

defect in the systems of Bell and Lancaster, that the understanding is by them altogether sacrificed to the memory: this defect admits of an easy remedy; but neither Bell nor Lancaster had the comprehension of mind or the real honesty of purpose with respect to the independence of the minds of their pupils, even to wish to discover it.

Still education, even in its most restricted sense, and making every allowance for the over-zeal or want of knowledge of its exclusive advocates, may and will become a co-operating instrument of transcendent importance in the diffusion of knowledge. Education in its comprehensive sense, including the effect of all external circumstances operating to form the mind and habits, is not now under contemplation: 'tis the reading, writing, hearing, and examining, by means of sensible signs, that take place in school or by means of books,—the formal instruction alone, not the incidental,—received previous to mature age, to which the attention must be confined. Hitherto what little effect this instrument, thus restricted, has produced, on the great majority of the community, has been to co-operate with existing institutions in forming passive habits of blind obedience—which was called morality—to ghostly and political oppressors.

School education comprehends two important branches of mental culture, the intellectual, and moral in its limited sense, the acquisition of knowledge and the formation of moral habits. Both of these are produced exclusively by operating on the *mind* or *brain*. What is called the *heart*, has no more to do with dispositions or habits than any other part of the body; or than it has to do with treatises on geometry. The muscles called the heart, alternately dilating by the bulk and contracting upon the impulse of the blood, have no more to do with our dispositions or morals, than the muscles that move the toes, have to do with them. Habits and dispositions are formed, just as knowledge is acquired, by operating on the mind or brain alone. The effects of that state of the brain called knowledge, are more frequently exhibited in speech and writing; while the effects of that state of the brain, denoted by the words, disposition or habits, are more frequently exhibited in muscular actions and motions. It is a falsehood, as strange as pernicious, to speak of the heart as holding a divided empire with the mind, or brain, in producing our voluntary actions, or as having any more connexion with thought or feeling than the lungs or stomach. The feeling and the judgement are equally a mental operation: the judgement, like all other mental processes, is only a modification of feeling. What is the consequence? *Therefore*, it is to

the culture of the *mind alone*, that we must look, discarding all poetical absurdity about a second ideal agent, called the heart, for the formation of good habits as well as of sound judgement and accurate perception.

Now in which of these two modes of mental culture is school education calculated to produce the most efficient and useful effects? Beyond all comparison, in the conveyance of knowledge, it is calculated to produce the greatest good. But to which of these two branches have its efforts been hitherto, as affecting the great majority of communities, almost exclusively directed? To the moral branch, the formation of habits. But habits are generated by circumstances formed by institutions, over which schools have no controul, and which they must follow or confirm under pain of repeating to unhearing ears their disregarded precepts, because opposed to real interests acting from without.

Here then we have a satisfactory explanation of the little progress made in education, inasmuch as that branch, in which its useful influence must be indirect, has been almost exclusively pursued, by direct means, and by means, dictation, force, terror, &c., otherwise the most unwise. Where indeed it has co-operated with vicious institutions, confirming the terror and antipathies by them excited, its influence has been sometimes great, but, in proportion to its magnitude, pernicious.

One reason, and by no means an unsatisfactory reason, why so little has been done in the way of communicating knowledge by means of school education is, that till lately little real knowledge, physical or moral, was known, and as little as to the mode of communicating it. The things taught, or professed to be taught, at schools—and it was necessary to teach something to fill up the time—were therefore necessarily mere words, or idle speculations, or empty precepts, impotent even when tending to good.

But the truth is, the little that has been done, or attempted to be done, by any community for the education of the great majority of its members, to whatever end perverted, or however unwisely conducted, must be set down in the scale of utility, as *nothing*. Wherever any real efforts have been made in the line of formal education previous to manhood, they have been directed to the exclusive advantage of the privileged, or at all events of the rich, who could provide for their own education. Witness the establishments, colleges, universities, inns-of-court, &c., all supported directly or indirectly out of the toils of the productive classes, for the benefit, the exclusive benefit, of the few. They are necessarily exclusive, because the expenses attending them are so

great that ninety-nine hundreds of the people are shut out from them. The aim and object of these institutions and the discipline pursued in them, have almost invariably been directed, not to the investigation and diffusion of whatever in moral or physical science might be esteemed *true* (the only property in knowledge which can make it an object of rational pursuit to man, because without being true it is not real knowledge, nor can it be useful), but to the support of certain prescribed opinions and institutions, on the utility of which all doubt and examination were denounced as *vices*, and deserving of horror and punishment: establishments, to drill the unproductive, at the expense of the productive, classes, into interested and zealous machines for perpetuating the institutions, however pernicious, under which they originated, and *keeping down* for ever from knowledge and consequently from comfort, the great mass of the community, by monopolizing the little real, or the supposed knowledge of the times. Wherever amongst these higher orders a provision is occasionally made for a *pauper* out of the mass of the productive classes, the badge of humiliation by differences in dress, food, lodging and society, is such as to turn the ostentatious boon into a scholarship of insult. Inasmuch as all who got education, were constrained to buy it of such institutions, they foolishly boasted of producing all the knowledge of the age. So much of late years has knowledge been advanced, almost always in spite of them, by independent cultivators outside of their walls, that fifty years ago one of the most enlightened men of his day declared them the receptacles of exploded errors. All institutions, the teachers of which are paid not by their pupils and according to the work done, but out of the public wealth, and to whom any particular doctrine, on any particular branch of physical or moral science, is prescribed to be taught, are grievous public nuisances, as utterly inimical to the acquisition or diffusion of knowledge, as to the production and just distribution of wealth.

What says the principle of utility to such establishments for the education of the few, and those the richest of the community? were such establishments ever so wisely conducted, ever so useful to those few, and to the enlargement of the bounds of knowledge? What would that principle say to them, which demands the pursuit of the *happiness*, and consequently of the *knowledge*, as one of the means, if not the most important of the means, of happiness, of at least the *majority*, and consequently the greatest happiness of the whole of a community?

It demands that the direction of such establishments should

be changed, and that instead of being used for the interest of a few, they should be devoted to the improvement of the whole community.

“ But to make all wise, or to make the majority wise,” say the favorers of exclusion, “ is an impossibility: the effort would be vain, and would be unproductively lost. Better to concentrate the means and operate on a few; through whom, well instructed, more knowledge will be diffused through the whole, than could be done by any fruitless attempt at immediate communication through the whole: at all events, better to have a few wise than all ignorant.”

Exactly similar excuses, and with equal confidence, have been put forward to justify the eternal efforts of what has been honoured as legislation, to *keep down* the wages, the comforts, of the productive classes. “ All cannot be rich: therefore, at all events, take care to add superabundantly to the wealth of the few; for wealth by being dissipated is lost, and *all* become poor and wretched. Better have a few rich and happy than all paupers.”

To both of these allegations it may be replied, that the uniform tendency of any exclusive advantage, under the institutions of insecurity, whether wealth or knowledge, is to prompt the possessors of that advantage to use it as a means of still further superiority, not as a means of lessening, by diffusion or otherwise, their own comparative importance. As to wealth, the evil effects of its forced inequality, both as to production and distribution, have been already pointed out. For inequality in the diffusion of knowledge there is less excuse than for inequality in the distribution of wealth; because the knowledge of one can in no possible way lessen the knowledge of others: but the fact is, that unequal knowledge has been sought almost solely with the view to unequal wealth.

But the main position, the assumed unavoidable ignorance of the great majority of every community, is of the most importance. Is this true? or is it a falsehood, a hypocritical falsehood, known to be false by those who utter it? The plausibility of the argument is this. *Hitherto* the great majority of every community have been very ignorant, acted on solely by the motives rising out of institutions, knowing as little of themselves, their physical and moral frame, as of the productions of nature and art around them, or of the nature or effects of the institutions of which they were the unreflecting creatures. *Therefore*, the great majority of every community must always remain ignorant, as they always have been. Apply this argument to navigation, to chemistry, to mechanics, to astronomy, if you wish to ascertain its real value. Previous

to the discovery of the magnet, vessels could not with safety remain many hours out of sight of land, and frequently, except in mild weather or moon-light, slept on shore or anchored at night. Previous to the application of steam, vessels could not navigate in face of the wind and tide. Previous to the discovery and improvements of the telescope, neither the motions nor the incalculable numbers of what are called the heavenly bodies (though our globe—if what is called heavenly mean any thing more than not belonging to our planet—is as much a heavenly body as any of them) were known. Previous to improvements in machinery and chemical combinations, cottons could not be made without more than twenty times the waste of labour than they now consume. To enumerate all the things that have been done of late years, which had never been previously done, and which therefore many said *could not* be done, would be to enumerate every thing which distinguishes the most improved state of modern society, and renders it superior to what preceded it. As it is *now proved* that it would have been false to have said, previous to these *physical* improvements, “they cannot be done:” but simply “*I don’t know the means of doing them*”; so with respect to future moral as well as physical improvements, not contrary to the ascertained regular recurrence, under similar circumstances of the phenomena of nature, called the laws of nature; the value of the argument in question is really this, “We, the objectors (if sincere and ignorant), cannot conceive by what means such things could be done.” Follow fairly out such an argument, and where will it lead? The more ignorant the prophet, the less it will be possible to do for human happiness: by him, yes; but not by those who are wiser than he: the most ignorant savage would lay an interdict on *all improvement* as impracticable, if not pernicious. What says reason? The wisest of us knows but little, can but feebly conjecture as to the improvements that *may* take place: as to what *cannot* take place—accordant of course with the laws of nature—all speculation is idle.

Having thus shown the argument, arising from the pretended *impossibility* of improvement, and of this particular species of improvement, the substituting of useful knowledge for the present ignorance of the majority of every community, to be, if sincere, a proof of nothing but of the want of knowledge of the means of effecting the improvement in question, by the objector; let us examine the *practicability* of effecting this improvement, not to say at any indefinite future period, but at the present time, with the means actually in the possession of all civilized communities.

First; the argument from experience, from past ignorance, is very much exaggerated. It is not true, that the majority of all communities are *equally ignorant*. They have been formed under different institutions, and since maturity have been exposed to very different quantities and species of information, spoken or written: compare the French population with the Indian; the Scotch with the Russian; or the present English, Swedish, Roman, Egyptian, with those people respectively at or previous to the time of Cicero; the difference in point of intellectual aptitude and of moral habits, and consequently of aptitude for happiness in general, will strike every eye. We need not descend for a comparison to the ferocious savage of Ashantee, whose propensities for blood and voracity seem to be borrowed from the unrelenting quadrupeds who dispute his possessions, nor need we put forward as opposed to him one of the majority of the people of any of those of the United States which are uncursed by the ferocity, sensuality, and other vices generated by domestic slavery. It is surely palpable that enough *has* been done, by whatever means, to prove what *might* be done, if adequate means were in our power, in effecting still further improvements in the intelligence of the people. The practicability of change being established by the fact that the majority of all communities are not equally ignorant, the question is reduced to one merely of *degree*. Let us inquire then, dropping possibilities and undefined practicabilities, whether the majority of any civilized community could by education—not counteracted by other instruments—be made as intelligent and moral, and consequently as happy (for intelligence and moral habits will always lead to an equal share of the comforts and conveniences of life), as those who are now the most intelligent and moral classes of any community. It will be shown that the means are at the command of every community, of making the majority of its members *much more* intelligent and moral—institutions flowing from representation or self-government co-operating therewith—than any of the present wealthier classes.

It is not insinuated that, in opposition to institutions, and to the existing state of knowledge, school education, under the direction of a parcel of rich zealots—could such be found—would effect this. No: it must proceed from the deliberate conviction of the majority of a community that it is a thing “right to be done;” in which case, the means are at hand. If the interests of the absolute numerical majority of a community were, as they ought to be, the only interest attended to, whenever any smaller interest was incompatible with it, that majority would at once perceive their interest, and ordain

the conservative blessings of knowledge by means of education to be impartially dispensed to all. Nor is it insinuated that any of the old institutions, upheld by insecurity, could, consistently with their endurance, co-operate in the establishment of a system of universal education, whose distinguishing characteristic, in order to be useful, should be to teach *nothing but the truth*; that is to say, not what its founders conceived to be the truth, but whatever, on inquiry, might appear *to the educated* to be the truth: a system of education, which should avail itself of no terror, of no force, of no seductions, of no false associations, of no antipathies, to influence the judgement, which should demand no reverence for *any* institutions or propositions, old or new, but what their perceived utility or truth necessarily and voluntarily engendered.

Far different from such species of education is that afforded to the richer classes of the community, or to those for whose instruction the national funds provide. To teach what is true in real existence, in nature and in fact; what is useful (or tending to preponderant happiness) in the consequences and effects of actions and institutions, is not the object. Unfortunately, almost all who have advocated the cause of education, whether for the richer or the poorer classes, whether friendly to old institutions or wishing to introduce new ones, seem to have been inoculated with the very disease which they condemn in all but themselves; that of teaching their own opinions without appropriate evidence, addressing them prematurely to minds not yet prepared to judge, and refusing the perfect liberty of assent or dissent on review of the evidence adduced. The only obloquy attendant on the pupil's non-assent to *any* proposition ought to be, that simple and natural, sufficiently severe and efficacious obloquy, designated by the word *stupidity*, as when applied to one out of a class or of a thousand, not able to understand, when properly explained, that "the three angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles." Till this fundamental error and vice in education, the presuming to teach *opinions* instead of *truth*, to dictate, instead of to propose, opinions with their reasons, for investigation, is extirpated, the majority of every community will be, more or less, machines, moved at their pleasure and for their profit by the mountebanks who have trained them. The members of every community of sentient rational beings, and of course the majority of those members, should be educated for their own sakes, with a view to their own happiness, and not to increase the number of the followers of the opinions, physical or metaphysical, theological or antitheological, or to be made instrumental to the interests, of

any class or classes of men whatsoever; they should be educated for *their own sakes alone*. And as it is clearly the interest of every community, in order to form right judgements, to see things as they really are, the real qualities and relations of physical objects, real facts and the real consequences of actions, it is their interest to be taught *nothing but the truth*; the truth meaning nothing more than this.

Now, in the first place, the education which every civilized community has now the means of imparting to all its members may, and naturally would, be in this respect superior to the efforts hitherto made in instilling falsehoods and antipathies in greater or lesser numbers under the shield of force and terror, into the minds of the rich or the poor. Truth, physical and moral, would be sincerely the sole object of intellectual pursuit, because in the acquisition of that alone could the interest of any community be found to be placed. Minor bodies, classes, privileged orders, parties, have found their interest in upholding tenets, practices, and institutions, however inconsistent with truth and utility as affecting the whole community, provided they favored their particular exclusive interests. But with a community at large, this could not be the case. Truth can never be inimical to the interests of a whole community: if subordinate interests are found incompatible with it, they ought to give way.

Here then is an obvious reason why no really useful plan of national education can be founded on a base less extensive than that of the great majority of a community; because the interests of no less a body can go hand in hand with the pursuit of physical and moral truth, the great intellectual polar-star of education.

But what are the means, the expedients, by which not only moral and physical truth is to be diffused amongst the great majority of a community instead of the doctrines and dogmas hitherto taught to a few, but by which the quantity and usefulness of the matters taught to them will be so much extended as to put to shame the scanty stock of really useful information hitherto afforded even to the privileged classes? How is this useful physical and moral truth to be unfolded to them? First, by discarding at once about nine-tenths of the utterly useless matter now taught, or pretended to be taught, to the richer classes: second, by retaining the one-tenth of useful matter: and third, by substituting highly useful and interesting matter from the lately investigated experimental and practical sciences, entirely adapted to the minds of youth, for the parrot-memory work of grammars and foreign words now practised. The number of years employed in the education of all the

members of the community, the one sex as well as the other, should be four or five years, but the number of hours need not be more than five each day. The useless matters now taught the richer classes, to be discarded from these more useful schools for the whole community, are what are called the dead languages, Latin, Greek, &c., the torture-associated lumber of grammar-schools; the one language of the community, English, French, or Spanish, being quite copious enough to convey all required useful knowledge of things and institutions interesting to a community, without wasting precious time in learning two names for a thing instead of one, as if learning fifty different *words* to denote an elephant would advance one atom any useful knowledge about that animal, about its structure, peculiarities of formation, its habits, uses to which while living it may be applied, uses to which the different parts of its body after death may be applied! The one-tenth, consisting of the useful matter now taught, and therefore to be retained, would be those parts of the physical sciences of quantity and numbers, geometry and arithmetic, which are practically useful. The *new* nine-tenths to be introduced, instead of the old nine-tenths of discarded and mere time-destroying matter, would consist of an elementary knowledge, first of natural history,—that is, of all the material things existing around the pupils and in the midst of which they live, in their rude state and previous to their being operated upon by human skill,—to learn their names, to *know* them, their qualities and uses.* Here, amongst the variety of minerals, plants, and animals, useful or pernicious to us, the only difficulty is to select with judgement the most simple and interesting to be first presented. Amongst animal forms, the knowledge of that of the pupils themselves, of the human form, would be of course the standard, beginning with its bony structure, and studying the structure of other animals as subordinate to the understanding and improvement of that of man: this would lay the foundation for studying, at the end of the course, what every human being ought to know, the physiology (effects produced by and on the different parts) of the human frame, and the laws of health and derangements of health; and thence the mode of preserving that, without which life ceases to be a blessing. For women in their future capacity of nurses, &c., this knowledge of the human frame and of the modes of preserving health and avoiding disease, would be peculiarly necessary. *At least half*

* See Bentham's *Chrestomathia*, and Owen's *Outline of Education at New Lanark*; also Hill's *Public Education for Boys* in large numbers.

the infants that now die, are destroyed by the *ignorance* and consequent mismanagement of their parents, entailing on themselves so much useless pain, anxiety and expense.

After this elementary knowledge of the rude materials of nature, would follow a knowledge of the decomposing combinations which these bodies produce with each other, and of the effects mechanically produced by them when operating as masses, under the guidance of man, co-operating to his use. Those two important branches of useful knowledge, chemistry and mechanics, as they themselves can only use the materials of natural history, or rather of nature, so in their turn they serve as a basis for agriculture and all the other useful sciences and arts, and applications to manufactures and commerce. As many of these sciences, with constant reference to useful practical arts, as the remainder of the four or five years afforded room for, and as might be deemed first in point of utility, might be pursued, and would fill up the course of *physical* education for all the members of the community.

What should be done for their *moral* education? While the physical course is proceeding, about one-fifth part of the work of every day should consist of reading and examination in history, biography, voyages and travels, and perhaps the least useless parts of vernacular and translated poetry; all aided by maps, drawings, and every attainable species of sensible representations. In the physical lessons, allusions connected by geography &c. would constantly be made to the historical branch, and *vice versa*, both proceeding at an equal pace, and both advancing from simplicity to comprehensiveness as they and the pupils' minds advanced. But the great machine for moral education would be the institution of the school itself: the idle repetition of mere moral precepts without reason, explanation or motive, would not be heard: morality would be taught by action and reflection: the school would be self-governed, and in its self-government would be a school of practical, always-acting, morals, of the most important branch of this part of knowledge, legislation, and of impartial justice and decorum in the administration of its laws*. Towards the end of the course of education, and as

* The wonderful facility and good effects of self-government in schools may be seen by any one who, like the writer, has a mind to go as far for that purpose as Birmingham: where, at Messrs. Hills' academy at Hazlewood, they will see the boys not only apply by means of courts of justice, but absolutely *enact*, through a committee of their nomination, the laws by which they are governed, one of the tutors being always on the committee. Mr. M. D. Hill's work, "Public Education," is a faithful representation of what is exhibited at the school. It seems rather ludicrous to address—as is

following the reading of history, biography, and best accounts of foreign nations (geography enlarged), and the *well-ascertained* truths, with their evidence, of political economy, might be given a simple statement of the *institutions* of the community of which the pupils would soon have to prepare themselves for acting the parts of members. The uses and objects of these different institutions, and the reasons on which they were founded, should be given: and no approbation or blame should be invited to them from newness or oldness, or any source of antipathy, from no other motives than their preponderant tendencies to good or to evil, to the increase or diminution of the happiness of the community.

Also, and particularly for the use of those doomed to be mothers, at the close of their own education the pupils' attention should be directed to the bringing up, physical and moral, of infants and of early youth: for it is one thing to have acquired a good deal of knowledge, and quite another to know how to communicate it, or to understand any thing of the principles of the human mind.

As these public schools would be mere day schools, and would occupy but part of the day, they ought to be directed to the exclusive teaching of what would be useful and agreeable to all the members of the community without any exception. Therefore, all religious matters, all mere matters of ornament, of accomplishment, what is peculiar to either of the sexes, and all such matters, language-learning &c., ought to be left for home superadded culture. The amusement of music, by means of a voluntary subscription school band, might perhaps be encouraged, as uniting cheerful associations with the school exercises, and as leading to tranquil innocent sources of pleasure. Simple reading and writing would be mostly acquired by the pupils before entering such schools: where not, there would be a provision made for teaching at a trifling expense, in a few months, these preliminary branches. The age of entrance should be unlimited,—any time, from seven or eight till the age of manhood, that the children were pre-

there done—a lad of 15, the judge, with the slavish appellation “My Lord”; and the frequent use of the word “rank” in a school, as indicating something unconnected with merit, seems objectionable. These are mere spots. Before visiting Hazlewood the writer was well aware that all odium of punishment might be taken off the master, and that the regular execution of useful regulations might be left to the pupils themselves: but he now sees that they can even *make* judicious regulations adapted to their circumstances. Which is the most judicious mode—letting the pupils make the laws, or giving them only the power of altering—may still be a question; the head-master having always a veto on the law. By Mr. Hill this veto has been scarcely ever exercised.

pared and it suited the convenience of the parents. Where the neighbourhood was sufficiently populous, it might perhaps be esteemed more convenient to have each sex taught in a different school-room; where otherwise, no sort of mischief incapable of easy remedy could arise from their being taught together, but many benefits would flow from such *joint*, as well as *equal*, instruction. 'Tis not till the age of prime, just when they are put together, or when without any putting they will run together, that—to use the language of antipathy—all the danger lies. Till passions grow up within them, children, if not perversely mis-directed, will see no more difference in each other than in differently drest dolls, and their curiosity respecting each other would be attended with no more feeling or emotion than curiosity directed to any other object. Hence the particular convenience of this time of calm for laying the foundation of many species of knowledge, particularly that respecting the physical frame. Ignorance has been too long hypocritically worshipped in women, under the veil of innocence, by those who wished to make that ignorance or innocence their prey.

“What! an education like this, superior to any thing ever yet given, even to the most favored, in the way of education, to be now given to every member of the community! Suppose the thing desirable and tending to the happiness of the community; where are to be found the *means* of doing it? Where are to be found the *schoolmasters* fitted for such undertakings? where the *school-houses*? where the *materials* for such extensive physical instruction? where, above all things, the *funds* requisite to carry so vast a scheme into effect?”

It is thought that the solution given to all these questions, will depend on the *bona fide* answer given to the main question of all on this subject of universal education; “Would the measure eminently tend to produce preponderant good to the greater number, and thence necessarily to the whole, of a community? Is it a measure of paramount importance, necessary not only for the physical and moral happiness of every individual in his person and in his social connexions; but is it necessary, with the view of upholding, on the sure basis of knowledge without delusion, the blessings of the wisest institutions, of the natural laws of distribution, of the greatest equality of enjoyment from wealth compatible with equal security? If so, then, next to the establishment of representative institutions founded on equal universal rights of all adult rational beings, it is the measure most pregnant in good to every community; and every other measure should be postponed to its accomplishment by every such rational commu-

nity—for by no less a will than that of a majority of a community, is it expected or proposed that such a measure of transcendant good should be attempted. No other voice but that of the community itself would have the moral influence necessary in such a mighty work of wisdom and beneficence.

Of the four difficulties in the way of the education of a whole community, the most alarming to ordinary eyes will probably be the *expense*: and just those who have been in the habit of seeing with complacency the products of the labor of the community lavished on the most useless or pernicious objects, will be those who will exclaim the loudest against the application of even a small portion of the fruits of their own industry to the real good of all, instead of the glittering exclusive interest of a few. But what would the expense of such an object be?

Suppose a community, like England, Ireland, and Scotland, consisting of twenty millions of individuals of all ages, the youth of whom it is proposed to educate, giving them suppose five years of instruction each. More than one half of this number, or say ten millions, are under twenty years of age and require instruction: but as they do not require to be educated every year till they are twenty years old, but only five years out of the twenty, this would give just the fifth part of half the community, to be educated every year: but as many more of those under twenty die, particularly in the first and subsequent years, than during the latter years of the series, when the deaths become very rare, the whole of the one-fifth of those under twenty years of age would not survive to be the candidates for instruction. More than one out of five would be wanting; so that instead of having five years out of the twenty of those under age to provide for, we should from this casualty have only four. As four divided into twenty will give five, we have a fifth for the whole number of those under twenty years of age, whom we supposed to be ten millions, or half the population, for whose education we should have *every year* to provide; that is to say, two millions of pupils every year. One master or mistress, by means of lessons (*to be made*) with the aid of an improved application, avoiding the evils and retaining the advantages, of the monitor and self-teaching system, could manage a school of five hundred children, say three to five; averaging four hundred. One pound a year paid by, or on account of, each pupil, would afford an ample remuneration for masters of enlarged minds fully equal to the task of instruction, besides affording one hundred, or one hundred and fifty pounds a year, as might be required, for supplying and keeping up the

materials of instruction and repairs of the building. The whole sum required every year for *thus educating* the whole community of twenty millions of the human race would be two millions per annum! Only two millions per annum!

One half of the expense of education, or ten shillings a year, *ought* probably to be paid, and all of it, the whole pound, if they thought fit, *might* be paid by the parents of the pupils: but none should be refused for poverty. The only obligation on those who received instruction gratis should be, that they should sign a receipt every year for ten shillings for the instruction they received to be repaid by them any time in after life, and when paid to be always publicly advertised, without particular request on the part of the payer to withhold it: these sums to be applied to a particular purpose, such as increasing the library of the school.

The masters should not receive their salaries yearly or quarterly, as in grammar-schools, free-schools, and what not, the improvement of the pupils being left to their honor or discretion; but, as practised with eminent success by the Hibernian School Society in Ireland, they should be paid the public balance, to make up the pound, over and above what the parents paid, on an order every half-year of the half-yearly *inspector*, who would know the knowledge, which every pupil, in every class, on every subject, ought within the time to have acquired, and mark off the quantum of payment, not by the number of heads alone, but according to the intelligence put within the time into those heads, according to a scale of easy capability previously graduated, on extensive experience, either for the whole schools of a community or the particular department under visitation.

Another new class of paid agents, and the only one, the *inspectors*, are now presented to our view. Of these, one would perhaps be sufficient for every half a million of inhabitants or for inspecting twice a year one hundred to one hundred and fifty schools, with about fifty thousand pupils, within a space of thirty to fifty square miles (the metropolis and a few very large cities excepted); so that by our whole community of twenty millions there would be forty of these inspectors to be provided for. Three to five hundred pounds a year, travelling expenses included, would be full payment for such services to men well qualified to perform them. This adds nearly twenty thousand pounds a year to the two millions.

It is almost preposterous to show how very light such a contribution would be amongst a community of twenty millions. The yearly contribution would be two shillings from each individual, were none of the salaries paid by the parents.

But as the probability is that more than half would be paid by the parents, as many, who now pay ten and twenty times a pound a year for drilling all intellectual capacity out of their children's heads, would gladly pay at these schools the whole price of a rational education and even assist many others in making the full payments. The expense would in this case be of course further reduced to one shilling a year national contribution from each individual in the community. But after a few years operation of such a system of early instruction, from the knowledge of economical and industrious sources of comfort, from the self-respect, from the salutary and ever-reforming effect on political and other institutions tending to the unconstrained development of all the faculties in the pursuit of preponderant happiness, from increased prudence in cutting short the propagation of more human beings than could be supported in comfort without perhaps sensibly diminishing the most valuable of the pleasures of sexual intercourse; the whole expense of education, the whole pound a year, would be voluntarily paid by the parents, and the national expense would be thus shortly reduced to almost nothing. Early education is an instrument which tends powerfully to ameliorate and perpetuate itself. The diffusion of knowledge to a certain extent, will make its further acquisition and diffusion a subject of delight. It would become the cheapest and most productive of national amusements. Intellectual pleasures to a community, would be the creation of a sixth sense, not only more constant in its supplies of gentle, pleasing, excitements than any of the other senses, but adding much to the pleasures of all the rest instead of taking away from them.

The community of twenty millions of individuals, of whom we have been speaking, pay now in Government and provincial taxation of all sorts, tithes, poor-rates and all provincial charges included, about one hundred millions of pounds per year, out of the yearly products of their labor. For what is this immense sum paid—no, but forcibly taken away from them? All but a very little, for the continuing them in their present ignorance and actual or comparative wretchedness; in Ireland actual, in England with what they have been, what they might be, and with what those whom their industry supports, are. The one hundredth part of this sum would raise these twenty millions of individuals, if applied in the way of education, into rational, industrious, moral, and happy beings. Look at your army; look at your navy; look at your colonies; look at your provision, from accountable and unaccountable sources, for the pestilential luxury of *one* man of hereditary legislative and executive wisdom; look at the sums

which priests levy and consume; look at the dead-weight pensions for successful murders; look at the pensions and sinecures for no murders or employment at all; look at the yearly interest of your debt; and say which of these could not well spare the sum necessary for the education of the whole people: or rather say which of them, or whether the whole of them together, can be put in competition in point of utility with this great object? And yet who so light-headed as to suppose that any such application will be made of any part of these forced contributions, by the men who levy them (averaging, as they do, about five pounds a year from every man, woman, and child), in contempt of the delegation and inclinations of nine out of ten of the community whom they controul? No: till the community, through its representatives, frees itself from the locusts that are consuming, in unhealthy idleness, almost every green thing the land produces, it must remain in ignorance as well as wretchedness. 'Tis the community's voice alone that will confer this blessing on all, even on the descendants of those (then happier than their parents) who are now the champions of exclusive institutions: 'tis the community's voice alone that will command the diffusion of knowledge, because it is not reconcileable with the interests of any thing less than the whole community, that knowledge should be equally diffused.

It being thus manifest that the consideration of *expense*, could be no obstacle to the support of an enlarged and useful system of national education, even under the most economical administration of the resources of a community, we may consider the other difficulties in the way of its speedy establishment, the want of school-houses, school-materials, and school-masters. We might go further, and say with truth that much money and time would be saved to the community by this plan: for more than ten shillings a year, and that frequently continued for more than four (though not always successive) years, are now absolutely thrown away by the very poor classes in the poorest part of the community, in Ireland, to drunken ignorant school-masters, for confining children to learn nothing, from want of things to teach as well as of knowledge of the mode of teaching. As one out of ten of the whole population, male and female, is the number to be provided for, one school-house containing five hundred, would be sufficient for a population of five thousand. Now there is always either a parish church, or large chapel, catholic, or methodist, in every town, or in every country district, containing this number of inhabitants. There are almost always to be found besides, one or more capacious school-rooms erected on the plan of Bell and Lan-

caster, or otherwise, which might be devoted or transferred to such useful purpose. If the community sat the example of devoting, during the working six days of the week, the places of worship, called national, to the purposes of education, by simply adapting the seats thereto, so as to serve the double purpose of school and church, the members of other sects of all sorts would emulously follow the good example, and a choice of school-rooms would not be wanting: for if any thing approaching to accommodation be found for the whole community in churches and chapels, surely one tenth of them, and those the smaller in bulk, could be easily accommodated for education in those same buildings. Private charity, being relieved from the burden of supporting schools, would as a matter of course transfer its buildings to the national use, and sometimes perhaps private school-masters, on being appointed to the new schools, would give the use of their premises for public convenience. Still, after all that can be expected of accommodation in the way of school-rooms, however inappropriate, from these sources, much will remain to be done. Many from prejudice or pride would not suffer their churches, or chapels, or meeting-houses, to lose a single unsocial room-destroying pew; and many poor districts there would be, where no sort of accommodation would be to be found. In all these cases, school-rooms must be built; and the funds for the buildings should be either immediately advanced by the province or county (not however exceeding a small sum, such as two pounds for every pupil to be at one time instructed in it, all over that sum to be advanced, if they think fit, by those locally interested) or from the national funds; to be repaid by the county, or under circumstances of peculiar incapacity not to be demanded. After the school-rooms were once built, it would be the inspector's care to see that they were kept in proper repair, a certain proportion of the annual payments, besides paying the master's salary, being always reserved for this and other purposes. Besides so many other interests, that of the school-master himself for his own comfort and to perpetuate his establishment, that of his pupils and their parents conjoined, the character of the whole district would concur in fixing attention on these establishments and their preservation. The probability is, that within a very few years a useful emulation would spring up not only for preserving but for improving and making more useful these school-houses and attaching ground to them, either near or at a distance, for purposes relating to art or science. About as much money, perhaps, as is luxuriously consumed every year by the bishops of a force-supported establishment, would

suffice to erect all the simple buildings wanting for the education of twenty millions of human beings !

We have next to provide for the *school materials* necessary for these establishments, which extending to really useful education, the teaching of the physical sciences, would require larger sums than have been hitherto contemplated under this head. Perhaps ten shillings for every pupil to be taught, or one million of pounds for the whole community of twenty millions, would not be more than sufficient to accomplish this object. A school of five hundred pupils, and so in proportion, would thus be supplied with two hundred and fifty pounds worth of mineral, vegetable, or animal, specimens, preparations, or prints, for the teaching of the knowledge or science of nature called natural history, of apparatus, tests, re-agents, &c., for the teaching of chemistry, and of the most simple and useful machines and instruments for the teaching of mechanics, as well as of books for the teaching of all. The quantity of useful knowledge that may be conveyed by means of the most simple and economical apparatus, is quite as great as, in elementary instruction such as that here designed, it would be possible to convey to the pupils in a first course of instruction. Such of them as may be able and anxious to pursue and develop and possibly enlarge the bounds of any of the sciences, will naturally, under other teachers at other establishments, pursue their intricacies with expensive instruments and apparatus. These schools must be confined to the strictly necessary and useful. This expense of original materials once incurred, every school would find within itself provision for keeping up always the original value of materials of instruction ; most probably, by presents and emulation, of constantly adding to and improving them. The pound from each pupil—whether paid by the parent or the community—would cover all expenses, two-thirds to four-fifths of it going to the master, his duty being by the inspector certified to have been done, and the remainder devoted to such matters as repairs, implements, books.

The next thing wanting for such an undertaking would be *school-masters* or school-mistresses : for where there were separate schools for the two sexes, women ought to be preferred, if with any thing like equal talent, for their own sex, if for no other reason, to save the expense of a female usher, or assistant, which a man would be under the necessity of having. The number to be permanently taught being two millions, and three to five hundred pupils being the number allotted to each master, the number of teachers would be from four to six thousand. As more than one half the existing

school-masters would by such a system be rendered disposable, they would naturally be amongst the candidates for the new situations, and would necessarily endeavour to prepare themselves worthily to fill them. In the same way, many of the present candidates for the idle and pernicious sinecures of priestcraft, would become industrious to improve themselves in useful knowledge, were all sects left, as under representative institutions they soon would be, to support their own priests, and would thus add to the number of these candidates. But as the competition ought to be open to all sects without distinction, Jews or Moslems if they had the requisite knowledge, the probability is that all the most active and best informed of those who otherwise would be the clergy of all sorts, would be candidates for these useful offices, leaving mere priests work for those who were fit for nothing else: and those whose tastes led them to intellectual in preference to muscular pursuits in every department of life, would naturally look to these situations as desirable means of exertion and support. When it is considered that there are at this moment in this community of Britain and Ireland, thirty thousand priests of all sorts, of whom about two thirds are paid by forced, and one third by voluntary, contributions, at the expense of from twelve to twenty millions of pounds per annum, or nearly one pound a year for every living being, it will be considered how very easily such a call as that for a few thousand useful school-masters could be supplied! the income of the idle priests living on forced payments averaging about six hundred pounds a year, while that of the active class supported by voluntary contribution does not average one hundred and fifty pounds a year, catholics, methodists, and presbyterians, all included. No fear, it may be said, of candidates where money is offered; but is it likely that so many men should be found able to teach, and on a new plan, so many sciences so little known, not yet brought into the circle of education, which so few of them could ever have learned? Even this difficulty in the present state of advanced knowledge, would be easily surmounted. First, it is only the elements of the sciences which it would be possible under such a system to teach: the profound, the doubtful, the disputed, the difficult, parts would necessarily be omitted. Utility united with simplicity would be the characteristics of the things taught. Now, there is no person of ordinary intellectual power who could not in a very short period so far master these branches of knowledge as to qualify himself to teach their elements: for though no provision is yet made for teaching them at any schools, and though they are little more than tolerated as

modern novelties at colleges, and are therefore brought to view just at the wrong period of education, at the *end* of it, when *moral* combinations begin to claim all the attention, and when mere physical differences and objects of the external senses are beginning to be supplanted by them; yet such is their palpable utility and the consequent current of public opinion in their favor, that, acquire it how he will, by reading, at public lectures, or elsewhere, no man is now esteemed possessed of good information who is ignorant on these points. Institutions and schools having equally neglected to make any provision for these useful sciences, voluntary laborers have supplied the deficiency, and nobly are they proceeding in their good work of diffusing useful physical knowledge, particularly by means of elementary books addressed to the young. Although there are none of these drawn up with a view to any such purpose as that now before us, being mostly intended for young people whose ordinary education was on the point of being finished, and with a view to excite attention rather than give accurate information; yet with their assistance, coupled with the use of regular and comprehensive works on the same subjects, very little difficulty would be found in acquiring the necessary information. Indeed by mere little books, without specimen, apparatus, or machine, little more than amusement can be conveyed: but these deficiencies being supplied at the schools, and at a time of life when all visible and tangible things have their greatest attraction, and the first years, or months, at school perfecting the master as well as the scholar, all difficulties would vanish. For it must not be forgotten, that the principle of *inspection* and payment by the double ratio of number and improvement of pupils, is an essential part of this system, is that without which or something of equal potency, this, like almost all past ones, would degenerate into a system of sinecures and robbery. Now with all these motives and facilities to exertion, with the impossibility of receiving payment without proof of work done, with the voice of public opinion, the interest of pupils and parents deciding on their aptitude, is it to be conceived that efficient teachers should not be soon found?

It is now time to reconcile a former principle insisted on in this chapter, that of prescribing no particular opinions to be assented to by the pupils, with the important principle of inspection. It may be asked, If the inspector do not know the matters which ought to be learned, how can he examine? To render this matter quite clear from the beginning: the interests of truth, and of course those of the community, do not permit that its representatives should ordain that any par-

ticular opinion on any one branch of knowledge should be entertained by the pupils of these schools: it does not ordain that the propositions of geometry shall be *assented to*, but that they shall be *taught*. Whether they are *assented to*, or not, is the exclusive province of the pupil. The inspector has merely to ascertain whether such and such facts and reasonings are known to the understanding of the pupils: if true and useful, they must necessarily be believed and valued. Until they are proved *to the satisfaction of the pupils* to be true and useful, belief and respect ought to be discouraged, instead of courted, as indicative of stupidity and hypocrisy. Certain branches of knowledge esteemed the most useful for the whole community, such as natural history, mechanics, chemistry, the science of numbers and quantity, geography, history, morals in its most extensive signification, (including legislation, political economy, education, &c., towards the end of the course,) should be ordained to be taught for so many years, in such an order, or such proportions of time allotted to each. But to direct assent to any one fact or proposition on any subject, would be absurd, because evidence carries its own probative force along with it, which no orders can increase; and indolence is too apt, without any order, to affect assent in order to save the trouble of exercising the understanding. To *compel* assent to any thing is to root out the understanding. The business of the inspectors, then, is not to turn inquisitors on pupils or teachers, but to ascertain that the pupils *know* and *understand* the simple elementary matters of the prescribed sciences, as well as the generally received new information of the day, without in any way presuming to interfere with their *opinions* on these data, or with their admission or rejection of the facts on which they assume to be grounded. Provided the pupils can tell what is the notion now generally entertained, with the facts on which it is founded, respecting the constituent parts of the air of the atmosphere, they may condemn and overturn the notion as fast as they please. So with respect to every other proposition deemed to be true and useful. Let the proposition and its proofs be exhibited, and let them be understood. Here the duty of the instructor ceases. By any thing extraneous, by hope or fear, by any antipathy or other false association, to attempt to influence the judgement, is vicious, instead of being commendable, in the teacher. Real genuine assent of the understanding, not the formal lip-echoes of the memory, is not a voluntary operation: it necessarily follows the exposition of appropriate evidence, and cannot be produced by any shorter process. But to produce this species of assent, the only one not

mischievous, knowledge and activity are necessary on the part of the teachers: mere memory assent is the necessary resource of ignorant and indolent teachers. Nothing can therefore be more deplorably absurd than the fear that the mind left to itself will not be influenced by the strongest evidence: it cannot avoid being so influenced.

As no particular theories or doctrines are to be prescribed, as matters of necessary assent or belief by the teachers to the pupils; so ought no theories or doctrines whatever, not even the circulation of the blood or Newtonian system of heavenly movements, be prescribed to the teachers. All to be required of them is to make a fair exhibit of facts and deductions as now generally received, leaving the masters entirely at liberty to combat these notions, and propose any others in preference to them: with always the same reserve of freedom of assent or dissent on the part of the pupils. This is in fact the way in which the physical sciences are now mostly taught. Why so? Because those who teach them, chiefly by lecture and extra-school work, depending for payment for the most part on their hearers, having no power over them, are compelled to the exclusive use of these legitimate means to produce conviction, under pain of not producing it at all, and therefore ceasing to interest, and working in vain. It is to this system alone that all the late splendid advances in physical science are to be attributed. By universal adherence to it, will both physical and moral knowledge be advanced and diffused, so as to be made really available for the happiness of all, instead of being, as hitherto, the mere means of plunder or glory to a few.

There remains however a great work to be done to facilitate the movements of these public schools, and to lighten the load of teaching to the masters. It is the drawing up of the *daily lessons* on all the sciences proposed to be taught, in accordance with the foregoing principles of instruction: lessons, in question and answer, so simple that the pupil-teacher of each class, supplied with the necessary materials, specimens, &c., indicated at the head of every lesson, should himself learn the lesson in the process of teaching it; the teacher being always at hand to explain difficulties. Till means more efficacious than the monitor system for the diffusion, by cheapness, of school instruction, shall have been devised, these means must be used by all who wish to diffuse knowledge. The simple expedient, for obviating the justly-apprehended and experienced evils of mere memory culture, arising from these printed questions and answers, is *not* to require the answer, on examination, to be given in the words printed, but

in any words of the pupil rendering the sense of the answer, the master determining, in case of appeal, whether the pupil's words show that he understands the answer. Were the plan of national education once seriously agitated, appropriate elementary lessons on every subject would be prepared while the school-rooms were building and other preparatory matters were in train. At all events, the interest of all the teachers of the schools would be such that they would every where vie with each other in offering for general use their particular models of teaching. A tutor of five hundred could not, by word of mouth, instruct the whole: he must either write down lessons to be conveyed through the most intelligent, to different groups or classes of his pupils, or point out pieces already written in books, to supply his labor. These lessons once written, the labor of future years would be reduced to almost nothing.

But, were the best possible set of lessons for all the sciences produced, should it be imperative on any or all of the public schools to adopt them? It should not be imperative on any one teacher of the five or six thousand national schools, to adopt a single sentence of them. Their utility, if useful, would work its own way: the danger would rather be, that the majority of masters would through indolence adopt any printed system, to which the slightest approbation was given, which would save them so much labor, than that they would perversely refuse the use of what was calculated to aid them and their pupils. At their own risk, they would substitute any worse system of instruction for the best known; not only in the way of increased labor, but of incapacity of the pupils to justify the certificate of the inspector for the half-yearly balance of the salary. Nor, if a teacher adopted these lessons, should his hand be restrained—always under the indirect check of the inspector—from altering them for the use of his pupils as he thought proper. Uniformity in teaching would thus be attained, in as far as useful, from its perceived utility, not from the command of authority.

The sciences have now so completely outstepped the pretexts, not to speak of the necessity, for leading-strings or pretended encouragements from power, that no provision whatever need be made for the further education beyond these universal schools, of any particular part of the community at the expense of the rest; and least of all for the exclusive benefit of the rich. There is scarcely any one of the old institutions of this sort that has not been a mere contrivance to restrain the advance of what it called knowledge, and to monopolize the advantages to be obtained from it to a few, to the exclusion and degradation of

the community. The funds of all such institutions, should be either applied to general national purposes, or to the use of the national public schools for the whole people. If the rich want more knowledge than is given by public means to the whole community, they can pay for their further education. When the present privileged monopolies of what is called learning shall cease, equally ruinous as they are in expense as in vices, intellectual and moral, of every species; all that the community should do to replace them, would be, to cause buildings in every province or county containing about two hundred thousand inhabitants, (of which of course there would be one hundred in a community of twenty millions,) where none previously existed, to be erected for the purpose of affording lecture-rooms for about a dozen lecturers or professors; but *not to give any one of these lecturers or professors one farthing of salary out of the public money.* These buildings should afford three lecture-rooms for five hundred pupils each (both sexes of course equally admitted), a room for a library, for a laboratory, for a museum, and for machinery and philosophical instruments. The only advantage the professors should be permitted to enjoy over other teachers on the same sciences, would be the use of the public lecture-rooms and the materials of instruction there preserved, the competition to these places being open to all of the community, men or women, mussulman, quaker, catholic, or presbyterian, qualified to fill them. When the University monopolies were abolished, and it ceased to be imperative on all wishing to be physicians, lawyers, or priests, to pass through their antiquated courses, at fifty times the expense they could obtain superior knowledge at home, these hundred provincial Lyceums (or by whatever other name called) would each of them educate, for the most part, their own county or provincial youth, now forced to these overgrown establishments. And when to this description of pupils we add the much greater numbers which would be prepared by elementary instruction at the national schools, and the unsuspected numbers of those who, at any moderate expense within their reach, as five to ten pounds instead of one to two hundred pounds a-year, would gladly purchase substantial knowledge for their children, we shall find reason to conclude that the one hundred provincial establishments would be well peopled. The exertions of the professors are secured by their payment depending entirely on the number of their class, by the active emulation of neighbouring professors in the similar surrounding county establishments, or of rival professors in the same towns. The number of students at every county or

provincial Lyceum could not be less on an average than about one thousand, ten thousand being the average number always in course of education at the national schools out of a population of about two hundred thousand: but it would be hazardous to limit the numbers to which the students might extend. One pound or a guinea should be the largest sum that any professor should be allowed to charge for admission to his course, to consist of at least one hundred and fifty lectures, extending through a session of at least nine months. One half, or even one quarter, of this sum might in a very few years be found sufficient; as there can be no reason why these professors, enjoying, as they would, more honor and doing less work, should receive larger payments than the most deserving of the national school-masters or inspectors; that is to say, about three hundred pounds a-year. In every thing it is the interest of the community to get a good article at the lowest possible price, as well in knowledge as in shoes. Professors ought no more to be pampered than shoe-makers, for their own sake: there is as much fear that the knowledge of making shoes should be lost in a community, as that any useful knowledge possessed by those who call themselves *learned* bodies, should be lost. Free competition, and as implied thereby the abolition of all monopolies literary or commercial, would not only preserve but increase useful knowledge, and bring down its price to the lowest that would afford a remuneration equal to that enjoyed by equal talent and labor in other departments of exertion. Four or five of these lectures, if each were given every day, would be as many as any one studying for a particular profession, as medicine, or for general information, could attend with benefit in one year. Five pounds therefore would be the *highest price* per annum—and five pounds paid at home—for an education, comprehensive and entirely useful on moral and physical science, such as no privileged corporation of professors has ever given, and from their very nature can never give.

An important problem remains to be solved. By what mode of appointment will the most efficient school-masters, inspectors, and professors, be obtained? Ought they to be appointed by the Government under old or new institutions, by any political influence? No mode of appointment could be more inimical to their duties, the diffusion of simple knowledge and the investigation of truth. Every bias, and more particularly every political bias, unfavorable to the pursuit of truth, ought to be carefully shunned: the circumstance that mankind must necessarily be brought up and their characters formed under particular institutions, tends of itself so

powerfully to shackle the judgement respecting them, that they should be invested with no additional factitious influence. This consideration is quite enough, to say nothing of favoritism, inaptitude to judge, and consequent unavoidable misjudgement. In Ireland, the London Hibernian School Society, being the dispensers of the bounty for children's schools, appoint their own masters and inspectors, and to all appearance with good effect: in fact, if they did not, they would be throwing away their own funds. But for these national establishments, upheld by the funds of the whole community, who shall nominate to them?

Suppose that the most intelligent men possessing the most extensive information, physical and moral, and at the same time the most interested in the appointment of proper teachers, could be selected in every province or county to elect the school-masters, part inspector (for there would not be one of these to every county) and professors of the district; would not such an arrangement promise hopes of success? Wherever, as would mostly be the case if any where, in the capital town of the province or department of about two hundred thousand inhabitants, there was formed a society of not less than fifty members, for the acquisition and diffusion of physical and moral knowledge (such as are called philosophical or scientific and literary societies), should not the choice be left to their election? *provided that, in addition to a majority of votes, a literary test, such as composing and defending a paper at a public sitting, was a requisite for the admission of its members?* Where no such test existed, but mere money procured admission to the society, such society to have no share in any such nomination. Where more than one such society existed, they must coalesce, or meet together for the purposes of these elections, or elect in rotation, or by the absolute majority added up from the votes of the different societies. Where no such society had been formed in any province, the instructors of that province to be nominated by the nearest society, until such an establishment of at least fifty qualified members was formed at home. A hall of meeting might be provided for the society in the county or provincial Lyceum; or they might make use of one of the lecture-rooms for their evening meetings, to read or discuss their papers and transact their business. No one, while member of such society, should be eligible to any office of public instruction; and any person so elected, school-master, inspector, or professor, though subsequently admitted a member of the society, should not be permitted *to vote* in elections or any other proceedings of the society as long as he remained in office.

In fact, to these societies might be safely confided the task of erecting every where, by *voluntary subscription*, provincial or county Lyceums. The vanity, or the patriotism, or the wisdom, or the benevolence of appointing masters and professors, in addition to the literary and scientific pleasures of the society itself, would be abundant stimulus to its exertions; provided all education monopolies were abolished, and that all the youth educated at any of these establishments for any calling or profession, were entitled to the same advantages on passing the same examinations, as those educated at any other places whatever in any part of the community, without the necessity of spending an hour or wasting one pound of wealth at any place of real or pretended instruction or wasteful dissipation, to be re-levied on the community in the monopoly charge for the work done by the privileged operators. All professions, like all trades, should be free to all: no diploma or stamp or permission should be legally required: but certificates of goodness and skill should be obtainable by those who sought for and deserved them, to assist the public judgement in distinguishing the well-informed and the genuine from the pretender and the spurious. These societies would naturally keep up their knowledge in their halls to the ever-extending level of their age; and thus would knowledge in all the schools and Lyceums be ever on the advance from the impulse thus communicated. To these societies perhaps might be left the determination of the number of professors required in every county Lyceum. It is not, perhaps, in every county that it would be useful to have, for instance, such a number of medical professors as would be requisite for a medical education: but in every county there should always exist the power of instituting them, or any other professorships whatsoever, that the interest and wishes of the surrounding portion of the community might demand. The importance and the stimulus given to such societies by means of these truly important nominations and the interesting discussions, moral and physical, connected with them, would be such as to call them every where into existence and to keep in active operation amongst the adults in every part of the country, the pursuit of useful knowledge. In the societies of particular districts of about two hundred thousand inhabitants, (whether called shires, counties, departments, or provinces,) unwise management might occur, and injudicious nominations might take place: but surrounded every where by similar institutions, by neighbouring county schools and Lyceums, by the unrestrained liberty of other societies to establish similar lecture-rooms and professorships within their view and hearing; as well as by

private competition of school-masters and lecturers within their own boundary, what so simple and effectual remedy can human wisdom devise as loss of reputation and ill success consequent on improbity and folly? The internal regulations of these societies and the aptitude or examinations they might require of the school-masters, inspectors or professors, should be left entirely to themselves. From active emulation in all these matters, the best mode, in all important points, would soon be universally adopted: and in all minor, or disputed, matters, variety of experiment is the only mode of ultimately ascertaining what is the most useful and true. The only point to be insisted on in their constitution is the test of *intellectual aptitude* and admission by the *majority* of votes; in order to prevent the possibility of party or other sinister influence: perhaps also a limit, as one pound a year, ought to be put to the annual subscription of members, to prevent the possibility of a few rich converting such societies into engines inimical to the public good. Voluntary subscription of the members or the community would be always at hand to supply funds for any *really useful purpose* the society might propose, in the way of buildings, library, museum, botanic garden, or any other objects. No possible good, but mischief in various ways, would arise from excluding women from these societies. Their most useful officer for the time being,—president, chairman, secretary, or however named,—should countersign the orders of the inspectors, at the foot of their certificates for the payment of the salaries of the school-masters and inspectors; and such orders should be immediately paid by the county treasurers.

The outlines, with some details of a plan of universal education—the third and last of the great instruments pointed out for the diffusion of useful knowledge—being thus exposed, and the extreme facility, particularly in the article of expense, of accomplishing it being, it is conceived, demonstrated; is it necessary to notice the objections to the very extensiveness and perfection of the scheme?

“Reading and writing—yes—we can still manage them, *perhaps*, if they know only so much: but to make them as wise as ourselves, who then shall manage the people?” Who shall? or who ought? The very object is to enable a community to manage its own affairs, to make men equal to the task of self-government, both in private and public life, to banish every partial interest incompatible with the welfare of the whole community, and to give the great majority of the community the requisite *knowledge* to discover the means, as they have already the *interest*, to pursue and attain their own

greatest possible happiness. The objector would find himself a more intelligent, moral, and therefore happier being, co-operating in one of these communities, than sharing in the management of ignorance, wretchedness and discontent. If a little knowledge be good, the most that can be given, is better.

“Yes,” it is urged, “but there is preponderant mischief in giving the people too much knowledge; because it consumes time, *many years*, which are thus abstracted from useful industry, from adding to the physical comforts, the enjoyments derived from the matter of wealth, of the families of which they form a part.” Now the majority of a community are either industrious and comfortable, or the reverse, to a greater or less degree. If comfortable, they can afford the loss of the time of one member: if the reverse, there is no loss, the time not being worth any other application, and so of any intermediate stage of poverty or industry, in proportion as the loss of the time is expensive, it indicates an equally high reward for the remaining occupied industry of the family. But what is the real amount of this loss of time? It need not be much more than half the day for three or four years; as active muscular exercise is necessary in youth to relieve intellectual exertion, and this exercise would be found in the pursuits of industry for part of the day. Say then half the pupil’s time is lost for four years, the whole for two; but at an age, when its industrious application would not earn more than a third of the industry of an adult. If we say it would earn the half, we have two years half adult earnings, equal to one year’s full wages given for a useful education, over and above the small sum of money that the parents might contribute to the school. What is gained for this sacrifice? The pupil lives suppose thirty years after his education. By the knowledge and the industrious habits acquired during such an education, would not the productive powers of those thirty years be increased one thirtieth? would they not more frequently be increased one fourth or one half? Would not such education afford the chance of engaging with effect in superior lines of industry, and of thus indefinitely increasing the productive industry of future life? Would not the *moral* habits, the attention to domestic economy, and to health, say only the one virtue sobriety, acquired during such an education, *save* more than a thirtieth, sometimes a quarter or a half of future earnings? besides the diseases and shortening of life which it would obviate? Would not the pleasing elements of knowledge acquired during such an education, supply materials for *useful* and interesting thought and conversation, during labor or during leisure, as well as banish pernicious thoughts and con-

versations, by which the happiness of every hour of life would be doubled, or indefinitely increased? Would not the real knowledge, the acquaintance with the ordinary regular operations, called the laws of nature, which such an education would afford, guard its pupils for ever from the impositions and the mental horrors produced by impostors or fools on ignorant credulity? Would not the knowledge of rights and duties, of the uses and tendencies of institutions, which such an education would confer, create such self-respect and rational attachment to useful institutions, that no fear could ever exist of a return to the vices and miseries of forced inequality and insecurity? Would not the *natural laws of distribution* be for ever secured? Would not the moral and political interest, inspired by such an education, in the discussions, regulations, and happiness of the provincial or national legislative measures of such a community, of both of which every one would feel himself a constituent member, create new and elevated sources of sympathy, of the purest and cheapest mental enjoyment, always varied, renewed with every opening year, with every rising day? Nor, in relation to society at large, are the effects of the diffusion of knowledge less conspicuous and useful. All the physical resources of the territory of a community would be soon *known* and brought into use: not a mineral, plant, animal, or useful indication of any sort, would long escape the curious eye of the every where well-informed peasant and mechanic. All the talents of all the community would be developed and brought forward for the public service; and universal competition would carry to the highest, the integrity as well as the skill of public agents in legislation, justice, or executive offices. All the sciences and arts would be every where advancing and improving in the double ratio of the increased number of their cultivators and of the increased activity of the exhilarating competition thereby produced.

Are these effects real? are they not the natural consequences to be expected from such an education, when not counteracted by other opposing circumstances? If so, is not the one year's sacrifice of the wages of an ignorant rustic or mechanic abundantly recompensed by such advantages? Where is now the balance of the account? Will preponderant mischief or good arise from this real education?—for learning to read and write is only acquiring the keys of the store-house of knowledge, is merely introductory to real good.

One circumstance attending the diffusion of useful knowledge, by means of education, amongst the children of the poorer classes, of the great majority of every community, has

not been sufficiently attended to. The children of the poor have a greater aptitude for intellectual instruction than the children of the rich, up to the age that both are sent to school: the children are as much more intellectually apt, as the adult are less apt than those of the better-provided classes: and both proceeding from the same cause. While children, the poor are not waited upon, are not carried about, do not find their wants anticipated, are not guarded by posts and nurses and attendants from all that might molest: hence they are compelled to use their own ears, eyes, and limbs, and quickly to exercise the judgement to avoid evils and to seek for good. In all these respects the children of the rich are in an opposite situation; and more accidents and mischiefs arise to them from want of culture of their own faculties consequent on overwatching, than happen to the children of the poor from the little experiments they are constantly but cautiously making of their expanding senses, strength, and feelings. Again, the minds of those surrounding the young of the poorer classes are more on a level with their companions than those of the rich: hence they feel more interest and have more communication, more interchange of ideas with them, and all about simple things, objects of sense, exactly suited to the faculties of children. But the adult rich have either real knowledge, or conventional cant and jargon which they call knowledge, or supposed refinement of manners and sentiments, all equally uninteresting because unintelligible to their children. When the rich, ever so well informed, address children, they generally, whether from vanity or ignorance of the mode of communicating knowledge, present to them complex, or abstract, or really absurd, though school, or college-learnt notions, which serve no other purpose than to bewilder them. Now the parents and friends of poor children *cannot* so disgust, by prematurely surfeiting, their understandings: therefore until the children come to a level of knowledge with their instructors, the simple and uninformed are better companions for them than the learned, if these learned have not learned the art of the gradual communication of knowledge. But from the time that real intellectual or school education begins, the poor child, the best to work upon, has been hitherto entirely neglected; and all effort has been expended to form exclusively the children of the rich. Hence the adult rich acquire again the superiority over the adult poor—aided of course by their greater intercourse with life and its incidents. Again, the excitement to a poor child when put into a theatre of education, is greater than to a rich child. To the poor 'tis a gain, a source of hope, a novelty, an introduction to those above him: to the rich child,

it is loss of liberty, a source of dread because of restraint, nothing novel but every thing less comfortable than at home, and no honor in the introduction to poorer children or to a dreaded school-master, nor any indefinite hope of future advantage.

Such are, and in so many ways, the peculiar facilities attending the honest wish of diffusing real knowledge, by means of education, through the productive, the really useful and efficient, classes of a community. But it is the community alone that will give such a blessing to itself.

Thus, in this chapter has it been attempted to show how knowledge is actually diffused or suppressed, and how it may be diffused to an indefinite extent over the whole face of society, by means the most simple and altogether at hand; applying to literary as to all other labor, the plain wisdom of the natural laws of distribution, "free labor, implying unrestrained competition, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges."

Of the three great instruments—institutions, instruction to adults, and education—for the diffusion of knowledge and formation of moral habits, with the view of indefinitely increasing, by rendering more susceptible of enjoyment, the pleasures to be derived from articles of wealth, as well as of perpetuating the wisest distribution of them, and multiplying their reproduction, we have now treated. The object has been so to develop their mode of operation that they may cease to be perverted from their legitimate object, the greatest happiness of the whole community, that labor and knowledge may be re-united and may henceforth accompany and befriend each other, that industry may no longer labor in vain. But neither of these instruments can produce its genuine good effects if counteracted by the others. They must all act harmoniously, education, institutions and public information, in order to produce all the inappreciable benefits of which they are susceptible. Little comparatively can be done by education if opposed by the other two. But the time is fast approaching when they will be all co-operating instruments in the pursuit of *truth*, the necessary basis of human happiness: and the articles of wealth will be as much multiplied as the enjoyments to be derived from them will be increased.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE PRESENT STATE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH,
AS RESULTING FROM THE INSTITUTIONS OF INSECURITY;
AND OF THE MEANS OF REDUCING THE EXISTING FORCED
EXPEDIENTS OF UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION TO THE VOLUN-
TARY MODE, OF EQUALITY LIMITED BY SECURITY.

UNDER the above head a chapter is written, consisting of about one hundred pages. This chapter is for the present withheld for two reasons; first lest the development of the effect of particular institutions, in addition to the few of a more prominent nature which have been already noticed, might lead to unnecessary and avoidable irritation of those now mechanically working under and moulded by such institutions to modes of action pernicious to the general welfare, the universal interest; second, that the inquiry might be comprised within one volume, and might as speedily and economically as possible be submitted to public consideration.

The concurrent operation of all these expedients of insecurity, in opposition to the natural laws of distribution, is in this chapter pointed out, and from a balance of the evil and fancied good they produce, they are shown to be inimical to equality limited by security, and consequently to the greatest happiness. An attempt is made to arrange them, not with any view to logical accuracy, but merely to facilitate their examination. The subject is divided into five heads, as follows.

SECTION 1. *Of the GENERAL EVILS of the abstraction by political power of the products of labor without the consent of the producers or owners of them; termed here PUBLIC plunder, and shown to be more extensive, more difficult of cure, and consequently more pernicious, than PRIVATE plunder.*

SECTION 2. *Of those particular institutions or expedients, whose most obvious effect is to GENERATE forced inequality of wealth—or that inequality not called for by equal security.*

Such are, 1. All laws or contrivances interfering with what ought to be the equal right of all to *unappropriated* articles. Such are,

Game laws.

Many of the navigation and fishing laws and customs.

All laws, customs, &c., controlling what ought to be the equal right of all to appropriate by labor, air, water, minerals, &c., not previously appropriated.

2. All laws or contrivances which limit the free *direction* of labor to articles previously appropriated by the laborer, or with consent of the appropriators. Such are,

Those which require apprenticeships to particular trades.

Those which require freedom of guilds to practice trades in particular places.

Those which control the locomotion of laborers through or out of the community.

Those which establish monopolies; which distribute bounties.

Those which impede the free direction of labor, with a view to, or under pretence of external or internal defence, revenue, &c.

3. All laws or contrivances which control the rate of the wages of labor, diverting them from that standard to which the natural laws of distribution would lead. Such are,

Those which violate security by wholesale, called *slave laws*.

Those which compel labor *without any reward*.

Those which compel labor for less than the laborer chooses to take.

Those which regulate, by raising or lowering, the wages of labor.

Those which prevent peaceable combinations of laborers to keep up or advance their wages.

Those which aid combinations of capitalists or others to keep down the wages of labor.

Those which, under the name of *by-laws* or *local laws*, regulate and oppress labor in particular districts.

Those which prohibit labor on particular days.

SECTION 3. *Of those particular institutions or expedients, whose most obvious effect is to PERPETUATE forced inequality of wealth.* Such are,

Those which establish hereditary power.

Those which aim to establish perpetuity of property, without labor, in the descendants of particular individuals.

SECTION 4. *Of those particular institutions or expedients, whose obvious effect is both to GENERATE AND PERPETUATE forced inequality of wealth.*

Such are 1. All laws or contrivances for abstracting the products of labor, without the consent of the producers, by political power, for its own immediate use. Such are,

Those which levy taxes in kind—tithes, &c.

Those which levy taxes in money.

Those which levy taxes concealed, or included in the price of commodities.

Those which control the mercantile value of the currency.

2. All laws or contrivances which seize the annual products of labor to indemnify capitalists or their representatives, for wealth, by them given to political power, and by political power squandered. Such are,

Those which levy taxes under the name of interest for what are called public debts.

3. All laws or contrivances whose effect is to monopolize knowledge to a few, keeping the mass of society in ignorance and delusion.

Those which supply places and means of *education* exclusively to the rich; neglecting at the same time the education of the poor.

Those which monopolize to the rich the knowledge and consequent means of wealth and influence derived from theology.

Those which monopolize to the rich the knowledge and consequent means of wealth and influence derived from law.

Those which monopolize to the rich the knowledge and consequent wealth and influence from medicine and from all other pursuits requiring knowledge.

SECTION 5. *Of the means of reducing these existing expedients of FORCED unequal distribution to the VOLUNTARY mode of the natural laws of distribution, inducing equality limited only by equal security.*

1. The universal establishment of representative institutions on the best plan the actual knowledge of the community permits; giving a just foundation to *public* morals, the parent (by means of institutions) of private morals.
2. The gradual removal under these, by simply withdrawing the force that protects them, of all the above institutions violating equal security and sacrificing universal happiness.
3. The diffusing of every species of knowledge of physical and moral truth (not the notions of the propagators) amongst the whole community; particular attention being directed to those of the community most devoid of knowledge and most in want of it.

The object or the effect, sometimes one, sometimes both, of almost all the past and existing institutions of society, however variously modified, has been to increase the unavoidable evils of inequality, justifiable to any extent only by the superior claims of equal security. By equal security as to matters of wealth, is meant the faculty of "free labor, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges." On these principles, called the natural laws of distribution, should be founded all regulations of positive law and of human conduct unconstrained by law, respecting wealth.

Hitherto the object of this inquiry has been, to contrast the system of equal security of all adult sentient beings—never yet more than partially established in any community—with all past and present systems respecting wealth, more or less violating equal security. The object has been to contrast security with insecurity, freedom of labor with the empire of force and fraud, the exercise of the instruments of persuasion and knowledge, with those of ignorance and delusion.

The only modes or systems of labor hitherto practised amongst men, have been those of labor by constraint, or those of labor by individual competition. The immense advantages of the entire freedom of individual competition, over any regulations not founded on the persuasion and volun-

tary acquiescence of those whose actions they regulated, have, it is hoped, been demonstrated. The utility of *equal security* has, it is hoped, been proved.

But, equal security established, the right of every adult rational human being, male or female, to free labor, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges, being established; a new question presents itself. *Is there no mode of human labor consistent with security*—whose paramount importance even to production has been demonstrated—but *that of individual competition*? May not a mode of labor be found, consistent with security, and still more productive of happiness, than labor by individual competition? Will equal security permit no further approach to equality, and consequently to virtue and happiness, than that which individual competition can effect? Manifest, as has been seen, are the benefits of individual competition when compared with systems of restraint, of involuntariness, are there no means of obtaining the blessings of unrestricted individual competition—abundant production, and development of all the active faculties—without the evils which, even in its best form, must accompany such individual competition? Nay more, may there not be found a mode of labor consistent with security, which will not only obviate the evils of individual competition, but which will afford its peculiar benefits—abundant production and development of all the faculties—to a greater, an incalculably greater extent, than the best arrangements of individual competition could afford?

No mode of labor can produce preponderant good, which does not respect the natural laws of distribution, “free labor, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges,” or the principle of equal security regarding wealth.

But, if respecting these laws, and producing otherwise greater benefits than labor by individual competition, there can be found any mode of labor which will satisfy the questions above put, that mode of labor should be preferred.

Such a mode of labor has been proposed. It has been called the system of labor by mutual co-operation; and its object and effect are to produce perfect voluntary equality of enjoyment of all the fruits of united labor. This system has been partially used in several places to such an extent as to prove its *practicability*. Its utility, and superiority to the system of individual competition, remain to be inquired into.

There are then three systems of human labor, that of constraint by mingled force and fraud, that of free individual competition (the mode hitherto advocated in this inquiry), and that of mutual co-operation.

Before entering on the consideration of the system of labor by mutual co-operation, the subject of the next chapter, it may be useful to point out some of the good and bad effects of the principle of individual competition as compared with that of mutual co-operation.

After the ample exposition, attempted in this inquiry, of the direct and collateral benefits flowing from equal security, or an observance of the natural laws of distribution, compared with all previous and existing systems of restraint; it cannot be necessary here even to recapitulate these benefits. Let us simply observe that whatever good now exists in society, arising from

1. Activity, of mind and body, in pursuit of wealth;
2. Knowledge and benevolence, to the degree existing;

are to be attributed to the efforts of free individual competition, in opposition to the constant efforts of ignorance to restrain by force or fraud the equal security, or free individual competition, of individuals. To these may be reduced, and in these may be comprised, all the blessings of individual competition. Activity, knowledge, and benevolence, *to the extent in which they now exist*, admirable when compared to the desolation of the rudeness and ignorance of savage life, of despotism, or of superstition, have been produced by individual competition.

But what is the amount of the activity, the knowledge, and benevolence now existing compared to what it is desirable for the happiness of communities of the human race, that they should be? First, as to activity: of *absolute* activity, there is not one half that there might be; of *well-directed* activity, not the tenth part. As to knowledge, it has been, in many communities, assiduously cultivated of late years, but confined to a very few, and used as a mere tool to acquire wealth and power: the diffusion of knowledge amidst the great mass of men, is still little more than a mere speculation. As to benevolence, it is unfortunately confined to fewer individuals than even knowledge: so powerfully in all past ages, as well as at present, have the institutions of society, generating the circumstances surrounding men, and these circumstances generating their habitual motives to action, forced men into selfishness to the exclusion of benevolence.

It is true that the undeviating adherence to free competition under equal security, would wonderfully increase useful activity, would almost banish pernicious activity, would extend and diffuse real knowledge, and with real knowledge benevolence would expand. But to this increase of useful activity, of knowledge, and benevolence, there are limits in the very nature of the principle of individual competition itself. These

limits necessitate certain evils, which it is useful to have fully in view, that the mind may be always alive to the means of removing or modifying them; or until they can be removed or modified, that they may be submitted to as unavoidable evils and not rendered the sources of irritation and unavailing regret.

The most prominent of these evils, arising from free competition in its most unrestricted and best form, may perhaps be comprised under the following heads.

1. It retains the principle of selfishness, necessarily warring with the principle of benevolence, as the leading motive to action, in all the ordinary affairs of life.
2. It paralyses the productive powers as to wealth, of one half the human race, women, by the waste and other mischiefs of individual family arrangements; and renders difficult, if not impossible, that equalization of rights and duties between the sexes, which is necessary for the equal enjoyment and greatest happiness of all.
3. It occasionally leads to unprofitable or injudicious modes of individual exertion, from the limited field of judgement open to individual minds.
4. It affords no adequate, no unobjectionable resource for sickness, old age, mal-formation, and other accidents incident to human life.
5. It obstructs the progress of useful physical and moral education, by the prejudices and despotism of continued domestic controul, rendered overwhelming by command of individual property: and it also obstructs the progress of general knowledge, from the necessity of concealment, in order to render improvements in science and art tributary to individual gain.

In the *very principle* of individual competition do all these evils seem to be inherent; preponderating in good as that principle appears to be, when compared with the principle of restraint by force and fraud. As we have shown however what labor by free individual competition can do for human happiness, it is right to show what it cannot do. To remove these evils, we must seek out another principle: or if that cannot be found, must endeavour to reduce these unavoidable evils to their lowest term, and to bear them so reduced as patiently as we would unavoidable physical calamities.

The first and the greatest objection to the principle of labor by individual competition in its most perfect form, is, that "it retains the principle of selfishness as the leading motive to action in all the ordinary affairs of life."

The object of all the exertions of individual competition as

to wealth, is to acquire for immediate enjoyment or accumulation, individual property. Every individual, striving for *self* at the ultimate peril of want, destitution, and death, there is a constant motive operating to regard the interests of others as opposed to his own. There is therefore a constant temptation to sacrifice the interests of others to his own as often as it can be done, by whatever means may seem necessary to accomplish the end. Hence the necessity of the interference of law with its brutal punishments, in order to counteract this tendency of selfishness. Hence the number of actions taken under the sanction of law, erected into crimes and marked out for punishment, till men are reduced to be the automata of arbitrary regulations. Equal security would doubtless reduce these evils to their least extent, but would not eradicate them. The interest of the individual, instead of being amalgamated with that of others, must still remain to a certain degree opposed to it. The very gathering together by every one of an individual heap of wealth, necessitates individual as opposed to general feelings, selfishness as opposed to benevolence. It will be in vain to object that all virtue, even benevolence, must be founded on self-interest, under all possible social arrangements. True. But comprehensive wisdom, resting on the most enlarged experience, demonstrates that self-interest is never so effectually promoted as when it is sought for as the general *result* of the happiness of all those liable to be influenced by the conduct of any individual agent. In those cases in which the happiness of others is not diminished by the pursuit of individual good, their benevolence smiles on the individual exertion. Selfishness seeks its self-interest, primarily, and to the exclusion of others. Benevolence seeks its self-interest in conjunction with the happiness of all whom its actions may influence, and as the result of that general happiness; the aggregate mass of happiness being primary, self secondary and mingling with it. Now it would appear that the possession of individual property, the consequence of individual competition, however nearly it may be brought to an equalization under the shield of equal security, renders this perfect union of interests as to wealth impossible, and consequently admits but of an approach to the influence of benevolence. Suppose the principle of benevolence once established in the mind of any individual acting under the system of competition, its gratification must be soon checked by the want of individual means to gratify it, and by the penalty of personal distress warded off only by constant attention to individual gain.

In all the pursuits of life under individual competition, this

unhappy tendency to war with benevolence might be pointed out. Every laborer, artizan, trader, sees a competitor, a rival, in every other laborer, artizan, and trader near him; and not only so, but they all see a second competition, a second rivalry, between the whole of their calling and the public. In medicine, it is the interest of the physician to cure diseases, but to cure them as slowly and with as much profit as the competition of other medical men will permit. It is the interest of all medical men that diseases should exist and prevail, or their trade would be decreased ten or one hundred fold. Hence the almost universal inattention, nursed by the interest of physicians, to regimen, to the *preservation of health*, by attention to food, air, moisture, cleanliness, and all other circumstances influencing it. It is the interest of mankind that the state of health should never be deranged: it is the interest of the healers of wounds and diseases that these incidents calling for their exertions and remunerations should be as frequent as may be. Individual remuneration is thus opposed at every step to the principle of benevolence; and the only remedy to the public evil which the system admits, is private competition between individuals of the same calling, mitigating the evils of selfishness on a large scale, by developing them on a smaller. The delusions and pernicious animosities engendered and perpetuated amongst mankind by the competition of priests for their share of individual wealth by individual competition, blacken almost all the pages of history and the existing aspect of human affairs. Let there be no *individual interest* in dreaming dreams and nursing hatreds, and the love of truth and beneficence will soon supersede rancor in theological as well as in other discussions. The interests of lawyers, from the desire of individual gain, nay, the necessity of individual gain to their existence, as well as to that of all other classes, are proverbially opposed to the interest of the community, rendering justice a marketable commodity and confounding the understanding and dispositions of mankind as to its attributes. In like manner the principle of individual interest, founded on individual remuneration, must pervade, more or less, all the offices of public affairs; in which it is most particularly desirable that no interest but that of the public, of universal beneficence, should prevail. In every occupation and pursuit of social life, *self* must be, under the system of individual competition, the primary object of pursuit, and constantly opposed to the principle of benevolence. It is certainly desirable for human happiness that there should be no opposition between these two principles, but that they should, if possible, proceed harmoniously to the same object,

the promotion of the greatest sum of universal happiness. From the pursuit of self-interest in the acquisition of individual wealth, proceed almost all vices and crimes. These vices and crimes must, to a certain extent, continue till the interest of self ceases to be opposed to the interest of others.

The next evil that seems to be inherent in the principle of individual competition in the pursuit of wealth is, that "it paralyzes the productive powers, as to wealth, of one half the human race, women, by the waste and other mischiefs of individual family arrangements, and renders difficult, if not impossible, that equalization of rights and duties between the sexes, which is necessary for the equal enjoyment and greatest happiness of all."

Individual family arrangements, rendered necessary by the pursuit of individual wealth, confine the exertions of one woman to the domestic affairs of herself and family, though there may be no really useful employment for three hours in the day. The fires, the meals, must be prepared, and all the little items of domestic drudgery done at stated hours. To remedy this enormous waste of time and unproductive thrift, it has been proposed that numbers of families adjoining each other, should form a common fund for preparing their food and educating their children, thus relieving the women from a considerable portion of unproductive domestic drudgery, and of course rendering much of their time disposable for useful pursuits. There is nothing more desirable than such a scheme. But it can never rest at this point: either the principle of mutual benevolence will be engendered by it and will prevail, in which case it will lead to entire mutual co-operation and equality of enjoyment of the products of united labor; or the principle of selfishness will prevail, and the habit of individual acquisition will bring back in every thing the love of individual expenditure and enjoyment, were it but for the sake of the distinction, however dearly purchased, of those, whose individual efforts procure them the most wealth. The loss therefore of the greater portion of the time of women may be reckoned inherent in the system of individual competition. The magnitude of this loss is appalling: suppose it to be but one half the time of women, it is one fourth of human effort, for machinery now so completely supersedes the necessity for mere animal strength in all the more delicate and valuable exertions of human industry, that women, if equally trained, might be as productively employed in them as men.

While women continue to be condemned to the seclusion and drudgery of half idle slaves, all their actions liable to the arbitrary controul of other human beings, their exertions and

duties limited to looking after the domestic comforts, as they are called, of their masters and children, they will never rise in the scale of social existence. To be more respected, they must be more useful. In the race of individual competition for wealth, men have such fearful advantages over women, from superiority of strength and exertion uninterrupted by gestation, that they must probably maintain the lead in acquisition by individual effort. Inferiority of wealth, other circumstances being equal, necessitates inequality of enjoyment. Let knowledge be equally and impartially conveyed to both sexes, let civil and political rights be equal to both, let acquired property at the death of parents be equally distributed to male and female; still the inequality of powers in the race of individual competition for wealth, must have a continual tendency to keep the average acquisitions of women under those of men, and of course to decrease their average enjoyments. But while individual competition exists, is it probable that man will not continue to make use of his greater facility in the production and acquisition of wealth, to withhold an equality of knowledge and of civil and political rights from those over whom nature has given him animal, physical, advantages? That the advancement of knowledge and benevolence, leading to the perception of man's true interest, will *ultimately* lead, in spite of the opposing tendency of the system of individual competition, to the equalization of knowledge, rights, wealth, and happiness, between the two great branches of the human race, men and women, equally necessary to each other's happiness and to the perpetuating of the race, may perhaps be presumed: but that individual competition for wealth, has such a *tendency* to continue the degradation of women and the wanton waste consequent thereon of the happiness of both sexes, will scarcely be contradicted. Indeed, the lovers of individual competition will almost universally be found to advocate the inequality of the condition of women; esteeming it most unjust that those who could earn the most, should not enjoy the most. Marriage, the pretended, but most futile and hypocritical, remedy for this inequality of physical powers, will never be entered into by men under individual competition, on equal terms. In the sacrifice of all knowledge and liberty of action, or in a great portion of these blessings, women will be made to pay for the modified equality which they are permitted by individual sufferance, not by general right, to enjoy, in some particular departments. The tendency to inequality between the strongest and the weakest half of the human race, is almost inseparable from individual competition.

The third evil here imputed to the very principle of individual competition is, that "it must occasionally lead to unprofitable or injudicious modes of individual exertion, from the limited field of judgement open to individual minds."

The system of labor under the present wretched practice of individual competition, controuled and disheartened every where by the expedients of insecurity, depends for its very existence on the extraction of profit out of it, to the holders of the food, tools, and materials, necessary to make labor productive. Till this condition, of profit to capitalists, can be complied with, labor, though teeming with the capabilities of making millions happy, must lie eternally dormant. Hence, and from the depressing competition of laborers amongst themselves, the unskilfulness, the unprofitableness, the almost absolute idleness as to useful production, of more than one half the human race, even in those countries where most fully, or least uneconomically employed. Under equal security, every man becoming possessed of the physical and mental means necessary to make his labor productive, every laborer being also capitalist, the great mass of these evils would doubtless disappear. But, still, while individual competition exists, every man must judge for himself as to the probability of success in the occupation which he adopts. And what are his means of judging? Every one, doing well in his calling, is interested in concealing his success, lest competition should reduce his gains. What individual can judge whether the market, frequently at a great distance, sometimes in another hemisphere of the globe, is overstocked or likely to be so with the article which inclination may lead him to fabricate? He is evidently reduced to act on the most general and vague probability. And should any *error of judgement*, whether induced by useful originality of view, by too great caution or too great confidence, lead him into an uncalled for and therefore unprofitable line of exertion, what is the consequence? A mere error of judgement, though attended with the utmost energy of activity and benevolence, may end in severe distress, if not in ruin. Cases of this sort seem to be unavoidable under the scheme of individual competition in its best form. If by any other scheme of human labor they could be avoided, it would surely be desirable that that mode of labor—no preponderating evils following in its train—should be preferred. As long as the practice of useful modes of action, called virtues, do not uniformly conduce to the happiness of the individual practising them, as long as institutions obscure the judgement, or prevent the possibility of judging respecting the consequences of actions, so long will morality remain a game of chance, and fail of ac-

quiring that respect, attachment, and pursuit, which human welfare requires. Here is therefore, in the very principle of individual competition, a source of occasional misery, and of falsification to the calculations of the most useful virtues, activity and industry, guided by benevolence.

The principle of individual competition is moreover charged with "affording no adequate, no unobjectionable resource for mal-formation, sickness, old age, with numerous accidents incident to human life."

It is evident, that no system of individual competition however freed from force or delusion, that no system of labor by mutual co-operation or by any other conceivable mode, that no advancement of the neglected art of preserving health, can ever wholly obviate the above evils. Under all possible combinations, they must occasionally afflict humanity. All that can be done, is to afford the utmost compensation that the nature of things will admit, in the way of mitigating the evils when they arrive. The remedy proposed for them, under the system of free individual competition, by the celebrated Condorcet, is the extension of the principle of "Insurances," to be adapted to every possible contingency of distress. The evils attending these expedients—supposing the schemes and management to be unobjectionable—are, the unavoidable expense of the management, the risk, however small, of failure of the fund, and the risk of accidents befalling non-subscribers. It is conceding to the principle of individual competition under equal security what many perhaps will refuse to concede to it, to assume that every individual may be possessed under it, of the knowledge and the pecuniary means to join such insurance associations as would relieve him from the apprehensions of suffering from possible natural contingencies. An adherence to the natural laws of distribution, to the rules of equal security, would however, if the preceding principles and inferences be correct, produce to all the members of a community—accidental circumstances excepted—such a result as to knowledge and wealth. How utterly futile, under all past and present systems of insecurity, where the productive laborers are every day becoming more productive and more depressed, and where the number of mere idle consumers is every day increasing and those increasing numbers more greedy after the vanities of mere unenjoying means of distinction, would be the hope of any general good from any such insurance schemes, need not be mentioned. Under all existing systems of insecurity, the advancement of knowledge is made use of by the few to devise new and more ingenious expedients for new exactions, or for rendering the

old more productive. The interest of the productive is now beginning to be sought by the idle consumers possessing power, just as they seek the interest of their horses, that the productive may do more perfect work and more of it in a given time, for the benefit of the unproductive. In as far as it is necessary to make the horses fat, in order to enable them to increase their speed or strength, they are fed; but no further: all beyond this is waste and so much abstracted from the established rights of the rich, so much purloined from their *property*. The interest of useful producers of the means of existence, health and comfort, that interest before which all others ought to shrink into insignificance, is every where a subordinate interest, almost always overlooked, and when attended to, never for its own sake, but from its accidental coincidence with the interest, real or supposed, of some superior class. But though representative institutions prevail, though the happiness of all the sentient rational beings of a community be impartially sought under the natural laws of distribution; still will the class of evils now before us prevail, occasionally and from accidental circumstances, in however mitigated a form. There is no doubt that human happiness would be increased if such evils could be universally compensated or mitigated when they occur without any of the risks of schemes of insurance. How far this may be practicable will be seen in the next chapter on the new scheme of labor by mutual co-operation.

We come now to the last evil imputed to the principle of individual competition, that, "it obstructs the progress of useful physical and moral education by the prejudices and despotism of continued domestic controul, rendered overwhelming by command of individual property: and it also obstructs the progress of general knowledge from the necessity of concealment, in order to render improvements in science and art tributary to individual gain."

In order to do justice to the principle of free individual competition in every thing, we must suppose that all the existing restrictions on the diffusion of real knowledge, to the young as well as to adults, have ceased, and that a scheme of universal education, as comprehensive, and at least as useful, as that proposed in the last chapter, has been adopted; such improvements being evidently compatible with individual competition. What obstacles will still remain in the very principle itself to the acquisition of truth by the young? All parents are more or less incrustated with the prejudices, on all subjects moral and physical, of their infancy, which they have never been able to inquire into: and amongst all those pre-

judices, there is not one more pernicious to human improvement than the common notion, that, in consequence of the sublime merit of begetting or bearing children, the formation of the mind of such children belongs of right to the caprice of such bearers or begetters. That the *power* of forming such infant minds to virtue or to vice, to wisdom or to folly, must, while the system of individual competition for wealth lasts, remain in the hands of the parents; and that more evil would be produced by transferring such power to any other hands than by letting it remain in the hands of the parents, cannot be disputed. But the power is one thing, and the propriety of using, or the most useful mode of using, such power is another. White men have the *power* of making black men and white women slaves: it does not follow that they act justly, that it adds to the mass of general happiness, of the happiness of the black or white slaves or slave-owners, that such power should be so used. Just so as to the power of forcibly constraining the limbs or the minds of children. In China now, and lately in these countries, the feet or the head or the trunk of infants were twisted and forced out of their natural development. All the rational in these countries, have now relinquished the barbarism of constraining the palpable visible development of the physical frame, from attending to the ill effects of such restraints in producing deformity, impotence, and disease. But the development of the mind being unseen, and the ill effects of constraint consequently more difficult of demonstration, the far more mischievous effects of force as applied to mental operations, have been overlooked. The only wholesome food for the mind—lead where it may—is *truth*, or a perception of things as they really exist or have existed in nature. If parents have the right, because they have the power, of applying poisonous food to the body, so have they the right to apply the poison of falsehood to the minds of children. The laws of all but the most savage countries punish the one: the other as atrocious act, popular morality scarcely yet condemns. No human being can justly, or without preponderant evil, assume that all or any of his notions are true, and force them, *without inquiry*, into the mind of any other human being. If the possessor of truth and benevolence arrogate to himself this privilege of non-convincing, why should not every other human being use the same power; for who is there that in his own opinion is not possessed of truth and benevolence? If not into the mind of any other adult, why into the mind of a child, why of the particular child, begotten or borne by the instructor or rather compeller of pretended instruction? Why

should a particular child, because produced by the co-operation of particular individuals, be compelled to admire or to hate Oliver Cromwell, Martin Luther, David Hume, or any notions entertained by these or any other individuals? Are the reason and the happiness of the child to be the object of education, or the mere chance caprices of ignorance? Ought the whole happiness of the future life of the child to be sacrificed to humour the ill-regulated propensities of a very few years of the life of the parent? If the things taught be true, surely the objects can be shown and the reasons exhibited, to the mind of the adult, or of the child as it advances in comprehension; and the only real knowledge the adult or child can acquire, must arise from the unconstrained, unbribed, exercise of its own faculty of comparing and judging on these data. If it be necessary that the child should adopt all the intellectual peculiarities of *one* of its parents—in case of difference of opinion, it cannot adopt those of both—why not maim or disfigure it to impart a physical resemblance to the diseases or deformities of its parents? Are the diseases of the mind, are false judgements misguiding conduct, and bitter hatreds withering all glow of benevolence and provoking universal retaliation, less productive of misery than diseases and deformities of the body? Freedom to the mind and body, are necessary to their perfect development: the ultimate and greatest happiness of the individual through the whole of its existence, is the only rightful object of education, as it is of human life.

Now as long as the production and acquisition of wealth by individual competition lasts, as long as all parents are possessed of the separate individual hoards on which the comforts, the existence of their children depend, so long must all parents possess a tremendously despotic power over the minds as well as bodies of their offspring, not only during childhood and youth, but, though in a modified degree, as long as the parents live—a power altogether independent of reason and justice, checked only by public opinion, and that public opinion again chiefly formed by those possessing the power. So vast a power in the hands of every parent, at least of every male parent, wise or foolish, must be liable to enormous abuses: its existence, and of course its liability to abuse, seem to be inseparable from the system of individual competition: and from the natural inclination to save trouble and mental exertion, power must be generally used, when to be had, in lieu of influence by persuasion and benevolence. If any system of human labor and exertion could be devised, by which the whole of this parental power that could be used to evil

purposes, should be lopped off, while all that could be well employed, that is to say, for the purposes of persuasion and beneficence, should be retained, would it not be desirable that such change should be effected? and that the use of mere brute force and terror should be superseded in parental education as well as in all the other concerns of life?

Again—the principle of individual competition “obstructs the progress of general knowledge, from the necessity of concealment in order to render improvements in science and art tributary to individual gain.” In all cases justice must be done to the principle of individual competition, by giving it credit for the removal of all the evils which equal security, or the natural laws of distribution, would banish. Still while individual competition lasts, every one must endeavour to make available for the increase of his individual hoard, though all were capitalist laborers, whatever powers of mind or body he might possess. To endeavour to render these powers common to all, would be to divest himself with his own hand of his advantages for the acquisition of happiness. Concealment, therefore, of what is new or excellent from competitors, must accompany individual competition, though shielded by equal security, because the strongest personal interest is by it opposed to the principle of benevolence. Is it possible to devise a state of things, in which these principles should run exactly in the same direction? in which it should not be the interest of *self* to confine knowledge or any thing useful, but to diffuse them and make them the possessions of all? in which every motive for useful activity would not only be left in full operation, but would be increased, while all motives to pernicious activity, exercised at the expense of others, would cease? As long as individual competition lasts, the interest of self must be the primary object of pursuit, the general good being necessarily subordinate thereto, and to be pursued only when conducive to the primary interest. Knowledge and all other advantages must be more or less exclusively or jealously guarded: the evil to a certain extent seems inseparable from the very principle of individual competition. If the interest of self could be made to co-exist with that of others and to be mingled with it so as to form one homogeneous undistinguishable mass, this would surely be an improvement on the principle of individual competition. The separation of self-interest from the general interest, not to say the opposition of the one to the other, must tend to the exclusive guarding of knowledge, like any other possession, as one of the efficient means of private benefit;

Such appears to be the amount of the evils, or of the most

material of the evils, inherent in the system, however modified or improved, of labor by individual competition, and of course of individual property. No community of property can possibly co-exist with production by individual competition. The two principles are irreconcilable. Individual competition necessitates individual possession and individual enjoyment. To demonstrate the benefits of this same principle of individual competition, when freely operating under the protection of the natural laws of distribution, as opposed to all past and present systems of insecurity supported by mere force and delusion, has been one of the leading objects of this inquiry.

On the basis of equal security, or what have been called the natural laws of distribution, must all just systems of human labour find their support. Should any system of human labor be proposed, violating these natural laws of distribution, no benefits of equality or any other alleged advantages, can be accepted of in lieu of them. But such are the benefits of equality, if to be had without violating security, that any system of labor founded on the reconciliation of these two principles, on their equal and concurrent activity, would be amongst the most desirable objects of human attainment. Such a system, embracing all the advantages of individual competition and individual property, without any of their disadvantages, has been proposed. It must be examined.

CHAPTER VI.

OF VOLUNTARY EQUALITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH. LABOR BY CO-OPERATION OPPOSED TO LABOR BY INDIVIDUAL COMPETITION.

IT has been shown in our first chapter that of all possible modes of distributing the objects of enjoyment, amongst any number of individuals, perfect equality of distribution tends to produce the greatest quantity of happiness, provided that the shares are not so reduced as to render their acquisition an object of indifference; and that such equality does not infringe on equal security.

An indistinct perception of this truth, has led the every where degraded majority of mankind, in all ages, to look with an evil eye on the systems of forced inequality of wealth under which they have been compelled to live, and has been the fruitful cause of divisions and strife amongst communities. Smarting under the evils of inequality, evils aggravated in a thousand ways by expedients, many of which have passed under our review, they have at times endeavoured, by the clumsy instrument of *force*, to rectify the evils of which they complained. But the application of force, although it might rectify for a moment the evils of inequality, brought in its train evils still more tremendous. Industry and re-production, we have shown to be incompatible with the *forced* equality of wealth: *that* security in the use of the products of labor and in the free exchange of those products, which is necessary to insure re-production, is annihilated by the exercise of force. Non-production is a greater evil than inequality of distribution. Hence the necessity at all hazards, and by whatever miserable expedients, of upholding what was called security. Under pretence of maintaining this security, equal to all, political power has every where established real and enormous insecurity, protecting its own acquisitions and those of a favored few, however obtained, but violating at its plea-

sure the security of the rest of the community; thus wantonly superadding to the necessary and unavoidable evils of inequality the unnecessary, avoidable, and therefore factitious evils of insecurity.

Under the name of, *systems, or institutions, of insecurity, and system of equal security*, the effects of these two modes of conduct on the wealth, the intelligence, the dispositions, and the happiness of communities have been pointed out and contrasted.

So far have we arrived in the argument. Equal security, or the natural laws of distribution, must be maintained, in order to insure reproduction; and particularly in order to insure the largest and most useful reproduction: but as equal security comprehends a power of voluntary exchange or transfer, a choice between labor in co-operation with any number of individuals and individual exertion, as well as between the common and the individual use or enjoyment of the articles produced; a way is left, by operating on the understanding, to influence the affections and the will to many different modes of production and distribution, all of them compatible with equal security. The products of individual exertion *may* be equally and voluntarily divided amongst any number of associated individuals, though the quantity produced by each might be ever so various. This mode of equal distribution and common enjoyment of articles produced by individual exertion, has been often tried; particularly under the auspices of Peter and the other apostles, by the first Christian communities at Jerusalem and elsewhere: but its continuance has never been found practicable. The only expedient for equality of distribution worthy of consideration, is that which is founded on mutual co-operation, if not on equality of co-operation, in the production. Equal distribution and enjoyment seem to be incompatible with individual production.

The important question therefore presses upon us. As equality of distribution has been shown to be attended with preponderant evil when obtained at the expense of the *forcible* transfer of the acquisitions of industry, "is it, or is it not, possible to bring about this desirable state of equality of distribution and enjoyment amongst communities, without violating equal security, without the employment of force, and by means simply of the *voluntary* transfer of the acquisitions of industry?" If without violating security, without the employment of force, without the transfer of the products of his labor from the industrious producer to the idle non-producer, perfect equality of distribution of the articles of wealth, the

products of human labor, could be effected, it would be the manifest interest of communities that it should be so effected.

To effect this desirable equality of distribution of the articles of wealth, different expedients have been proposed by intelligent and benevolent men. There is not one of those expedients which has not been founded either on the employment of force and the consequent violation of security, or on the delusion of the understandings of those subjected, or proposed to be subjected, to them. Force or fraud, or combinations of these, are the means which men have hitherto employed, through ignorance of more appropriate means, for effecting even the most benevolent or praise-worthy objects, schemes of equality, as well as others.

In order to influence the conduct of men, two great instruments present themselves, and have been constantly and necessarily employed, compulsion, and persuasion; the one influencing the conduct through the will by what are called voluntary motives, the other influencing the conduct by extraneous motives of force or terror in contempt of the will of the agent. But the will may be influenced, either by the exhibition and comparison of *existing* facts and *real* interests, or by a *false* representation of facts and interests. When the proposer of these facts or interests to operate on the will of his fellow-creatures, knows them to be unreal, he operates by delusion: when he prevents the access of counter-statements to the minds of those on whom he seeks to operate, he super-adds force to fraud or delusion. It is evident that in order to command usefully and permanently the voluntary actions of rational beings, fraud (or delusion) as well as force, must be excluded. The real interests of the agents must be sought out; a true statement or picture of things must be laid before them; and through their understanding, the deliberate assent of the will must be obtained.

To examine, after what has been said through the whole course of this treatise, systems of equality proposed to be maintained by force, by constant violations of equal security, would be a waste of time. Almost as little worthy of attention are those systems of equality maintained by delusion, whether by mistaken or wilfully misrepresented views of interest on the part of the proposers of them or of those to be influenced by them, or of both. The compulsory equality of work- and prison-houses and the half-compelled and half-deluded equality of Moravian, Catholic, or other fanatic religionists, can form no useful model for the conduct of free and rational men. One ray of light, one unlucky doubt is always liable to dispel the visions and the confiding machinery

of the one; while a temporary superiority of force of the subjected, is always disposed to exert itself in abating or leveling the artificial restraints of the other. A real statement of facts, and those facts really consistent with the interest of those invited to co-operate in an equal distribution of wealth, are the preliminaries requisite to entitle any proposer of even voluntary equality of distribution to a hearing from the advocate of equal security. Equality of distribution, if rendered practicable by being rendered consistent with equal security, and if proposed to be brought about by the operation of the understanding on the will of rational agents, from a calm view of real interest; far from being a scheme to be repelled without examination, would merit, from the mere novelty and reasonableness of the terms in which it was proposed, as well as from its all-comprehensive influence on human happiness, the most anxious and dispassionate consideration of every real lover of human happiness. To reconcile equal and perfect security with equality of distribution, is a problem of mighty import, which legislators and philosophers, or those few of them whose efforts have been sincerely directed to the production of the greatest mass of happiness, have labored in vain to unravel, and which they have almost always concluded, by abandoning in despair of a solution, or by cutting through. Wide will be the admiration, delightful the sympathy of mankind for him who shall have solved this problem, and shown them how to reconcile and to enjoy, at the same time, all the blessings of the equal distribution of wealth and those not less prolific of good which spring from equal security and its overflowing reproduction.

An individual has been found bold enough to undertake and to put forward, on rational principles, a solution of this mighty problem, "how to reconcile equality of distribution with perfect security." This individual is Mr. Owen of New Lanark in Scotland. Mutual co-operation, and equality of distribution, are the instruments by which he operates. In whatever language he may clothe his ideas, this is the real and laudable object, and would be the effect, of those magnificent combinations, the result of a rare union of profound thought and unequalled practical knowledge, to which he invites the attention of all men interested in the pursuit of happiness. To estimate the practicability and the utility of this plan, according to the principles herein developed, is a duty necessarily arising from the undertaking to demonstrate the happiest distribution of wealth. The mode of inquiry shall be, not that of an advocate for or against, not so much the plan of the individual as the principles of the

new combination in their supposed most perfect form. Whatever is supposed imperfect or unessential to the main design, will not be noticed, as the object is to ascertain truth, not to support or condemn Mr. Owen.

In the first place, then, the developments in the first chapter demonstrating the increased happiness produced by equality of distribution (when not obtained at the expense of equal security) are entirely in accord with the principles of Mr. Owen. He every where assumes, and reasons on it as a first principle, that equality of distribution tends most to happiness. In establishing this important principle, an equal and mutual support is afforded to Mr. Owen's principle of *social* security by mutual co-operation, and to the system herein advocated of equal *individual* security by equal competition. Both systems repose equally on the natural laws of distribution. In the *prima-facie* benefits of equality, the two systems of social security (co-operation) and individual security (competition) are agreed. But the system of *individual* security requires a restraint on equality in order to insure reproduction; while the system of *social* security professes to require no restraint on the full enjoyments of equal distribution. It must be always kept in mind that the moral or mental effects of equal distribution, those lighter but more frequent feelings of pleasure or pain which are secondary and derivative regarding those of immediate sensation, are as beneficially influenced by equality of distribution of wealth, as the immediate feelings from its increased physical enjoyments. Indefinite increase of physical enjoyment is but half the blessing: an increase equally extensive of intelligence and moral habits constitutes the other, equally important, half.

Again—the two systems, of social security and of individual security, equally deprecate all the past institutions of communities as founded on restraints, exclusions, monopolies, and injurious competition, and generating by a variety of expedients forced inequality of wealth and all the mischiefs in its train hitherto prevalent since history has preserved records of human communities. The object of both is equally to banish these evils. The existence of them, the system of social security takes for granted as admitted facts, as facts of public notoriety; while an effort has been here made to trace in detail the injurious operation of many of the most conspicuous and influential of these baneful institutions. Hence arises another point of union between the two systems. The object of both is to show that those injurious institutions may be easily and peaceably replaced, and to the increase of the real happiness of all, by substituting more simple institutions for

them: but the system of social (or common) security by co-operation, professes to remove altogether the evils of insecurity and inequality, while the system of individual security by the most chastened competition, professes to do no more than to reduce to their lowest term the still unavoidable ills of partial inequality.

But it is time to ascertain what are the leading features of Mr. Owen's system; or rather what are those *essential* and *characteristic* circumstances by which the system of social equality must be judged as compared with all other schemes of social organization, whether those of insecurity or of equal individual security.

In justice to Mr. Owen, and in superior deference to truth, it is necessary that it should be clearly understood as a preliminary, that it is proposed that the new institutions of social equality shall be founded on truth alone, on the real and perceived interest of those engaging in them, and on the voluntary consent of every individual member. All force, all fraud or delusion of any kind, are excluded, both in their original formation and their subsequent economy. Instead of wishing to make these voluntary associations of rational beings, the instruments of extending *power*, political or religious, of promoting the pecuniary interest, or any other sinister interest whatever, of those who are active in persuading their fellow-men to their formation; it is calculated as one of the most indubitable results, and is therefore one of the most sincere objects, of their formation, that the members will become incomparably less liable to any other controul than that of reason and their own real interest, than any equal number of even the most intelligent persons of ordinary society. It is the more necessary to carry this preliminary in mind, as what many persons look on as the pattern establishment at New Lanark, being conducted partly on the individual principle of profit and competition, and of course but partly on the social principle of co-operation, is necessarily governed more or less by regulations devised by, and enforced by the moral and legal influence of, the proprietors of that establishment. Many visitors of that establishment, not comprehending the influence or mode of operation of the immense moral machinery, of which they saw only the effects, have most erroneously imputed to this circumstance alone, the controul of the proprietors, the success which has attended their efforts in promoting the happiness of those connected with them. Now whatever may be said of New Lanark, or of establishment for the poor, the immoral, or criminal; the proposed establishments of social equality for general society are altogethe

freed from any such objections of arbitrary regulations and involuntary obedience: they would be self-governed, every working member either immediately, or ultimately by joint exertions, becoming a joint proprietor of the whole establishment. The co-operation which they require, is *voluntary* co-operation, and that alone, on the perceived tendency of that co-operation to produce the greatest quantity of individual, as well as of general, happiness. This preliminary difficulty removed, and the system of social equality thus reconciled with our principles of perfect equal security, we come again to the proposed essential and characteristic arrangements.

It is proposed that any number of individuals, whose mutual co-operation can according to circumstances, say from three hundred to two thousand or upwards, produce for the common use and enjoyment of all, the greatest quantity of the objects of wealth contributing to human happiness, shall voluntarily associate together to produce by their united labor, with all the aids of science and art, such maximum of the means of enjoyment: supply and demand being thus rendered always commensurate to each other.

It is proposed that these communities shall in all cases cultivate so much good land, at least, as will provide for their own healthful and pleasurable existence, say half an acre to an acre and a half for each individual; that where human labor is more productive, and otherwise more useful, than that of inferior animals, as in the spade husbandry, it shall be used in preference; and that the surplus of their labor shall be directed to the fabrication of the most useful clothing, habitations, and furniture, and lastly to the fabrication of such articles of minor comfort or convenience as may be most desired, or of things which may be exchanged for them, or which may be necessary to discharge the debts contracted by, or the charges of political power imposed on, such communities in common with the rest of society. The direction of the surplus of labor to manufacturing or agricultural pursuits, to be determined by local circumstances, such as soil, natural products, markets, acquired skill, pecuniary means, of the co-operators.

It is proposed that where these individuals so associating for mutual happiness, have the means, say about forty pounds for each individual, and four times as much for a family, they shall contribute sufficient for the erection of their dwellings and the purchase of the necessary stock and machinery, agricultural or otherwise, in such a situation as they may approve, and on such a plan as may be submitted to them and of which they may also approve, combining health and convenience with

the greatest facilities for production. Where they are more wealthy, the contribution of about another forty pounds a head, would buy the land, on which their habitations would be built and their agricultural and manufacturing operations conducted.

It is proposed that these associations, if not rich enough to buy the land, shall rent the land; and if not able to erect their own dwellings and other buildings, or buy their own stock, shall borrow the amount requisite for one or both of these purposes; the land and the buildings with the fruits of their labor being security for the rent and the amount borrowed. Any person, whether intending to live in the community or not, may subscribe any amount for these purposes: the interest to be paid out of the products of the yearly labor of the community, and the capital borrowed, itself, to be ultimately repaid out of the same fund. Any subscriber to the building fund, wishing to live in the community and share its benefits, without co-operating in the labor, may do so on paying a certain sum (perhaps forty pounds) annually, to be allowed him out of the amount of his subscription; or, yielding the subscription to the community, he may become a non-working member;—the proprietors of the subscribed stock for building, appointing a committee, and the working associates another, to arrange and erect the whole establishment, and to purchase the agricultural and manufacturing machinery, &c.

It is proposed, that each individual shall be fed and clad out of the common store, that the children and young people shall sleep in common dormitories for the different sexes and ages, and that single adults shall have one private apartment each: if married, or two men or two women living together, to have two rooms between them, with use of the public rooms for dining, reading, lectures, amusements, &c. The number of private rooms liable of course to be increased according to the funds and notions of convenience of the community, or according to the amount of subscription to the capital fund.

It is proposed, in order to render more productive, more healthful, and more pleasant, the labor of these co-operators, that they shall all be alternately employed in agricultural and manufacturing industry. It is therefore desirable that amongst the co-operators should be those skilled in every useful art, that they may, by proper arrangements, communicate to each other the knowledge and skill necessary for such useful alternation of employments. Should none skilled in any particular line of industry, thought to be desirable by the com-

munity, be found amongst the co-operators, some persons so skilled, and not of the community, must be induced, through benevolent or pecuniary motives, to teach the co-operators the art required. Amongst the most useful co-operators would be a surgeon, physician, and apothecary.

It is proposed, in order still further to increase the useful products of the labor of the community, that women shall be relieved from the care of children over two years old, and from the drudgery of family cooking; the children being to be educated in common under a proper number of superintendants, but always under the eye of the parents, and the culinary arrangements for the whole community to be performed in a common kitchen: meals to be taken in the common sitting-rooms, or in the private apartments of the co-operators, at their pleasure. The departments of labor, agricultural and manufacturing, or otherwise, to be done by women, to be such as is best suited to their physical and intellectual powers.

It is proposed, that all the children of the community shall share the best physical and moral education that the present state of knowledge and the means of the community can afford, incomparably superior to the best education that the best educated in society now receive, giving them an outline of all real knowledge exposed to their senses and expanding judgement, adapted to the real wants of their future lives and embracing the applications of science to the useful arts, with occasional practice and illustration from the establishments in the midst of which they are educated, and of which they will become, when adult, joint proprietors. The expense of such education, to be the labor of a proper number of the associates; or in the beginning, if there are none qualified, assistance for this purpose must be derived from without. The plan of education to be laid before the community and assented to by them.

It is proposed, that entire freedom as to thought and worship, on religious, as well as on all other subjects, shall be the rule of the community. Some of the associates may be clergymen, and perform from *pure motives* (for here no others can prevail) clerical duties, in a building to be erected for that purpose, which different sects might use; or the members of the community might resort to whatever churches or chapels they thought fit out of the establishment. Neither the institutor of the system of social co-operation, nor committee of stock proprietors, nor any other individuals whatever, shall in any way dictate to the community or any part thereof, as to their religious affairs.

It is proposed, that the government of the community shall be inherent in itself, in all its adult, male and female, members, whether by committees appointed by election, or rotation, or seniority, or any other manner that may be proposed to such community and by them agreed on. But as the basis of the association is mutual co-operation and equal united enjoyment of the products of common social industry, as the object of the institution is to identify individual with social feelings and enjoyments, as all individual competition is excluded; it is evident that no *factitious* rewards or punishments can prevail in such a community: they must be such as arise from the good or ill opinion of the associates, to be ultimately authenticated by the removal from amongst them, on payment of his share in the joint property, the person whose conduct might have been injurious to the general welfare. The rewards and punishments must be such only as flow naturally from the actions themselves, from the human constitution and surrounding circumstances. The regulations would be mostly directions and recommendations as to the members, and exchanges as to others. The general laws of society would be incompatible with most sorts of factitious punishments in these communities. As to factitious rewards—from whence are they to come? Of the common stock of products the individual has already what he wants; and the community has no other fund than the common stock, without making exchanges out of the common stock for that particular purpose, out of which to give. He that has sincerely associated for the common enjoyment, will find no pleasure in individual factitious rewards. Voluntariness is the life principle of these associations, compulsion their death-warrant. As to the rest—the plan of government will be submitted to the community, and they will delegate its powers to whom they think fit, on the best view their knowledge will permit them to take of their interest.

It is proposed, that every art and science, manual, mental, or partaking of both, productive of real preponderant happiness to the community, being within their pecuniary means, and not opposed by physical obstacles, as want of fuel, peculiarity of soil, &c., shall be cultivated by some of the associated members of the community for the common benefit of all; the surplus hours of artists, medical or literary men, being devoted to some of the healthful useful occupations of the rest of the community, or to the diffusing of their peculiar knowledge, by aiding in the education of the young, or by experimental lectures, or otherwise, to the adults.

It is proposed that all misunderstandings (for all rancorous strifes about individual wealth are removed by the very con-

stitution of the society) amongst any of the associated members, shall be arranged by such internal conciliatory means, arbitration or otherwise, as to the community may appear best calculated to engender and perpetuate kindly dispositions.

It is proposed, that every member of the association shall be at perfect liberty to leave it whenever he or she may think proper, with claim on the society for whatever proportion of joint property, or of stock lent, the retiring member may be entitled to. Should any vacancy occur in the establishment, the society admits a new member under whatever forms of admission it may deem most useful.

Perhaps it might be expedient to add, Any member withdrawing from the society for a day, a month, or any other portion of time, is expected to substitute some other person to perform the duties thus lost to the community. Any member in good health and residing within the community, wishing to spend his or her time in some peculiar pursuit, literary, mechanical, philosophical, or otherwise, is at liberty so to do, on condition of inscribing the name and mode of occupation or non-occupation in a register, kept for that purpose, open to the inspection of all the members.

Such seem to be the essential and characteristic features of the plan of voluntary equality of wealth, produced by mutual co-operation, always under the shield of equal social as well as individual security, proposed by Mr. Owen. Such, it is conceived, are the essentials of a plan for industrious and rational men; not for criminals, or parish-poor, or mere profit-making manufacturing establishments.

In the previous chapters of this inquiry, the comparison was between the old institutions of insecurity and consequent excessive inequality, and the system of equal individual security, leading, as was supposed, to the greatest practicable useful equality of wealth. We have now a different species of comparison to institute, a comparison between two different species of security, between individual security and social or associated security, between immediate individual interest and that same individual merged in and identified with social interest, between individual interest attained by universal competition and individual interest attained by universal co-operation and combination, between equality limited by equal individual security and equality voluntarily limited by social security, or security of the whole. For let it not be supposed that any system, even of the most perfect equality of wealth, amongst the most perfect beings, could be maintained without security. Voluntary co-operation, the voluntary yielding the products

of individual labor to a common fund, on condition of enjoying equally the products of all other associated labor, implies the most perfect security as far as that transaction is concerned. Without security, equality could not subsist any more than any useful reproduction. Forcible equality and fraudulent equality are inconsistent with security. Voluntary equality is dependent on it; as much dependent on security as that approach to equality which we have hitherto advocated. Moreover—besides this individual assent constituting security, it is plain that no association of equality, any more than any other species of association, could subsist without security of the whole from without, as well as from the occasional misconduct of its own members, however gentle the means necessary to maintain this security. The great principle is still the same: “without the *consent* of the individual productive laborer, no portion of the products of his labor can be subtracted, without preponderant evil.” On no other principle can any system for the production and enjoyment of wealth by rational beings, be constructed. It is necessary to vindicate at the same time the principle of security and the system of *voluntary* equality, from the ignorant reproach of incompatibility between them, urged by the enemies of both, as well as from the errors of enthusiasts of equality, whose minds, more occupied with the enjoyment of benevolent feelings than with the analysis of mental processes, forget that all their schemes repose on equal security, derived from the equal capacity of all for, and thence their equal right to, happiness.

No attempt has been made to disguise the fact—it has on the contrary been fully pointed out at the end of the last chapter—that after all that can be done under the best arranged system of perfect equal security, with the undeviating observance of the natural laws of distribution, there will still remain evils inherent in the very frame of society, arising out of that very healthful, active, competition of individual interests put into motion by security for individual well-being. Now the system of voluntary equality by mutual co-operation, not only professes to remove the evils of the institutions of insecurity, but also the evils of equal security arising from competition, allowed to exist, but deemed unavoidable under the system of competition, except at the expense of preponderant mischief.

Let those who are in search of truth and their own happiness, pause and consider well the effects of the preceding arrangements proposed to be made by and for rational beings co-operating together for their mutual interest. Let them consider, on the one hand, what are the *benefits* which the proposed scheme of voluntary equality, if generally carried into effect, and as far as carried into effect, would produce, the restraints on equality and security, and consequently on morality and happiness, which it would remove. Let them, on the other hand, consider what are the obstacles, if any, to real equality and security which this scheme would fail in removing, and what, if any, are the obstacles which its establishment, unattended with co-operating arrangements of general society, would even tend to aggravate. The practicability of the plan will be subsequently discussed.

The obvious benefits of the proposed arrangements seem to be, that

1. They would save the waste, at least within the precincts of the association, of mere *unproductive consumption*.
2. They would save the *waste of labor* and skill, now unemployed, through mere ignorance or want of market, or now uselessly, or perniciously, directed.
3. They would save the waste, now consumed under the name of *profits*, of wholesale and retail dealers; every co-operator being himself a joint proprietor and capitalist: production and consumption being shared equally by all.
4. They would save, by means of physical arrangements and the communication of knowledge, the waste of life, of *health*, and enjoyment, now caused by poverty, ignorance, and neglect.
5. They would save the incalculable waste of happiness, now arising from the contentions, animosities and cruelties engendered by the institutions of insecurity, and in some degree inseparable from the most chastened pursuit of individual gain; the social combinations proposed removing the *causes* of those crimes and vices, and by the education of the understanding implanting opposite, permanent, dispositions and habits.
6. They would render supply and demand always commensurate, and reduce the economy of supply and demand, population, and other contested questions of morals, legislation, and political economy, to fixed and easily ascertained data, and principles founded thereon.

Respecting each of these benefits some explanation and de-

tail will be necessary. That all the above are benefits of the highest order, and that they are to be procured by social co-operation, provided that beings like those of the human race *can be induced voluntarily to co-operate in their production*, no one will doubt. To prevent idle unproductive consumers from seizing on the fruits of the labor of the industrious, to teach the unemployed, skill, so as to render their labor to the utmost degree productive, to share amongst all the co-operators the benefits of profits now confined to a few at the expense of all, to improve the health and capacity for all enjoyment, and consequently to lengthen the term of human life, incalculably to add to virtue by banishing almost all temptations to vice, and to prevent the benefits of these operations from being ever lost by keeping supply and demand always commensurate—surely, if there be any objects of human pursuit worth the attainment, these are amongst them.

The benefit of social co-operation first noticed, is, that it “would save the waste, at least within the precincts of the association, of mere unproductive consumption.” All the co-operators must be productive laborers: there would be no idle capitalists or landlords: all the productive laborers would be either directly or ultimately landlords and capitalists; landlords and capitalists of a joint benevolent stock for social universal happiness, not for selfish individual distinction, enjoyed only because contrasted with the poverty and wretchedness around. Even those whose ordinary labors are more of a mental than of a muscular description, will find it useful for health and variety, to devote a part of their time to some of the ordinary agricultural or mechanical operations. The perverted association of disgrace—but the very natural association, from the union of dirt and fatigue, want, ignorance, and misery forced upon it—now attached to *labor*, will, under the new circumstances, be transferred to *idleness*, from the union which will be found between labor and comfort, intelligence, and happiness. Public opinion will exert an influence hitherto unknown and unsuspected; for the very simple reason that every individual of the public will be personally interested, the supply of the wants, of the comforts, and conveniences of life, will depend on the useful exertion of the industry, of the useful co-operation, of every other member of the community. Public opinion awards now its disapprobation against the liar and the drunkard: but suppose that every member of the community from which that disapprobation emanated, suffered personal evil, or loss of comfort, from the effects of the falsehood and drunkenness, instead of, as now, only sympathizing with their effects on others, with what an irre-

sistible moral effect would the expression of the public opinion of such a suffering community be accompanied! Who can calculate its force? Who can set bounds to the wonders to which it may give rise? But such would be exactly the situation of these associated communities. The comforts of every member of them would be individually dependent on the active social exertions of every other member; which would give to public opinion the energy of family sympathies, of family love, or family disapprobation. Even now, who can bear the averted eye and the altered manner of a single friend? But under the arrangements proposed, where every co-operator is a friend, and an always busy friend, always employed for the benefit of the idle as well as of the rest of the co-operators; who could live exposed to the alienated feelings of such a community of friends, to whose intelligent and interested glance, and to whose moral inspection and control he must be every day exposed? No one, certainly, constituted as human beings usually are. But suppose such a one to be found, incapable of being influenced by the usual interests and sympathies of other men. He would be either regarded as an unfortunate idiot, whose partial insanity would be harmless, as it would find no imitators, or if the example were likely to be productive of mischief, the society would exercise, under whatever forms and regulations might be judged most useful, its power of self-preservation, by refusing the benefits of co-operation, by excluding from its number the member ceasing to co-operate. Once in joint possession, every individual a proprietor, of the land, the buildings, the machinery and other stock, the basis of their operations, what could lead to the admission of a member not contributing by his industry to the common comfort? Nothing but the possession of some peculiar talent, the exercise of which might be deemed by the community more conducive to general happiness than any other mode of employing the individual so peculiarly disposed. Suppose a painter, a sculptor, a musician, a literary character, or scientific inquirer after experimental truth, suppose a lawyer, a bonze from the East Indies, wished to devote themselves, in such community, to their peculiar occupations; it is possible that the five first might carry with them the sympathy and admiration of the community, and that they might deem the public share in the benefits to be derived from such pursuits, either in immediate gratification from the ornament of their productions, or in probable future utility to themselves and society at large, to be such as to afford more than an equivalent for the share of the physical benefits of the community participated by such individuals.

But the lawyer and the bonze would probably meet with little encouragement to settle amongst the intelligent, the industrious and the moral. Possessions being in common, owned, as associated friends, by all for mutual enjoyment, as individual owners by none, the basis of the trade of the lawyer, both as to civil and criminal cases, disputes respecting *mine and thine*, and violations of each other's goods, would be impossible. *Within* the community, there would be no materials for litigation, nothing to go to law about: no criminal or even moral disturbance could arise, but such as reason, friendship, arbitration, or other conciliatory means, would easily compose. There would remain the external exchanges of that part of the products of the joint labors of the community, which would be necessary to procure conveniences and pay charges, and the external intercourse of individual members with society at large. The general internal spirit of the society would of course pervade these external transactions; and reason and kindness, not legal expenses, would lead to accommodation. The saving of the waste of unproductive consumption from this source alone, would be very great; to say nothing of the loss of time, vexation, and tormenting feelings and passions which would be saved with it to the community of social co-operation.

It must be observed, however, that while the proposed arrangements guard effectually against any injurious unproductive consumption from *within*, they do not affect to diminish the unproductive consumption of the products of their united labor from *without*. Against almost all those that may be called private and indirect restraints on the development of industry, the scheme of mutual co-operation guards; but against public and direct attacks, against that unproductive consumption which is fed by the seizures of political power, it does not profess to guard. To these attacks on its general and aggregate security, it is as fully exposed as private individuals living in society, are on their individual security. But as the labor of the associated community, is rendered by the proposed arrangements so much more productive than that of an equal number of individuals laboring by competition in general society; that amount of public unproductive consumption which now contributes, with profits, to press down unassociated individuals into poverty and wretchedness, would lessen but in a comparatively small degree the comforts of such co-operating communities. To this point we must again revert—Besides rendering their labor more productive, they would wisely direct it to the fabrication of such articles, as fruit and milk instead of intoxicating liquors and tobacco, as at the same

time tend more to health and happiness, and less to feed the cravings of taxation. By such means, it would not require more perhaps than *one-tenth* of the products of their labor to defray their share of that taxation or general public plunder which consumes one-third to one-half the labor of the industrious in general society. Even in the support of *external* unproductive consumers, then, a comparatively small part of their labor would be employed; whilst from within the bosom of their association, unproductive consumption would altogether disappear.

The next saving noticed from the proposed arrangements for mutual co-operation, is, "the saving of the labor and skill now unemployed through mere ignorance or want of market, or uselessly or perniciously directed." From the operation of all combination laws, corporation laws, wages-regulation laws, such voluntarily-retiring and co-operating communities would be at once withdrawn. They would require the benefit of no such laws, would appeal to no such laws, would have no connexions with those interested in them, would unite in their own persons masters and servants, and would therefore emancipate themselves, their labor and their faculties, at one bound, from an odious heap of ignorant and oppressive restraints. Retired within themselves, they would have no masters to hunt them down, no corporation privileges to contend with, no rise or falling of wages to apprehend from the political or fiscal caprices or atrocities of political power. Their knowledge, skill and prudence would be sure of their appropriate reward, not the sport of circumstances over which they could have no controul, and which no prudence could foresee. For all articles of prime necessity and prime comfort, their own consumption would always form a market for themselves; and the accidental greater or less supply of non-essential articles would add to, or detract but little from, their well-being. No one would be ignorant where there would be a demand for his labor, and meet perhaps the punishment of a criminal, under the name of a vagrant, after traversing the land to find employment; nor would any, though unskilled and ignorant of the mode of applying their labor, be studiously kept in that ignorance and awkwardness by surrounding jealousy and ever-calculating selfish competition. Under the proposed arrangements of mutual co-operation, it would be the interest of every member that the knowledge and the skill of every one of his associates should be as great as possible, as much greater than possible even than his own, as his interest depends incalculably more on the skilful co-operation of his associates than on his own individual exertions. Under these new circumstances

every one would be interested in removing the ignorance and awkwardness, and infusing and adding to the knowledge and skill, of his associates, to increase the common produce, as much as he is now interested to perpetuate the one and obstruct the other, for fear of educating a rival to his own gain: no one, under these arrangements, could derive benefit from the ignorance or awkwardness of others: no one could increase in knowledge and skill without benefiting all. Thus would ignorance and awkwardness be gradually transformed into knowledge and skill, and no one would fear their competition in lowering the remuneration (wages) of his labor.

A community associating together under these arrangements for the production of wealth for mutual enjoyment, would form a new and rational estimate of all the wants, factitious or real, which now prevail in artificial society, that their labor might be directed to the gratification of those, in the first place, which produce the greatest quantity of preponderant good, immediate pleasure and ultimate consequences both taken into the account. Whatever, though immediately pleasurable to the taste brought by the compulsion of habit to its relish, was ultimately prejudicial, shortening life, inducing present or laying the foundation of future disease, such as intoxicating liquors and tobacco, would be at once discarded, and would not be used if procurable without labor, much less at the expense of what might otherwise be the best directed labor. Wretchedness of mind and body, ignorance of consequences, exhaustion from over-work, from exposure, and under-feeding, want of means to procure substantial gratifications, now lead men to these pernicious momentary indulgences. In the new communities, even those addicted to them would soon lose their relish for them, their wants being supplied with wholesome food, and all other causes of perverted inclination being withdrawn. Neither therefore would the healthful produce of their fields and orchards be converted, at a great cost of labor, into consuming poison; nor would the useful products of their labor be exchanged for such pernicious articles. There would be no restraint certainly, but the exertion of their own will; but this will would be necessarily guided in a short time (all motives to delusion being removed) by a correct view of their own interest. The saving of the waste of labor from this cause alone, would be from one-third to one-tenth of the whole labor of the community—to say nothing of health and morals. Strange it is, but true, that in proportion to the poverty and ignorance of the people, the *comparative* amount as balanced by their whole earnings, expended on such pernicious articles increases with the ignorance and poverty. Amongst such

communities there would be no wholesale manufactories or storehouses of poison: physical health, by means of suitable food, clothes, and shelter, as the basis of all happiness, would be the first object sought for. Hides, wool, flax, the materials of the most useful domestic manufactures, the produce of their own lands would supply. Fruits, honey, milk, and every useful garden vegetable, labor would create in the required abundance. Exchanges would therefore be very limited, and confined to a few superfluities, besides the materials of the arts, such as iron, &c., where not produced on the soil.

Hence arises, under this head, another saving from producing and consuming on the spot, the waste of land and water carriage, the labor expended on transportation, which in general society amounts frequently to a tenth, and from that, according to distance and bulk of the article, to even one-half the cost of production—on some few articles much higher. Three-fourths at least of the labor of mere transportation would be saved to the associated communities by the proposed regulations. The transportation labor, thus saved, would be doubly productive: first, the support of the men, horses and machinery, employed in transportation, would cease to be a drain on the common stock of labor for useful production and enjoyment; and next, the labor of these very men, horses, and transporting machines would be transferred to increase the common stock of useful products for increased enjoyment; for it must never be forgotten that under the new arrangements, an excess of industrious producers, an excess of supply, can never be complained of, the whole community and all the individuals in it, and all newly-admitted increase of numbers being always consumers and producers to each other; the only limit to useful production and enjoyment being the distant want of land and materials to work with and upon.

A further saving, under this head, would be of the waste of human labor now expended in the production or seeking for numerous articles, of no sort of intrinsic value, but serving merely as means of distinguishing, unaccompanied with merit of any sort, certain individuals from their fellow-creatures. Such are ornamental precious stones, pearls, costly trinkets, as steel buttons, and in general all things that serve for mere distinction beyond their intrinsic use. Were sparkling and reflecting stones procured as easily as flowers, and sought for for their mere prettiness, where not for their use, they would be as innocent ornaments; but procured as they are at immense cost of useful productive labor, and giving no intrinsic

enjoyment,—for the mere pleasure of reflection to the eye, is beneath ridicule—they are a constant drain on human happiness, not only by the labor misdirected to their acquisition, but by the unsocial passions and contentions which they generate. A rational community, such as mutual co-operation would suppose or produce, would waste its labor on no article for mere distinction sake; would bestow labor in proportion to utility alone, i. e. to preponderant happiness, present or future, over the labor of the acquisition. As all the members would be equal *as to wealth*, the real wants and comforts of *all* would be supplied before the factitious wants of any could be thought of: as to mere factitious distinction, grounded on any thing but the possession of useful personal qualities, it would soon cease to be sought for, and would be held as the fool's pursuit. As soon as all possible physical wants and conveniences, and all intellectual and moral pleasures of *all* were abundantly provided for; then and not before, would the unemployed time of such a community, be as harmlessly devoted to the gathering and polishing of pretty stones as to the cultivating and gathering of ornamental pinks and roses. As harmless the pearl as the rose, if as easily procured and giving as much intrinsic pleasure; but till then, it would not be preferred as an ornament, but applied solely to useful purposes. As to general society, these co-operating communities would not envy them their distinguishing and merit-suppressing baubles: for such things they would not exchange the useful products of their labor: by far different tests would they measure and award their sympathies to the members of their community and to all the world.

A vast additional saving of the waste of time and labor would be produced by the essential arrangement of teaching every member of the community both manufacturing and agricultural operations. The intellect that can learn one of these, can learn the other: the facility of teaching ordinary trades in a few months has been put out of doubt in numerous manufacturing, poor-house and criminal establishments, both on the continent and in England. Frost, rains, and shortness of winter-days, with the addition in some countries of compelled holiday idleness, subtract about one-sixth, and from that up to a third, from the productiveness of the labor of agriculturists: and so must it be as long as they remain mere agriculturists. By learning other species of useful labor and having the workshops on the spot, these wasted hours will be turned into the means of increased enjoyment by increased production. Again, many agricultural operations require an immediate doubling or trebling of the ordinary

strength of labor : on these occasions, the whole force of the community would be within call, and would be trained to the operations required, the manufactures suffering no loss from the temporary delay produced by needful and grateful change of employment. Many manufactures in their turn may not advantageously occupy the whole year, the whole day, or the particular season, of the individuals whose inclinations lead them to make such arts their chief occupation. In the healthful variety of agricultural pursuits, will such waste time be advantageously employed. There are out-of-door trades too, such as the slater, now unemployed in bad weather : manufacturing work-shops of clothes, furniture, conveniencies, or matters for exchange, would turn to account all such precious hours; now wasted, to the loss and misery of the tradesmen. The saving of the waste of the productive powers of human labor by this arrangement alone, substituting a variety for a fixation of employment, would be perhaps equal to a sixth of its present total amount.

Another saving of waste, under the head of labor, of still more importance, is that produced by the arrangements for the employment of women, and that mechanical part of the education of children called their training. Women forming one-half of human society, and not one-half of useful human operations requiring, with the present aids of machinery, more strength than they possess, they could, if properly trained, contribute their half by useful productive labor to human enjoyment; that portion of their time deducted which is necessarily occupied in the production and care of very young children; an occupation more useful, not to say more necessary to human existence and happiness, than any other whatever. It is evidently desirable for the happiness of all, that this time should be as much as possible abridged. Under the present system of individual effort and isolation, the whole of the time of married women is taken up in looking after a few children, preparing food for a few, and in other little matters of what are called domestic economy. From more than five-sixths of this species of labor, the proposed arrangements free married women, and enable them to co-operate almost as effectually as the men, in contributing, by productive labor, to the common happiness. From purchasing and preparing solid and liquid food, fire-making to heat and light apartments, with all the attendant operations, and retail bargainings, they are relieved by the common kitchen, lighting and heating apparatus managed by a few for the use of all. From the care of children over two or three years of age, they are relieved by common dormitories and places of useful training

within their view. If we allow the large number of five children to every woman, and suppose the time of four entire months occupied in the rearing of each of them till two or three years old, we shall have twenty months, say twenty-four, of every woman's life occupied necessarily in this way. Suppose again the average of human life, at twenty, to be so low, under the new healthful arrangements, as thirty years, we have a fifteenth of every woman's life occupied about children. The whole of the remainder of women's time and skill, twenty-eight years, are, by the proposed arrangements, thrown into the common stock of useful productive labor; deducting only the labor of those who may be employed about those general operations of training, cooking, heating, lighting, &c., from which women are individually relieved, and which may be estimated at ten to twelve individuals for a population of ten to twelve hundred, or one person employed for every fifty women thus rendered industrious producers. Thus nearly fourteen-fifteenths of the time of half the productive power of the community, hitherto, under all the old arrangements of individual exertion and isolated establishments, absolutely lost to society, may now, by this most admirable and simple arrangement, be saved to production and enjoyment. We may set down the value of this capital arrangement very fairly as one-third added to the means of human happiness, as far as dependant on articles of wealth. Its other effects, productive of ulterior benefits in other ways, will be presently noticed.

The waste of labor saved from all these sources, from the useless domestic drudgery of women, from the uneconomical and fool-engendering confinement of all productive laborers to one operation, from the acquisition of mere articles of distinction, from uneconomical transportation, from the production of pernicious or merely useless articles of depraved acquired desire, from want of skill, of knowledge, of employment, would be such a fund of production in the hands of mutual co-operation for common benefit, as, with the present aids of science and art, would convert want and misery into plenty and enjoyment. Under the existing restraints of insecurity all these sources of waste must go on, because land and capital having been by the expedients of insecurity monopolised by a few, and, over and above these, direct seizures of the products of labor having been systematized by political power, without the pretence of a satisfactory equivalent, strictly selfish competition, spurning equal security, being the moving spring of society, it matters not that the interest of the millions might be promoted by putting their productive powers into beneficial motion, if the interest of the ascendant

few is not equally advanced and their *comparative* superiority still maintained. To the capitalist, *as such*, neither the useful employment nor even the existence, to say nothing of the health, morals, and happiness, of his fellow-creatures, are objects of more regard than the employment of inferior animals or machines. Besides supporting and making themselves happy by their labor, will they yield him an average profit? If so, let them be employed. Will they not yield him an average profit? Then let them live or die as they may: with their well-being he has nothing to do. Though their own happiness might be increased a million of times by their united labor, the capitalist, *as such*, is in no way concerned: to make others *as happy* as himself was no part of his education, but to make himself *richer* than others. By mutual co-operation alone can the unprovided or the slenderly provided advance at once to production and happiness, leaving to the few who are well provided the use of what they have acquired. It must be confessed that under the best system of equal *individual* security and competition, with all the restraints of insecurity removed, many of the benefits of the proposed arrangements of co-operation would be lost, or rather perhaps would be more gradually acquired: for the system of equal security, as before observed, has a *gradual* tendency to make *all* capitalists and to equalize wealth.

As important as the last effect of the proposed arrangements in saving the waste of labor, is the next pointed out, of saving “the waste of *profits* of wholesale and retail dealers: every co-operator being himself a joint proprietor and capitalist: production and consumption being shared equally by all.”

That this arrangement, essential to the system of voluntary equality by mutual co-operation, is an *advantage*, is here assumed, and the first chapter, section eleven, is referred to for demonstration. If voluntary equality of wealth be desirable—its practicability will be hereafter considered—individual profits, implying inequality of wealth, must be undesirable. With the profits of general society already accumulated and formed into capital, the proposed regulations do not at all interfere: they simply prevent the future growth of any such excrescences amongst the associated communities. Will it be asked, how then could the business of distribution be done? who would undertake without profit such offices of care and trust? It should rather be asked, who in such a community would not press forward for equal remuneration to the discharge of duties so light, and implying so much of public confidence? The general management of the affairs of the whole community by those best qualified for the task, will supersede the necessity

of large managing capitalists for the entire as one great compound manufactory; while individuals for minute distribution in a few particular departments, will supply all the retail labor that such a community would require. The fact, is that the retail labor would be reduced to almost nothing.

In society as now constituted, two circumstances give rise, to the immense waste of labor, and consumption of the products of the labor of others, in the endless retail establishments that every where meet the eye; these are the distance of the consumers from the producers, and the numerous individual, personal or family wants, that must be supplied. Under the proposed arrangements, distance—for all essential articles—between consumers and producers, would be annihilated, as they would reside together; and the wants of one or two thousand persons would be supplied as those of one family or one individual. Wants being supplied in common, there would be nothing to retail. Now, five hundred families consuming bread and butchers' meat, support between them ten or a dozen master butchers and bakers, besides the journeymen at these trades, the journeymen doing the work, the masters superintending and distributing its products in the quantities demanded by each customer. The waste by this retail system is about one-fourth to one-fifth of the value of the bread and meat, by way of profit to the master-tradesman, besides the necessary support of the workmen though frequently on a very uneconomical scale. These retail master-tradesmen and their profits would disappear; and their labor, like that of the carriers, would be added to the joint stock of production for mutual increased enjoyment; and as joint producers and consumers of the new association, they would gain much in physical comfort and convenience, and much more in happiness, over and above what they enjoyed under the competitions and anxieties of their former employments. As little demand would there be for profit in the *manufacture*, as in the *retail* or distribution of any article used by the community: the machinery, the tools, the workmen, the materials, and the storehouse to receive the work done, being supplied, the demand for profit is superseded. The retail of articles of food (as well as light and heat, and all the endless apparatus now connected with them,) being superseded by a common kitchen and common supply, whether consumed in the common hall or in private apartments, there would remain the distribution of articles of furniture, clothing, and convenience. For these, one storehouse of general consumption arranged according to convenience, and one superintendant to note down the members receiving the supply,

would be perhaps sufficient for the whole society; as there would be no bargain-making to consume time. The quality of the furniture and clothing being the same for all, with perhaps slight variations of colour &c. for individual tastes, the space and extent to be clad and furnished being the same for each individual, and these articles not being wanted by the members for external individual exchanges, all their rational wants (and others would soon cease) being supplied from within, the check of the exhibition in the register open to all the community, and the thence-resulting operation of public opinion as to these articles, would be sufficient to prevent waste. Nor would there be any temptation to exchange them for articles of convenience from without: for is the object wished for a chemical or philosophical machine, a useful book, or any thing really tending to preponderant good? In the library, the laboratory, the work-shops, the reading- and news-rooms of the associated community, they would be to be found. In such a community, the individual appropriation of such articles of common reference, not of continual use, would be regarded rather as an incumbrance than as an object of rational desire. They are now sought for, first, as mere silly means of distinction, next because no provision is made for a common supply, so that even for occasional use they must be appropriated. The individual interest of every member of the community, would be a sufficient restraint on the frowardness that might lead to individual barter for external baubles, of the clothes, food, or furniture, in the use of individual members. All these circumstances, all these checks, motives, supplies, considered, who can doubt of their being sufficient to prevent wilful waste of consumption or otherwise, by the members of the community? particularly when the self-preserving power, essentially inherent in every voluntary association, of excluding sources of its own destruction, as by shutting out incorrigibly perverse members, is taken into the account? This entire freedom of supply of furniture and clothes, is, however, by no means necessary to the system. Various are the limits which the prudence of different associating communities might perhaps, at first, think proper to impose on the early-formed propensities of new members; limits assuredly sufficient to restrain them from any injurious development.

It is evident then that the retail distribution of such associated communities would be reduced to a speck, that any of the ordinarily-endowed members would be able to discharge it, that it would require no profit, no additional remuneration, but like every other duty in the society would be a source of amusement as well as universal utility; and if deemed prefer-

able to other occupations, would be sought for merely on account of the increased sympathy to which its well-performance would entitle the agent.

Will it be asked, "may not the managers, the exchangers, the superintendants of the society betray their trust, and convert to sources of private gain the joint property committed to their charge?" Such an occurrence is surely most improbable. If the means stated are sufficient to restrain the ordinary members of less mental cultivation, and less under the control of public opinion; how much more powerfully must such motives act on the best cultivated minds! But on them, additional motives operate: they have not only the common pleasure of the joint possession and proprietorship of the immense land, dwellings, and stock of the whole community, to balance the little selfish love of petty individual ownership; but by disposing of the common fund of all, they more particularly identify themselves with the ownership of all, and thus enjoy more of the pleasure of power and distinction than they could hope to gain by petty pilfering, and as a necessary consequence leaving the society: for while they remained in the society, of what use could such pilfering be to them, were it otherwise practicable, and could so many eyes and interests be deceived? This objection supposes that the mere love of power and distinction would continue to actuate men under the scheme of mutual co-operation; which it is believed would be very partially the case, would soon cease altogether, and would be replaced by estimating every quality and exertion according to its intrinsic use, immediate and future, to the individual and to others. The fear of the waste of speculation, then, succeeding to the waste of profit, is an imaginary fear, for which there is no foundation under the proposed arrangements.

The next advantage (in order, the fourth) noticed as arising from these arrangements, is, that "they would save, by means of physical arrangements and the communication of knowledge, the waste of *health*, of enjoyment, and life, now caused by poverty, ignorance and neglect." On preserving the animal machine in perfect health, depends not only immediate comfort, but the capacity for all enjoyment and exertion, intellectual and moral as well as physical: on its undeviating preservation depend, the *aptitude* to disease, the consumption, and of course the average length, of life. And yet under the institutions of insecurity, engendered by chance and ignorance, no adequate precautions are taken for the maintenance of this basis of all well-being to the whole, or to any part, of the community. Chance and ignorance are left to direct every thing: even the value of health is not known. How different

in their essential features the arrangements proposed by Mr. Owen! Were the production of health his only object, instead of the production of the greatest possible quantity of things useful for enjoyment, he could not more certainly promote it. Every essential arrangement tends to the preservation of health, surely but unostentatiously. Knowledge, and the most favorable circumstances, are both supplied to every individual to secure to him this indispensable good. In his dwelling, clothes and food, rest and labor, variety of occupation, choice of site of the associated buildings, every known obstacle to health is removed; by every circumstance favorable to the preservation of health, is the associated community surrounded.

Of the numerous circumstances necessary to be attended to for the preservation of human health, none are more systematically, but inevitably, neglected under the present arrangements of insecurity, than those connected with the site of the habitation and place of labor of the industrious. Even the place of abode of the few rich is, from other causes, scarcely at all attended to. What determines *now* the place of habitation and labor of the productive classes? The conduciveness of the site to the *profit of the capitalist*. If—which, from the ignorance of the industrious and the immediate claims of want, is seldom the case—any repugnance to the situation should be manifested, a trifling addition to wages, or a delusive bribe in the shape of a new foe to health, ardent spirits, removes it at once; and competition for employment keeps this bribe or addition at the lowest. The merest accident, the vicinity of any one real or supposed convenience to the proprietor, caprice, determine the site of the habitations of human beings. The evils of ill-health being remote, the chance of escaping them relied on; the claims of want, the necessity of wages to existence being immediate and urgent, the industrious vegetates and works wherever chance has placed, or employment invites, him. Bereft, by the institutions of insecurity of capital for the support of even a few days' existence, he must work where he can get work, or starve. Bad air, dampness, putrid or mineral effluvia, morbidic gases, frequently take years to disorganize the frame; and during their gradual operation, counter-stimulants, keeping up a continual excitement of fever, are generally made use of. Disease at length comes: they die comparatively young, in wretchedness and pain, who might have lived happily an additional ten or twenty years. What consequence to the capitalist? They die: so do horses, and in a much smaller number of years; and yet a succession of fine horses, or of in-

dustrious men, will never be wanting while capitalists permit them to obtain food and work, while able to work. Worn-out horses to be sure are shot: diseased men must be left to die; but at their leisure, and at their own expense. If, like horses, at the expense of the capitalist, we should doubtless have heard of Ukases, Ulemas, or Acts of Parliament, complaining of the grievance, and providing an equally summary and economical mode of exit for both animals. A delusive prosperity and treacherous enjoyments, frequently attend unhealthy abodes and occupations: high wages are given, and with them come increased present comforts in the midst of the unseen agents of disease: early mortality makes necessary early marriages even to keep up the population: dead children are provided for, and the survivors become soon productive, though diseased, machines. Such was the state of the population in the unhealthy marshes of Holland, and in the crowded manufacturing districts of Britain. But in Britain the early marriage advantage of the manufacturers could not last long, as the quick consumption of life could be more cheaply supplied out of the products of healthy marriages without the range of the manufactories, while in Holland the very climate repelled the *unseasoned* intruder and made it necessary to breed from the old stock. In the long run too, putting occasional mechanical and chemical improvements out of the question, manufacturing labor must come down very nearly to the level of agricultural, the skill, such as it is, of the one being balanced by the hard labor of the other.

There is still another source of delusion attending the effect of situation on health. Noxious applications to the lungs, particularly want of pure air well supplied with oxygen, do not seem to operate by any means as prejudiciously on adults as on the young, particularly infants. Their pulse and blood move faster; and, like birds, (all whose vessels through their hollow bones and apertures in the viscera are bathed in air,) they require double the supply of oxygen that adults do to repair the rapid waste of growth. Birds and children would die in an atmosphere where men would live in health: the health of adults, seems to be more dependent on heat than that of children; of children, on pure air than that of adults. Hence in crowded cities and manufacturing districts, the waste of early life: hence the distress caused to parents from inferring that where they live in comparative health their children will also live in health.

Under the proposed arrangements, the site of the habitations and work-houses for the whole community, is not left to individual ignorance, short-sighted cupidity, or caprice, but is to

be chosen by the members themselves, through whatever instrumentality they may think proper, on a full consideration of its adaptation to health. Knowledge being within their reach, neither caprice, nor momentary interest, nor want, can distract them from their interest in choosing the healthiest situation. Once fixed on, this important requisite for universal health—the site—is secured, for ever, out of the reach of the follies and passions of individual competition. As the healthiest site, by crowded buildings, want of ventilation, and dirt, may be made pestilential; by adopting the open, square, or quadrangular form surrounding certain indispensable buildings and exercise grounds, as recommended by Mr. Owen, the healthiness of the situation will be preserved, and pure air for the utmost demand of the quickest circulation and most rapid growth will always surround and pervade the community in the gardens, the fields, the work-houses, the dwellings. Even in the mode of communicating heat in winter, by diffusing it equally through the air of the apartments, instead of its partial emission from fire-places, heating injuriously one part of the frame, or of those present, at the expense of the rest, health will be promoted hand-in-hand with economy. The dirt, effluvia, and inequality of the heat, of coals, will be exchanged for cleanliness, purity of air, and *equality* of temperature, a circumstance more necessary than any *particular degree* of heat to preserve health; equality round the whole frame, as well as equality through different periods of time.

No less effectually and admirably are the peculiar circumstances necessary for the health of the children provided for, by means of their early classification, as soon as they have sufficient muscular power to be capable of training, than those for the health of the adults. By the common and airy dormitories and grounds and apartments for the exclusive education of the children, they may be supplied with quantities of fresh air, heat, and liberty of muscular motion, which might not be either grateful to the feelings or useful to the health of their parents at their private apartments. The health and comfort of both parties will gain by the classification. While forced as now in common society, old and young, into one small space together, their health and comfort are certainly incompatible with each other. One or the other must be sacrificed. The new arrangement provides equally for both, and improves both.

The general site of the whole buildings, and the particular relative position of all the individual apartments being adapted to serve the most useful supply, according to the different ages, of pure air, dryness, heat, light, consequent cleanliness, with the addition of as many objects, rural and otherwise,

pleasing to the senses, as may be within command; the quality and mode of supplying the *food* of the whole community are made equally tributary to the health of the inhabitants. Of all the uses of food—to gratify the sense of taste, the appetite of hunger, to supply strength, and rotundity as connected with beauty, to facilitate intellectual or moral exertions, to increase the enjoyment of any particular sense—there is not one which ought not to be made altogether subservient to the preservation of permanent health; i. e. perfect freedom from all pain, all uneasiness, free action of all the viscera and of all the animal functions, and perfect use of all the faculties, muscular and intellectual. The simple reason is this: Promote health, and you are in a state to enjoy the greatest desirable quantity (or unattended with preponderant mischief) of any of these or any other ulterior sources of happiness: promote any of these secondary objects of food at the expense of health, and you not only sacrifice all other pleasures to the one sought, but find that the want of general health takes away the faculty of enjoying even the one pleasure sought, nourishing at the same time a depraved appetite which extinguishes all power of self-command, and consequently of change of system. From want of early training and education directed to any one useful pursuit connected with human happiness, co-operating with the other institutions of insecurity, the wretched and only objects now sought for from food, are, on the part of the poor, the mere means of prolonging life in whatever state of wretchedness, and on the part of the rich, the pampering, and necessarily the over-excitement, of the pleasures of taste. The consequence is, habitual uneasiness from undue actions of the system to all, occasional diseases of one sort to the poor, of another to the rich, and universal abridgement of the term of life: for there is no other way of prolonging life than by keeping up permanent health. Alternate health and skilful treatment of disease are most useful to the trade of medicine; but to all other human beings uninterrupted health should be the object. Now under the new arrangements, permanent health being the paramount object sought for from food, the subordinate depraved tastes and objects of the rich or the poor must be equally disregarded, and that species of food must be provided by the labor of the community, if possible directly, if not by exchange, which experience has found to be most conducive to this end. Vegetable food, roots, grains, and fruits, prepared in different ways, will supply the basis, with very small quantity—perhaps better with none—of animal matter, and no intoxicating liquors. No fact is better established than, that simplicity of food like this, yields more of pleasure to the always susceptible nerves of taste,

than any combination of more stimulating substances, which continually weaken the susceptibility of the nerves, not only to all simple tastes, but even to their own excitements. In the case of variety and stimulating substances, the pleasures of the appetite, of gratifying hunger, are altogether sacrificed; while in the case of simple food, this appetite is always awake, and its gratification most lively at every meal, excelled only by the pleasures of taste.

To the substance and texture of the clothing of the whole associated community, with reference still to permanent health, the *interest* of all will direct their attention. What *form* of dress, climate and all other influential circumstances considered, for men, women, children, at the different seasons, is most conducive to health? of what substance should it be fabricated,—wool, cotton, linen, silk, leather, straw, or a combination of all or any of these? of what *quality* of the material, cost of labor to procure the finer qualities placed against the real advantages they confer, should they be fabricated? The modes in which clothing contributes to health, being by confining the heat of the body, securing from wet, and promoting cleanliness to facilitate constant insensible perspiration, what form, material, quality, will best attain these ends united, or, if incompatible, the most important of them? Were silk as useful for these purposes, and to be attained with as little cost of labor, as woollen or linen, either directly or by exchange, it ought to be preferred from the *subordinate* advantages of pleasing lustre to the eye and pleasant feeling to the touch: but these secondary considerations will never be permitted to counterbalance in the minds of a rational community,—where nothing is to be gained by seeking for distinction for distinction's sake, independent of utility,—the only substantial uses for which mere dress is worthy of a moment's thought. On this subject, as on that of food, accurate experiments, extending, under an exact similarity in all other influential circumstances, through the different periods of life, remain to be made.

In the arrangements for variety of occupations, rest and labor of all the members, the same paramount principle of health is kept constantly in view. Being the first requisite to happiness, no increase of wealth is put in competition with it. One additional year of happy life would be ill bestowed for the addition of all the wealth in the universe: for to the happiness of a community possessing the simple but sufficient means of all natural, intellectual and moral pleasures, what addition of happiness, even for a day, could it give them to be called the possessors of the world's wealth? if to be made use of for themselves, and not to be directed to the raising of others to a state of happiness equal to theirs? With this view, as well as

for other purposes only second in importance, all members of the community are to be conversant in some species, both of agricultural and of manufacturing industry, in occupations of a sedentary as well as of an active nature, in occupations to be performed within in wet and cold, as well as without in fine weather, in the long dreary evenings of winter as well as in the fine closings of summer days. Now, the health of the agricultural laborer is frequently attacked by the cold, wet, and damp to which he is unavoidably exposed. As the seasons wait for no man, as he must be either altogether idle or make the best of a bad day, as he can call on no assistant to make up by co-operation for neglected labor, the agriculturist must brave the seasons in spite of health. Now also the manufacturer, confined from morning to night in apartments more or less unwholesome, deprived of the proper use of air, exercise, heat, becomes a prey in his turn, to weakness, perhaps loss of appetite, and peculiar diseases, from which it is impossible for him to escape under the penalty of starving, by means of such a period of absence from labor as would be necessary to re-establish his health. With agricultural labor, which would accomplish this object, he is unacquainted, and would neither be hired by the farmer, nor admitted to intrude amongst the agricultural laborers: he therefore frequently struggles through a life of disease, and dies. Besides, in most sedentary as well as active occupations, peculiar muscles and even internal viscera are either excited into undue action, or paralysed, by the constant peculiar motions, attitudes, and localities, necessary to these occupations. Hence derangements of the system; which, by merely relieving the muscles employed by different modes of exertion, would be at once obviated. By the proposed variety of occupations, the health of the agriculturist and manufacturer are both at the same time and equally provided for. As the same occupations will mostly continue for one day, or till meal time, for the morning or the evening, no time will be lost in the break-off from one operation to the other, the day or the meal forming the necessary interval, whether the same or different work be taken up. The increased manual consequent on increased intellectual skill, though with less practice, will overbalance the mere automatic skill acquired by drilling. Tools, gardens, work-shops, fields, being all within range, and apparatus provided by the general community, a change of employment would only require a change in the direction to the place of labor in the morning or after meals, not a looking about for tools and employment as where individual competitors change their employments.

Is it however conceived, that the object sought for by saving the waste from unproductive consumption, from unemployed

or misdirected productive powers, from wholesale and retail profits, is merely to increase to the utmost the quantity of articles of wealth, in the shape of accumulated goods, or what is called capital? The ultimate object is not accumulation, is not capital, but enjoyment immediate or future. Herein differ the mere political and the moral economist. The accumulation of wealth or capital, and particularly in large masses, is the sole object of the mere political economist: happiness, health, particularly of the productive many, are with him *secondary*. Here they are primary; and wealth and particularly accumulation, are only secondary. True it is that in a great number, perhaps in a majority of cases, the accumulation of capital, from labor, even under the restraints of insecurity, has produced more happiness than would have existed without such accumulation. Hence the proposition was generalized; and from this most partial experience it was inferred, that to produce the happiness of society—as far as wealth was concerned—the one and only thing necessary was to increase production, accumulation, capital—which to be apparent must be in large masses and in a few hands. The moral economist, on the other hand, never loses sight of the great polar star happiness, from *all* sources, in the greatest quantity, consequently of the greatest number. Before wealth, and as the basis of all happiness from whatever source, he finds it necessary to maintain *health*: wherever the two are incompatible, wealth must be unhesitatingly sacrificed.

Labor and rest, mental and muscular occupation or amusement—according to these principles, shall they or shall they not be alternately employed as found most conducive to happiness? If remaining at perfect rest, would support the frame and produce more pleasing feelings than active exertion, or than alternate and various exertion and repose, the active would be fools. But we have here to do with health alone, as the necessary prop to happiness. Shall any occupations injurious to health from the inhaling of noxious metallic particles or gasses, from cold, moisture, or excess of muscular exertion, be entered on, for the sake of any quantum of gain? By no means. Shall a few individuals, by lot or otherwise, be made the victims to such employments for the good of the rest of the community? By no means. No acquisition of wealth from such labor could counterbalance the mere evil of the weakening of the general principle of sympathy, which such voluntary abandonment by the community of one of its members would imply—to say nothing of the individual's loss of happiness, his whole existence considered, being greater than the community's gain. Wherever therefore employments injurious to health, cannot, by additional labor in the way of

mechanical or chemical contrivances, not exceeding in value the article gained, be reconciled therewith, such employments, with their pretended advantages, must by a community of rational men be relinquished. By savings from every possible source of waste, an immense mass of productive power is brought together for the common benefit of the associated community. Enough can be spared from this fund to render all employments healthy; or, if this be unattainable, to substitute others productive of preponderant benefit. Enough can be spared from this fund, to obviate injurious fatigue, to prevent labor from ever ceasing to be an occupation of useful and therefore interesting amusement, to afford time for relaxation, for mental amusement, for the enjoyment of every pleasure of the senses and social, of which the human machine, under the guidance of prudence, is susceptible. Wherefore were all the sources of waste of human capabilities so rigorously scrutinized? To turn human beings into endless producers for production's sake? No: but to economize time for every rational employment, for the enjoyment, by the whole community, according to their advances in talent, wisdom, virtue, and the varieties of their physical constitution, of all other sources of happiness, *besides those of wealth*. Of these, health being the first and the basis of all the rest, neither time nor exertion will be devoted to any occupation incompatible with it; and the mode and quantity of muscular exertion most conducive to it, will be diligently studied, and with cheerful alacrity supplied, whether it be three or fifteen hours out of the four and twenty.

Besides all these means, chiefly physical and arising out of the very structure of the community, for the preservation of health, the youth of the whole association, male and female, will learn, as one of the most useful branches of human knowledge to all, the structure and functions of the human machine, the mode of operation of the arrangements surrounding them, and all those minute circumstances which tend to derange or favor the healthful play of the vital powers.

Health thus amply provided for by the proposed arrangements; the next class of obstacles to human happiness generated by insecurity, which they would remove, are those which render impossible while they exist, the acquisition of habits of social and personal virtue by the members of the community. The proposed arrangements "would save the incalculable waste of happiness, now arising from the contentions, animosities, and cruelties engendered by the institutions of insecurity, and in some degree inseparable from the most chastened pursuit of individual gain; the social combinations proposed removing the *causes* of those crimes and vices, and

by the education of the understanding implanting opposite permanent dispositions and habits."

Look round society, examine the contentions that embitter life, the actions, sometimes the mere words or supposed intentions which criminal laws have erected into offences, and which *they* visit, in the name of humanity, with all the cruelty of torturing punishments: look to the deceits, perjuries, forgeries of all sorts, that encompass all our transactions: look at the deeds of violence and fraud that desolate human life. From what source do nine out of ten, nay ninety-nine out of a hundred of them, directly or indirectly proceed? From what, but from the pursuit of individual gain? from the pursuit of individual wealth, whether for the mere sake of influence or distinction, or for the sake of the supposed immediate selfish benefit to be derived from the article sought? For the gratification of any passion or desire unconnected with wealth, scarcely any contention—certainly no injurious contention—is excited; because either the means of gratifying such desires are ample and open to all, or else force or fraud cannot aid in the acquisition of those *personal* qualities which are the objects of such desires. The sexual passion is the only exception: though what are called its aberrations, are in reality almost always connected with wealth, yet are there some few cases in which wealth is in no way concerned.

Now, as to all the vices and crimes arising from the mere pursuit of individual gain, by the competition of individual with individual, or with all other individuals, nothing is more plain, than that such vices and crimes could not have place in a society where no such thing as individual gain, as individual possession, was known. Though the clothes and the private apartments may be in some measure called individual possessions, at least during the time of occupation and use, yet as every other member of the community has apartments and clothes equally extensive and good, adequate to every rational personal demand, what motive can there be for any contention about the possession of any such articles? If a fresh supply of any article is wanted by any member for individual use, the easy way is open to him of procuring such supply by application at the common distribution ware-rooms. No sane animal will contend for that which can be got without contention. Contention is a forced unpleasant state surrounded with mistrust and apprehension, and therefore not entered on but with a view to some countervailing benefit: here the countervailing benefit is withdrawn, and therefore the contention can have no cause, can have no object in view, to set it in motion. It will therefore cease, with all the painful feelings of which it is

the parent. Wherefore are perjuries, and forgeries and frauds of all sorts now practised? To facilitate the acquisition of some portion of individual wealth. But in these associated communities of voluntary equality of wealth, there would be *nothing to be gained* by these perjuries, forgeries, or other species of falsehood: the motives to lying, as to theft, would be withdrawn, and therefore, without supposing any change whatever in the nature of man, he will cease to lie and steal, simply because he will find in his altered circumstances, that nothing is to be gained, no increase of happiness, by lying and stealing.

Thus, by the simple operation of the proposed arrangements, will the crimes and vices of falsehood and violence respecting property, cease within such communities; as a lamp ceases to burn, when the oil or gas that supplied it is withdrawn.

The passions of envy, jealousy, hatred, pride, vanity, &c., and the crimes against person or property, to which they sometimes give rise, are almost always connected with property; and will therefore cease with the altered circumstances of joint and social possession and enjoyment. There remain those few cases of the development of such passions, not connected with wealth.

At the head of private or simply personal vices—which seldom are, but which never ought to be erected into crimes and made punishable by the laws—stands intemperance as to eating and drinking. Health requiring the rejection of intoxicating liquors except as an occasional medicine, intemperance as to drinking will be unknown, drunkenness in all its varieties, and with its endless train of consequential mischiefs, will soon cease. Though the most gratifying food will be afforded in abundance, intemperance in eating cannot prevail to any injurious extent, because the temptation to excess from the unwholesome variety of over-stimulating animal food being withdrawn, simple and natural tastes alone being consulted and gratified, and the appetite having always a keen recurrence from daily muscular or mental activity, or both, the evils of over-eating would be so quickly and palpably felt, the pleasure of the succeeding meal would be diminished so much more than that of the over-supplied meal would be increased; and the force of example and public opinion would be so strong, that injurious excess from this source, would not be an object of apprehension. The poor, the wretched, would now perhaps over-eat even at a healthful meal, from the variety of the enjoyment and the certainty of its non-recurrence: but, under the proposed arrangements, these incitements would be

removed, as the healthful meal would be the universal meal, and the recurrence certain. Every healthful gratification of the appetite, every gratification attended with preponderant good, being not only permitted but sought for by the benevolent united wisdom of the community,—the *fool* only would injure himself by any excess, and the number of such fools would daily decrease. On the same principles would be regulated mere personal excess (dissevered from all other consequences) in the gratification of the sexual passion.

Even under the institutions of partial security, those vices and crimes, unconnected with the pursuit of wealth, which arise from misgoverned sexual desire, abduction, rape, and such like, are very trifling in amount or magnitude. With the most partial advance in civilization they are irreconcilable. What now leads to the few offences of this class that are committed? Uncommon brutality of disposition, or inequality of situation with the object of attachment. All those cases arising from inequality of situation as to pecuniary affairs, would cease at once under the proposed arrangements, because every man and every woman under them are equal, as to wealth; joint possessors of all wealth and all social advantages, private individual possessors of nothing. Personal qualities alone therefore would decide the attachments of love; good qualities of body and mind. From the progress of education and just views of happiness, mental qualities would be continually gaining on the merely animal. The employment of force or fraud to operate on the conduct in the co-operating communities, not being practised nor of course known, personal good qualities and persuasion, would be the only means of exciting attachment that could occur to the members. In truth, the mutual desires of the two sexes would be, under the proposed arrangements, an additional link to the chain of motives calling forth the cultivation of personal good (i. e. useful) qualities; and a link of what efficacy! Who can, under the present feverish toil for mere wealth and distinction, by any factitious means, estimate its energy? Now, the one sex, being degraded into a mere puppet, deprived of almost all civil and of all political rights, for the amusement of the other, operates as an eternal countervailing force to all expansion of mind and enlarged benevolence: love is the seal of mental imbecility and indolence; and nature, as the poets would say, stands avenged on the despotism of man by linking him with the abject creature of uncalculating sensuality which he has made. But, under the proposed arrangements, woman being in every respect an equal participator with man in all the blessings of education, as well as in all the other benefits

which the combined exertions of the community can command, the two sexes would operate in a new and mutually beneficial way on each other as friends and equals. Improved intellect and elevated sympathy would shrink from association with the ignorant and depraved: the bars of wealth and the impertinences of rank unknown in these communities, preference would have nothing else to feed and banquet upon but useful and therefore estimable qualities: the sphere of choice of all would be enlarged and open to all: all artificial restraints to sincere attachment being removed, those incentives which are natural and useful would exclusively and with the more intensity be cultivated; and the sexual passion instead of bringing down all to its own level of ignorance and selfishness, instead of being the ally of vice and waste and disease, would become a powerful additional, and universally operating, stimulus to the mutual acquisition of intelligence and benevolence. Attachment for which no reason could be given, grounded on no palpable qualities, glorying in loving without knowing why, and in constancy in spite of discovered worthlessness, could not long maintain its ground in a community, all whose efforts were directed to real preponderant good. As rational attachments become common, what are called romantic attachments would cease. Prostitution,—that most wretched of the trades of insecurity, mowing down in early prime more of human life in the one sex than the insanity of war does in the other,—could not exist in such communities. Man, not being the guardian of individual wealth, would have no bribe wherewith to insult woman for the purchase of that which loses all real value when it can be bought. Woman being in as full possession as man of all the enjoyments procured by the mutual co-operation of the whole community, *could* not—education even out of the question—be driven by either want or vanity, to yield to such degradation. Neither distress, nor delusion, nor compulsion, could turn to bitterness those ever-springing sources of beneficent sympathy which, by the very laws of our organization, mature health diffuses through the frame of the sexes for each other. Whatever addition to happiness could be gained from this almost universal feeling of animated nature, would be studiously cherished and increased by every useful association: whatever evils were attendant or consequential on it, would be reduced to their lowest point. Under such circumstances, where all were equal to all, and equally worthy of all, where would be the motives leading to abduction, rape, or any sexual violence?

The vices and crimes not connected with wealth, springing from the passions, such as envy or jealousy of superior

talents and hatred of their possessor, remain to be dismissed. Against the few cases in which such passions could be developed, general culture and the continually operating influence of the new circumstances, would provide. Utility being recognized as the standard by which all qualities are to be judged, mere distinction would soon cease to be an object of desire or admiration. If divested of utility, present or future, to the possessor or others,—why should the possessor of any quality be envied, not to say hated? What good will such a quality do its possessor in a co-operating community? what sympathy will it procure for him? Admired and esteemed, if the quality be useful—yes. A useful quality is esteemed by such a community, because it increases the happiness of the possessor, or of some other members of the community. Partaking of this feeling of esteem, of admiration, because it is the interest of every one to be benefited by the good qualities of every other member of the community, and no factitious rewards being known,—what is there left to be envied? what to be hated? The utter uselessness of such passions, or rather their gratuitous self-torment inflicted on those who harbour them, must be so apparent to an active and usefully-occupied community, that they would find no sympathy in the minds of any, and would therefore cease. Not that occasional errors of the feelings and misregulations of the voluntary actions would not occur, as derangements of the animal economy from the state of health would sometimes take place; but these would be so rare and so light, that public opinion would be quite sufficient to restrain them within harmless bounds.

What are the crimes and vices that still remain to be noticed? Those which may occur between the members of the society or the general stock or management of the community and the members of general society around them. Neither the associated members, it is evident, nor the superintendants of its affairs, could have any stronger motives to steal, cheat, or lie towards persons without its limits than within them; because the transactions of gain ceasing, the interests would cease, and there would be no objects left to plunder, cheat, and lie about for their own individual advantage. Abundantly supplied at home in every thing useful, what possible motive could exist for coveting the scanty products of the individual laborers, by competition, around them? In those few exchanges of produce which the superintendants would have to transact to procure the articles of comfort for the general use, which could not be made at home without waste of labor, the usual temptations, it may be said, present themselves. First, the

superintendants are acting for general benefit, not individual gain, and are moreover always liable to be displaced by the community. Second, all *necessary* wants of the community are supplied by themselves, and these exchanges are but for secondary, consequently not exciting such keenness of desire. Third, the general practice of beneficence and of course justice, included in the very principle of mutual co-operation, must influence these external transactions, and would certainly lead to the strictest integrity of dealing. When exchanging with similar societies, rules would be devised for the exchanges, superseding the necessity of competition bargain-making: a plan of this sort Mr. Owen has suggested.

To those wanton attacks of vice and crime from without, from the individual members of general society around it, to which the associating community would doubtless be exposed, a remedy is still wanting. The community itself will be so numerous, so convenient, and genial a society for its own members, that if the neighbourhood be much below it in improvement, there will be very little intercourse or opportunity for the exciting of *personal* disagreements. For the protection of the public property, there are, the general laws of the society*, the interested watchfulness of every individual in the community, himself a joint proprietor of any property that might be violated, and the remoteness and security from external plunderers of the general stock. It is presumed, however, that the disposition and ameliorating example of such communities will rather lead the neighbourhood to corresponding kindness and imitation of their co-operating pursuits of industry, than to hostility and abortive attempts at plunder.

Almost all the motives engendering vice and crime thus withdrawn from a community of mutual co-operation, from its mere position as such; if we want to know what would be their conduct as to positive virtue, to active beneficence, we have only to inquire what is their real interest? and will they be placed in such circumstances that they must perceive that real interest? The very vulgar exclaim, that "a man will be virtuous—and no thanks to him—if all temptations to vice are withdrawn; that there is no merit in such virtue." To just this state of unpretending virtue is it, that the mutual co-operators would be reduced. To merit they make no pretensions, if merit imply a claim to factitious reward. Their object is happiness; happiness as the result of their own con-

* It should rather be said, "there might be:" for as the law now stands, *joint stock* is without the pale of the law! except favored by charter or particular acts of parliament. A general law on this subject is wanting.

duct, not as arising from adventitious sugar-plums to be capriciously showered down upon them by those having the power to shower them down, who may think proper to be pleased with their conduct. Merit aside, when no possible good is to be got by out-witting, plundering, or otherwise tormenting each other, it will be plainly their interest to try if no increase is to be had to their happiness by cultivating as much as possible the social affections. Nothing so contagious as happiness: nothing, but light, so much abounding in reflections, and so much dependant for its general effect on their number and variety. By an association of our nature, from which there is no escape, dependant partly on organization and partly on early inevitable habit, the usual indications, by means of the countenance and otherwise, of happiness in those around us, excite a glow more or less lively of kindred feelings in ourselves, whenever some real or supposed counteracting interest does not mar the effect. Scarcely any one can enjoy happiness surrounded with the miserable. Scarcely any bounds can be assigned to the increase which individual happiness is capable of receiving, from the associations of reflected happiness: though minute, yet gentle and ever-springing, they are frequently of potency sufficient even to banish personal uneasiness. What pleasures so cheap as these? requiring no purchase but yielding to their impulse? What wisdom so great as to increase them to the utmost? by every possible act of mutual kindness to increase them? All essential wants of all already gratified, no painful personal privation could interpose its chilling veto.—But, if these things be so, what is to prevent a community with all its wants supplied, all temptations to maleficence removed, from plainly perceiving its interest in this respect? Factitious interest and ignorance are the causes that lead men not to pursue their real interest: these obstacles withdrawn, knowledge within their reach, and the greatest sum of happiness to all, the sole and avowed end of their association; is it within the scope of any rational probability, that such associated members should not perceive that the same motives which led them to mutual co-operation in essential matters, demand that in every minor pursuit they should seek the happiness of all by mutual kindness and good offices? This is the principle of a virtuous disposition; and thus do we find it included in the very ground-work of these communities. The pleasures of sense so amply provided for, they must inevitably seek for additional pleasures by cultivating to the utmost the pleasures of sympathy.

The last of the advantages, not as excluding other advantages, but as the most prominent, immediate, and most closely connected with our subject, mentioned as arising from the

proposed arrangements, is, that "they would render supply and demand always commensurate; would reduce the economy of supply and demand, of population, and other contested questions of morals, legislation, and political economy, to fixed and easily ascertained data."

The paramount mischief of all systems of insecurity, by whatever subordinate and varying expedients accomplished, is, that by throwing into the hands of a few the dwellings of the whole community, the raw materials on which they must labor, the machinery and tools which they must use, and the very soil on which they live and from which their food must be extracted,—these few, by combining together, seizing on or allying themselves with political power, reserving knowledge to themselves and keeping the mass of the community ignorant, acquire the absolute regulation of the remuneration of all the productive laborers of the community, and possess the faculty of forcing that community or any portion of it to starve, whenever, from whatever causes, the exercise of their industry does not, under these same expedients of insecurity, yield such a return as will not only give ordinary support to the laborers, but also that quantum of the products of the labor to themselves, under the name of profits on capital, which they have been accustomed, from whatever circumstances, to look upon as their due. Now, though political power were to seize on nothing out of the products of labor, but to leave the whole to the discretion of the owners of capital, land included; yet would it be entirely in the power of these capitalists, by regulations of cupidity and ignorance, to prevent the development of industry, and of course the production of human life and enjoyment. The restraints and plunder of political power, have been always so amalgamated with those of capitalists, that it is perhaps impossible to find a complete exemplification in practice of this position. As the nearest, mark the contrast between those cases where political power affected not only not to impose no restraints, but to give encouragements, to industry, as in the settlements adjacent to the Crimea by the autocracy of Russia, and in Canada, Cape of Good Hope, and Austral-Asia, by the oligarchy of England; and those where the restraints both of political power and almost of capitalists were in reality withdrawn, as in some of the non-slave settlements of the United States of North America, the nearest approach to equal security. The expedients of insecurity directed by the law-supported cupidity of capitalists, have prevented, and must ever prevent, any real progress to prosperity and happiness in the one case; while in the other, *States* are founded in a generation. True, that the further accumulation of the general capital of the community

itself is prevented by such restraints: but the object of capitalists, is not to increase the general capital of the community, but to make most productive of profit to themselves, what is absolutely in their possession: the real interest of the capitalist, as such, is always and necessarily opposed to the interest of the laborer; and he will always make use of all means in his power to make that interest available: the only personal check is his own calculation, always blinded by his interest, of the effect of his forced restraints on the spirit and thence on the productive powers of the laborer. The check on the cupidity of capitalists from the competition of other capitalists, has been found in practice utterly inoperative of any permanent good to the producers, its effects being merely temporary, and balanced by many evils even while it lasts.

But the fact is, that though the restraints of insecurity imposed by capitalists to increase their profits, or any two or three of those restraints, would be sufficient to keep down the happiness of the laborers; and though also the public plunder of the products of labor by political power would of itself be abundantly sufficient to produce the same effect; yet have these two moral engines of human misery always gone hand in hand, sometimes the one sometimes the other taking the lead. There is also a physical possibility, (a moral impossibility in the present state of knowledge,) that, though all the restraints and exactions of capitalists were removed, though all the restraints and direct plunder of political power were removed, though the products of labor were left untouched by any but the producer, and capital were as equally divided amongst the community as equal security could accomplish, yet if the productive laborers so unrestrained, shut their eyes to consequences, and increased their numbers by marriage beyond their power of providing for them the same comforts that they themselves enjoyed; such over-population would produce similar disastrous effects. But as it requires much less knowledge and energy to regulate population to supply, than to ward off the plunder and restraints of political power and of capitalists, this source of evil resolves itself into the others, being produced entirely by them in all but the most savage stages of existence. Now whenever from either of these causes operating singly, or from both operating in whatever proportions, the exertions of labor do not produce a healthful subsistence after deduction made of the plunder or profit, or both; it is said "there is no demand for labor," the seats at the table of nature's mighty banquet are occupied. The evil is said to be irremediable; and those who cannot find employment must live as long as they can.

Under the system of equal security, of the natural laws of distribution, and the simple institutions compatible with them, it is evident—provided that skill and knowledge were, as they might be, communicated to all the members of the community—that every laborer would become a capitalist, that the plunder of political power could not exist, and that all the members of the community would be producers and consumers to each other. Almost the whole of the capital of the community being possessed by the laborers, and there being consequently but very little demand for useless articles of mere luxurious caprice, their industrious exertions could be but very partially impeded by the opposing interest of mere capitalists. Very uncommon and very short would be the occasions, in which the capacity to labor would not meet with an adequate demand for its exertion, and a just recompense according to the state of knowledge and skilful industry of the community.

But under the systems of insecurity or any modifications of them, irremediable the evils, by war, by earthquake, unequalled, in the train of want of employment. As of late in Ireland, under some of the most wicked of the combinations of insecurity, privation of dwelling, of clothes, of food, disease, death: and all this not only in the midst of a capability to produce, but of an absolute surplus produce of food; the producers dying for want, the products of their labor unsaleable!

Under the proposed arrangements, it is certainly impossible that any such evils could occur. The first object of the united labor of the whole community is to provide an abundance of wholesome food, for their own wants at least. A reserve store also for as many months or years supply as experience shows may be rendered necessary for the deficiency of bad harvests, forms an essential part of their economy. The next object of the united labor of the community, is to provide in equal abundance, but without any waste, a supply of the most useful clothing for the whole, and to preserve well the common buildings and dwellings. The surplus labor goes to procure, immediately or by exchange, comforts and conveniences. In this state of things, consumers, i. e. employers, can never be wanting; for the whole community are the consumers, the employers. Nor can productive laborers be wanting, for the whole community are also the productive laborers. Demand therefore and supply of all articles necessary to health, must be commensurate: from more or less of other articles, little inconvenience can be felt; for such a community would be very careful how it directed its surplus labor to the pro-

duction of any articles, however glittering the immediate profit, for which the real and regular wants of society at large, did not guaranty something approaching to a permanent equality of demand. Whenever the community found that any part of its surplus labor was misdirected, it could with the least possible inconvenience, from the varied skill of its members and the possession of mechanical power, give it a new direction; or if all but the impossible circumstance arose, of a total want of demand from without, in the way of exchange, for any articles which the surplus labor could produce,—the only consequence would be, that this surplus labor would be put to work under the direction of excited ingenuity to fabricate home products into substitutes for external conveniences, no longer to be procured without too great a waste of useful labor. Thus would the tremendous evil of want of employment and consequent wretchedness, be absolutely banished from such associated communities: thus would supply and demand be strictly and eternally commensurate; thus would the eternal and disgraceful question of want of employment for the poor be gently laid to rest: there would be no human beings in such communities to whom such a degrading epithet as poor could apply.

On an equal footing with the question of employment, is that of *population*. Want of employment, excess, or existence in any quantity, of a miserable population, low-living whether on mere potatoes or other under-exciting food; all these and many others, so often put forward as *causes* of the misery of the majority of the community, are nothing but *effects* of some or other of the ever-varying combinations of expedients, to which insecurity, under different circumstances and according to the existing state of knowledge, gives birth. Let those expedients or institutions of insecurity remain, not to say all of them but only a few of those which are influential, and these evils will follow as certainly as water will find the horizontal figure of the earth. Remove these mighty master-springs of evil, and employment, population, and food will find their level and regulate themselves: but insult not the suffering mass, the great majority of mankind, with the glaring falsehood, that by means of limiting population or not-eating potatoes, their own happiness is in their own hands, while the causes are left in full operation which render it morally and physically impossible for them to live without potatoes and improvident breeding. All the labored obstacles to human improvement, which, with a view to palliate, and to blind the eyes of men (the preachers doubtless sometimes themselves blind) to the overwhelming evils of systems of inse-

curity, have been put forward as arising from the principle of population, have been founded on this *false* position, that “*increased comfort will necessarily lead to increase of improvident breeding.*” All the facts of history and all investigation of human motives, demonstrate the utter falsehood of this position. There is no disposition or physical interest amongst mankind, elevated but one step over the merest savage existence, if even in that state, to breed beyond their absolute comforts, whatever they may be : and as these comforts increase, accompanied as they are with an increase of knowledge, the tendency to improvident breeding, uniformly decreases with their increase. Not a single instance can be quoted from history, or from the conduct of any living community, of overbreeding taking place in consequence of increased comfort alone, where all expedients of insecurity had been removed. Look again for illustration to the non-slave provinces of the United States of North America, approaching the nearest to a state of equal security. Have the inhabitants of the Old States increased in improvident breeding in consequence of their increased comforts? On the contrary, has not their increase of comforts and of population gone hand in hand, and has not every new generation demanded rather more than less of comfort from the associations of early habit than its predecessor? The tendency to multiply has certainly increased with the increase of comforts, but the tendency to *improvident* multiplication has as certainly diminished. The skilful confounding of these two tendencies, or perhaps the ignorant confounding of them, mingled up with the physical possibility of a geometrical increase of numbers, and the assumption of the inevitableness or necessary existence of certain of the expedients of insecurity, have given rise to a school of political and economical fatalists, whose sole merit is, that they have brought fully into view, though with the sole design of supporting systems of insecurity, certain obstacles to human improvement, which had not been previously sufficiently studied ; but which once known and understood, cease to be objects of alarm. Look again to the west of the Alleghanny mountains : increase has taken place there prodigiously with increased capabilities and comforts : but has *improvident* increase taken place there any more than in the old states of the Union? No : with increase of comforts, under equal security, foresight has always increased, and must always increase. Both in the old and new States, population keeps up, though at a different rate of increase, or nearly keeps up, to the level of comforts, but does not go beyond them ; though nothing has been done in the United States, deserving the

name, to give education, knowledge, to the whole community. That done, and all the vile remnants of insecurity removed, whenever the population of the whole Union, or of any part, arrives at that state that it cannot be further increased without lessening actual comforts attended in the opinion of the people with preponderant good; it will then cease to increase; and re-production will exactly balance the waste of life. Perhaps such a state of society is the most conducive to happiness. Less of pain and labor of women, being taken up in the mere rearing of children, and less of the time and industry of both men and women being expended in the providing for them, more free time would be left to both parties for intellectual and social pursuits, and enough of the variety of childhood, youth, and age would exist to keep up pleasing associations and endearments, without making every generation a mere breeding stock for the succeeding.

In what way the proposed regulations affect population, will be presently noticed. Meantime it is evident that every thing in these communities on such influential matters, may be and will be, matter of record. Experiments in morals, legislation, and political, including rural, economy, may be instituted, or inferences may be drawn, with a confidence and accuracy which they have never hitherto attained. The whole of the arrangements, form one grand moral as well as economical experiment. 'Tis an experiment, as well for almost eradicating vice, as for increasing physical comforts to the utmost. By punishments alone, or with very few exceptions within the few last years, have legislators aimed to arrest the progress of vice and crime. By comparing the irregularities occurring in communities of mutual co-operation with the crimes and vices of equal numbers of individuals of surrounding society, a new field will be open to the legislator. As in order to promote physical comfort and the progress of the arts leading to it, the removal of restraints alone is demanded; so in order to promote moral conduct, he will see the efficiency of the mere removal of the temptations to vice by surrounding with new circumstances and affording new motives. The benevolent legislator, whose object is to repress misery by repressing crime, will not surely be displeased to find that he has less crimes to punish, and that severity of punishment will be less and less called for as preventive means increase. No alteration in the criminal laws of society do these communities ask for in their favor: their object is never to commit any offence which any *just* law, severe or not severe, would repress. If those who never transgress the criminal laws, who aim to hold out to the rest of society an example of innocence

as to crime, should be the favourites of the criminal legislator, whether their obedience is caused by fear of the denunciations and punishments of law, or by a regard to their own newly-formed interests, these communities surely should be cherished by him in proportion as they accomplish what they promise—an example of guiltlessness. A benevolent physician might as well complain that the small-pox had ceased, and that no opportunity was left for the exhibition of his skill in curing the disease, as a legislator that all crimes, or that particular crimes, became less frequent in consequence of the establishment of those communities. The physician and the legislator may both of them rest satisfied, that whatever advances may be made by those, whom they, if sincere, must regard as their fellow-laborers, in preserving health and in preserving morals, there will still remain a field as ample as before for studying the human frame, its derangements, and remedies, and for studying the voluntary actions of men, the motives to them, and the means of preventing preponderant evil from their occasional misdirection. Let the physician of health and the physician of disease, the preventive and coercive moralist, unite all their most anxious and energetic efforts, the one still remedying what the other has failed to prevent, and they will still find that physical and moral evil will be too abundant, and that their respective studies will be as attractive as before, though directed to more delicate pursuits, combating every day less atrocious masses of evil, and producing by milder means more important results. If indeed the proposer of these arrangements were presumptuous enough to say, “Diseases and crimes will not be known in these communities; therefore laws and medical remedies shall not be permitted amongst them,” the physician and the legislator might be alarmed. But his language is diametrically the reverse: “Maintain your laws, increase if you please their number and severity; perfect the cures of all diseases, and let the remedies be prepared: let no precaution be omitted to repress as they arise our moral and physical imperfections: when experience shall have proved that the harsh and repulsive remedies formerly employed to repress diseases and crimes are no longer necessary, then and not before let them be replaced by more gentle expedients.” The physician may be as rationally alarmed at vaccination hospitals, or the legislator at the institution of Lancasterian schools, lest the harvest of criminals for the machinery of law should be lessened, or of patients for the bearing of torments and paying of fees, as at the institution of mutual co-operation societies. Opposition or friendliness to all preventive means, to the preservation of

health and morals, is the true criterion between the fortune or fame-hunting quack and the sincerely benevolent physician or legislator. The mere lawyer indeed must be unfriendly to these communities: his occupation will not be found amongst their useful employments: he must become one of the happy co-operating members, raised a thousand times in intellectual and moral value over his former debasing pursuits of chicane.

To the enlightened moralist, what a field would these associated communities afford! With what a development of human motives, whose very existence the infancy of his science had hardly suspected, would they supply him! motives gentle and all-pervading like the descending dews, unappreciated till the leafy forest and the bending crops of gladness attest their universal operation. The efficacy of the social motives, has never yet been tried: human society, as hitherto constituted, has afforded no opportunity for their development: the experimental moralist must hail their establishment whether successful or not: on experience and experiment, and the just inferences drawn therefrom, the only solid advance that ever has been or can be made in physical and moral knowledge, must be founded; all else is idle speculation, if not delusive absurdity.

Education forming so essential a part of Mr. Owen's system, it may be wondered at that it is not put prominently forward here, as one of the advantages of the system of mutual co-operation.

The main moral improvement to be expected from the system of mutual co-operation, will be produced by the *altered circumstances* of the community, not by talking or writing about rights and duties, and issuing empty threats, to induce one line of conduct, while substantial motives of interest are permitted to exist impelling to its opposite. This applies particularly to the adults, and to all, as far as their habits had been previously formed, on first entering into such a community. That part of education, which may be called literary, and which consists in diffusing real knowledge, in communicating truth physical and moral to the understanding, always under the caution against hypocritical assent without perception or conviction to save the trouble of exertion, must be communicated chiefly to the younger members of the community, and would therefore be more prospective, even to them, than the other benefits, which would be immediately reaped, and which are incorporated, as it were, with the very movements of the social machine; and which more directly relate to wealth and distribution. There is certainly no part of the system of more deep and ultimate importance than the diffu-

sion of real knowledge; of which nine-tenth parts are undisputed, the other tenth consisting of discoveries not yet fully canvassed, nor of course universally admitted. But no particular plan of education is laid down, nor is indeed essential to these co-operating communities. That they would all adopt one system, particularly in matters of detail, for the imparting of knowledge to their youth, is neither to be expected nor desired. Some would perhaps adopt, by means of teachers of their own associated members, the plan proposed in Chapter IV. on the diffusion of knowledge. To all would be afforded the most ample opportunity and means of instituting whatever system they deemed the best: to general society they would be no yearly charge for tuition, for instruction of any sort, for support of their poor or any other succour. Their places and materials for instruction form part of their general arrangements: the children and all the materials of art and science on the spot, and the real agricultural, manufacturing, and scientific operations always in motion and within sight for exemplification; the command of all circumstances so as to remove all sources of delusion and false judgement, so as to present nothing but real facts for the young mind to judge upon, being completely in the power of the institutors; where has ever existed or been conceived, a situation for the education of the young so replete with advantages, hitherto deemed incompatible with each other? The effect of such states of things in the development of all the variety of intellectual capabilities and in the implanting of moral associations, founded in truth and tending to happiness, cannot be appreciated. The delineation of just expectations, would appear the dream of fancy. Every one of these communities would shortly become in that branch of their economy relating to the acquisition and diffusion of knowledge, rival establishments, not to court distinction for the attraction of a worthless gaze, still less to abstract the largest possible portions of the wealth and means of enjoyment of other communities, but to discover and render effectual for the common good of all rational sentient beings, new modes of applying the energies and fashioning the materials of nature to make them more subservient to human enjoyment. The press is now only a play-thing in point of usefulness to what it would then become.

Another advantage arising out of the arrangements for mutual co-operation, not here put forward because not so immediately connected with our main inquiry,—the distribution of wealth,—is that just equality of rights and duties and enjoyments which it would establish between the two sexes. This, it may be said, is included in the more extended equality of

all the members of the community. Under the proposed arrangements it is; but not necessarily under all arrangements for the equality of men, either as to matters of wealth or political power. However equal men may have been proposed to be made to each other, the relative inferiority of all women to all men, has been ever insisted on: old association and the brute right of superior strength, have every where prevailed, amongst religious fanatics as well as amongst republican institutors. The weaker sex, as the weaker men, have been universally the prey of the stronger. Moreover, as these communities are all subject to the common laws of the general society amongst which they are established, they cannot, by any private act of theirs, alter such laws, or abstract the women of their association from the capricious degradation to which such laws consign them. If they cannot prevent an insane husband from ordering, as he would his horse, his wife, happy in such a community, to leave it at his bidding; they can at least by the previous consent of all the associated members, remove almost all those occasions which would tempt husbands to the exercise of those brutal and senseless prerogatives which almost all laws give them. Disputes about property, about household affairs, about children, would be rendered almost impossible, almost all the arrangements on these matters being in common. In the use of all the property of the community, the woman has as ample liberty as the man; little being left to mere private household economy. The husband *may*, it is true, as now in general society, order his wife as well as his children home from any useful work of co-operation about which they may be employed, and may confine them all day in his apartments. The common law of Britain will support him in the exercise of such authority. But by so acting he evidently breaks his voluntary engagement of mutual co-operation, and begins a system of individual interest which can only end in his separation from the society. While the family remains in the co-operating community, no inducements fitted to operate on the minds of men as ordinarily constituted, will be found, tempting the men to the exercise of any vexatious power. In point of fact therefore, as nothing but the pleasure of vexing could be derived from the exercise under such circumstances of arbitrary command, as all the usual motives for the exercise of a husband's legal superiority would be withdrawn, it would be soon forgotten, and sympathy and reason would be the sole umpire between husband and wife as between every individual in the community and every other individual. Moreover, the unmarried women of such communities, would be at perfect liberty to

refuse any other connexions than those, perfectly equal and voluntary, which might take place within the community itself; neither the care and support of children, nor disputes about succession to individual wealth, nor fear of neglect of the mother in gestation, remaining any longer as motives to compel women to submit to the slavery as to them, of the marriage obligations of general society. Their marriages might be simple, and within the community, like those of the Quakers: but not operating like the Quakers for individual gain, they would be under no necessity of superadding the shackles of law to their own simple, voluntary, and perfectly equal contracts.

Were it fit here to enlarge on all the collateral moral benefits that seem necessarily to follow from the operation but for a few years of such communities of social co-operation, on their own happiness, or from their good example on society in general, the examination of advantages might be carried to an indefinite length: we must therefore cease with those most intimately connected with our subject, and pass on to inquire if there are any obstacles to human happiness, any restraints of insecurity, which the proposed arrangements would not remove; if there are any which they would even tend to aggravate.

Obstacles to human improvement which the proposed regulations would not remove.

One of the most curious and extraordinary features of the proposed arrangements is, that they demand no alteration whatever in any of the existing institutions of insecurity, the protection of their joint property excepted. But then in return their *immediate* benefits are confined to the co-operating members. The system of equal security and individual exertion, advocated in our previous chapters, herein differs from the system of mutual co-operation. In the system of equal security coupled with individual exertion, not a step can be made by individuals without the aid of the legislature; but then the whole community is at the same time benefited; not indeed the active aid of political power, but the ceasing to oppress, the removal of restraints on equal individual exertion; while, on the contrary, in the system of mutual co-operation, no aid is demanded of the legislator, no removal of any of the restraints of insecurity on individual exertion: the exactions of capitalists and the plunder of political power, and all the expedients or institutions of insecurity are passed by: no change is sought to be made in them: to whatever pressure, whether under

autocratic or privileged-order institutions, the rest of the general society in which they live is subjected, they submit themselves likewise, excepting in as far as those very institutions have left them the faculty of ceasing, by voluntary consent, to inflict on each other certain portions of the evils of insecurity. For instance, in Russia the great majority of the agricultural community are in a state of slavery to other members of the community, and are attached to the soil. Such men could not leave the soil and their masters' work to enter into such co-operating associations: but in the greater part of Europe, the institutions of insecurity not being so ignorantly and brutally vicious, the faculty of forming such associations is left to mankind without the necessity of any formal legal permission or removal of Russian restraints of field-slavery. In countries where this extreme expedient of insecurity is unknown, it is plain that any number of individuals, sufficiently large to supply each other's wants, and not too large for the convenience of instruction, social intercourse, carriage, mechanical power, &c., now living apart from each other, and each of them operating for his individual benefit and availing himself of every enactment of insecurity in his favor, as that of controuling wages, of persecuting those not regular apprentices, of persecuting those exporting tools, exporting materials, or exporting themselves, might mutually forgo the exercise of these powers of annoyance against each other. The habit of living by little retail profit, by keeping little secrets of trade or skill to themselves, they might also forgo; as well as the habit of individual expenditure and isolated domestic arrangements. They might evidently join in a plan of equal mutual co-operation for common benefit, on a persuasion that the comforts of the whole and of every individual of the whole would be increased thereby. In the direction of their associated labor, they would also, if wise, consider not only what things were most useful, but what things were also most highly taxed, that none of it might be expended in vain, or on those not co-operating in production; never employing labor on a taxed article unless its utility exceeded by the amount of the tax that of an untaxed article, producible by their labor, which might be substituted for it. On the new direction of their labor no imposts could be laid by political power without taxing similar articles in general society. If political power in no way aided these communities, 'tis hardly to be supposed they would be persecuted by unequal taxation. All equal and just taxation, their economy of labor and real utility of expenditure would enable them to discharge with much more facility than an equal number of individuals in

society at large, selected indiscriminately and in just proportion from all existing classes.

It must be always recollected, however, that no individual is bound by his engagement to remain one moment longer in such co-operation than he deems it his interest, whether wisely or not, to continue such co-operation. No power of compulsion do these communities claim. Enlightened views of individual identified with social interest, and the influence of public opinion, are to them arms sufficiently powerful for every useful purpose. They ask no aid from law.

Thus then, by the proposed arrangements, an expedient is devised, as profound as it is benevolent, for *evading* many of the evils of the institutions of insecurity, instead of calling on political power to *abolish* them. The interest of general society, (less able, from their isolated and uneconomical exertions, than the associated communities, to bear the exactions of political power,) in repressing its excesses, would be a sufficient guard, it is perhaps conceived, for the common interest of these communities as members of the whole, without any direct exertion on their part, much less any profession of faith, as to political measures.

But let not, on the other hand, these proposed arrangements be charged with *excluding* national or provincial affairs from the consideration of the individual members. Though members of a co-operating community, they have not ceased to be members of the great general community in which they live. They take no monastic vows of voluntary seclusion from the world. They cease not to be men and to have a country, because they engage in a large family concern of many co-operating members, any more than if they had engaged for the supply of their physical wants and the amelioration of their habits, on a smaller scale. The species of interest which they will take in the affairs of society at large, will probably be altogether changed from what it used to be, from the interest of wealth and competition and rancor, to that of regret for the uninformed and vicious, and of benevolence for all.

The sympathies of such communities will be enlarged, not contracted, as their understandings are improved. By reason, by generosity, they will always seek to promote the public good. Different members will necessarily take different views of public affairs, as of all other matters of human concern: but, removed as long as they remain in the community from the pursuit of any sinister pecuniary interest of general society, their opinion as to the regulation of public affairs will possess the more weight as their motives must be pure. Liable to the operation of all laws and taxes as well as the rest of the

general society, why should they not be interested in its concerns, even personally interested, as far as these matters extend? Where, with so much calm and benevolent anxiety as amongst such men, could questions of morals, legislation, education, political economy, as well as of all the physical sciences, be discussed? to whom could they be more attractive, or who would have better data to form judgements upon them? No more controul do the proposed arrangements seek over the political, than over the religious, opinions of men: they aim only to put them all on the road of attaining mutual kindness and truth, the interest of all. Who shall say that the institutor of these arrangements does not interest himself in public concerns, and therefore would not desire the associated communities to meddle with them? As communities, not: but as individuals, who is the institutor but an individual proposing to his equals, arrangements for their happiness, founded on their interest and addressed to their reason? not seeking by force or delusion to found an empire of any sort on the prostration of their wills. Were his mind narrow and monastic enough to wish it, who are now the rational men that will surrender the free exercise of their minds on political and religious matters and their expanding sympathies, to any institutor? As little as they would stoop to such bondage, would he form the wish to exercise it. Were he himself a member of any of these communities, he would be no more than an equal to the other members, and would seek no further influence than that arising from reason and persuasion.

With many it may be matter of objection, that this system of mutual co-operation does not connect itself with any particular sect or party. Having the equal happiness of all in view, it can identify itself with the opinions of none, but affords perfect freedom of opinion to all. Others perhaps will regard it as a proof of the wisdom and benevolence of the system, that it is essentially neuter as to all possible political and religious establishments, guarantying merely the common and equal liberty of opinion of all.

Obstacles to human improvement which the proposed regulations would seem to aggravate.

One of the main pillars, as we have seen, one of the universal expedients of insecurity, is the abstraction which it makes without consent of the producers, in the shape of public plunder, levied by direct or circuitous means, out of the products of labor. Public plunder, now that knowledge is dif-

fusing itself, is the real support of all existing systems of insecurity. The co-operating societies, if successful in a few instances, would rapidly diffuse themselves, till economy of labor, co-operation in producing, and equality in distributing, would by degrees supersede, wherever such advantages could be procured, the present waste of labor and happiness. But as a necessary consequence, the production of wealth would be annually and indefinitely increased; increased, it may be said, to add to the comforts of the producers, but increased also not unseen by political power, not without exciting its cupidity to rifle the honey of such industrious bee-hives. If gold and silver continued the *bona-fide* medium of exchange, and the quantity obtained from the mines remained sufficient to supply the annual waste and preserve the present relative proportion between money and commodities; not only might all the present demands of political power be annually paid out of the products of such increasing wealth, but the amount of those most tremendous iniquities of all systems of insecurity, public debts as they are falsely called, might be gradually discharged.

What prospect could be more exhilarating than this to the holders of political power? They see the industrious of the community forming themselves into groups, to increase by mutual co-operation, instead of isolated individual competition, four-fold or a hundred-fold, the annual quantity of wealth hitherto produced. The industrious yoke themselves to the new talismanic cars of production, and, without stipulating or inquiring who are to be the drivers, proceed in their career of industry. Political power continues to plunder: the exaction is not felt. The facility of acquisition and the sweets of possession and enjoyment, whet the appetite of political power. New exactions are made, the old debts of insecurity are lessened, and co-operative industry still smiles, provided abundantly with health and comfort, even after the satisfaction of these increased demands. Political power smiles also; smiles with content; smiles at the honest simplicity of co-operative industry, and curtails no more his views of magnificence at home, his ancient amusement, necessary to keep up emotion, of pillage and murder of human beings, under the name of war, abroad. A new race commences; a race of increased expenditure against the new race of industry. As the old debts of political power are diminished by tens, new debts are contracted by hundreds. What are the increased capacities for the production of wealth by means of co-operative labor, when compared with the increased capacities and caprices of the possessors of political power, and of the thousands and

millions of the expectant idle, greedy of the plundered honey, and anxious to form a partnership with and bulwark around political power? Let the one be ever so great, the other must still exceed it; because it is always easier to desire and consume than to produce.

Were it one of the proposed arrangements of mutual co-operation, that neither the whole co-operating community as a body, nor any of its individual members, should interest themselves about the possession or the exercise of the political powers of the whole provincial or national community amongst which they lived, and were such arrangement an indispensable condition of their organization; it does not appear that any benefits of increased production and improved habits to be expected from them, would at all counterbalance the evils of *insecurity*, to which they would be thus subjected. Instead of the individual misery of competition, general misery in spite of co-operation, were its products increased a hundred-fold; would be the result: and with misery would come its attendant vices. Against insecurity from private attacks, voluntary co-operation guards, or nearly guards; but against insecurity from public attacks, much more extensive and deadly, it affords no protection at all till the holders of political power give in their adhesion also. The other institutions of insecurity, those operating amongst individuals, it may *evade*; but those it cannot evade, it must submit to, or cause to be relinquished.

Now, were such a regulation, so flagrantly destructive of human sympathy and human right, proposed, who is there that would on such condition unite himself with such co-operating community? Who would withdraw himself from the race of competition, the scramble for wealth, the excitation of hope and fear, the presumption of success, the lottery of life, in which, in a continual fever, he now lives, to devote all his intellectual and muscular powers, calmly to multiply with his fellow-men, by mutual co-operation, the products of their united labor, if he had not some assurance of *security* in the joint enjoyment of these increased products? security, not only from casual, ragged, starving, thieves, but from the ever-present, irresistible, well-clad, and sleek arm of political power? Whether the products of labor are consumed by a number of producers in common, or by every individual producer, *security* in the entire use of its products and voluntary exchanges, are alike necessary for the continuance of reproduction. Security is as indispensable to voluntary equality, as to individual competition. No rational being would on such condition of anticipated wholesale plunder and submission,

join in such associations. What would he do then? First, he would reject the condition as altogether inadmissible. Then, he would ascertain if the remaining arrangements were of such a nature as not to be practicable without this slavish addition. Finding them to be not only practicable without, but to derive all their health and vigor, like all human exertions, from perfect security, he would take to the arrangements and insist on security by every means, as heretofore, which he had been accustomed to employ to attain for himself and his fellow-creatures that indispensable bulwark of industry and happiness. All the evils of political insecurity would be so increased by such an undertaking to submit, and new expedients would be so easily devised for shackling the industry of men working in co-operation, (just as easily as they had been previously devised to shackle the industry of men working by individual competition,) that all co-operation under such circumstances would be vain.

The alarm however is groundless: no such condition is to be found amongst the arrangements: whether it is or is not a desideratum in the mind of the author of them, is of little consequence to the co-operators: such a condition would be altogether inconsistent with another necessary condition, that of perfect freedom of opinion on *all* subjects amongst all the members.

Mr. Owen will perhaps say that "the necessary progression of events, the influence of the new circumstances, the relative situation of these communities with general society, would be such as, without any direct interference of theirs in political matters, to secure them from the apprehended evils of insecurity from political power. The individual producers by competition of general society, not being able to bear so heavy a taxation as these communities, would still, for their own sakes, use all the means in their power to prevent that increase of taxation to which they, as well as the co-operating communities, would be subjected. Were a tax laid on milk or wool or cloth, or on all adults, the producers of general society would have to pay it as well as the co-operators, besides all the other taxes to which they had been previously exposed. Till all society, then, or the great majority of producers, adopted the economical system of mutual co-operation, the fruits of the increased productions of the co-operators, would be enjoyed by themselves; as the amount of tithe is now saved by the minority whose lands are tithe free. As soon, on the contrary, as the labor of the greater part of the community was done by mutual co-operation, the individuals of these communities forming a majority of society, and possessed of almost

all the useful energies of it, would acquire such a moral influence as to check the admiration of idleness, wasteful expenditure, and war, and of course the desire of taxation, to feed these pernicious propensities on the part of the possessors of political power and their numerous retainers. These men, meeting no longer with that respect and awe which the exhibition of their useless and distinguishing baubles formerly excited, would necessarily begin to feel indifferent to the baubles themselves, and of course to the means of procuring them by plundering the products of the industry of their fellow-creatures. They too would begin to estimate objects of wealth by their real value, by their tendency to promote real preponderant physical good, not to distinguish one creature from another. For every useful object to be attained by wealth, they would find an abundance of it amongst the communities of mutual co-operation, and would soon cease to wish for more, directing their future exertions to whatever pursuits of real usefulness the improved intellect of general society might hold in estimation."

These expectations seem to a certain extent to be well founded. As to taxation, it is certainly possible, as it has been often practised, that the amount of a given tax, as that on spirits, used by general society, should be *transferred* to another article, as milk, or any thing else very little used by general society, but substituted by the co-operating communities for intoxicating liquors. In this way political power might delude the decaying industry of general society with an apparent relief at the expense of co-operating industry, enlisting in some measure the feelings and the interests of individual producers on its side, in return for the desertion by the mutual co-operating societies of all matters of national interest. As to the *ultimate* result of these societies, if practicable and successful, in bringing about the change stated in the dispositions even of the idle and the holders of political power; there can be no doubt that such an effect would ultimately be produced: but in what time, and by what means, and after how many oscillations and the gratuitous production of how much misery? Were the co-operating communities not only as bodies, but as individuals, to be selfishly careless and silent about public affairs, generations would pass away before the dumb eloquence of circumstances produced the change. Inveterate habits and mistaken views of interest must be roused to thought; roused by having new views presented to the minds of those holding them and calmly explained to them. If circumstances operate, they operate on the human character (at least when they operate usefully and permanently) *through the understanding*, on a clear perception of real interest. What

are the appropriate means to sway the understanding? what are they but a statement of real facts and just deductions, tracing the real connections and consequences of these facts? Who so fit to use these means for the convincing and happiness of their fellow-creatures, as those whom experience shall have taught the blessings of mutual co-operation and equal enjoyment? How can men be induced, how otherwise as rational beings ought they to be induced, to alter their present conduct, but by pointing out to them the evils to themselves and others of their past conduct, the advantages to be expected from a change? If such be the necessary means to lead to ameliorations of human affairs, what higher claim to the approbation of his fellow-creatures can any man, in these societies or out of them, have, than by using with sincerity such appropriate means? Do they not desert their duty to their fellow-creatures who are able to employ such means, and who neglect them? What else is Mr. Owen now doing? He is mostly confining himself to presenting to his fellow-creatures what he justly conceives, the advantages of labor by mutual co-operation and joint possession and enjoyment. In the foregoing pages, the effort has been made to point out the essential evils of all past systems of insecurity. How but by calm discussion can those changes in the understanding be produced, which must precede a voluntary and useful change of circumstances? Ultimately, no doubt, the pressure of relative and immediate circumstances, would compel the attention of the most obtuse: but as a top continues to spin and a ship to move, even after the impulses that gave them motion are withdrawn, so do men, from acquired habits, pursue determinate lines of conduct long after the objects, good or evil, which put them in motion, are withdrawn. The consequence of the industrious silence and submission to arbitrary plunder, of these societies, would be to counteract the natural tendency of the new circumstances to operate on the minds of the idle consumers. To them there would be no change, but the more industry, the more honey to be plundered. They would form a society and a public opinion of their own, reinforced by increased numbers of idle consumers and of accumulating means of wasteful expenditure. New wars, increased waste, multiplied taxation, would compel expostulation and resistance, or would bury the industry of the mutual co-operating societies, with all their multiplied productions, in one grave with security. Wherefore should not the co-operators in these communities, deliberately warn political power that they were no more inclined to accumulate thought and skill, and labor and production, that the fruits thereof might be abstracted without their consent, to pamper *their* unreal wants, than to supply the real wants of the far

less wicked because more ignorant, the pitiful private plunderer? Why not guard against these obvious sources of contention, these oscillations of misery? Why encourage political power in false and pernicious views of increased plunder? If political power were sincere in its pretensions to benevolence, it would rather voluntarily remove all existing taxation from such communities, than look forward to their multiplied exertions with a view to robbing them of their fruits. If it be desirable that the evils of insecurity should cease, why not endeavour by every possible development of truth, to convince the majority of every community, to arrest as speedily as possible their mischievous career?

Such will be the course of events. No institutor can arrest it. As well might men be told, whether in these co-operating communities or out of them, that they have nothing to do with mechanics or chemistry but to use the preparations and avail themselves of the aid they afford, as not to interest themselves with moral science, with extensive political and economical combinations, but to launch themselves on the happy ocean of improved circumstances, careless of the causes which produced, or of those which might fatally derange them. Here is the common, the essential bond of interest, which was wanting, to unite those working by co-operation with those working by individual competition; their common interest in the support of universal equal security. This is the point of union of all productive laborers, in or out of these communities. The free use of all their faculties, of the entire products of united manual and mental labor, and of voluntary exchanges, are as much the right, because essential to the development of the greatest happiness, of the co-operating communities, as of society at large. Bees labor and produce honey, and men consume it; because bees have neither knowledge nor foresight. But from these co-operating communities of human bees, knowledge and foresight cannot be withheld: they are the very fires that must kindle the mass of mankind into activity and happiness; more necessary to them than to the short-sighted calculators of individual competition in general society, whose views the necessity of existence terminates for the most part with the day or the week. And from such men, acting by mutual co-operation, whose whole scheme of life is founded on comparatively remote and extensive calculations, is it likely that the palpable interest and necessity to their very existence, of equal security, should remain unheeded, uninvestigated, and unclaimed? No: the prosperity of these co-operating communities, is not, and cannot be founded on the desertion of the interests of their fellow-creatures. Insecurity is equally the foe of all human exertion,

whether conducted by one, or by the co-operation of ten thousand individuals. By the unwearied exhibition of truth, the majority of every community must be persuaded of the mischievousness of insecurity, that it may cease for ever.



Thus we have seen that the evils connected with those co-operating communities are few, transitory; but above all things that they are perfectly avoidable, and, whether deemed by any persons essential to them or not, are in fact such as the progress of the human mind, in and out of these societies, must ultimately, perhaps speedily, remove: while the advantages of voluntary equality are numerous, permanent, and such as not even equal security, unassisted by mutual co-operation and common enjoyment, could produce.

The simple question, then, that remains to be solved—seeing that such a state of society is desirable—is, *is it practicable?* Is there any thing in the nature of man, in his organization, muscular or mental, that incapacitates him for such co-operation? Is there any thing in the physical circumstances surrounding him, in the disposition of the materials on which he must labor, or through the instrumentality of which he must operate, in the climate in which he may be placed, irreconcilable with the system of mutual co-operation, for the production and equal enjoyment of all useful things? Are the motives which the system of voluntary equality would discard, and which have hitherto been the leading motives of human conduct, the only ones by which energetic and permanent exertion can be produced? Are there no other motives equally efficacious, by which the understandings of men may be operated upon, to lead them to equally energetic and permanent exertion?

It is to be regretted that of all those, many of them eminent in morals, legislation, and political economy, who have pronounced the new system of voluntary equality impracticable, not one seems, from the plain testimony of the nature of his objections, to have taken the trouble to examine and understand Mr. Owen's arrangements and means of execution. Whether the air of mystery and frequent boldness of promise of Mr. Owen's stile, or his neglecting to obviate popular objections, or his occasional inaccuracies of reasoning or statement on subordinate points; whether all or any of these may have led to their hasty decision, it is hard to determine. Though the proposer of a scheme so unparalleled in anticipated benefits, might not himself have clearly seen his way through all its details, though, like many other mechanics on

a much humbler scale, he might be more skilful in erecting and guiding the machinery than in explaining the nice principles of its movements to the uninformed; it is not surely the man, but the scheme, that should have been considered: and without investigating and understanding, no opinion, even of the wisest, as to practicability, in either moral or physical science, is worthy of much regard. In general, it amounts to no more than this, “*I know not the means of accomplishing the proposed object: therefore, it cannot be accomplished.*” ’Tis a mere argument from ignorance.

A fond and childish notion, has been bandied about from lips to lips, even of the grave and learned, that, “nothing but some over-ruling, some super-human motive, some general bond of artificial connexion, ever has kept, or ever can keep, together, communities of equality by mutual co-operation or otherwise.” The short and conclusive exposure of this sophism, is this: This over-ruling motive, this general bond supplied by superstition or otherwise, can only produce its effect from an apprehended view of interest to be gratified here or hereafter. If the interest will bear examination and be real, no more is wanted; let it be universally applied; and it will in other more useful cases produce the effects of union, which it has already, for less useful purposes, produced. Explaining the real, physical or temporal, interest, in conjunction with the super-human, must add to its interest, and make it irresistible. If, on the contrary, the over-ruling motive, the general bond, be, after all, a delusion—how has it operated? Evidently from a *supposed* view of interest. Now if a supposed view of interest has led men to co-operate, why should not a real perception of real interest, produce the same result? Is there any magic power in delusion beyond what truth possesses? It is absurd to maintain that a supposed, but false view, of interest, will lead to more energetic action, *of the useful class*, than a true and real view of interest. It would be imputing the power of thought and motion to the shadow, instead of the rational agent that intercepted the light.

All the schemes of equality hitherto proposed, have been found, on examination and from experience, productive of preponderant evil. But they have all been founded on compulsion, or delusion, religious or otherwise. Those founded on compulsion, are mere schemes of tyranny: if otherwise useful, the restraint would neutralize all their pretended benefits. Those founded on delusion, are the mere expedients of knaves, with a slight mixture and by no means uncommon, of fanaticism, with their knavery, to gratify their love of power, gluttony, or wealth, at the expense of the dupes to whom their equality is

preached. These two species of equality rejected, it never occurred that there remained a third species, which had never yet been tried, the impracticability of which had never been demonstrated, the system¹ of *voluntary* equality, from a comprehensive view of the utility of mutual co-operation to increase individual comfort. No system of equality hitherto proposed, promised any more than a fair and equal division of the usual products of the ordinary industry of the associated members: none promised (because they did not know the means, they did not suspect the possibility of doing it) to increase those products, to an *ultimate* extent not to be defined, to an *immediate* extent of three or four times the average comforts of ordinary individual exertions. The blessings hitherto expected, but never attained, from the improper means, force or fraud, used to attain them, from systems of equality, were simply those proved in sections 3, 4, &c. of our first chapter as arising from the equal distribution of wealth, without increasing the whole mass to be distributed. By lopping off the excrescences of great wealth and abject poverty, all were to be placed in a moderate state of average comfort. By the new scheme of diffusing skill, economizing, uniting, and dividing labor, the lopping off of the excrescences of wealth and poverty, will not only produce this state of average comfort, but will quadruple this average state in its immediate operation, with indefinite hopes of still further increase.

Excelling as the system of voluntary equality does all previous systems in the magnitude of the objects to be gained, it does not less excel in the means by which the association is formed. Force and delusion, the vulgar means hitherto exclusively employed for every purpose, are altogether excluded from the new system. It is founded on the *individual interest* of every one of the co-operating members, as perceived and recognised by their understandings; not on extraneous motives, such as obedience to the wishes of dead men or other pretended invisible powers, the assumed mode of pleasing whom is mostly by privations and absurdities. The independence, the right of judgement, the security of every individual are scrupulously preserved. The very nature of all preceding systems of equality, rendered the employment of force or fraud necessary. The real object of the institutor, was always different from the apparent object of increasing the happiness of the co-operators: the institutors had always something to conceal, some pretended magnificent end of their own, some scheme of government, superstition, conquest, to promote which all the machinery of equality was set in motion. Here the object is one and simple: the institutor is

nothing: the first and last end in view, is to increase the happiness of the co-operators. With this object sincerely and solely in view, the means must be those of persuasion and security; and in order to be permanently useful, must be founded in truth.

Now is it wise to cast aside without examination a system like this, with objects and means so different from all previous systems of equality, on the general presumption of its incompatibility with human motives, or with the circumstances in which men are by nature placed, without taking the trouble to understand the combinations proposed? proposed too by a man who has in practice realized to a very considerable extent the benefits he promises, and whose whole solicitude is to invite an examination of his principles and practice?

We shall inquire then, first,

Is the system of voluntary equality impracticable from the known motives that influence human conduct?
next,

Is the system of voluntary equality impracticable from any of the physical circumstances by which men are surrounded?

“Whatever mode of conduct promotes the happiness of men, whatever it is their interest to follow; that mode of conduct, if otherwise practicable, they will pursue, without compulsion or delusion, as soon as their understandings are really convinced that it is their interest to pursue it: action necessarily follows this real persuasion, as long as it lasts, and in proportion to its intensity.” It is presumed that all reasonable men who have investigated this proposition, will assent to its truth, and therefore admit it as a basis of argument.

This proposition admitted, two conditions remain to be complied with before the system of voluntary equality of wealth, can be practised: first, it must have a real tendency to produce preponderant happiness—which has been already shown: next, the means must be found to demonstrate to the understandings of those called upon to engage in it, that it is their interest so to engage.

On the first of the above questions, as to the impracticability of voluntary equality from motives of human conduct, a most unwarrantable assumption is frequently made by the opponents of equality, and sometimes admitted by its unreflecting friends. It is said, “Self-interest, always has governed and always must govern all sentient beings: any system demanding a sacrifice of this main principle, however modified in its application to details, is not worthy of consideration; because, however great the advantages of such a system, there

are no means of acquiring them, self-interest being withdrawn. This principle withdrawn, nothing but force or fraud can prop up systems of equality; and equality can offer nothing to counterbalance the evils of these."

So far is this objection from being true, as applying to the proposed system of voluntary equality, that this system, whether the institutor admits or enlarges on it, or not, is founded altogether on that self-same self-interest which is assumed to be incompatible with it. The mistake seems to lie here. Self-interest, implies a general desire to promote our own individual well-being, without reference to any particular means. Selfishness implies a desire to promote by all *immediate* and *direct* means in our power our well-being, without calculating the effects of our conduct on the feelings and conduct of those whom it may affect, nor of course their reflex operation on ourselves. Selfishness is a short-sighted and ignorant pursuit of self-interest, and is necessarily hateful to those whose feelings it disregards. These two words, self-interest and selfishness, are frequently confounded and used the one for the other. The friend of voluntary equality, execrating selfishness, which is necessarily short-sighted and the most destructive foe of his system, is apt to abjure self-interest also, and thus to appear to act without rational motive, laying himself open to the ridicule of his antagonist. Self-interest, allied with ignorance, may be, and naturally is, developed in selfishness. But self-interest, allied with wisdom, may be, and is necessarily, developed in the cultivation of the muscular and mental powers, in sympathy, and beneficence. The selfish man is guided by self-interest: so is also he that is called the most disinterested. The object sought is the same, well-being, happiness; the greatest possible quantity of these. The difference is in the *means* by which that object is sought. The one seeks it by direct, short-sighted means, ignorantly disregarding the surrounding interests of other sentient beings; the other seeks it on an enlarged calculation, estimating the interests of all human beings within the sphere of its influence. The general pursuit of self-interest, is only in other words the general pursuit of happiness. The man who acts with the view of pleasing a supernatural being real or fictitious, does so for no other conceivable reason but that he apprehends evil or hopes for pleasure, either now or at some indefinite future period when this planetary system shall have been worn out, from that being. He is guided in his obedience, however extensive the field of his operations, however remote the advantages he may expect, by the very same general motive of self-interest, or desire of happiness, that guides the man who lives, eats and

sleeps like the cow, and never looks beyond the day in which he lives, neglecting to avail himself of those exquisite means of varied happiness, with which the active cultivation of his muscular and mental faculties would supply him. He, whose sole motive to action is hope or dread of remote future good or evil from any superhuman power, is not only guided by the same self-interest, but may be as *selfish* as the animal whose views extend not beyond the day. How so? Because the interests of their fellow-creatures *may* be equally (though, in general, in point of fact it is not so) discarded from the calculations of both. To the sensualist and the superstitious, the feelings, the interests, and the fate, of all human beings but themselves, may be perfectly indifferent, the one satisfied with eating his own meal, the other with saving his own soul, because no necessary connexion may be traced by either of them between the happiness (the interest) of those amongst whom he lives and his own happiness: they may be both equally selfish, even equally maleficent. Though the strength of mind that can look forward and appreciate distant enjoyments and weigh them against the present, may be able also to calculate the interests of others as affected by its proceedings, it does not follow that it will always do so. Wherever it does not, though long-sighted, it is still selfish and comparatively ignorant. But, he who associates with others, for mutual enjoyment, through mutual co-operation, cannot be selfish. With him there is a necessary connexion between his happiness and that of all those with whom he associates. In him are conspicuous the two requisites, separating enlightened self-interest from selfishness. While on the one hand, all distant sources of happiness, ever so remote, are taken into his calculation, on the other, he calculates the effects of all his actions on all sentient beings around him, and their reflex operation. Without this extent of view in this double direction, he cannot advance a step. Selfishness he must cast off at the beginning of his career, and never again embrace. By self-interest, enlightened and benevolent, because it promotes his happiness that it should be so, he will be always governed.

The general principle thus cleared, the universal motive to all human action thus plainly put forward, without pretension, and without disguise; let us see what are the particular modifications of this principle, which are said to be necessary to human exertion, and which are at the same time said to be excluded by the system of voluntary equality.

When we take a survey of human actions, important and unimportant, those of the child just beginning its voluntary

actions, and of those of the reasonable man, we cannot but distinguish two great classes of motives, one or the other, or both of which, must be always present as the predisposing cause of every action. First, if a child suffer its body to over-hang so far from the centre that the power of the muscles shall not be sufficient to counteract the force of gravity, it falls, and probably receives pain. If a man tell a falsehood or betray a trust to any one on one occasion, it is almost certain that he will lose the advantage of being believed or trusted by the same person, very probably not by others, on subsequent occasions. In these two cases of the child and the man, there are certain consequences, the falling, and the loss of confidence, which, from their own natural organization and that of surrounding objects, sentient or not sentient, necessarily follow, without any effort of theirs or others, the doing of the acts. These consequences follow, as cause and effect, according to what we call the laws of nature, physical and mental. The contemplation of the probability of these natural consequences, operates on the mind of the child and the man respectively, and influences them not to repeat such actions, lest similar unpleasant natural consequences should be experienced from them. This influencing contemplation, forms the *motive*; and when it is directed to consequences like these, flowing directly from the acts themselves, without any interference from without, we call it the *natural* motive to action.

On the other hand, suppose that any person, parent or not, has seen the child fall, and, according to the modifications of its ignorance, beats the child or beats the object on which the child may have fallen, diverting the attention of the child from the instructive natural circumstances attending the fall, to these arbitrary beatings, exhibiting or engendering cruelty, cowardice, revenge, and imprudence. In like manner, suppose that some one overhears the falsehood or the breach of trust, and in consequence thereof, from an indignation which he may amuse himself by calling holy or moral, cuts the finger or the cheek of the offender; here also is a consequence, out of the natural course of things, following the falsehood or the breach of trust. Also, a person likely to profit by the falsehood or the breach of trust, might give a reward of any sort to the person committing either of them—another accidental consequence arising out of the transaction, and no more necessarily connected with it than the cutting. Yet the apprehension to the child of the beating of itself, or its gratification at the sympathy manifested by the revengeful beating of the object on which it fell, the apprehension to the man of the

cutting or his gratification by the reward, though only fortuitous circumstances, might operate on the mind of the child or the man respectively, to cause a repetition or a discontinuance of the actions in question, and thus operate as *motives* to their future conduct. Now, to all such motives, to all motives whatever, not necessarily following from the actions themselves, but imposed from without, we apply the term *factitious*.

Here then we have two great classes of motives to human conduct, *natural* motives and *factitious* motives; both of them operating sometimes by pain, sometimes by pleasure, sometimes in the shape of reward, sometimes in the shape of punishment. Both of these classes of motives may be dependent equally on every variety of pain and pleasure: they may be both of them immediate or remote in their operation: many other qualities we shall find they possess in common.

What is the reason that one action is called good, and another evil or bad? Because the one is productive of preponderant good immediate or consequential, that is to say, of a clear balance of pleasures over pains to those sentient rational beings, the agent or others as the case may be, whom it affects: while the other is called evil, simply because it is productive of preponderant mischief, immediate or consequential, or a clear balance of pains over pleasures to those whom it may affect. But, it must be observed, that morally speaking and independent of all existing institutions and restraints, the pains and pleasures taken into calculation in estimating the value of an action, are confined to those of the natural class, to the exclusion of those which are artificial or factitious. If, then, it may be asked, the only intelligible reason that can be given why one action is bad and another good, is that the one produces a balance of natural pains and the other a balance of natural pleasures, why add to the evil, the pains, of the evil action, any additional evil in the way of punishment, over and above what nature (physical organization and surrounding circumstances) have attached to it? why add to the good, the pleasures, of the good action, any additional factitious good in the way of reward, over and above what nature has attached to it? Is it not preposterous in the one case to increase the evil which we affect to deplore, by adding gratuitous evil? and in the other case is it not preposterous to add artificially to the pleasures, thus holding out fallacious inducements, which experience will not make good, to the practice of the particular action? What other effect can these factitious rewards and punishments produce, than to divert the mind of the agent from the contemplation of the

natural consequences of his actions, the real tests of their value, to the contemplation of arbitrary lots of pleasure and pain which caprice may attach to these actions, and may at its pleasure vary?

From this first showing it would appear, that *if the object sought for, were simply the happiness of the agents*, nothing could be more preposterous than the addition of factitious rewards and punishments to those consequences of the actions themselves which nature has attached to them. Where these consequences, these natural rewards and punishments, were not known to the agents, it would appear to be the sole duty of the really benevolent, to bring forward these consequences to their contemplation, that they might serve as motives to regulate their conduct on future occasions. It being the interest of the agents to see the real consequences of their actions, and to pursue or avoid them exactly in proportion to the preponderant good or evil to be expected from them, and knowledge being thus afforded them, what more can usefully be done for their guidance?

But the fact is, that the object hitherto sought by both moralists and legislators—to say nothing of political economists—has *not* been the interest or happiness of the agents, but the support of whatever system or set of institutions, wise or foolish, they may have deemed it fit or convenient to support. To support these as a primary object, it has been unavoidably found necessary to sacrifice individual interest as often as it interfered with them. But individual interest would not be voluntarily relinquished, actions ever so injurious to the system or institutions, would continue to be performed or avoided according to the preponderant natural good or evil to be expected from them, and according to the degree of knowledge possessed by the calculating agents. What is to be done then to supersede the inducements of these natural motives? and to lead men to resign their real natural interest in favor of this new interest sought to be promoted? To a man who had fairly observed the consequences of his actions, natural motives would dictate that the speaking of the truth on all occasions was his most obvious interest: but political institutions, intercepting as we have seen by various expedients the products of his labor without his consent obtained, or, restraining the free and useful direction of his faculties mental or muscular, subvert this course of natural interests, and hold out energetic motives, the saving of his property from the grasp of violence, to the protection, by falsehood or any other means, of the property sought to be snatched from him. Hence arises an obvious necessity for the introduction of fac-

factitious motives. Natural motives will lead an individual to speak truth, as long as a preponderance of good to all affected by the words, requires it; and no longer. But political power requires truth to be spoken for its own purposes, not for the interest of the speaker, after these natural motives have ceased to operate. Thus man's interest is placed in opposition to his duty; arbitrarily so placed by political power for its own real or supposed benefit. The imparting of knowledge in this case would do mischief to the views of political power: it would not lead man into the line of conduct pointed out by political power, the surrender of his earnings or of the direction of his faculties—but would more clearly show him how much opposed it was to his real interest to surrender them. Knowledge being the enemy of these usurpations, natural motives opposed to them, where were motives to be sought for, to enforce a compliance with them? Where but in the factitious class? where but amongst factitious rewards and punishments, chiefly amongst punishments, rewards being in their nature so very limited? where but in the application or threat of force or delusion? Thus, as soon as the rules of beneficence and justice are violated, factitious motives, factitious rewards and punishments, become necessary to sway human conduct, as a substitute for reason.

Now when Mr. Owen says that *rewards and punishments are not necessary* to influence either children or adults to the uniform practice of moral conduct, or that species of conduct which will produce the greatest sum of happiness to themselves and their associates; he alludes solely to *factitious* rewards and punishments, as opposed to the *natural*. Instead of rejecting the aid of natural rewards and punishments, he relies on them altogether as entirely adequate to his purpose. But then, in order to render them operative, he removes, by voluntary agreement, from the co-operating community, all those mutual attacks and restraints—save the plunder of political power—which counteract, in ordinary life, the operation of these natural motives. He shows men how to place themselves in such circumstances, that their interest shall be always in union with their duty, that if they act wrong it must be through ignorance, and that it shall be always the interest of every one around them to enlighten this ignorance.

The pretext put forward for the present universal employment of factitious rewards and punishments, is the remoteness of many of the natural consequences of actions, the absolute ignorance of the great majority of mankind of the existence of any such consequences, and their incapacity, from want of acquired habits of self-controul, to resist the temp-

tations of immediate pleasure in favor of such remote consequences, even if perceived.

The present besotted ignorance of the great majority of human beings, and their lamentable want of self-controul, forming together so large a portion of their character, arise altogether from the circumstances in which they have been placed, that is to say, from more or less of the various expedients of insecurity to which they have been subjected. Were these circumstances—the factitious work of insecurity—changed, knowledge and self-controul would succeed to ignorance and passion, and the remote consequences of actions would be estimated as well as the immediate, their value however always decreasing in proportion to their remoteness, from the uncertainty of eventual possession which remoteness includes.

All *factitious* rewards and punishments then, all factitious motives, Mr. Owen would wisely counsel to be removed from the associations of voluntary equality or mutual co-operation. Let us take a glance at the factitious motives thus discarded, that we may estimate the sacrifice which, in ordinary estimation, is thus made of the power of influencing human conduct. Factitious motives, as influencing either by pleasure or by pain, or the apprehension of them, whether applied to the young or to the adult, are either rewards or punishments. In the training of the young, factitious rewards are frequently used as well as punishments: in the management of adults, punishments are almost exclusively employed. Factitious punishments are,

First, the employment of compulsion or restraint, either direct, or to be eventually enforced by the application of *physical pain* of any sort, or its immediate infliction; not necessarily consequential on the action itself.

Second, the employment of *terror* of physical or mental evils, here or hereafter, either not the necessary consequences of the actions themselves, or exaggerated misrepresentations of these consequences.

Third, the *arbitrary addition* to the natural evils, mental or physical, of an evil act, of other portions of evil (such as shame, pain, &c.,) of the same sort with that naturally arising therefrom.

Factitious rewards may in the same way be classed under the three heads of, immediate arbitrary pleasures attached to certain acts, promises delusive or sincere of future pleasures other than those flowing from the acts themselves, and arbitrary addition of pleasures of the same sort to those of the acts themselves.

In the above baneful list will be found included almost all considerations that have been made use of not only by politicians, but by moralists also, to deter men from crime and vice. Legislators, of necessity, made use of no other but these factitious motives to influence human conduct; for if the natural motives were sufficient to lead to the practice of the conduct desired, there would be no need of legislative interference. But moralists also, treading in the footsteps of legislators, not having traced and not knowing how to point out, the real consequences of actions, that being presented to the mind they might operate as natural rewards and punishments, have almost uniformly availed themselves of some of these factitious rewards or punishments to induce that mode of moral conduct, the natural motives to which had been either removed or counteracted by unwise institutions, or which, though they existed, the pretended moral philosopher knew not how to discover. Many motives concurred to encourage moralists in this strange course: ignorance of the real consequences of actions and of the artificial obstructions to the development of them, love of indolence saving the labor of inquiry, love of power wielding at will these factitious rewards and punishments, particularly terror and shame, and love of self-preservation avoiding those frowns of political power which would be incurred by opposing its sanctions.

Thus then have the rewards and punishments which the unerring laws of nature attach to virtuous or to vicious conduct, in the preponderant good or evil produced by such actions when pursued through all their consequences, been almost entirely disregarded, and every species of arbitrary reward and punishment, which caprice could dream of, has been substituted in their stead. To such an egregious and melancholy excess has this system been carried, that the real nature of virtue and vice has become so utterly lost sight of, that vice and pleasure, and virtue and suffering and privation have been represented by gloomy fanatics, under the name of moralists, as almost synonymous terms.

Not such is the philosophy of Mr. Owen or of reason. He sees that, when the restraints of insecurity are removed, or evaded, (where it is in the power of associations of men to evade them,) when men are surrounded by circumstances permitting the development of the natural consequences of actions; the rewards and punishments physical and mental, which nature attaches to them, are the only and the sufficient motives which wisdom will use to influence human conduct. These motives, once in operation, are permanent as our organization. They act with force exactly proportioned to the

preponderant good or evil to be produced by the voluntary actions to be shunned or avoided. According to the degree of knowledge and power of self-controul possessed by each individual, will these motives influence him to good, or to his own real, greatest, happiness. The power of self-controul is a necessary consequence of a sincere conviction of the real though remote consequences of actions; and this knowledge of consequences and this habit of resigning immediate present for greater future good, will be both acquired, just as habits of sloth and intemperance are now acquired, by the operation of the new circumstances, education and early training included, with which the new associations will find it their interest to surround themselves.

Neither time nor space is here allowed, to examine and point out in detail the *pernicious* tendency of the use of the several species of factitious rewards and punishments. That would belong to an introduction, or first principles, of a treatise on education. Enough here to show that they are *unnecessary*; which will be done when the natural motives are put forward and shown to be abundantly sufficient for the production of virtuous conduct, saving thereby the superfluous waste of human suffering incurred by factitious punishments, and the misapplication of the matter of wealth or other enjoyment incurred by the use of factitious rewards. Let those however, who doubt the possibility of dispensing with factitious rewards and punishments, even in the interior concerns of a voluntarily associated community, bear in mind that these associations are still liable to all the laws of the land in which they live, just as any ordinary member of society is liable to them. At the requisition of any member of the association or of any individual from without, the laws of the country may be at any time appealed to against him who does any act which is by such laws visited with factitious punishment. No member certainly can appeal to the laws against a member without violating his engagement of mutual co-operation, implying mutual kindness. Still—all contests about property being removed, and with them almost all sources of ill-will—admit that injurious language or violence takes place, the member injured has the *power* of appealing to the law: and this power, in case of the ascertained inefficiency of natural motives, and public opinion one of the most efficient of these motives, is quite sufficient to guaranty the most timid against the danger of trusting to natural motives, by whatever new combination of circumstances put into motion, for the maintenance of virtuous conduct. The associated community itself, could not institute factitious punishments for adults, other than those of

the general laws of the land, except voluntarily incurred by every individual offender. These communities, then, by bringing into active operation the natural motives to intelligence and beneficence, do not take away from the aggregate of motives to useful conduct, but increase them by an immense power hitherto neglected or opposed.

One thing is certain, that hitherto factitious rewards have been used in all ages, and particularly factitious punishments in every shape of horror, towards the young in education, and towards adults by the laws; and vice and crime seem to have thriven under their sway. They have signally failed in producing virtuous conduct. The combinations of voluntary equality, removing almost all the temptations to vice and crime engendered by the vicious institutions of insecurity; it is conceived that factitious motives will, under these new circumstances, be quite superfluous. At all events, these motives having hitherto failed, is not another course worth the trial? What then are the natural motives, the natural rewards and punishments, to operate on the young and on adults, to produce virtuous conduct amongst all the members of the association under their new circumstances? Natural punishments are,

First, the immediate evil or pain caused by the act itself to the agent or to others, when unattended by any consequences.

Second, the aggravated evil of the act when followed by other evils, or the preponderant evil when followed by partial good or pleasure to the agent or others.

In the same way those natural pleasurable motives, called natural rewards, are either the immediate good or pleasure, or the consequential good or pleasure to be derived from an action.

So simple appear the materials, natural pains or pleasures, immediate or consequential, from which must be fabricated the motives for the practice of every virtue, for the avoidance of every vice, under the proposed arrangements of mutual co-operation and joint possession and enjoyment! But we must analyse these masses, and see the potency of every separate ingredient of which they are composed.

Children for the most part must be induced to act from motives of immediate pleasure or pain; youths and adults, according to the improvement of their understandings, from the preponderant good or evil of their actions, weighing all their consequences, immediate and remote, on themselves and others. All motives of the first class, leading to actions attended with immediate pain or pleasure and not followed by any consequences good or evil to the agent or others, are to

be obeyed in proportion to the magnitude of the pains or pleasures attached to them, and for a stronger reason where the ultimate are of the same nature, whether good or evil, with the immediate, consequences. Where the consequences are both in good and in evil, to the agent and to others, *there* is the demand for wisdom, in determining the conduct which it is most the interest of the agent to pursue.

The pains and pleasures, the natural rewards and punishments, attached to actions, whether immediate or consequential, are,

All the pleasures and pains of the senses and appetites, internal and external.

All the pleasures and pains arising from the active use or neglect of the muscular system.

All the pleasures and pains arising from the active use or neglect of the intellectual faculties.

All the pleasures and pains of a purely social nature, arising from our intercourse with our fellow-creatures, those of sympathy and beneficence, and of antipathy and maleficence.

There are none of these pains or pleasures which are not necessarily connected with some of our voluntary actions, sometimes immediate, instantaneous, in their development, sometimes remote. Many also of the different sorts of pleasures or of pains may be attached to the same action: even pains and pleasures of many sorts may at the same time attach to the same action. It is in these cases that moral calculation is so requisite and so difficult: first to find out the real, though remote and ramified, consequences of actions, next to weigh the different lots of pleasures and pains, and by the preponderant good or evil to estimate the value of the action.

The perfection of moral conduct on the part of the individual, is so to regulate his voluntary actions as to obtain through the whole of his existence the greatest sum of happiness, or preponderance of pleasures over pains, from all these sources. To effect this, it is necessary, when living in society, that he should consider himself as one unit and no more, as to claims for happiness, amongst those, whatever may be their number, with whom he is connected.

The pleasures and pains of the first class, those of feeling, taste, sight, &c., of hunger and thirst, of the sexual appetite, and of the healthy or obstructed (diseased) action of all the internal viscera and organs, are familiar to every one; and are known to be frequently connected with our voluntary actions, forming the motives, the natural rewards or punishments, to their pursuit or avoidance. But when these plea-

asures and pains are remote, not immediate, consequences, they are apt to be overlooked like all other remote objects. So with the second set of pleasures and pains, those from muscular exertion or from muscular inactivity, they are more operative on the young than on adults, but are familiar to all. The third the intellectual, and the fourth the social, pleasures and pains, are more operative on adults than on the young, in proportion to extent of knowledge and accuracy of judgement: though, under a judicious mode of instruction, the extent to which even these may be made to operate on the young, has been contemplated but by few.

The pleasures and pains of the second class arising from muscular exertion, are not so palpable, and have not attracted so much attention as those of the first, the internal and external senses and appetites. The vicious institutions of insecurity, have altogether perverted the perception and judgement as to their importance and real operation. It is muscular exertion, that supports all the pleasures of the first class: it is necessary to their existence; without its continuance they must cease. The neglect of muscular exertion, whether by way of exercise or necessary employment, does more than this: it induces positive pain: it withholds that necessary stimulus to the motions of the internal viscera and organs, which are necessary to their healthful action, and renders the animal frame susceptible of derangement from the slightest external, atmospheric, or other changes. The neglect of muscular exertion, even where food and all other circumstances are favorable to health, lays the foundation for diseases which, almost always, at the same time, torment and shorten life. The positive, immediate, and direct advantages of gentle muscular exertion, are, that it increases the circulation, induces heat and a pleasurable glow through the frame, strengthens the muscles used, and fills up time with occupation, and therefore with pleasing emotion, the pleasure of which is always increased by the degree of interest which the mind takes in the pursuit. A human being without muscular exertion and not excited by mental activity, falls into a state of listlessness, in which life loses all value, and from which sleep and intoxication are eagerly sought as means of relief. The calls of the senses necessitate, to be sure, *some* muscular exertion: but these are soon gratified, generally over-stimulated, and by no means of the kind requisite for the production of health. There remain, the long unoccupied hours of the day, demanding action or engendering wretchedness.

Under the existing institutions of insecurity, the great masses of mankind are every where compelled, from the necessity of existence, to unrequited, unremitted muscular exertions, in the way of labor, for the benefit of a few whom chance (or minute inappreciable circumstances) has invested with political power or the possession of the land, materials, and instruments, with and upon which, these human beings labor. The muscular exertion to which they are doomed, goes far beyond that necessary to health, from its intensity, continuance, or injurious physical accompaniments. Labor, muscular exertion, pain, and privation, are thus associated together. The association extends through all classes, the idle as well as the laborious, and *inevitably* extends, because it is the result of real, though pernicious, circumstances. The great object of the desire of human life, is, to get up out of, and to remain for ever as far as possible removed from, these unhappy masses of toiling want. To possess the means of living without working, "to be idle, is to be happy." This wretched dogma becomes as current as any of its twin dogmas (twin in pernicious tendency) of superstition. A sort of disgrace, of dishonor, becomes attached to manual labor, to muscular exertion. The moral sanction, the public opinion of mankind, thus perverted, renders impossible to minds under its influence, a just estimate of the advantages of muscular exertion: all but that under the denomination of exercise, is prescribed under dread of the imputation of poverty and all its attendant horrors. No wonder therefore that the pleasures of muscular exertion and the pains arising from neglect of it, are at present almost unknown and unappreciated. It is hoped however that those who have had the exertion to toil through this inquiry, are able to perceive them and understand their importance.

The pleasures and pains, the natural rewards and punishments, of the third class, those arising from the active use or neglect of the intellectual faculties, are perhaps rather more justly estimated by the idle, than the preceding. As the exertions of the intellectual faculties, are scarcely ever—except in the horrible practices of schools—compulsatory, as they are gentle in their nature, little susceptible of being overstrained, and very little shared in by the productive classes, the associations of idleness are not so commonly or so strongly formed against their cultivation. Were all force and terror utterly removed from early education, and the culture of the mind rendered, as it well might be, agreeable to the young, associations of delight would lead the educated, when mature

and idle, to replace, by the exercise of the mental faculties, that loss of occupation, to which the prejudices of their caste, condemn them in the proscription of useful muscular exertion. But it is not so: the mode of their education and the repulsive uselessness of the things taught, make them, for the most part, haters of intellectual pursuits during their lives. Sensuality and the baubles of vain distinction, engross all their stunted wishes.

The pleasures of the third class, those arising from the exercise of the intellectual faculties, are, first, those of perception (when the pursuit does not rest with the mere perception); second, those of memory; third, those of the judgment; fourth, those of volition (or self-direction or regulation); and, fifth, the combinations of all or any of these, and consequent to which, is the contemplation of all the other pleasures of other classes as well as the avoidance of evils, brought within our grasp by the increased knowledge derived from this intellectual exertion. The pains arising from the neglect of the intellectual faculties, are that tedium of time, increasing even to disgust of life, which attends intellectual when accompanied, as it mostly is, with muscular inaction. The gratuitous loss of the pleasures of mental excitement, with all its consequential losses, will not of course be forgotten: though a mere negative evil, it often constitutes the sole difference between a life overflowing with happiness, in which every day seems too short for the ever-springing and interesting, though gentle, emotions of thought, and a life joyless and monotonous as that of an oyster.

The pleasures and pains of the fourth class, the social rewards and punishments, arising from the opinions and actions of others on us and of ours on them, exemplifying sympathy and beneficence, or antipathy and maleficence, are of about equal importance perhaps with all the others conjoined. There lives not a human being of sound mind, with other beings constituted like himself, who can withdraw himself, almost for a moment, from the influence of social feelings. However acquired the habit—it cannot here be explained—it universally and necessarily exists, of holding a great portion of our happiness dependent on the opinions, the dispositions, of others towards us, even though attended with no active display of kindness or unkindness. Who, though all his other wants were abundantly gratified, though abundantly secured against any injurious manifestation of displeasure, could live happily, could live without misery, in a community, where all his opinions, though ever so true and useful, were by all around him held in horror? where on every countenance he met, he

read disapprobation, where his presence stopt the effusions of joy, where no common chord of sympathy was left by which kindred feelings might be made to vibrate simultaneously through his and surrounding minds? and where no kindly breast was left to him to which he could retire and on which he could repose, mingling a communion of compassion and grief at the world's injustice? Where is the strength of mind, though joined with ever such prodigality of benevolence, that could support itself under such circumstances? The more benevolent, the more accustomed has he been to feed upon, the more necessary to his existence is, the manifestation of surrounding happiness; the less is he able to be happy without the accustomed excitement of sympathetic feeling. In vain will his wounded mind vent itself in compassion: in that very feeling is included regret, pain at the perception of the defect, though accompanied with a wish ever so earnest to remove it. Compassion for others' wants or errors, cannot fill up the void, which the absence of kindred emotions causes within him. Deprived of these feelings, life is reduced to that of the wolf or other wild beast in the midst of civilization, who risks the seizing of his prey when urged by appetite, and devours it in watchful and greedy terror of its loss. Did not nature (or our organization) lay the basis of such feelings in the first maternal smile, giving and receiving pleasure in the abstraction of milk from the distended breast, nourishing them by daily and hourly offices of indispensable kindness; *he* would have been one of the greatest benefactors to his race, who had by any artificial means introduced a source of new pleasures, so cheap and so prolific!

The uncontrollable tendency developed within us all, to participate in the feelings of others, and the necessary wish, for our own sakes, that these feelings should be pleasurable, that ours tinged by them may be pleasurable also, is a principle of such paramount efficacy in the regulation of human conduct, that it may well be wondered at that it should have been so little employed, and that force, terror, and delusion, should have been so universally substituted for it. But the object of the directors of human conduct, not being to guide it to the happiness of the agents, but of themselves, the sympathy of those whose interest was neglected, was no longer in their power: the force of public opinion, the expression of this feeling, was no longer with them: it was necessarily arrayed in opposition to them, and factitious motives were therefore resorted to in defect of the outraged natural motives. The operation of the institutions of insecurity, ceasing, or being evaded, under the system of voluntary equality, the natural

motives of sympathy, benevolence and public opinion, resume their empire. Not an action in society, would be performed without reference to this principle. Even those acts the most personal and individual, would be indulged in or avoided, would be entirely regulated by its controul. Not that it would usurp the place of reason, but that itself formed on the best reason of the community, it would superadd the convincing of the judgement to the associations of sympathy.

The pleasures of sympathy and benevolence are, if possible, cheaper and more abundant than those arising from the exercise of the intellectual faculties. They are within the reach of all, and of every degree of intellectual power. With the perfection of reason, the development of the remotest consequences of actions, their highest rewards are wound up: but to all they offer a field—indefinite in point of extent, and in point of intensity dependent on their peculiar organization and culture,—for the acquisition of new sources of happiness, demanding no other price or effort than the disposition to enjoy them.

To these four sources of natural pleasures and pains, the rewards and punishments which nature, or our own organization and the constitution of things around us, has attached to our actions, may perhaps be added a fifth, which is the combination of any two or more of these, forming what may be called, in reference to these, *compounded* motives, or rewards and punishments. It is in this state of combination however that they mostly present themselves; social motives more particularly attaching themselves to all the other classes, either adding to their intensity or counteracting their influence. By the combination of these, and the operation of the mind upon them, are produced what are called the passions, hope, joy, hate, revenge, jealousy, avarice, ambition or love of power, emulation, and such like. It is useful constantly to analyse these, and to present their component parts as motives to the mind, rather than their collected masses. Love of power, emulation, hatred, revenge, should never be proposed as motives to action, or their gratification as matter of reward, because they are vague and indistinct, are necessarily accompanied with an excess of feeling blinding the judgement, imply for the most part a pleasure in the inferiority or pain of others, and are otherwise attended with preponderant mischief.

From these several sources of pleasures and pains is derived an abundant supply of natural rewards and punishments, not to be distributed at the arbitrary pleasure of the instructor, but to be studied by him that he may be able to present them readily on all proper occasions to the mind, as the effects which will inevitably follow the pursuing certain lines of conduct,

those attended with preponderant mischief being denominated vices in consequence of the natural pains or punishments that attend them, and those attended with preponderant good being denominated virtues in consequence of the natural pleasures or rewards in their train. These pleasures and pains in fact include all, of which man's nature is susceptible. As to number and efficiency, then, there is no want: the want is simply that of intellectual power to trace their connexions with our voluntary actions.

It may be necessary here to obviate an objection,—“How are children or ordinary men to be able to follow the analysis of the motives by which they are governed? if such previous investigations be necessary to make them virtuous, they never will be so.” It is by no means necessary that those even, whose lives have been governed by certain compounded or simple motives, should be aware of these motives, much less that they should be able to analyse the whole of the operations of their minds. Was not the blood propelled by the heart to nourish every part of the human body, before the circulation of the blood was discovered? As the blood circulates, so do motives operate on the individual: he feels the agency, he obeys the impulse and performs the actions, but is no more bound to develop those motives, than to explain the circulation of the blood under pain of ceasing to derive benefit from it. The blood circulates, the motives operate; and both might circulate and operate eternally without sufficient intellectual power in the agent so operated upon, to look into himself and develop the animal machinery, physical and mental, employed. From the progress of knowledge in these communities, there can be no doubt that their members would speedily comprehend the whole system and motives by which their social organization was upheld: more particularly would the children, educated under this system to truth and real facts, become conversant with their intellectual organization, as well as with all other branches of useful knowledge.

Such being the fund of natural rewards and punishments, where are to be found the species of actions of children or men, which these unaided consequences of their very actions, are not sufficient to controul?

Any pursuit, injurious to health from its continuance, intensity, or accompaniments, or, though not injurious to health, so offensive to any of the senses as to outweigh the benefit to be derived to the individual from it (including in the individual's interest his contemplation of the social benefit such action may produce), these natural rewards and punishments would not cause to be undertaken. All such actions or labor,

therefore, now carried on to the waste of human life, or the annoyance of the operators, for the profit of capitalists or the luxurious convenience, the supposed happiness, of a few of the wealthy of society, would of course cease; these motives being inadequate to impel to their performance. Wherefore should such actions be continued? If not attended with preponderant mischief, with a diminution of the sum total of happiness, these motives are sufficient to cause them to be done. If attended with preponderant mischief, 'tis folly to continue them.

Now indeed, under the institutions of insecurity, unremitting, disagreeable, and unrequited toil, is exacted from the productive classes. Such is the arrangement of things, that, under the stern necessity of existence, such species of labor must be performed by those whose lot has thrown them, poor and ignorant, into those spots where such operations are conducted. Young women too, the finest in form and natural capabilities, must now surrender their lot in life for an average existence of six years (the average duration of the life of prostitutes in London) of feverish excitement, alternating with disease and privations, to keep up the supply of victims level to the demand of the heartless sensuality of excessive wealth. Want, necessity, now compel these things. In the associated communities, no young woman could be compelled, by the double motive of dread of want and aspirations for the chances of vain baubles of superfluous wealth, to surrender the realities of a happy existence every day enjoyed, the average duration of which, beyond maturity, may be estimated at forty years, for such a pittance of degraded and wretched existence. The trade of prostitution would cease. Though lead or sulphuric acid should be raised in price or should cease to be produced, these communities would rather forgo their uses than raise or elaborate them at the expense of preponderant mischief; natural rewards and punishments ceasing to operate at this point. The production of these or any other articles, must be rendered compatible not only with health, but even with comfort, by mechanical or chemical contrivances, or by shortening or alternating the period of individual occupation about them, or by some other means, before their production can be ensured through the operation of natural rewards and punishments. Now there is certainly no difficulty of getting such things done: factitious rewards and punishments, engendered directly or indirectly by the institutions of insecurity, compel them, as the arm of the steam-engine throws back and spurns the waters. The advantage then, such as it is, and to those who esteem it an

advantage, of the continuance of such operations, is freely conceded to systems of insecurity. With the system of natural rewards and punishments, they are admitted to be incompatible.

All these pernicious or excessive modes of exertion thus cleared away, what remains? That species of exertion alone, which being compatible with health, comfort, and even pleasure, is moreover necessary to all of these. Without compulsion or delusion, men will not exert themselves beyond this point. Natural motives of self-interest, natural rewards and punishments, will ensure this salutary degree of exertion.

What are the natural rewards and punishments within the power of a community of voluntary co-operation, to bestow, in order to excite and keep constantly in action such moderate exertion? They are nothing more than such of the pleasures and the pains of some one or more of the four classes, of the senses, muscular, intellectual, or social, before mentioned, as necessarily follow the yielding or the withholding of such exertion. Are comfortable dwellings in pleasant situations, is a regular supply of grateful food, are neat and useful articles of clothing, objects of desire and motives to exertion amongst men? If so, four times the quantity or goodness of these means of procuring pleasure or avoiding pain or discomfort, would the members of these communities enjoy, that the same labor would procure them by individual isolated exertion and consumption. Are alternate, gentle, muscular exertions and repose, necessary to preserve the health and energy of the system, the capacity for all enjoyment, and to fill up with an occupation and a source of interest the otherwise blank and heavy hours of existence? Just such exertions, and no more, as will be attended with these natural rewards, do these communities require from their members. Are the pleasures of the interchange of ideas, of hearing, judging, and communicating thought, so great even to the lowly in intellect, as to add considerably to the happiness of life, particularly when time so devoted is withdrawn from what would otherwise be spent in excessive or unhealthful occupations? If so—then are such pleasures, with opportunity of improvement by books or lectures to any extent, to be added, as additional natural rewards, to stimulate and repay the moderate exertions of the members of such communities. Above all, are social pleasures of any avail in throwing rapture over the otherwise almost insipidities of sense, of muscular exertion, even of intellect? the sympathies of respect and attachment between equals, between the two sexes (also equal in rights, duties, and enjoyments, and therefore yielding to each other, plea-

sures a thousand times increased), between childhood and youth and the old, between man and all his associated fellow-creatures around him? If so, then would the *common interest* of these communities superadd such social motives to individual exertion as not only do not exist in ordinary society, but as are altogether banished therefrom by the rivalships, jealousies, and hatreds of ordinary competition; deterred only from force or fraud by the real apprehension of legal punishment, by the idle and distant threatenings of interested superstition. On what basis must be laid the superstructure of these so cheap, now so rarely enjoyed, pleasures of sympathy? In the previous abundant gratification of every reasonable physical want. Till a sentient being is happy and satisfied within itself, it cannot look out of itself for objects to partake with it, and over which it may diffuse the overflowings of its happiness. Physical wants are so urgent, that they cannot be bribed or deluded: they must be gratified, under pain of the engendering of selfishness, if not of maleficence. Wherever, as in these associated communities, all natural wants are abundantly gratified, without the possibility of over-excitement, there, is the fittest soil for the social affections. Wherever contending interests are removed, and all temptations to mutual annoyance and fraud are withdrawn, there of necessity, where *nothing is to be got* by mutual tormenting, will sources of occupation and emotion be sought for by mutual kindness and assistance. Not a smile will remain unproductive on the lips of the happy: from every eye it will be reflected, through every mind will it vibrate, propagating itself like the moved air when thought is borne upon its bosom. Here, every one is directly interested in the moral habits and in the industrious conduct of every one. Here, public opinion will have all the gentle, the pervading, the useful influence, without any of the tyrannical controul, of the most pure domestic circle. Here, every one will read in the countenance of every one, the value of his exertions for the happiness of all: this gentle approbation of surrounding friends, will become every day, more and more, an accustomed, a necessary solace of existence: to be bereft of it will be like the withdrawing of the solar heat from the animal economy: a principle of action, one of the springs of activity, will be felt to be withdrawn, and exertion will be redoubled or its direction changed, to re-acquire its vivifying influence. When our reason tells us that this public opinion is rightly directed, it is impossible to escape its controul—as well may we expose the nerve to the passage of the electric fluid, and expect to escape its peculiar sensation. It is impossible to conceive a state of

social existence, in which the principle of sympathy, the force of public opinion, can be so energetic, because no where can the interest calling for its development be so universal. No where also have opportunities ever existed so constantly recurring, for its expression. Times of labor, of meals, of recreation, of social, literary, or scientific, meeting, every day, almost every hour of the day, afford these occasions. Even in the very private apartment, the air breathes the public sentiment, conveyed to it by the increased impetus of the system from the reflecting mind. Where, out, can a member walk or move, that this all-pervading sympathy with his actions, is not likely to meet and to surround him? How even in thought can he escape from it? But, wherefore should he wish to escape from it? Can this sympathy be unjustly directed? Can it be morose or severe? Can it be such as a well-regulated mind, would not rejoice to share and to obey? No actions but such as are really injurious to the community, will they take the trouble of disapproving: but in this intimate connexion of interests, there is scarcely a private vice, really injurious to the individual, by which the public interest is not affected. Is the health of any individual impaired by any species of intemperance, by neglect, by the effect of any ill-regulated passion? His aid in production, in instruction, in healing, in superintending or distributing, is lost, in whole or in part, to the society. Every one suffers by his loss of health: every one is interested in his recovery of health. Here private interest and public interest, here private virtue and public virtue, both as to the individual and the community, are one and the same: here interest and duty are united. Every one will sympathize with the pain, and be anxious to remove it: every one will reprove the error. But every one knowing the force of circumstances and his own liability to err, will endeavour to soothe, instruct, and amend, not to add to the mental or physical pangs of the erring. Amongst such friends, to have erred, will but excite, when the error is removed—and by such means it must be removed—remembrances of kindness, assistance, and persuasive truth, not shame and apprehension: it will enlarge the mind to a perception of the utter foolishness of the injurious conduct. Who is he therefore that can be found sincerely to say that he believes not in the controuling energy of sympathy and public opinion in such communities as these? Where, rather, is the vicious to be found who will dare to encounter them? that would not be abashed and withdraw from their influence? that would not rather hug his vices in secret where no surrounding eyes could see, where no scrutinizing minds could scan and

present to his contemplation the frightful consequences of his actions? In such communities, would the idle or the otherwise vicious remain till that natural alternative which is implied in all voluntary co-operation, the reciprocal avoidance of the contract by the one party when the other has ceased to fulfill the conditions, should have been enforced? Would he stay till the community separated itself from him? Would a case be ever found in which retirement would not precede, by a thousand degrees, such forced abdication? Would not the power of expulsion, inherent in every voluntarily formed community, be in this case entirely superseded by the previous uncontrolled operation of the power of public opinion?

Have we not exposed natural motives, rewards and punishments, sufficient to excite and keep in full activity all the productive co-operative energy of these communities? Where, in ordinary society, are such and so great rewards and punishments to be found for exertion? omitting the deplorable cases of mere want and necessity. What other than such motives, are those which impel to all the industrious pursuits of ordinary life? Exactly the same, but less, unspeakably less, in degree, and counteracted by the factitious and repressive motives of the hopelessness of exertion under the ordinary course of the institutions of insecurity, relieved only by the gambling hazard of superior success by the coincidence of fortuitous events with unremitting toil. For what but to obtain a greater quantity of the pleasures of sense, at the head of which are mostly placed eating and drinking, the accommodation of good houses and good clothing, all the various articles promising what is called luxurious enjoyment, with occasional regard to the pleasures of muscular and intellectual activity and of public opinion; for what other ends or objects is all that activity of life now maintained, over and above that heartless portion of exertion which arises from the depressing motives of mere want? Are men *now* industrious for fear of being hanged, or of any other criminal punishment? Is it not solely the hope of bettering their condition, of increasing their store of the comforts and conveniencies of life, the exhilarating motive of reward, that is in actual and daily operation?

"Soon," exclaims an admirer of the systems of insecurity, "will the mere appetite for the necessaries, for the comforts and conveniencies, even for the luxuries of life be gratified: but more generous motives soon engage the attention, and activity becomes more active in proportion as it is sated with the means of enjoyment. The sordid motive of mere animal gratification, soon ceases to operate: the desire of excelling, the *love of distinction*, of being admired, perhaps envied;

these are the motives that act on lofty minds, and lead to all the vastness of exertion and accumulation. What but the hope of this distinction, has animated the exertions of the thousands that have failed to realize their early anticipations?"

This objection requires to be sifted. Those, first, who have gone along with the reasonings and facts of our second chapter on "the evils produced by the present systems of forced inequality of wealth," will reply, that this motive to exertion, "the love of distinction &c. of lofty minds," for mere distinction sake, is a vicious propensity, because productive of preponderant evil; they will reply that the pursuit of mere wealth is now over-excited and in most pernicious activity, that it is quite necessary for human happiness that this pursuit of wealth should relax and cease as soon as all really useful wants are supplied, and just at the point where the lofty minds begin to sigh for more and more wealth, as mere means of factitious distinction. From the pursuit of excessive wealth, the most tremendous evils have been shown to proceed. The charge is therefore freely admitted, that that motive for exertion arising from mere love of distinction, of excelling, of exciting envy, by means of individual accumulations of wealth, and thus attracting public sympathy, would be lost to these communities. It is voluntarily lost, because its effects are pernicious. One of the great advantages of the system of mutual co-operation and joint possession is, that it eradicates such motives of action.

But there is, as has been shown, in these societies, a diffusion of sympathy and energy of public opinion, which cannot exist, because there is not the same interest to generate them, elsewhere. Wherefore prevails the love of distinction, of heaping up more than others or expending more ostentatiously in ordinary society? Wherefore but to attract public notice, to gain the sympathy of others? Who would labor to excel, to accumulate; to be distinguished on a desert island, himself the sole proprietor? Public opinion is therefore the object really sought for; and distinction by accumulation and expenditure, is but the means. It is that inevitable dependence in which we live on the smiles and frowns of our fellow-creatures, that makes men seek to be distinguished by any folly however absurd, however atrocious. In these communities, the public sympathy and its expression in public opinion are to be earned in all their freshness and vigor of sincerity without any superfluous efforts after inequality of wealth. Inequality of useful qualities, of social effort for the general happiness, of success in any new and difficult, if at the same time useful, branch of art or science; these are amongst the

useful distinctions to which the rewards of public opinion will be attached, instead of the mere idle distinction of wealth. And as this desire of public sympathy, is allowed to be so strong in every day society as to call forth these efforts of exertion and accumulation, to earn which they are employed; with what superior effect will the same instrument operate, where it is so much more powerful, in these communities, in producing those peculiar exertions, whatever they may be, which are necessary to procure it?

“But still,” says the lover of inequality of wealth, “lofty souls can never relish the overflowing smiles of such a public opinion without the substantial association of superior wealth. How can such lofty minds endure to be no better provided for than the ordinary herd of their fellows? We can only ask the lover of inequality, in reply, “What proportion would these lofty souls, unsusceptible of the ordinary sympathies of their fellow-creatures, probably bear to the whole number of such communities? one in ten or one in a hundred? Which-ever it may be, does he really think the associated communities would be the less happy, though all these lofty minds left them and seceded in a body to exalt general society with their *generous* motives? or though they never condescended to join in their united labors?”

No one will defend for a moment as a useful motive to action, the desire of possessing more than others, or the incapacity to enjoy, because all around have equal means of enjoyment. It is the very principle of misanthropy or malevolence. To every well-constituted, benevolent mind, happiness is doubled when shared with an equal, equally happy. Ten masses of happiness, those of ten human beings, must not be sacrificed to *decrease* the happiness of the eleventh grasping the whole, incalculably under what it would be, if in a healthy state of aptitude for receiving favorable impressions.

Public sympathy and public opinion then, in or out of these societies, is the real universal motive to action, over and above the desire of gratifying real wants and substantial or preponderant pleasures. It urges the savage to slaughter or to endure pain, the superstitious to die or to persecute for the error of his brain. Where public opinion is most energetic, the most energetic action will be produced: where public opinion is most enlightened, there will that most energetic, be also the most useful, line of action. In these communities, public opinion must be at the same time the most energetic and the most enlightened. The useful exertions of the members therefore will never want a stimulus—they may

perhaps rather need a restraint—and that stimulus of exactly the same nature with that which now every where leads to high exertion.

“Alas! the habits of the first co-operators in these communities must have been formed in ordinary society. In proportion to their individual exertions, they have hitherto experienced, or been taught to think that they ought to have experienced, individual and exclusive benefit. Individual idleness has been attended with individual loss. Individual industry has been distinguished by its superior earnings: the idle has not eaten the bread of the industrious.”

If in these communities the arrangements were such that the idle could eat the bread of the industrious, that error would be fatal to them. But, in these communities, it is impossible that there can be any voluntarily or viciously idle. Accident or disease alone, will restrain from that easy and delightful exertion, where social feelings give a zest to the pleasures of muscular exertion, to the interest of a common pursuit, in which all are principals and proprietors. How is it possible that an idler could remain or find support in these communities? How could he find admission? for what purpose could his presence be tolerated? If the community were compelled to support a certain quantity of idlers, there would be some sense in the objection: but to suppose that a set of men, under no compulsion, should voluntarily give the fruits of their labor, or permit to come or to remain amongst them, a swarm, or a single individual, of the class of idle consumers, of miserable imbecile creatures, is to suppose that such a community are, not benevolent, but mad. All fear of discouragement on this score, then, is absolutely vain.

“But, if no absolute idlers, some might not work as diligently as others, and the diligent would be discouraged by not receiving more reward for their labor than the torpid.” The absolute practice of society, shows how little evil is to be apprehended from this source. Agriculturists, weavers, carpenters, sailors, respectively, even now under the system of competition, work almost universally for the same wages; and yet every one conversant with labor knows that the best hands, excelling in strength or skill, in all these lines, do once and a half or twice the work that the worst do. To the skilful, or the strong, or the active-minded, double the quantity of work is not more irksome than half to the unskilful, the weakly, or the dispirited. The mere praise of being the best workman, is sufficient to keep alive the superior efforts of the superior men. The great majority yield from their labor the average of production, the

regular motive to labor being the regular average reward. And this takes place—observe—where there is no public opinion, nothing but the necessity of ordinary exertion, to secure the wages; this takes place where there is a divided interest between the capitalist and the producers, where the general tendency of the whole of the workmen as a body, is necessarily to do as little and get as much as they can. But under the united interest and ownership, under the expanded sympathies and energetic expression of public opinion, of these communities, under the increased rewards of the comforts and conveniencies of life which an average of labor will procure equally for every laborer, who can dread any discouragement to the most skilful and active-minded of such a community, from the malevolent motive of grudging the happiness of their fellow-laborer, to whom nature and circumstances have not given powers of exertion equal to theirs? No: the regret will be on the part of those, whose powers of co-operation and usefulness will be the least. On the part of the superior workmen, there will be a constant effort to improve these. Wherefore? Because it will *then* be their interest to improve them, whereas *now* it is their interest to keep them eternally back and depressed; every one now thriving on the comparative ignorance and helplessness of his neighbour.

“But ordinary common laborers have not now, in point of fact, the strength of mind to look forward to the general result of the year, much less of extensive united yearly labor, as the reward of their toils: the evening must bring the reward, or the motive arising from the reward, however great, is lost on such minds.” True as to the lowest class of imbecility of mind, produced by existing systems of insecurity: but altogether absurd as applied to ordinary minds living but one year under the operation of the new system; and still less applicable to minds to be trained, as of the young, altogether under this system. But—in order to begin these communities, what class or description of persons are they who will volunteer out of general society? Is it the ordinary minds of the day, those who have no foresight, who can make no calculation? Not one of these, from the very nature of things, will join such communities; and surely the communities will not implore of general society the aid of press-gangs or Inquisition-familiars, to *compel* such to come in. If however a number of such unfortunate creatures, as Irish peasants for instance, were drawn, like fish in a net, into one of these communities, and associated with but a third part of their number who could see to the year’s end and to the common interest; though their mental power had been so nullified into

stupid selfishness as to be incapable of immediate foresight, of comprehension; yet would they by the operation of the system be drilled into such new and agreeable *habits* of exertion, repose, and enjoyment, as to delight in the system at the year's end, though they knew not why. By degrees, wherever nature had placed no cerebral defect in the way, as again in the case of the Irish peasant, the understanding would be compelled to perceive the useful workings of the system for individual interest; and it would soon be much more difficult to drive out from such communities these originally stupid co-operators, than it was to drive them in.

“Habits”—rejoins again the lover of existing systems, “here the new system fails; in these are founded the duration and superiority of the existing. No matter how absurd the practices, how uneconomical the labor, how unjustly distributed its products, existing habits, the results of ages, are all formed for existing systems. ’Tis not reason, but habit, that governs men. Though truth, interest, and virtue were in favor of the new, yet habit alone in the other scale shall master these.” There has unfortunately been a time when the friends of force and delusion, could use such language truly. That time has ceased to exist. So much truth is now known, and the modes of simplifying and diffusing it, of operating on the understanding even of the lowly, are now so widely diffused, that injurious habits of thinking and acting will be compelled to give way to views of real interest. All habits moreover are individual, not hereditary: at least no strong presumption of any transmitted cerebral aptitude to particular habits, has yet been demonstrated; and if such were, it must be very slight. Habits then being formed with every individual, their succession through a past eternity is of no consequence. Truth is an over-match for delusion, and will weaken every day more and more the mere force of habit. As reason improves, mere habit becomes unnecessary as a guide to action. Hitherto old and vicious habits have been scarcely ever attacked with any thing else than *mere words*, the circumstances generating these habits, from ignorance or want of power to remove them, being suffered to remain in full operation. The principle, or one of the principles, of the new system, is to reason by *facts* and *things*; to operate on the mind by circumstances, and to make use of words to explain these.—These habits however in favor of old systems and old operations, are altogether over-rated: they are in fact at this moment every where extremely and most beneficially weakened; and a new impulse is sought for. This impetus new circumstances will give. Though enlightened interest

and truth, rather than habit, will be the ruling motives to action of the new communities, though the constant effort there will be to retrace habits and to compare them with real interests and real facts, yet habit on such a basis of reason once established, as by such a process it necessarily must be, will be as much superior in useful effect and in permanence to the mechanical habits of old systems, as truth is superior to error and real interest to delusion. Habit then, instead of being the foe, will be converted—as far as it is worth retaining,—into a most useful ally of the new establishments. Habit, in as far as it prevails over reason and takes away the power of comprehending views of real interest, has been, and now is, one of the most inveterate foes of human improvement. Under the new system, whatever is useful in habit, all its advantages, will be retained; whatever is pernicious, all its disadvantages, will be rejected. All useful habits, as those of industrious exertion, sincerity, &c., would acquire under the new system, a ten-fold force from the accompaniments of pleasure in the exercise and perceived utility which would attend them. There would be no warfare between habit and reason: both directed to no other than useful objects, the one would strengthen and confirm the other. Those entering into the new communities, who had already acquired in ordinary society, industrious habits, would be so much the more fitted to enter usefully into them: those without such habits, sincerely desirous of their happiness by co-operation under the new arrangements, would speedily and in the most useful way acquire them; means incomparably more powerful for generating useful habits existing in the new than under the old arrangements of society.

It being now, it is hoped, apparent, from this exposition of human motives, that as far as *adults* are concerned, there is nothing in the known and ordinary motives that influence human conduct incompatible with the formation and progress of these co-operating communities; it remains to inquire whether there is any thing in those motives which govern the young, which is incompatible with their training under the new system.

The general facts and principles respecting the human mind being the same in infancy and adult age, this branch of the inquiry will not detain us long. If, as we have shown, it is not only possible, but most useful, to guide the actions of adults, with their increased strength, their superadded passions, their increased energy of common passions, by the motives, the natural rewards and punishments pointed out, without the addition of any factitious rewards and punishments

whatever, within these communities; how much more easy will it be for an overwhelming majority of adults to guide the voluntary actions of the children of the community, by such natural motives! Hitherto, one great error in the management of all children, by all adults, as in the management of all adults themselves by political power, has been the controuling of their actions for the supposed benefit of the governors, by force or fraud, instead of truth and reason. If force and fraud can be dispensed with as towards the most untractable, how little need can there be of their exercise towards those who are more under controul, towards those who are the absolute dependants on those who govern them? From want of knowledge and of strength, from incapacity to do serious mischief to the community, the ordinary factitious rewards and punishments of the law are not enforced against children. Under none of the systems of insecurity has it been found necessary to strengthen by legal sanctions the already too powerful hand of the director of youth. From these several considerations, it would appear almost superfluous to inquire whether children can be governed without a greater expenditure of effort than is necessary to govern the old.

But though adults are stronger, have new passions, and stronger passions than the young, though the general principles of the human mind are the same in both cases; yet if adults can be governed without force or fraud, it is because they have *reason* to be acted upon. The minds of children, it may be said, not being developed, compulsion must be used to restrain them; and though no laws directly apply to their actions, yet is it because the laws give almost all their power, and in the most arbitrary shape, into the hands of parents and their delegates.

These statements of fact are to a melancholy extent correct. They do not weaken however any of the arguments before made use of against factitious rewards and punishments. In proportion as children acquire strength and the power to do injurious actions, they are capable of acquiring, and by proper training will necessarily acquire, reason also. As they can have no motive in this early stage of their existence, except where bad passions have been systematically and with great effort drilled into them, to injure others, the object of the earliest part of education is simply to remove from them, to keep them out of the way of being themselves injured by, injurious causes; thus giving them unobstructed scope for the development of all their senses, of their muscular and intellectual powers. Under this management, the muscular and intellectual powers, strength and reason, go on increasing

hand in hand: by the time the child is able to do any thing hurtful to others, it has reason to be guided to the avoidance of such hurtful actions: nothing of course but ignorance will lead it to hurt itself; for which real knowledge of facts, not force, is the appropriate remedy.

But it is still curious, and useful, and necessary to inquire what are the *peculiar modes* of instruction and persuasion which are best adapted to those imperfect, undeveloped, periods of human existence, childhood and youth? What are those peculiar natural motives, natural rewards and punishments, which are fitted to guide the young to useful action? and how far do they differ from those best calculated to act on adults? Out of the grand store-house of natural motives, which are those that should be selected for this particular purpose?

In childhood every thing is new; and mere novelty, from the nature of our organization, wherever nothing otherwise painful attends the sensation or emotion, is a source of pleasure. The repetition, at a certain interval, when the nerve and cerebral structure have had time to recover what is called their tone, or capacity of being again acted upon, of an agreeable taste, is pleasing: but if another taste equally agreeable but new, is substituted, every one knows the pleasure is increased. This is one of the ultimate facts respecting our nervous system. Now to adults, in proportion to their acquisitions, the pleasures to be derived from mere novelty are few, and every day diminishing: but on the other hand the pleasures of comparing and of judging of all these facts, of looking into consequences, of inventing or hearing of new combinations of actions, or of things useful in the sciences or the arts, all these, under the name of intellectual pleasures, are numerous in proportion to mental culture, are continually expanding, and must be used as motives to the guidance of the actions of adults. By reason chiefly, without neglecting observation or novelty, adults must be guided; by immediate observation and novelty chiefly, without neglecting reason and solely with a view to its future successful cultivation, children must be guided. Adults, however limited their stock of facts, find more pleasure in comparing the endless combinations of these, in planning the gratification of their more impetuous feelings, than in making new simple observations, in acquiring the neglected knowledge of facts and things, and their qualities. For a contrary reason, the great delight of children is in activity and curiosity; in muscular exertion and new sensations, and in comparing these as their little stock increases.

Hence follow plainly, the course that should be pursued in early education, the natural rewards and punishments that

should be made use of. The double object is to infuse real knowledge or truth (i. e. real facts, real things, real consequences, real resemblances and differences), and to implant habits tending to preponderant happiness, in the young.

First, then, as to the implanting of moral or useful habits. This operation is necessarily begun previous to the time when the reason of the child can perceive any useful tendency in the habit taught. These habits are taught by means of what is called association. Let the doing of any act by a child, as the killing of flies, tormenting kittens, or beating any thing offensive, be always accompanied with the expression of pleasure on the part of its teachers: these acts (except by the lucky countervailing tendency of some natural punishment, as the biting or scratching of the kitten) will infallibly be deemed good and fit to be done by the child in proportion to the intensity of approbation bestowed by the teachers, particularly if they themselves give the example of such conduct, and add other factitious rewards, such as the gratification of any of the senses, on the performance of these actions. Although it is thus true that bad habits are formed, and that good habits ought to be formed, and may be formed, by association previous to the development of reason, it does not follow that it is necessary or wise to dispense with the exercise of reason when unfolded, even with respect to these very habits, to the most moral and useful of them. Nothing is more delicate or important in education than the management of these early associations. Three rules, it would appear, are necessary to be observed respecting them. First, "Let no association be used for any purpose that is not founded in truth, and not only so, but in truth universally recognised not only by all sects and parties but by all civilized men." Universal kindness, truth, fortitude—these and such like universal virtues, because it is the interest of all that they should be practised towards them, may be taught ever so early by the association of sympathy and by example: but the local supposed virtue of kindness to people of any particular sect or party, or respect for any possible speculative opinion, alleged fact of history or other matter within the province of the understanding, and not necessary for the immediate guidance of the child's conduct to the happiness of itself and of those affected by its conduct, should never be impressed at all by any association. The necessity of the case, that demands the employment of association previous to the development of reason, should also strictly limit its exercise to points of necessary and universal morality. It is a dangerous power, of tremendous efficacy for evil, of very partial and only tempo-

rary use for good purposes. Second rule: "Let no moral association whatsoever, however true and universal, be strengthened by any factitious reward or punishment, nor even by the expression of any exaggerated or affected emotion." When the Indian woman presses her child to her breast and points with expressions and gestures of horror to a fellow-creature, a neighbour, of another caste, the impression often repeated on the terrified imagination of the child, remains for life, tormenting equally itself and others. Though the person pointed at were a robber, liar, murderer, and his arts ever so worthy of disapprobation, no possible good could arise from this exaggerated expression: it is not necessary for the child's preservation, it takes away the power of forming a future calm judgement of the value of the act, and can lead to nothing but indiscriminate, unjudging, hatred and vengeance. Third rule: "Let not the association, in any case, be so strongly impressed on the mind as to render it incapable of an impartial examination of the characters, or of the good or ill consequences of the actions connected by it, as soon as the understanding is sufficiently developed to form such judgement." Be these moral associations ever so true, ever so universal, be the expression of approbation or disapprobation ever so measured and appropriate, still if it incapacitate from future impartial judgement with respect even to the most universally acknowledged virtuous act, it leaves the agent with respect to that act (and if with respect to that one, why not as to others, and to any others good or bad?) a slave to prejudice, to the forming of opinions before reasons or without reasons. The legitimate use of association, is as a substitute for reason until it is developed, and an ally of reason to enhance the pleasures of perceived utility. Its *exclusive* use is only for the immediate temporary guidance of the child. Nothing more simple than the reason of this. If the actions originally performed or avoided through the associations of sympathy, be really productive of preponderant good or evil on an examination of all their consequences, what so certain as that this examination will increase the force of every useful association, will place its future operation out of the power of chance, will apportion its energy exactly in proportion to its utility, and will render reason and sympathy eternal co-operators to good, instead of being, as now, eternally antagonizing principles of action?

Under the head of association, is included the principle of imitation. If the rules laid down with respect to all moral associations are observed, imitation affects usefully almost the whole of early moral training where large numbers of children

are brought up together; the *new comers* almost immediately adopting the modes of acting of the little society into which they are introduced. The pleasure of imitation is composed of the pleasure of the active use of the faculties, mental or muscular as may be, and the pleasure of the association of sympathy. In *voluntary* imitation, there is a double pleasure. A child will not willingly imitate actions which give it pain. Hence from the presence of these two pleasures, the great extent to which imitation operates: hence the necessity that the actions to be imitated, should be useful ones. In ordinary associations, there is not necessarily more than one source of pleasure, that of sympathy with the person who forms the association, superadding whatever good he pleases to the things joined. The action to be encouraged by the association of pleasure, may be in itself the most revolting, the arbitrary addition of pleasure overcoming the disinclination to the act: but in voluntary imitation, the act imitated cannot be of a painful nature. But as many actions immediately pleasing, may in their consequences be most pernicious, and as young children can know nothing about these consequences; hence the vast importance that the general actions and feelings of the school or community of young people, should be useful and benevolent. This is the high duty of the director of early education in the skilful management of association, till reason can gradually interpose to judge and unite in useful bonds interest and duty. The principle of voluntary imitation is, in ordinary cases, quite sufficient to form the habits of the new comers to those of the mass of pupils whom they join: bad or good, if the actions afford exertion and are repaid with the sympathy of their little companions, children will immediately join in them. Hence the incalculable advantage (or one of those advantages) of training children in large numbers: but hence also the increased and awful responsibility of forming aright the habits of these masses by just use of the great instrument of association, in the first formation of them. Where the associations are useful, the elder children will in the course of action, without effort, explain to the younger as their minds open, not as lessons but as matters of mutual interest, more usefully than any adult teacher can do, the pleasures of which they are productive. Imitation in education, is therefore secondary in importance to association; and its good or evil effects depend entirely on the character given to the mass whose actions are imitated. A child of extraordinary vigor of muscle or mind, may occasionally break the uniformity of even useful imitation by new and injurious modes of action. Carefully to observe and skilfully to manage these deviations, is

amongst the duties of the superintendant of the general habits of the children trained.

The first object of early education, the implanting of moral habits, thus provided for by a force of association, fearful in its efficacy, though unaided by factitious rewards and punishments; the second object, that of infusing real knowledge, presents itself. We shall find also that this branch of education is better promoted by natural than by factitious rewards and punishments, and that there is nothing in the way of ordinary human motives opposed to this branch of education, under the system of voluntary equality.

By what motives shall the young of these establishments be induced to find pleasure in the acquisition of real and of useful knowledge? By the joint pleasure arising from the exercise of their faculties and of novelty, and from the gratification of the constant desire of these pleasures under the name of curiosity. To these, that may be called the primary and selfish pleasures of education, are to be added the social pleasures, constantly increasing, to be derived therefrom. The intellectual faculties to be exercised, or pleasures to be acquired, by the young in education, are first those of *perception* and sensation. These are frequently distinguished: by sensation are here meant all those perceptions or feelings which are excited through the senses. From every object calling forth the exercise of any of the senses, and not otherwise attended with pain, a child receives pleasure. What from long repetition has ceased to please the adult, every new form, color, sound, smell, taste, is a source of gratification to the young. Now, these sources of gratification nature presents in almost endless variety, in the minerals, plants, and animals, that people this globe, beyond the reach of the most tenacious memory. These things, or the models or drawings of them, so useful, the elements whence all human wants are supplied, so suited to the powers and inclinations of the young, are the proper materials of early education, giving at the same time immediate useful knowledge and affording pleasure. Every new impression made by these real objects is a new fact, is a real increase of knowledge, to the child: it is acquiring the possession of those simple materials, on which its mind must be hereafter exercised. The more numerous and accurate the facts, the more certain the future conclusions. But no sooner has the child been gratified with the external form and appearances, as brilliancy, brittleness, hardness, softness, with the colour, smell, sound, taste, effect on the touch, of these objects, than it

seeks for other information. Curiosity wants to find out what the substances are made of, what's inside of them, how they are composed, what's doing within as well as without them. The external structure known, the child wants to find out the internal. Utility here again goes hand in hand with inclination: this also is a kindred branch of the most useful knowledge a child can acquire. The internal structure of minerals, of plants, and of animals, ending with a knowledge of its own frame, the most perfect and to man the most interesting and useful to be known of animal forms, closes this branch of early education, called "Natural History." During the examination of the outward and inward structure of these articles, endless collateral points of curiosity respecting them, the country, the soil, the climate, the people from which they came, the mode of procuring them, their uses, their character and habits, if animals, will be inquired into. The gratification of this species of curiosity, is a further source of useful knowledge and of pleasure. Here again nature is to be followed, and her rewards to be seized and made the most of. But at the same time that the mind is employed, why not let the muscular system, the love of motion, be gratified? Not a natural object presented to the senses, that should not be sketched by the pupils to afford employment to the hand, to teach the rudiments of the useful art of drawing, and to imprint more strongly the lessons on the memory. With the same view useful facts and short descriptions should be written under the sketches; and thus writing as well as drawing would be taught incidentally and without any particular effort, forming only a relief and a support to the main object in view, the acquisition of useful facts, of real knowledge.

Such is the natural mode of beginning education with the culture of the simplest and first acquired faculties. When these objects and facts are known to the young, then springs up curiosity afresh for a bolder flight. Out of these materials which we find on the earth, above and around us, are fabricated all articles produced by labor for human use. Food, clothes, furniture, houses, all useful things, are derived from these elements; by taking them to pieces, decomposing them, causing their minute component parts to operate on each other and forming new combinations, under the name of chemical processes, new sources of wonder are opened for curiosity to feed upon, and applications to the useful arts of every day life, are continually presenting themselves. The *memory* now must be constantly on the stretch to bring up for use all the facts acquired in the previous pursuit of natural history; and

the *judgement* is now constantly employed in more lengthened comparisons and deductions, of chemical investigation.

But while some of these objects of natural history, are made useful by decomposing or making new compounds of them under the name of chemistry; others are turned to use in masses, and without destroying their texture, their physical powers or properties are made use of, under the name of mechanics, to abridge or facilitate human labor, to add a thousand fold to human force and to the capacities of many of the senses. In the construction and uses of all these machines and the few simple principles on which they are founded, what excitement is held out to curiosity, what gratification in the discovery of the powers and the means they afford! From every step in the intellectual progress, the pleasure of *success* is derived; of looking back and comparing our present with our past state of knowledge, the self-gratulation experienced on perceiving ourselves possessed of new powers, or of increased means of happiness; for no one wilfully makes use of power but as a means of happiness; to himself always; if wise, to himself as connected with his fellow-creatures.

But to the pleasures of perception, of memory, and judgement, to all others that may be styled merely personal pleasures, are not confined the motives to intellectual culture. *Social* motives are constantly present and are eminently powerful in all stages of the progress, but constantly increasing in strength with increasing knowledge. These pleasures, all operating as motives, as natural rewards, are the pleasures of sympathy, the pleasures of intellectual intercourse, the pleasures of benevolence, or those arising from a contemplation of the benefits flowing from the knowledge already acquired or expected from future acquisitions of knowledge. In most young and ardent minds, will naturally be to be added to this list, the anticipation of contributing hereafter by discoveries in art or science to the further progress of knowledge, of human power and welfare.

The pleasures of sympathy prompting to the acquisition of knowledge, are those of the children towards each other, of the teachers towards the children, and of the parents and the community in general towards those who make the greatest progress or take the greatest pains in improving themselves. Neither children, teachers, parents or the public, particularly when so wisely limited as that all shall know all and have an influence on the conduct of all, can avoid feeling and exhibiting feelings of approbation or pleasure when a superior intellect, any more than when a superior article of a physical kind, is presented to them. A useful article of any

sort must give more pleasure in its contemplation, let the causes leading to its usefulness be ever so necessary, than one less useful. This feeling must be perceived by the person possessing, or being the object that excited it, and must give him pleasure, though it were a mere unspoken recognition of the act of improvement. With particular force this principle, of the associations of sympathy, acts on children, all of whose early actions were swayed by it. There being no arbitrary punishments or rewards to divert sympathy from its proper channel and to enlist it in opposition to improvement, it will under such circumstances and in such a community, where nothing but what is useful is taught, operate with a force hitherto unknown in education. With the useless pedantic jargon now taught in schools, who out of them can sympathize?

The next natural social motive to improvement, are the pleasures of intellectual intercourse. In an education directed solely to what is useful and what must of course interest by turns every member of the community, particularly in a community constituted like this, these pleasures of the pupils must be of every day's occurrence. Walking the fields, learning agricultural operations, the mineral, the plant of the lesson, will be the mineral, the plant of the garden, the orchard, the field; the chemical compound or the machine of the lesson, will be found illustrated in principle, if not in exact counterpart of resemblance, in the operations of manufacturing industry, to which the children will be equally trained. To what endless interest of conversation and improving little discussions, will not such coincidences give rise! how will labor be dignified, how will study be rendered familiar and attractive! The species and variety of the thoughts that are continually passing through our minds, attended more or less with pleasurable or unpleasant feelings, sometimes amounting to emotion, constitute the essence of our happiness or unhappiness, during all that portion of our time that we are not renewing our powers by sleep or employed in the immediate gratification of the senses. That portion of our time particularly which is not spent in some active muscular employment, emphatically called leisure time, is altogether dependent on the flow of our thoughts. Now every new fact presented to the minds of children, affords a new thought, and gives occasion for an indefinite increase of thoughts, by the comparisons with other things and the train of judgements to which it may give rise. These facts communicated to others, not only afford them pleasure reflected on the narrator, but lead also to the instituting of comparisons or judge-

ments by them, which again increase the variety of the narrator's thoughts, of the common stock for intellectual intercourse. These pleasures and motives to attention are not now enjoyed by children, from the utter want of interest, the absolute uselessness of almost all that is now taught them, as well as from the repulsive methods of teaching. But where all factitious rewards and punishments are altogether discarded from education, the teachers, having no clubs and brooms to lean upon, must study the nature of mind and of the human affections, must give exciting and pleasing food to the mind as well as to the body, and must thus depend upon the pleasures of intellectual intercourse experienced by the pupils, for increase of their anxiety to add to their stock of knowledge, the means of increasing these intellectual pleasures. Various charms will attend their conversations with their companions, their parents, all their adult friends surrounding them in the community; and by all will they be stimulated to new improvement, to increased curiosity for additional knowledge.

The next natural motive, of the social class, leading to intellectual improvement, is the benevolent contemplation of the benefits flowing, or to be expected from, the powers to be derived from, increased knowledge. This pleasure of contemplation, requiring some extent of view, frequently both a wide and a remote tracing of consequences good and evil, and a balancing of these to ascertain the preponderance of good, is not calculated to act on the very young; and, though the most noble, is therefore deferred to the last of the natural rewards in education. Towards the end of education indeed, utility, comprehending all good, present and future, becomes the predominant motive to the acquisition of knowledge. The touchstone of morals, every pursuit is, with severe benignity, scrutinized by it. Long before the close, however, even at the very commencement of education it operates, its force depending on the skill of the teacher. From the time that the first associations of infancy come to be examined and moral habits secured on the appropriate foundation of reason and interest, the *uses* of every thing proposed to be learned, will be always pressing themselves into the minds and upon the lips of the pupils. The most simple and immediate only of these uses, can be first explained to children; but even these will be to them enough to implant the *principle* of utility, and with it that of benevolence, looking even into the interminable future. From the mere exercise of the understanding in tracing out the uses, the affections become enlisted in the pursuit; and what was first mere calculation, ends—from the association of fact, of the indissoluble union of each

individual's interest with that of his fellow-creatures—in the exalted and delightful sentiment of benevolence. “What's the use of this?” Is there an intelligent child who has not at some early period of his education, asked this question, till repeated blows or despair of receiving any satisfactory answer, whether from the stupidity of the teacher or the more frequent impossibility from the uselessness of the thing taught, arrest his inquiries, his curiosity, and benevolence, for ever? In the schools of these communities on the contrary, under the natural system of useful, and nothing but useful tuition, tuition useful to the individual taught, not to make him or her a passive slave to any other interest whatever; from the first moment such a gladdening question is asked, the progress of the pupil will be deemed secure. As his mind expands, he will be shown and will discover new uses, till the persuasion will spring up that no species of *real* knowledge can be useless, and that for every possible increase of knowledge, a use will some day be found.

Still another natural motive to intellectual exertion arising and combined out of almost all the foregoing, is the desire on the part of the pupil of contributing, one day, to the progress of knowledge and human happiness by discoveries in art or science or other intellectual pursuits. Who that has ever derived when young any pleasure from knowledge, does not recollect the frequent expansion of this wish in his mind? though perhaps from a mingled generosity and selfishness of motive, according to the training which he had previously received? With some young persons, under the name of literary ambition or emulation, it absorbs every other motive, and selfishness predominates in it. From these communities, as in their whole conduct, so in their plan of education, selfishness is banished. Ambition, or the love of mere power for any other use than that of activity or promoting happiness, emulation, or a desire of seeing ourselves superior and of course of seeing our fellow-creatures inferior to us, are both of them motives, whether natural or factitious (for 'tis only the *useful* natural motives that must be employed in education) which are inconsistent with the principles of these communities; the use of such motives being attended with preponderant mischief. Under the circumstances and the operation of motives hitherto detailed; such feelings and wishes as these would not arise in the pupils' minds. Power, superiority, they would value simply because they afforded the means of increasing happiness to themselves and others. From every leading act of their lives, the happiness of others would have been so associated in their minds with their own happiness

and reason and utility would have so strengthened this association, that the pernicious ingredients, now necessarily mixed up with the young romantic wish for excellence and discovery, could with them have no place. The desire of emulating others, would be simply the desire of promoting as much happiness as those others had been the means of promoting; the desire of emulating always joined with admiration and love of those whose example is proposed for imitation. What we admire, we must wish to imitate: whatever appears to us morally excellent, we must from the constitution of our nature admire: to imitate, to do as much good, well—to do more, better: the double pleasure of the active exercise of the faculties and of benevolence, prompt the wish: once excited, and selfishness banished from it, who can set bounds to the wonders which, in communities where public opinion was all powerful, it would produce?

Hence, it is presumed, it appears that there are an abundance of useful natural motives, surrounding the teacher who has the skill and the kindness to use them, for all the proper purposes of the education of youth; and that there is nothing in the nature of human motives, as respects the young any more than adults, inimical to the system of voluntary co-operation and equality of enjoyment. In enumerating the natural motives, personal, social, and mixed, to be made use of in education, no mention has been made of those of the *negative* class, such following necessarily in train of the positive motives to which they are opposed. Were there even none of the positive motives, however, these negative ones would be found to operate to a considerable extent. Forced idleness, the mere compulsory sitting or standing still while all the surrounding children were employed, have been used with effect as sufficient punishments for the cure of voluntary idleness. The method here pursued is to remove the temptations to idleness by not overstraining the faculties, and by presenting with kindness, interesting objects to the attention. In children, an uneasiness amounting to absolute pain attends long-continued inaction, first of the mere muscular system, afterwards as the faculties unfold, of the whole being, mental and muscular. Judiciously applied, and confined to interesting objects, education affords the delightful means of avoiding this lassitude and carelessness of being, degenerating frequently, from mere want of excitement, into incurable stupidity; and by adding the variety of mental to the muscular pursuits of the infantine and youthful day, it rewards in the escape from pain, the application to intellectual pursuits.

From the above sketch of matters to be taught in the commencement and earlier parts of education, let it not be inferred that these are the only matters: biography, history, moral and intellectual subjects of all useful species, the numerous applications of the physical sciences, and afterwards of both physical and mental, to the complicated operations and affairs of life, to the art of preserving health and avoiding disease, to comprehensive social regulations (always increasing in interest to the pupils in proportion to their extent) embracing whole districts and nations and families of nations; all these, every thing really useful, that is to say, attended with preponderant good, balancing the time spent in education against the future appropriation of the same quantity of time as to its effect on the happiness of the whole of life, will be assuredly taught in these schools, or a basis laid for their future development at the lectures given by some of the members of the community. To show the operation of natural motives it was necessary to apply them to some branch of knowledge: and the first in order to be taught, the most interesting and the most simple, presented itself: the object was not, to give even a sketch of the course of education to be pursued.

It is not, in fact, in the management of the young that the difficulty of dispensing with factitious rewards and punishments, has been felt by those whose minds were any way enlarged and dispositions kindly. Force and terror are now beginning to be generally disused by all but the most ignorant and brutal: the factitious motives retained by any who now lay claim to any thing judicious in education, are limited to the arbitrary employment of, or additions to, the natural motives, as shame, forced idleness, emulation, &c. To show the injurious consequences of these, would be a useful task, but wandering too far from our immediate subject: enough if it have been shown that there are natural motives sufficient to render their employment unnecessary. 'Tis in the management of adults, that the great difficulty has been found. When vices, caused by the wretched circumstances which entangle men, run high, criminal laws interfere with their restraints, terrors, and physical pains, to stay the spreading of the evil. To dispense with these, was the difficulty; which is simply done by remodelling anti-social circumstances, by removing the temptations to vice. These removed, natural motives in abundance exist, as has been shown, to the practice of mutual beneficence.

But we have also to inquire under this section, "Is the system of voluntary equality impracticable—if not from the

known motives that influence human conduct—from any of the physical circumstances by which men are surrounded?" This part of the inquiry need not delay us long.

That numberless favorable situations for the establishment of such communities of mutual co-operation for the supply of all the necessities and even comforts of life, are to be found in all inhabited parts of the globe, no person disputes: the objection is, that there are some spots, immense tracts of rugged mountains, barren sands, or otherwise unproductive soils, where numbers could not be congregated together, and consequently where this system could not supersede that of individual exertion, economy, and reward. Again, workmen in immense mines, navigators, could not practise all these arrangements. Suppose that one-tenth of all civilized nations were, from these and similar circumstances, debarred from enjoying, like the rest of the community, the benefits—supposing them to be ascertained benefits—of economical co-operation and expenditure, does it follow from thence that these benefits are not to be enjoyed by those within whose power they are placed? As well might it be said, that if all mankind cannot by any contrivance escape from any particular disease, as the consumption or the gout, no precautions whatever ought to be taken by the great mass of mankind against the approaches of such maladies. If diseases are bad, the less of them mankind have, though but by one-tenth, the better. If mutual co-operation, joint possession, and expenditure are good, the more these blessings are diffused the better; though we may never be able to make them universal. Have the lovers of forced systems of insecurity hitherto acted on this principle? Have they ceased to accumulate wealth by all means in their power because they could not make their fellow-creatures rich? On the contrary, does not this enhance to their diseased minds, the anti-social pleasures of their wealth? Is not the secret dread of seeing their fellow-creatures raised to an equality with themselves, one of the strongest reasons of their repugnance to a system of equality, ever so voluntary? where every thing is to be created; and where nothing is asked to be by them bestowed? Were this system however, securing to the united laborers the entire use of the products of their labor, produced, possessed, and enjoyed in common, found to be practicable as well as beneficial by the great majority of society; the remuneration of the labor of the less fortunate few who could not partake of these advantages, would be raised to the average, if not beyond the average,—as unpleasant occupations have even now an increase of wages,—of the physical comforts of those

living in social co-operation. These intractable occupations would naturally be the quarry to which would soar those unquiet spirits, on whom no other incitement than inequality of wealth and adventure, could operate as a sufficient stimulus to exertion.

Another view presents itself. Neither the individual security of the industrious in general society, nor the social security of these co-operating communities, is compatible with the arbitrary caprice of despoiling by the hands of political power. Who would combine, economize, and new-direct their labor, that other parties at a distance, idle or perniciously active, should despoil them of its fruits? Representative government is necessary to security, whether the work be performed by a single hand, by one thousand, or by ten thousand, in company or co-operation: security is necessary to reproduction. Security can only be attained by self-government, whether as respects the internal or the external affairs of the community. Self-government, as respects external affairs, at least in the present state of knowledge and moral improvement, can only be attained through representation. It being then equally the interest of co-operative as of individual labor, to demand as its support and shield, perfect security by self or representative government, such mode of government must be every where ultimately established, and all the degrading and impoverishing expedients of insecurity abolished. But the tendency, under this state of things, is to raise the wages or remuneration of labor, and gradually to put every man of ordinary skill in the community, into possession of that portion of capital which would secure to himself almost the whole, if not the whole, of the products of his labor. All those trades and manufactures, or expeditions, then, which could be undertaken by any of these stationary communities or by detachments from them, would be undertaken, not as now by one great capitalist and hundreds or thousands of ignorant, depraved, overworked slaves of law or institutions, but by joint-stock companies of equals; and the results, particularly when fostered by the kindred spirit of the co-operating and co-enjoying communities, would be nearly as productive of equal happiness, as the united communities themselves. Even now, in all ships, the crew enjoy their meals in common: the captain's table would then be joined to the common mess, and all the accommodations would be improved and alike for the whole crew; the competition for captainship being reduced to the common desire of the performance of that office by the person best qualified for it. So with respect to the directors of all other joint establishments. What makes the competi-

tion now so keen for these offices, is the individual superiority of power, comforts, &c., attached to them.

Where a situation abounded in materials, particularly if bulky and difficult of carriage, and the soil was niggardly of its produce, the chief operations of such a community would doubtless be the working up of the bulky articles near at hand, getting a mere subsistence from their own immediate soil and living chiefly by exchange. All the co-operators of such a community however, though they possessed a mine instead of an over-land manufacture, and worked therein alternately with agriculture, would nevertheless as much be joint possessors, laborers, and enjoyers, as the communities possessed of the finest agricultural settlement. Nay, a community of mere miners who did not raise a day's work of their own food but lived altogether by exchange, might do all their operations by joint labor, possession, and enjoyment, just like any other co-operating community: whether it would be wise to establish such a community without any agricultural labor, is another question.

As to the difference of latitude, the heat and cold of climates, and the different productions for food, or exchange, it is evident that none of these circumstances could make any difference in the principle of co-operation and enjoyment. Sugar, grapes, cotton, or tobacco, (if human beings remain long insane enough to throw away their labor on such a pernicious poison as the latter,) may be cultivated by joint labor, as well as oats, potatoes, and flax. In Van Dieman's Land, it could be adopted as well as on the banks of the Oronoco or the Neva. Wherever there are human beings, knowledge and suitable land, nothing but despotism, or insecurity arising from some other cause, restraining the freedom of action from forming such communities, as in Russia, Turkey; or the political plundering of the fruits of their labor when produced, as every where but in the non-slave States of North America, could prevent their successful establishment. Mere geographical limits not inducing sterility, have no controul over the formation of these communities. A society of watchmakers and agriculturists could be as readily formed on the plan in Switzerland, as a society of linen-weavers and agriculturists in Ireland. The influence of climate or productions, is absolutely nothing as to physical obstruction: as to prudential, yes; as, supposing the produce to be lead ore, a prudent community would not for any possible consideration of profit devote much of its labor to such occupations as mining, or smelting the lead.

At present in the most civilized and fully peopled communities, of whose internal arrangements we have any accurate

knowledge, those of Europe and North America—for respecting the internal economy of the half-civilized barbarians ruling over the millions of China, we have but mere rude outlines of knowledge,—the quantity of good land and materials, or the facility of creating the materials, is so great, so much more than necessary for the actual population *under the new arrangements*, that it is quite idle to talk of physical obstructions. If in one hundred or one thousand years such obstructions should present themselves, the knowledge and foresight of such communities as will then exist, will doubtless be able to grapple with the evils and reduce them to their smallest amount; or, more likely, precautionary measures would be adopted to prevent their approach. But how strange the caution to people in search of happiness, to warn them to resign the greatest happiness of the whole of their lives and those of their immediate descendants, lest peradventure their children's grand-children might not be as happy as themselves!—this too, admitting the truth of the proposition, that the children's grand-children would certainly be inconvenienced by the consequences of the happiness of the living and of all those who are to live in the intermediate time! a proposition utterly incapable of proof. If proved to demonstration that such long periods of succeeding happiness would be incompatible with a continuance at a very remote period of *equal* happiness; would it cause the succeeding state to be *worse* than the present? If not, the long intermediate space is so much clear gain of happiness. If even the succeeding state would be rendered worse than the present, I know of no rule of morals, or right reason, that should induce rational sentient beings on this earth to resign their happiness, in favor of beings whom they can never see and with whom they can never have any connexion, whether residing in the planet Mercury or Saturn, or to be called into existence on this planet in one hundred or one thousand years. Were there no other reason to show the utter folly of such conduct, the uncertainty of the existence of this very planet, on which we live, in its present state at distant periods, would be amply sufficient. We may dismiss then all notion of physical obstruction to be apprehended from the ultimate progression of the system, as mere idle speculations, not calculated, even if true, to produce any effect on the conduct of living men. To the progression towards improvement by means of individual exertion and reward, the very same objection of an ultimate obstruction to the progress might be made—every one sees how vain. The subject of population will not be over-looked in the next section.

SECTION 5.

Popular Objections to voluntary Equality of Wealth.

IN this section it was proposed to discuss the popular objections to the system of voluntary equality. We must endeavour to be brief; for if the reins were given to speculations on remote contingencies respecting a system which includes all social arrangements and interests, and the nature of the human mind, which has its theory as well as its practice, the whole space of this inquiry would not afford scope for the discussion.

First, then, we will pass by the popular objections to the *theory* of the plan as that theory has been developed by Mr. Owen, because though the theory were found here and there defective, whether in an economical, political, or intellectual point of view, it would no way affect the practical arrangements and ascertained facts: it would prove only that the general conclusions were not accurately deduced from these or other facts. Thus, for instance, Mr. Owen advocates the doctrine of what has been called "philosophical necessity," and says, that "the character of man is formed by the circumstances surrounding and acting upon him," that "his character, opinions, &c., are formed *for* him and not *by* him;" and as a consequence, that "men may be trained to any thing good or evil consistent with their organization." These propositions, as understood and explained by Mr. Owen, appear to be quite just. Many object because they misapprehend the meaning: others because they cannot part with early associations about free-will, (i. e. a power of acting or forming a volition without motive or contrary to the strongest motive,) as existing in point of fact, or as justifying a being, whom they style benevolent, in tormenting without object, when all benefit from example would have ceased, the creatures he made. Discussions like these, so delicate, and so bordering on theological reveries, cannot be indispensable preliminaries to rational practical arrangements. Let men theorize as they may about the idle power of acting without motive, they all admit that this power is seldom exercised, and that man's conduct is in point of fact *very much* influenced by the circumstances in which he is placed. They do not recollect that the immediately preceding state of every man's mind is one of the most influential of the circumstances, which, co-operating with those from without, produce his immediate subsequent conduct. When it is asserted that man may be made any thing good

or bad, by the withdrawing of certain circumstances and the substitution of others, it is not meant that here in Britain it would be possible for any man to train and educate his fellow-creatures to be cannibals; because no man in Britain could by any possibility controul those counteracting circumstances, existing in this country, which would render such a project impracticable. It is merely meant to be conveyed, that *if* all such counteracting circumstances could be here controuled, or if children were transported in early life to a tribe of cannibals, they would necessarily by degrees sympathize with their feelings and adopt their conduct. The operator himself is as much under the influence of circumstances as those he is operating upon: no man or set of men have more than a very limited command of the circumstances necessary to form the character of others: if he forget the common external circumstances in which he is with them enveloped, if in order to gain his point he states as facts what are not true, he is eternally exposed to failure in his project. The physical and moral knowledge now acquired in Europe, is one of the circumstances most influential in the formation of character. But it is no more in the power of any individual to blot out this knowledge, than to blot out one of the planets from our solar system. Man's character cannot be usefully or durably formed by circumstances or in any other way, except in as far as these circumstances have a useful tendency, and are founded in truth. Where knowledge has made in a community a certain progress, the existence of that knowledge is a circumstance which no operator on character can remove; and if his plans are formed in opposition to it and the new interests called into action by it, he will assuredly fail. In New Zealand, where knowledge is not, and interests are not understood, characters may be formed which could not by any possibility be now formed in Britain, because no man could in Britain create an atmosphere of surrounding circumstances similar to that which exists amongst those living with their feet, like their manners and morals, nearly opposed to ours. These circumstances, of existing knowledge, and accordance with real facts, are not lost sight of by Mr. Owen, but form the basis of his arrangements. He does not pretend—nor has he the least inclination to try the experiment—that he could turn Englishmen's or Irishmen's children into New Zealanders or Nova Zemblers, but that, availing himself of the existing state of knowledge in these countries, using no instrument inconsistent with truth and real facts, he could modify so usefully for their happiness the circumstances in which men are placed, by removing temptations to evil and supplying motives to good, as to add almost indefinitely to that happiness.

Now, be these circumstances as they may; let men be supposed to possess ever so despotic a power over their wills, every one admits that it is very seldom they are so foolish as to exercise this power, in opposition to their perceived and acknowledged interests. So much conceded, affords a basis for entering at once into an examination of the popular objections to the practical arrangements. These objections may be roughly classed under the names of moral, economical, and political: few of them perhaps will be found strictly confined to any one of these heads; but for the sake of order, let them be considered according to that characteristic which is the most apparent.

To begin with the objections of a moral nature—it is said, that “the arrangements for voluntary equality, as laid down by Mr. Owen, are founded in *restraint*: that though they may be well adapted to the wretched, who for the sake of subsistence would or must submit to such restraints, yet none above the pressure of want would, for any pecuniary consideration, submit to them.”

Were this objection, so repugnant to the principles advocated in the first chapter, nay through the whole of this work, well founded, the plan of pretended voluntary equality must be at once dismissed: but the fact is, that it is founded altogether on an ignorance of the subject.

The arrangements for mutual co-operation and voluntary equality, are capable of different modifications. Where the community is so poor as to be under the necessity of borrowing the money to erect their houses, to buy their land and stock, no doubt they must be under such restraints and liable to such conditions, as to the repayment of the capital borrowed, as any other individual or individuals would be, entering into voluntary arrangements to repay capital out of the products of labor. According to the respective knowledge and benevolence of those with whom they contract, the terms of repayment and the quantum of controul given to the capitalists for the security of their capital, will be more or less onerous to the borrowers. In these engagements however they have the general protection of the laws of the land respecting all contracts; and if they give a power of interference beyond the law, it is no longer binding on them than while they find it their interest to obey. To simplify the matter, we shall dismiss all those cases where capitalists have any sort of controul in the internal affairs of the community, and then compare the restraints of ordinary life with individual exertion, to the restraints of the individual members of such a community, owners of their own establishment.

In entering these communities and leaving them, there is perfect freedom of action. Can the same be said as to the employments of ordinary life, whether singly conducted or in partnership? The individual working for himself, is mostly controuled by the situation in which he was born, and the establishments to which he succeeds, and in which he must continue under pain of a great pecuniary loss. If in partnership, the individual cannot leave it without the consent of his partner. But in these communities, no consent of partners is necessary: for the stock and all the operations are on so large a scale, that the withdrawing of any individual member with his share thereof, could produce no effect on the prosperity of the whole: there would be therefore no need to insist on the consent of the community (as in small private partnerships where the whole concern might be deranged by the withdrawing of one partner and his capital) to the withdrawing of any individual members. There would be absolutely no loss of capital from a change of individual employments; no perceptible inconvenience to the individual or the community. This gives such a facility of changing abode and occupation, as must be ever incompatible with individual arrangements without great attendant sacrifices; if practicable at any sacrifice. So far, then, the restraint is clearly and enormously on the side of individual exertion. These communities remove an immense burden of restraint: they enable all their members, without loss of capital to any one, without loss of time, to change their abode, society, and mode of life. Supposing the removal to be to another distant community on the same principle of co-operation but of dissimilar occupations and physical circumstances, restraint on removal is not only taken away, but all risk of success in the new occupations is removed, as it was in the establishment left. In fact, if these establishments were numerous and in different places, changes of abode and occupation, instead of being, as now, some of the most serious events of life, would be mere excursions or experiments of pleasure, either by selling out of one and buying into another, or by simply exchanging. Nor would there be any need of the formality of the assent of the two communities or of either of them, to sanction these exchanges of abode and co-operation. The variety would be useful and pleasant to each community, and no evil could arise from this gratification of individual inclination: if the advantages of the two communities were not nearly equal, exchanges would not be made: and although the intrusion of an ordinary individual from general society without the consent of the community, *might* be productive of evil, yet the

exchange of an associate from a similar community accustomed to and approving of the same plan of life, could not by possibility produce any evil to an extensive community to counterbalance the evil of restraint on its individual members. On the contrary, nothing could be more useful for every community than these voluntary individual exchanges: by means of them, all the uncongenial members of every community would be gradually withdrawing to societies more attractive to them; and the result of this individual exchange and constant power of choice, would be to maintain the utmost possible cordiality and unanimity between the members of every community, held together not only by their general interest as co-operators, but by their particular attachment as friends. These exchanges would operate as safety valves to every community for the retiring of every irritating and irritated member, and for the attraction of members whose views and pursuits would harmonize with those of their new associates. So decidedly superior are these co-operating communities as to freedom from restraint in the choice and change of abode, that we should have been fully justified in enumerating this freedom from restraint, as compared with all but the *idle* rich of ordinary life, amongst their most striking advantages. Even the very idlest of the rich cannot now remove with so little loss of capital as the inmates of these communities could.

What species of restraints remain to be feared in communities, self-governed, like these? Vexatious internal regulations, prescribing times, and meals, and rest, and labor, and mode of dress, and all the details of life? almost the whole interest of which arises from their voluntariness? No restraint of this, or of any sort, will be imposed upon the community, that is not imposed by their own hands. A restraint self-imposed, a voluntary restraint, is a contradiction in terms. The majority may be ill-informed and may judge erroneously, but they can lay no burden in the nature of a restraint upon themselves: nor will any just and rational men forming a majority, impose any restraint on even the smallest minority, except in those rare cases in which the interests or the gratification of the majority and the minority are clearly incompatible with each other. The minority, it is true, may be dissatisfied; and may likewise be in the right. By what human contrivance can this evil be remedied, as long as men are permitted the exercise of their reasoning powers? Where has the evil been reduced to so narrow a compass as here? First, voluntary entrance into the community: then perfect freedom of departure, accompanied with no loss, dependent on the permission or assent of no one, affording the easy means to ever

so small a minority to withdraw from the influence of regulations, which they may deem restraints and unwise, if they deem the effort hopeless of convincing the community of the undesirableness of such regulations. But why should a rational man despair of making their interest apparent, amongst a community of co-operating friends? Is it possible, on calm discussion, by writing and speaking, in public and private, where no sinister pecuniary interest can exist to warp the judgement, that right conclusions should not be ultimately admitted and adopted, by men seeking nothing but their own happiness? where all the data for forming a correct judgement and the means of proof by experiment, are in their power? To talk of restraints under such circumstances, is using a language which, if applied to any other communities, would imply the utmost extent of freedom.

Suppose then the worst, suppose the majority of a community so unreasonable as to pass, or to permit their committee to pass, such a regulation as that all men should wear their beards, or, like Peter of Russia, that no man should wear his beard, that no person should dance, or play on a musical instrument, or write or recite a line of poetry? Where are the *sanctions* to enforce these restraints? Where are the rewards or punishments to cause their observance? We have seen long ago that all factitious rewards and punishments are rejected from the government of these communities, and that many even of those, usually esteemed natural rewards and punishments, are also rejected as inducing preponderant evil. Where is the penalty, then, for the breach of these dreaded restraints? where are the guards of Peter to cut off the beards and hew down the rebellious? The only guards, the only enforcing power is *public opinion*, the public opinion of the community. If this public opinion be formed of a very small majority, its force will be weak: the beards, or the dance, or the music, will be seen or heard notwithstanding such feeble public opinion; and the expression of it will but give rise to friendly discussions, which will ultimately establish through the community the innocence or the injurious tendency of beards, dancing, or music. Thus, public opinion being the only sanction, over and above every one's view of his own interest, of these restraints; a mere majority will gain little more by enacting them than to bring them forward, as matters of doubtful utility, for the consideration of the community. But as this can be done in the ordinary way of social intercourse, it will be quite superfluous to express any public opinion on the subject until the public mind of almost the whole of the community is formed. The expression of the

opinion of the majority thus formed, may be useful, as ascertaining the fact of its tendency, and by necessary consequence rendering it imperative on those who act in opposition to it, to reconsider the reasons on which their conduct is founded, to weigh all the consequences of such actions.

Who now so weak as to dread such restraints? restraints self-imposed, restraints enforced by the perception of their utility alone, as announced by the expression of public opinion? restraints removable as soon as their injurious tendency can be shown, restraints from which, though there be but a single dissentient voice, the owner of that voice may remove without loss, without requiring the assent of any other human being but his own?

Shall we after all be told that the vital objection is to this sanction itself, to the very restraint of public opinion, to the tyrannic exercise of that power before which even laws and institutions are compelled to bend? which penetrates all the chambers of the mind, and places there the eye of man's fellow-creature and equal, scrutinizing his motives and prescribing his actions? Shall we be told that the charm of independence consists, not only in not being dictated to, but in not being even observed or judged of? that the prying curiosity and the opinions of others would root out all our delicate pleasures, pleasures which retire from the public gaze—from the public conversation and scandal still more?

There is no doubt of the possibility of the public opinion of one of these, like any other community or society, great or small, being altogether misdirected: but under the original and fundamental stipulation for freedom of opinion on every possible subject, all real evils from this source are obviated. Where freedom of discussion exists and sinister interests are removed, it is impossible that public opinion should continue long or very injuriously misdirected. 'Tis sinister interest and the force and fraud by it engendered, that corrupt and brutalize public opinion. The very assent to such arrangements and principles as those, on which these communities are founded, indicates such a state of mind on the part of the co-operators, as to render quite impossible any gross misapplication of the public or popular sanction. Even such moral impossibilities, however, are guarded against by the power of withdrawing. Little indeed is the danger that the public opinion of such communities would be found revolting to the intellectual or moral feelings of its most enlightened members; but great, very great, is the probability that such enlightened members would sway to the full extent of their intellectual and moral powers, the march of that public opinion. Never

was theatre of rational and sentient beings so well prepared for the diffusion of truth. In no community have the wise and good ever enjoyed such ample opportunity of directing aright public opinion. From the wise and good, therefore, will not proceed the objection of submitting to its gentle, its salutary, controul.

But there are other classes of persons: there are those who are neither wise nor good; whose characters have been so moulded, by the circumstances through which they have passed, to acts injurious, on a calm review of all their consequences, to their own happiness, that they dread the clash of public opinion, anticipating its condemnation, as applied to gambling, drunkenness, enervating debauchery, insolence, idleness, and similar qualities. No doubt the restraints of enlightened public opinion, where all would know all, would to such men be most galling: and the more enlightened, the more benevolent, the more galling. Utter concealment in the midst of the hundreds of thousands of an overgrown metropolis, would better suit the habits of such men. If prudent, they would not join such communities if not determined to reconsider the tendency of their habits and to trust themselves to circumstances which would gradually remove them. If wedded to any such habits as the above, they could not inflict a greater evil on such a community than by associating themselves with it. With such characters, an industrious rational community would be as ill assorted, as they would be with the community. They are not fit materials out of which such a structure could be raised. If their habits were not to be parted with, they could not long remain attached to such communities: better therefore never to join them. It is admitted that such a community would lose the co-operation of all such characters as dreaded the exercise of public opinion: but such loss would be an advantage to such a community.

As to minor private unimportant actions and private sympathies, that only pass from eye to eye, is it to be believed that the majority of a community founded on the absolute freedom of private opinion, would turn jailors and inquisitors of themselves, would pry for their mutual misery into each other's secrets and retirements, and find out a malicious pleasure in blasting happiness uninjurious to others, by dragging it into publicity and encompassing it with slander? This abuse of the influence of public opinion, will not take place, simply because it never can be the interest of the majority that it should take place. The majority cannot be formed of the old, the unfeeling, the morose. The majority must be composed of those, the middle-aged, who will cherish every

possible pleasure unattended with preponderant evil; whose influence will establish such a public opinion of mutual kindness and forbearance, as will make slander and prying curiosity unknown in the community. Property belonging to all in common, and opinion free, what is to be gained by slander or molesting other persons' enjoyments?

'Tis true that in a community of mutual co-operation, founded, like those of the Shakers in America, *in delusion*, in repressing all knowledge but what is immediately necessary for the practice of their persevering industry, public opinion may be so egregiously misdirected, as, through a jargon of fanaticism, to impose restraints, such as prohibiting all intercourse by marriage or otherwise between the sexes, revolting to reason and happiness. Does it follow that the public opinion of a community, founded on the utmost freedom of inquiry and opinion, should countenance such antisocial restraints, should be fooled, or torment its members, with any similar absurdities? These American, half-quaker communities, guided by some expressions of Paul, the apostle or rather founder of Christianity, dissuading from marriage, wisely admit no one who does not make a confession of faith of these absurdities, previous to admission; well knowing that reason would never teach them to the new-comers. The proposed communities, on the other hand, renounce all confessions of faith, and rely on reason alone to guide their members to the perception and the practice of their interest. The American communities have been kept together, though under very imperfect arrangements compared to those now proposed, in spite of their absurdities, from the strong interest of mutual co-operation and the overflowing abundance of physical comforts which that co-operation produces. Beyond these, the narrow views of their superstitious founders were not able to look. Physical comforts and minor moral habits within themselves, the only points to be admired in these American communities of ignorant fanaticism, are in the proposed new communities, the mere basis, on which may be erected the fairest superstructure of intellectual excellence and expansive benevolence, that men have yet witnessed. To draw any inference therefore from the perversion of public opinion amongst a set of ignorant, knowledge-proscribing fanatics, to its perversion amongst an enlightened community proscribing nothing but ignorance and vice, and proscribing even these by the mere arms of persuasion, is palpably reasoning in opposition to the analogy of the case, instead of following that analogy. The good which these communities have produced, is the demonstration of the practicability of mutual co-ope-

ration for production and enjoyment, as well as of the unequalled abundance thereby produced. Mischievous in other respects have these ignorant communities been : but in nothing so mischievous as in the deadly association they have caused to be formed, that co-operating communities must necessarily be selfish, absurd, stupid, and deluded, fed and governed like sheep or cattle without suspicion of the machinery within them or of that by which they are moved, and deterring all rational creatures from any wish to co-operate with them. For—what even gorgeous pampering of all the desires, of all the senses and appetites, which occupy at best but so few hours in the day, can atone for the want of those intellectual pleasures, of the pleasures of sympathy and comprehensive benevolence, which depend on the highest and freest cultivation of the mind, pursuing truth alone as the essential basis of happiness and of all permanent good ?

Compare now the restraints of these free communities with those which prevail in general society—the restraints of trade, the restraints of law, the restraints of public opinion, the restraints of superstition, the restraints of political power by means of public plunder. “ In trades,” the laborers of general society, without tools, materials, or land, to enable them to work, not only under restraint, but absolute dependence, to those who have contrived to lay hold of all these means of production with the atrocious powers of combination laws, of wages-regulation, removal, corporation, and thousand other, expedients of insecurity, by which capitalists extract labor and life from the ignorant and wretched, are as complete automatons by the operation of these expedients, though by themselves frequently unseen, as the little figures dressed like men exhibited to cheat the vulgar with the appearance of voluntary motion. So, in general society, is the productive laborer cheated with the appearances of voluntary action. The restraints of insecurity, he is taught to look upon as the changes of the seasons, or the dogmas of his creed : no choice with respect to these is left to him. But submitting to all these, he is then told he may change his abode, he may work or not work, may take or refuse the wages doled out to him ! Truly so ; but what is the consequence if he change his abode, or refuse to work at the prescribed wages ? He starves. Let him go where he will, the same restraints await him. Such is the hypocritical freedom from restraint, of systems of insecurity ! A prey to the operation of the thousand unseen causes that annihilate the demand for the only article he knows how to work at, what can he do when this gentle restraint arrives ? He has the option of starving, thieving, or begging,

or in some places of becoming a pauper. But take the case of the most fortunate of the productive laborers, to whom it has never happened to want such employment and remuneration as systems of insecurity afford. Is there one in a thousand of such, who has knowledge and curiosity sufficient to prompt him to wish to visit neighbouring cities or counties, to see the manners or productions of other places? If so fortunate as to get regular employment, they stay at home gladly and become attached to their home. 'Tis want, want of employ, *necessity*, in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of a thousand, that compels them to leave their homes. How very absurd, then, to talk of the freedom from restraint of such beings, and to contrast it with the real freedom from restraint to be enjoyed by every individual of a community of mutual co-operation, joint possessors of all things requisite to make the whole of the products of their labor (excepting always that which is seized by political power) their own! From all commercial and manufacturing restraints, and from some of the most galling of those of taxation, these communities, possessing from the first all their own capital, free themselves by their voluntary mutual concession of the power to overreach and oppress each other, by the very act of their mutual co-operation and joint possession. No masters are, there, restraining apprentices; no tradesmen restraining the uninitiated, unless by seven years or corporation freedom, from following their craft; no capitalists restraining wages by possession of the tools, materials, clothes, food, and house of the laborer, and superadding to these the absolute forcible fixation of wages; no imprisonings, whippings and other torturing of human beings, to compel them to work for this pittance; combinations of masters, and counter-combinations and conspiracies of workmen, restraining and tormenting each other; no dread of worse than restraints from failure of employers, or want of demand; no restraints of trade, no regulations whatever but such as are self-imposed, with a view to some preponderant benefit to be enjoyed by the individual members of the community, not by any abstract thing called, the public good, and meaning generally the supposed private interest of a few leading men. But individuals of these communities, from their superior information, may wish to travel to acquire knowledge and verify what they have read. What follows? If the community think that more happiness is to be gained by travelling, each in his turn, one month, or a longer or shorter proportion than a twelfth of their time, every year, than by devoting that time to the increase by labor, muscular or mental, of the comforts and conveniencies of life and domestic enjoyments, where is the restraint to prevent

them from indulging in such gratifications? They have only to will it, and it is done. No fear, from the absence of the master's eye, that the stock and trade left will become deranged. The few absentees from such communities, can never derange the operations or risk the loss of the stock: the establishment proceeds in its regular course, uninfluenced by such temporary absence, and guided by intelligence and skill equal to what has departed from it. Who, on the contrary, does not see that the physical and moral restraints on the locomotive powers of the productive laborers, not to speak of tradesmen and even many capitalists, of general society, are such that to speak of their travelling for information or curiosity, would be looked upon as a species of insane ignorance of the world? Again, as to the length of a day's labor, and the nature of his occupation, the custom of the place condemns the machine of ordinary society to labor or pine: but in these communities no restraint whatever, physical or moral, compels to one hour's more labor or to any species of employment which the majority may deem injurious to their health or productive of any other preponderant evil. 'Tis idle to proceed: there can be no comparison made between the restraints of the industrious of general society and those of these communities: the life of the one is a net-work of artificial restraint; they cannot stretch forth their hand without being entangled in it: the life of the other is freed from almost every other restraint but that of nature, which renders it necessary to produce in order to enjoy.

"Yet, amongst a thousand co-operators, those who, under the system of individual competition, would have drawn the prizes, and have acquired the ownership of the whole capital of the community, must lose," it may be said, "in point of freedom from restraint, though the great mass of the community may gain."

Is the happiness of one, or of two, or of ten, to be preferred to the happiness of ninety-nine, ninety-eight, or ninety? Such is the conclusive answer to such an objection, the only one perhaps it merits. But it is assumed that these capitalist-competitors of general society, are happier, from their powers of loco-motion &c., than the intelligent equal associates of such a community, such as one generation would make them. This assumption being altogether unfounded—as need not be again here shown—we may pass to more important matter.

The restraints of law! To the ignorant and poor productive laborers of general society, without house, tools, materials, food, or clothes—which every adult human being ought in a well-constituted society to possess, to enable him to enjoy the whole products of his labor—unprotected, exposed to every

temptation, how terrific are the restraints of law! To the rich, to those who have possessed themselves, by the established modes, of all the accumulated products of labor, and by the instrumentality of these, of its future productive capabilities, the laws are a protection against the ignorant poor, whose labor produced them; to the poor an ever-impending scourge, warning them off from the means of enjoyment their hands have produced. Physical pain of all degrees, terminating in cruel death, are the amiable, the well-assorted guardians of all systems of insecurity. The dread of encountering their penalties, ever present to the minds of those whom ten thousand accidents without any fault of their own, or the vice-engendering circumstances surrounding them, may expose to their visitations, is one of the daily and dreadful associations of their lives.

Is it then a trifling advantage to shake off from the mind these dreaded associations? to throw out fear and all the withering hosts of terrors from amongst the motives to human actions? so to arrange the exertions of human industry, that, like the voluntary associations of marriage (where perfect equality is the basis, or where individual humanity supersedes the iniquitous inequalities and indissolubility of law), but on a larger scale, all cause of contest between individuals for property—the fruitful source of almost all vices as well as crimes—whether in its acquisition or enjoyment, must be removed? Is it a trifling advantage that, by means of the facilities afforded for an education directed solely to utility, those evil passions which are the parents of the few remaining vices or crimes which are not connected with property, shall be so nearly exterminated, as to require no further repressive force than the gentle but all-pervading controul of the moral sanction or public opinion?

If the life of the poor is tormented by the ever-impending danger of physical pain from the transgressions of whatever laws political power may think proper to enact, how many of those who have been fortunate enough to make acquisitions at the expense of their fellow-creatures—for in the ordinary course of things 'tis fortune rather than intelligence or virtue that leads to the acquisition—are almost equally tormented by the intricacies, delays, and expenses of legal proceedings, by which the possession of their acquisitions is affected to be secured to them! of what else does the life of these hunters after individual wealth consist, but of efforts to supplant and over-reach each other, by all means consistent with safety from legal punishment? What a vast portion of the miseries of those who have wealth, is caused by law-suits and their

consequences ! If the criminal law vexes the poor ; the civil laws torment the rich, and lead their minds from benevolence and justice to technicalities. While the lawyers devise their expedients, and the priests their rites and dogmas, to get respectively into their hands the greatest share, of the accumulations of the products of labor as well as the greatest immediate consumption ; what risk of life, or health, or morals, to the community, arrests the eager competitors in ordinary physical occupations, from mixing, substituting, vending, whatever will produce individual profit, till human beings themselves are made articles of trade, and the accumulation of all crimes and vices in one—slave-making—is justified by the consuming desire of individual wealth ? Hence the multiplicity of vain laws to restrain this universal cupidity ; the law-makers, smitten with its love as much as the meanest of those whom they seek to restrain, when their own particular interest is not directly or indirectly concerned ; as in the case of lotteries, monopolies, spirit-distilling, game-laws, and such like, endeavouring with a palsied and insincere hand to remove some of the fruits of that destructive principle of individual competition for excessive wealth ; of which *principle* they are themselves the prime depositaries and most successful champions. The necessity of this factitious individual pursuit, they have erected into a principle of human nature, assuming that happiness, the only universal end of all, cannot otherwise be attained, and then heap laws upon laws to restrain the desolating evils to which this cherished principle absolutely leads, till every act and project of human exertion, is so fenced round with contradictory restraints that one of the main businesses of life is to study and evade them.

It is obvious that from these terrors of the poor and the rich, from the physical pains of the criminal law on the one side and the mental pangs of the civil law on the other, joint possession and enjoyment secure the co-operating communities. Of what laws should they be afraid ? and with whom could they quarrel about property ? Themselves they cannot plunder or defraud, and they have no motive to plunder or defraud others out of the community. All their property is in joint possession, and indissolubly linked up with the happiness of each other.

Though the system of equal security to all and individual competition might, with universal education as its necessary support, obviate the necessity of the greater part of these restraints, and though equal security is as necessary to social co-operation as to useful individual competition ; yet can it not be denied that social co-operation and joint possession on the

part of those individuals thus equally secure, is the only efficient instrument yet proposed for human consideration, for altogether dispensing with such factitious restraints, legal or otherwise, amongst communities. The very principle of the co-operation is to relieve the co-operators from all restraint but such as is self-imposed, that is to say, from every thing properly called restraint, substituting for it, just views of interest, under circumstances which make interest and duty to co-incide.

Next point of comparison as to restraints between these communities possessing their own capital and the members of general society, is as to those of the moral sanction or of public opinion. To what was before stated in general on this subject, may here be made a few particular observations. There are several interesting points of comparison between the moral sanction as expressed by the public opinion of these communities and of general society, and the great preponderant balance of good appears to be in favor of the small united communities. First, we may observe, the public opinion of these communities is more homogeneous than that of general society; it has unity in it, it is one opinion, of the majority of the members. In general society, there is one public opinion, one moral sanction for the rich, another for the poor, one for the army, another for the priests, one for the industrious, another for the idle, amongst the rich; nay, when society becomes extensive and divided, the retainers of almost every particular vice and crime become so numerous, that they form a species of public opinion of their own, and set the general opinion at defiance. Instead of one public opinion there are fifty modifications of it, the one holding that virtuous or blameless, which the other esteems vicious, and every one seeking a support for his own injurious propensities in the countenance of associates of similar inclinations. Hence the great mistake of attributing importance to the extent of the field of public opinion as regarding private morals. In such communities, as in a large metropolis, public opinion loses all controul over private morals: the private conduct of individuals, is beneath its notice; it is lost in the ocean of actions, and no time nor pens could register private conduct. The actions of the few who are conspicuous, who tower above their fellows, remarkable for any thing, wealth, situation, power, talents, virtue, vice,—these, in as far as they concern the public, or violate the established laws and thus become crimes, are powerfully controuled by public opinion, resounding over a large theatre and almost instantaneously, by means of the press, pervading the minds of millions. But as to the private morals

of even these lofty individuals, they are, by common consent and for mutual accommodation, shielded from the notice, however unimpeachably correct, of this immense instrument of public benefit. In large communities, public opinion loses all force on private morals, from its division, from the multitude of its objects, from the universal attraction towards those who are conspicuous. But in these small united communities, where all are equal, there can be no divisions of public opinion: every one being known to all, there is no need of placing a few on pedestals for public opinion to find food for its judgements. The conduct of every one is equally benefited by it, none so high or so low as to escape its salutary controul. From these circumstances the force of public opinion is more operative on private morals, as ten thousand to one, in these small united communities than in general society, particularly than in large cities. As to that portion of public opinion or instruction which is expressed through the press, the co-operating communities would partake of its benefits just as freely as the rest of the community, though they might stand in little need of its admonitions.

Another point of comparison between the moral sanction of the co-operating communities and of general society, is, that no factitious reward or punishment is made use of by the one, while the other is altogether governed by caprice in the distribution of its rewards and punishments, almost entirely factitious. A man pursuing individual gain may be injured, perhaps ruined, in a thousand ways, by the whispers or ill-offices of those around him. According to the society in which the person on whom his fate may depend, lives, he may be disinherited or reinstated in favor on account of the self-same acts—reward or punishment equally incongruous and disproportionate to them. In these small united communities, while public opinion is one and consistent, and all-pervading, it is at the same time gentle and equable in its penalties and rewards. No individual member there, has the fate of another in his hands: no antipathy, no envy, can disinherit, or cause to be disinherited. By a smile or a frown, by reasoning in approbation or disapprobation, alone, can public opinion be rendered available in these communities. Its comparative omniscience and omnipresence render available its slightest impressions, so that it must operate by conviction alone, reforming by kindness and reason: The suspicion of sinister interest being altogether removed, the disapprobation being always mild from the impossibility of wielding any but gentle motives, the interest of the agent being always to derive the greatest preponderant happiness from his actions, all their

consequences included ; what is to hinder the person in error in these communities from entering into a frank survey with any of his friends, of those consequences good or evil, to himself or others, which they might conceive he had overlooked ? What habits so deep-rooted as to be inaccessible to the influence of a moral sanction thus administered ?

Another point of comparison equally interesting, between the moral sanction, the public opinion, of general society and of these communities, is the *utility of the direction* which it must assume in the different cases. In general society, we have seen that the moral sanction is divided and subdivided into as many directions as there are conflicting masses of interest, presumed or real. In each of these, public opinion takes a different direction, and that not only on minor unimportant points, but on the most important points of every day morals, temperance, truth, honesty, humanity, as well as mere ceremonial observances. The consequence is, that every one takes as his guide the opinion of the party to which he belongs. What more different than the morality of the Quakers and that of the privileged classes, or military, men of honor ? Neither the one nor the other of these, takes a useful direction. The object of neither is the happiness of the sentient being, man, but of the sect, profession, or caste, to which the party belongs. In the very few points of morality in which the public opinion of all these parties agree, they are probably right ; and the co-operating communities would partake equally with the rest of society at large in the benefits, whatever they might be, of such united public opinion. To point out in detail the pernicious errors of all these opposing moral, or rather immoral, sanctions, in general society, would be a waste of time and words. Enough that amongst opposing opinions one only *can* be right and well directed ; while not one of the whole may be well directed. Till all the restraints of insecurity are removed, and general society is united by one comprehensive interest, such union of public opinion as to private morals, cannot take place. There is no branch of private morals, the violators of which will not find numerous sympathizing co-operators to associate with, sufficient to form a public opinion of their own, openly setting at defiance the public opinion of the rest of the community. Now in all these respects the situation of the co-operating communities altogether differs from that of society at large, necessarily giving a useful direction to their public opinion. First of all, the interest of every co-operating community is one and undivided ; it is the same for all ; no private pursuits jarring with the general good, or with others' individual pursuits. Hence they can

calmly deliberate on their interest, nor fear any sinister motives clouding the judgement or swaying the conduct of individual members. It is the interest of all to see the truth: no one has any interest not to see the truth. The only thing wanting then to lead their public opinion into the most useful direction, is to inform their understandings. And is it not probable that, with such dispositions, they will acquire the best notions which the knowledge of the age affords, as to that direction of their voluntary actions which will produce the greatest preponderant good? Or rather, is it not probable that under the favorable circumstances of their situation, they will form much more correct views of moral conduct than even the most enlightened of those clusters of opinion which war for the mastery and the distinguishing epithet of *the public* opinion in general society? With a sincere desire to promote their own interest, the happiness of all, no physicians living in scanty poverty in consequence of the salubrity of food and seasons, no lawyers pining in the midst of over-flowing plenty for want of legal disputations and animosities, no over-reachings or combinations between capitalists and mere laborers where all are capitalists, no other interest of any other class tending to counteract the general interest,—what is to prevent the moral sanction of such a community from continually re-judging and ameliorating itself, all the most important data for sound judgement lying before it in the conduct, and consequences of the actions, of its members? What is now, in general society, the incorrigible obstacle to the right direction of the moral sanction? The conflicting irreconcilable interests generated by insecurity. In the co-operating communities, these conflicting interests cannot exist. Therefore, guided by the principle of free inquiry, it is impossible but that the moral sanction of these communities must become the best directed, and that from which general society, groaning under the evils of insecurity, will receive its best lessons. The printing presses of these communities—and not one of them will long be without a printing press—will be the efficient moral apostles for elevating, enlightening, and bringing to one useful focus, the discordant and diverging rays of what is now called public opinion; instead of confining its selfish wishes within the bosom of its own village felicity.

But perhaps the most useful point of comparison, and that which renders it most efficacious, between the public opinion of these co-operating communities and that of general society as now constituted, is, that in these united communities, every member has a real available voice, and forms a part of that public opinion. In general society, the opinions of one class are rejected and ridiculed in mass by another: seldom that two

individuals belong to the same class and party in the leading points of wealth, situation, religion, politics, &c. Disagreement in any one of these, annihilates the controul of the moral sanction. The person to whom it is addressed, refuses to acknowledge its award: he was not one of those who co-operated in its formation; would have been perhaps despised as an intruder and alien had he offered an opinion; and cannot therefore participate in it or yield to its controul. How different the situation of a co-operator in the formation of the public opinion of the united communities! He has a daily and equal opportunity of influencing the formation of this opinion: he is one of the jury that compose it. In respecting it, in respecting the public opinion of the majority of the community, he does in fact no more than respect his own opinion, the chances being always greatly in favor of any particular individual being amongst the majority where all have an equal voice; and even where he happens to know he is in the minority, the interest he must feel in supporting the moral sanction in the great majority of cases in which he must concur with it, as well as the general and useful habit of respectful sympathy with the moral sentiments of the great mass of the community, in whose happiness his own is bound up and included, must render the moral sanction little less efficacious over him, even in those cases in which he may offend against its dictates. What limits can be placed to the commanding but gentle influence of a moral sanction thus composed? We have seen that it is concentrated into one public opinion, without splitting or clashing of interests, and therefore universally operative; that it relies on no factitious means of pain or injury of any sort to enforce its award, but operates by persuasion alone, founded on utility and calm views of interest; that from the annihilation of opposing interests, and of every interest opposed to truth, it must be the best informed and most usefully directed; and that, from the universal concurrence of all in its formation, it must be listened to with confidence and gladly obeyed. As regards private morals, its influence is altogether superior, so as to leave no room for comparison, to the discordant echoes of sect and class, calling themselves the public opinion of general society. As regards public morals, or the conduct of men exercising what ought to be public trusts, in which all society has an equal interest, its impartial voice will add strength to that public opinion when rightly formed, though constituting itself but a fraction of it, and will frequently perhaps, even on such occasions, convince and unite the angry and mistaken views of those who are, and those who would wish to be, public plunderers, under the

flimsy veil of declaiming for the public good. From the restraints of public opinion, of general society, capricious, cruel where its sanction is enforced, or else entirely inoperative, endlessly divided, ill directed, not shared in by individual members, reduced to impotence from the extent of surface which it affects to cover; we pass to,

The restraints of superstition. Even in general society, in the very midst of all the institutions of insecurity, these restraints so tremendously fatal to human happiness, poisoning every cup of pleasure, darkening every glowing prospect, and chilling all the incipient effusions of sympathy, are every day retiring as knowledge advances. In mere ignorance frequently, and frequently in pernicious early associations, these restraints are founded. They are, the fear of supernatural malicious agency whether in the dark or elsewhere, the belief in, and liability to imposition, terror, and imprudent conduct, from the suggestions of swindlers dealing in jargon about shades, ghosts, sprites, or other supposed superhuman apparitions, about the influence of stars, marks, mystic ceremonies, &c. on the results of human conduct, and in general the seeking out of nature, and attributing to malicious voluntary agency, the causes of physical and moral natural events. In ordinary life, we know that the most kindly dispositions, the most exalted intellect, courage that would laugh at real danger, are often the abject slaves of such superstitious terrors. Amongst the poor, the weak, the ignorant, 'tis rare to find one whose conduct and mind are altogether freed from their influence. How can it be otherwise? The great mass of mankind, pertinaciously deprived of that useful knowledge of the phenomena, of the objects and existences, surrounding them, and of the order of their changes, which might be so easily conveyed through their senses to their judgement; their minds left either in utter ignorance, or their memory burdened with vain words or falsehoods worse than ignorance, are the proper soil for the reception of the wildest absurdities of interested imposture. They have never learned to form a correct judgement of any thing. In addition to the physical restraints that encompass them on every side, the mental restraints of terror sadden the scanty means of happiness which these leave them.—But in the associated communities, the knowledge of one would gradually become the knowledge of all; old trains of thinking and acting, old associations, would be broken; and new circumstances would give rise to new associations even amongst those of the co-operators whose minds might have been previously debased and rendered wretched by superstitious terrors. Over the young, however, the most salutary

influence would be diffused, by simply imbuing their minds with real physical knowledge, as they were developed to receive and judge of its truth; thus giving them an antidote to the miseries of superstitious terrors, without raising up in their minds any antipathies, any unkindly associations against those afflicted with them. As some of the most benevolent and intelligent of the community would be the instructors of the youth, they would never hear the extravagances and false appalling stories that so often wither up the human mind and sympathies in earliest childhood. All the children of the community being educated in common, and educated equally well, there being no lower orders of children with minds doomed to ignorance, that their bodies may be more readily bent to drudgery and privation; and the education of all being directed not only to real but also to useful knowledge, the access of evil in the shape of pernicious falsehood being thus closed up, how could these restraints of superstition acquire an influence over the mind? how could they ever find entrance into it? It will be shortly found that the teaching of truth and beneficence, will be as much more simple and easy of execution than the present cumbersome mode of inoculating falsehood and terror, as the fruits of the one in the conduct of life are superior to those of the other. No parent in these communities, that will not rejoice that his child's mind is kept free from these tormenting diseases, though his own might be infected with them, for the same reason that he would not wish his child to share in his bodily complaints. If otherwise disposed, he is at liberty to imbue his child's mind with them, checked only by the counteracting force of an enlightened public opinion operating upon himself and upon the mind of the child, surrounded with other healthy children imbued with no disease of mind or body. Little must that man have seen of life, and studied less of the human mind, who cannot appreciate the immense accession to happiness arising from the superiority of freedom from the restraints of superstition which the co-operating members of communities founded on freedom of opinion, must enjoy.

The last of the restraints mentioned, as points of comparison between these co-operating communities and general society, are those of political power in the exercise of public plunder. In this respect these associated communities have little advantage over the members of general society. Where the whole system of government is not carried on by delegation from the governed, there must all the products of the labor of the community be more or less exposed, no matter by what manœuvres, direct or indirect, or under what names, to be

seized upon at the caprice of those possessing political power. Should a co-operating community be enamoured of diseases, imbecility of body and mind, mutual injuries, and shortness of life, and establish amongst them, in order to command these advantages, a manufacture of poison under the name of gin or whiskey, they must submit to the visits and restraints of the excise-officers just like the other owners of such establishments. If they exchange any of their surplus produce for another species of imported poison, tobacco, they must contribute, in increased quantities of their produce, to the general plunder levied on society at large through that article. But as the probability is, that not many of the co-operating communities would think it wise to direct their productive powers to the fabrication or acquisition of any thing that would be useless, not to say injurious, to their happiness, while so many undisputed modes remain of making it tributary, without any counterbalancing evil, to that happiness; the acquisition of all pernicious, useless, or doubtful, articles, would be replaced by the acquisition, by direct or indirect labor, by production or exchange, of useful articles (or those tending to preponderant pleasure) alone; the quantum and quality of labor proportioned to the usefulness. As it so happens that many of those articles, by means of which political power extracts its plunder of the products of labor, are of the useless or pernicious class, either not worth the labor necessary to procure them, or not desirable if to be had without labor, the co-operating communities, by non-consumption of such articles, would, as far as they are concerned, escape these worst and most pernicious of restraints on abundant reproduction. But, as to agricultural produce, the tenth part of which is in some countries under the eternal ban of anticipated proscription, to be abstracted, beneath the shield of political power, by a particular class of its co-adjutors and co-partners, without any contribution to its production, or the rendering of any tangible or satisfactory equivalent in return; as to all this most important department of the products of their labor, these communities will be liable to be more egregiously plundered than any equal number of individuals in general society, inasmuch as they will be greater producers. In countries like France, America, Scotland, where this most iniquitous branch of public plunder has ceased, the co-operating communities might evade, by judiciously varying their production and consumption, the greater part of the restraints from general plunder to which the rest of society are subjected.—On the whole, then, the co-operating communities are nearly on a level with the rest of society as to liability to these

particular species of restraint: an evil to be obviated in no other way than by making the consent of the producers requisite to the abstraction of the products of their labor, either previous to its seizure by means of delegates appointed by all who produce, or at the time of its abstraction, by making the consent of every individual producer requisite to justify the seizure.

Too much has perhaps been said in reply to the strange, but widely diffused, popular objection to voluntary equality, as attended with *restraints*. The vital importance of the objection, if true, must be given in excuse. One observation more, and it shall be dismissed. As all the members of these communities are liable, like all other individuals, to the general laws of the political society to which they belong,—as even the majority have no power but that of public opinion, to enforce any regulation ever so useful not sanctioned by the public law,—as every individual may at any moment appeal to the protection of the law against any attempt of any member, or even of the majority or the whole community, to impose any restraint on his conduct,—as such societies reject delusion as well as force, and propose to be founded in freedom of opinion, investigation of truth, and self-interest of all the members; it is evident, that, though by mutual agreement they may *evade* many of the restraints of society at large, it is impossible that they should be exposed to greater or more numerous restraints. Subjected to more numerous restraints than society at large, they cannot be; the common law renders it impossible: we have seen how by mutual agreement they may evade almost all the restraints of general society but those of public plunder, which restraints can never be removed but by the co-operation of *all* rational men, whether producing, possessing, and enjoying, by individual or by joint exertion. Were charters indeed obtained by a few men for the government of these communities, were they erected into corporations, and did they acquire the power of making by-laws to be supported by the political power of the community at large,—then indeed their charm would be gone, and with the corporation bond would enter the corporation spirit, and public opinion would be set aside for the arbitrary dictation of one or many men. But it must be again repeated, that such unworthy manœuvring would not be the system of *voluntary* equality here advocated; but one of *forced* equality herein reprobated. Against force and delusion and all interference of political power, further than securing the joint property of these communities as the individual property of other men is secured, we have all along protested, and do protest. If these

communities are not founded in men's interests, and if these interests cannot be brought home to the conviction of men's minds, they are not deserving of success, and assuredly will not obtain it, till knowledge becomes confined to one mind in every nation, and that mind, directing political power, amuses itself with the erection of baby-things under the nick-name of Equality.

The next popular objection in point of importance, of a moral nature, against the system of voluntary equality by joint possession, labor, and enjoyment, is the ill-grounded fear, that "it would, by withdrawing the stimulus of individual reward, annihilate, or very much lessen the chances of, genius, exalted talents and exertions, and thus limit the career of human improvement and happiness to the abundant gratification of mere animal wants."

This objection has some truth, and some error in it. As far as it is true, the talents and exertions it would repress, ought, for the happiness of humanity, to be repressed:—as far as it is false, the talents and exertions it would not repress, but would stimulate, are all those the development of which is useful for human happiness.

No error is more common, than to confound individual reward in general with individual reward of a pecuniary nature, or of the matter of wealth. All enjoyment must be individual enjoyment: all motives to produce individual action must be brought home to the individual to be acted upon: the pleasure of seeing others happy is as much an individual pleasure, as the pleasure of eating a pine-apple or other favorite fruit; it is one of the individual rewards which the constitution of our nature and surrounding circumstances, have attached to the cultivation and exercise of benevolence, and serves as an individual natural motive to the practice of this first of the virtues. But why should a man practise this virtue of benevolence, called when put into action beneficence? For no other possible reason than that it is clearly his individual interest to practise it. His individual pecuniary interest? Most generally, but not necessarily so: his individual interest on the balance of chances of happiness from all possible sources, immediate and remote? Undoubtedly yes. But can we say, because it is not a man's individual *pecuniary* interest in a particular case to be benevolent, that he has therefore no individual interest,—or in other words, no interest at all, whether of an earthly nature or to be enjoyed in ever so many millions of years,—to be benevolent? If so, man must act without motive; for a motive not individual, is to him no motive: a social motive, if you please, and not a selfish motive;

but selfish or social, it must be individual; must come home to the real or supposed interest of the agent, or he cannot act.

Having briefly exposed in the last section the motives to human exertion, the desire to obtain the pleasures of the senses and appetites, external and internal, those derived from the active use of the muscular system, from the active use of the cerebral or intellectual structure, from sympathy and from all the endless combinations and modifications of which these are susceptible; it is enough to refer to these to point out the entire fallacy of the assumption and inference, that all individual motives being centred in those of wealth, no stimulus to high exertion can remain, when these are removed. Wealth is only a means of acquiring some of these advantages; and, in society as now constituted, is much more efficient than it ought to be for the acquisition of them.

But without making a parade of the motives that in these communities would call forth the exertion of every useful, of every exalted talent, as well as virtue, the motives that absolutely produce, at the present moment, the most exalted of these qualities, will demonstrate the fallacy of the objection. Once raised above the reach of want—and in the co-operating communities every one would be so raised—the compounded motives that lead to superior exertions and excellence, in intellectual pursuits, in actions of great difficulty, whether useful or pernicious, are, the pleasures of action, muscular or intellectual, of the pursuit, the pleasures of mere power, the pleasures of wealth as a mere source of distinction, the pleasures of sympathy as expressed by simple gesture, by approbation, by consent, by conviction, by admiration, the pleasures of benevolence, or of the contemplation of the happiness, the real advantages of any sort, expected from the exertions in question.

The use of some of these motives leads to unmixed good, of some to evil, of most to a mixture of good and evil. The pleasures of exertion, muscular, mental, or both, in the pursuit, the pleasures of benevolence, the pleasures of sympathy justly proportioned to the exercise of talent and beneficence; all these motives do now usefully prompt to the most energetic exertions in general society; and their operation, by the increased force of public opinion and the universal diffusion of real knowledge, would in the co-operating communities be a hundred-fold increased. The love of mere power for the sake of influencing the actions of others, without any regard to benevolence; and the love of wealth, for the mere sake of the distinction it would confer, without regard

to the substantial use of the articles of which it is composed, could scarcely exist amongst the associated communities: nor, even in general society, are these motives often productive of useful exertions. Under the name of ambition and avarice, they lead to an immense preponderance of mischief. There are minor occasional motives, such as love, hatred, jealousy, revenge, envy, &c., which sometimes lead to energetic exertions; but are too limited in their sphere of operation to be noticed here. The motives which produce useful energy of thought and action, exist in greater force in the associated communities than in general society: the motives which only occasionally do good, but which lead in general to preponderant evil, are in these communities cleared of their pernicious accompaniments, and rendered instrumental to the higher motives of benevolence, sympathy, and the pleasures of exertion, or activity.

It is a fact as certain and as pleasing as it is important, that almost all the useful of the higher attainments and discoveries of men, in science and action, have been produced by the operation of the better motives; while almost all pernicious activity has been engendered by the love of mere power, or mere wealth, and occasional ill-regulated passions. Look to conquerors, statesmen, priests, lawyers, privileged classes of every species: avarice and ambition, love of mere power, love of mere wealth, have been their almost exclusive motives to the most persevering and difficult exertions. But look to all those, the discoverers of physical and moral truth, men of genius in the fine arts as well as in mechanical operations, and you will find the great majority of them, particularly the most illustrious amongst them, either but partially swayed by such injurious motives, or raised entirely above them, and under the sole influence of the more useful springs to action. From Homer to Milton, Shakespear, and Barry in the fine arts; from Epaminondas to Washington (and almost every succeeding American president) and Bolivar, in patriotic exertion; from Anaxagoras to Galileo, Lavoisier and Priestley, in physics; from Epicurus and Socrates to the founder of the principle of utility, or the proposer of voluntary equality by mutual co-operation in morals;—the men who have been the most ardent and successful in useful discovery and exertion, have not only been almost exclusively governed by the useful motives, but have persevered in opposition to the frowns of power and the risk of want, even braving persecution. Of the men of genius now living, who devote all the exertions of their lives to moral and physical improvement by writing and action, perhaps the greater part suffer loss both in wealth and power

for the love of their ruling pursuit; demonstrating the utter ignorance of the human mind of those who assert that high intellectual exertion depends for its excitement on such motives as avarice or ambition. Although those who have no extraneous means of support, must live by their exertions, it does not follow that the love of the wealth necessary for their support, was the influential motive to their higher exertions; because they could in general gain more wealth by other less toilsome means. In general, where mere love of wealth has been the influential motive with men of talent, it has brought down their exertions to the comparative grossness of the parent motive. To gain renown, that is to say, the sympathy and the consenting judgement of their fellow-creatures now living, or even to anticipate the sympathies of future generations, is at this present hour, in general society, a sufficient motive with numbers to devote, not only their whole time and exertions, but also their wealth, (by whatever means acquired,) to intellectual and other pursuits connected with human improvement: the love of activity animates others; the desire of increasing and diffusing happiness many more. These three motives, in various ways compounded and modified, have actually produced, and are now producing, the greater part of the higher useful intellectual and moral exertions amongst men: those, not rich, exerting themselves from such motives, must include the means of living in their remuneration; but it does not follow that the desire of obtaining those means, was the inspiring motive to those higher exertions. It is doubtful whether in almost any well-authenticated case, the mere love of wealth, for its palpable pleasures or distinctions, or both, has been the sole motive to any really useful exertions of genius, in writing or action: so also of the mere love of power; they have led men to difficult, to splendid, exertions, but to most pernicious exertions, which have been the curse of their fellow-creatures' happiness always, and mostly of their own.

For different species of exertion, by action or thought, different motives are requisite: for the great bulk of ordinary actions necessary to procure food, lodging, and clothing, and other real conveniences dependent on wealth, the desire of partaking in such pleasures, and of acquiring, whether by individual or combined effort, the necessary materials of gratification, is the appropriate and just motive. This the preceding reasonings have not only admitted, but have endeavoured to demonstrate. But, all these wants or desires gratified, other sources of happiness, by means of other exertions, present themselves. These pleasures do not operate by means

of wealth, nor of course is wealth the natural motive for exciting to the exertions necessary to obtain them. The question therefore is, whether these other motives exist in greater vigor in general society, or in the associated communities; and whether that abundant supply of all real wants and comforts, which is the necessary basis on which these higher exertions must be founded, exists to a greater extent in general society, or in the associated communities?

In general society, 'tis only a few, the rich, that are above the reach of want, and permitted to come under the possible influence of these higher motives: but even these, from their education and habits, such motives can seldom reach. Their wealth also, from the caprices and frauds of political power and of the various expedients of insecurity, is always in danger; so that few have the opportunity, and still fewer the inclination, of resigning themselves to the influence of these motives, and engaging in the useful exertions to which they would lead. Almost all the higher intellectual exertions of society, are now perverted from useful general objects to the pursuits of selfish individual gain; and the highest powers are prostituted, in the race of envy and strife, to stand foremost in the acquisition of wealth as a source of distinction: so that the comparatively few, who, from useful motives, pursue useful objects, are by the general herd looked upon as unaccountable beings, fools to their own interest; the objectors having never felt any other interest but that of a pecuniary nature.

In the co-operating communities, all these circumstances would be reversed. There *all* are raised above the reach of want: there, the pursuit of wealth as a mere source of distinction, or for any other purpose than the rational one of enjoying its products, cannot exist: there, all the young are equally educated in all really useful knowledge and good habits: there, all have leisure for intellectual pursuits: there, public opinion is steadily and usefully operative, and always ready to reward with its sympathy and gratitude even the unsuccessful efforts of him who labors by rare and difficult exertions to increase the common stock of happiness: there, will operate most strongly the desire of benefiting general society, of benefiting all of the family of mankind: there, the paths of avarice and ambition are blocked up: there, are no paths left for the development of exalted talents and exertions, but such as are useful to the agent and his fellow-creatures: there, are no constantly operating sources of distraction to bribe or force all exalted talent and exertion into the eternal career of competition for endless heaps of individual wealth: there, all the capabilities of the community are kept under a species of con-

stant requisition, by the means of instruction presented equally to all, so that no peculiarity of talent can fail of being called forth.

Can there be then any sort of comparison as to the quantity of the higher species of talent and exertion, *of the useful class*, to be expected in these communities and in general society? for it is freely admitted, that for those high qualities and actions vulgarly called great, no motive will, in the co-operating communities, be to be found.

“Of the merely useful class it may be,” continues an objector; “on utility these communities are founded: to mere useful objects will their exertions be directed. But is human exertion to stop there?—what becomes of the *ornamental*? painting, sculpture, music, poetry, eloquence? Are these to be abandoned as useless?—what time is left for such refined pursuits? how, under the co-operating arrangements, can they be cultivated? Are these amongst the useless or the pernicious pursuits?”

The fact with respect to these secondary or lighter pleasures, called ornamental or those of taste, seems to be, that, in the co-operating communities, the capacity and the inclination of deriving pleasure from them, will be diffused to the utmost extent; that is to say, will be shared by all the members of the community; whereas, in society at large, it is not one individual in five hundred, who has the inclination, the time, or the means of pursuing or enjoying these lighter pleasures. On the other hand, it must be equally confessed that the comparatively few who in general society practise or admire these works of taste, set an exclusive and higher value upon them, much beyond what would be apt to prevail in the co-operating minds, where the pleasure was more diffused. The only rational questions on this branch of the subject are, first, Is more happiness to be attained by the diffusion through the whole community, or by the exclusive pursuit by a few, of these lighter ornamental pleasures? Next, Supposing less were gained by the *diffusion* amongst the co-operating communities than was lost in *intensity* as felt by a few only, would not this loss be more than counterbalanced to them by other pleasures of a superior order which must be sacrificed to attain this intensity?

Where to all minds are given, equal opportunities of development by a common system of education, the pleasures arising from the fine arts, poetry, painting, music, sculpture, &c., are incalculably increased by their diffusion; just like the pleasures derived from the distribution of articles of wealth: for the increased pleasure which one individual out of five

hundred derives from critical acumen, does not perhaps outweigh the simple pleasures of two persons of ordinary culture and sensibility. The pleasures of the four hundred and ninety-eight are therefore so much gained. But supposing that the critical and exclusive admirer, derived more pleasure from the object of his idolatry than the united simple pleasures of the five hundred ordinarily cultivated minds, the second question would still remain; Is he therefore *happier* than any one of the five hundred, not to say than the whole united? If not, the exclusive pursuit of such pleasures, would be irrational. If he be happier than any ordinarily endowed and educated member of the community, then is it rational that he should inoculate all the members with his peculiar taste; and it being their interest to receive the inoculation, and they the sole selectors of their means of happiness, what hinders them from receiving it? "There is water, what hinders them from being baptized?"

Doubtless, in as far as any of these communities may, on a rational estimate of the time and effort requisite to enjoy the more delicate pleasures of the fine arts, deem them productive of preponderant happiness over any other way of expending the same time and effort, they will be pursued. Beyond this point, 'tis folly, not wisdom, to pursue them. The enthusiast for excellence in any of these, will here be under the most favorable circumstances for the development of his peculiar talent; not, as in general society, seeking out patrons, and a prey to want: but here, a good general education having laid the basis for all real excellence, half a dozen leisure hours every day being at his disposal, as soon as a tendency to excellence is discovered in painting, in poetry, in sculpture, in music, would it not be equally the interest of the community and his own, that he should devote even some, or the whole, of his ordinary working hours to his peculiar talent? Is his talent, painting, sculpture, music, poetry? he ornaments the community's buildings and grounds, or amuses their ears or minds with the products of his art, *at the cost of ordinary labor*,—not, as now, at the cost of one hundred times ordinary labor. The reward of excellence, sympathy in the increased pleasures of his friends, he obtains. Does he wish to *sell* his talents to general society, he has but to leave the community, either by selling his share to the community itself or to any other purchaser; thus acquiring a stock for immediate support. If he be animated with the flame of real genius guided by benevolence, he will not leave the community, but attract to it the additional admiration of those who set a rational value on ornamental pursuits, and teach the proud

possessors of specimens of the ornamental arts, what this real value is. Music, all will more or less learn, as an accessory amusement in the course of education. Drawing will be an instrument of education, impressing more strongly on the mind, objects of nature and art, their qualities and uses, and varying mental with muscular exertion. The only useful part of poetry, that which justly describes human feelings and actions and objects of nature and art, surrounding them all with useful, endearing or energetic, associations, may here be pursued; pursued with all the ardor with which nature and truth inspire young minds: but to these—to nature and truth—will poetry in such a community be ever subordinate. Most probably an organ or some other musical instrument, would be erected for singing, dancing, amusement at meals; and other purposes, in some hall, of most or all of these communities; the smaller instruments dependent on the fancy of individuals.

The delicate pleasures of the fine arts thus disposed of, shall we be frightened with an anticipation of a dull uniformity of character? Dullness, it need not be said, is in these communities of free inquiry, impossible, till all the facts of nature and the command of all her energies, shall have been explored and mastered. *Then*, if the mere use of all these mighty means of happiness, acting on the various and perhaps improved nervous susceptibilities of our organization, be not sufficient to ward off dullness, such communities must be satisfied to be dull. To uniformity they must also plead guilty, if to be all, intelligent, moral, and happy, be to be uniform. Variety of characters and incidents in ordinary life and the tumultuous excitements of society, arise from two sources; from the mixture of the depraved and the wretched on the one hand with the general mass, and on the other from the mixture of the enlightened and good. That part of the variety and stirring excitement, which arises from the admixture of vices and crimes, the co-operating communities certainly cannot enjoy. Better to be dull, than to be excited by the hearing and seeing of vices and misery. Thieving cannot exist, where every one owns every thing, where every want is supplied, and where of course there is nothing to steal; falsehoods and perjuries cannot exist where nothing can be gained by practising them; civil strifes and contentions cannot exist about property, where there are no individual possessions: where none are in want, assaults and murders cannot take place to extort the necessities of life, nor will such occupations as those of highway-robbers, shop-lifters, &c., exist. Hence the high excitements of fear, of violence, and fraud on the one side,

and on the other of tormenting and life-destroying punishments at public executions; hence the high excitements from the gentlemanly reverses of gamblers, from the after-pangs of drunken midnight debauch, the suicides that so beautifully vary the terminations of human existence, will be unknown. Almost all the lofty excitements to vigilance of conduct arising from these, and from crimes and vices like these, will cease; and the uniformity of enjoyment, morality and happiness, arising from the cessation of crimes and vices must be borne, though such a state should appear dull. But as it is allowed that a state of non-excitement cannot be to sentient creatures a state of happiness, these communities will be impelled, in order to withdraw themselves from the monotony of inorganic existence, from mere freedom from evil, to seek out for some exciting causes, over and above the supply of their physical wants, and the amusement and interest of their daily occupations. These will be found in a ten-fold or a hundred-fold increase of all those excitements of pleasing enthusiasm, which the general pursuit of science, art, and beneficence, cannot fail to produce. Not an improvement in moral or physical science, that will not give more general interest throughout all these communities of well-informed men, than the announcement of wholesale robberies and murders under the name of war and glory, now produce in general society. But the feelings excited, how different in their nature and effects! The wide wish of benevolence will dilate from the expanded foreheads of such communities over the interests, the affairs, of all nations: from the contest of mutual destruction, their thoughts will be directed to the emulation of mutual good. Whatever social regulation, agricultural or mechanical improvement, have been any where made; whatever casualties or natural phenomena occur over the globe, will be, at meals, at labor, as well as at hours of leisure, the means of constantly-recurring excitements to such communities, while man and nature exist; because there are none of those things which, by the equal opportunities of common enjoyment, will not be brought immediately home to the interest of every individual. The differences of the nervous, as well as the muscular and organic systems of individuals, will ensure, under the rule of free inquiry, and the thence-resulting eternal progress in knowledge, all the freshness of originality, as well as individuality, of character, which is necessary for individual personal excitement. Add to these, the affections of friendship and love, where these feelings can neither be bought, nor sold, nor feigned, nor entered into nor bound together by mercenary motives; and it will be found that while in these communities almost all sources of painful

excitement leading to preponderant mischief are excluded, the sources of pleasurable excitement of the highest class, and leading always to preponderant good, are beyond calculation increased.

The two popular objections to the proposed system of voluntary co-operation, which have been discussed—the dread of restraints, and the dread of uniformity of character—are the only ones of a *moral* nature which appeared of that importance to call for particular notice here. The popular objections of an *economical* nature next claim our attention.

It is said, that “the establishment of these co-operating communities would not root out the principle of competition, nor the consequent injurious depression of wages; but would shift the competition from individual laborers to individual communities; that as these communities increased, they would vie with each other in the sale of their surplus produce, as individuals do now, and in the same way bring down the remuneration of their labor; that competition in dress, in other comforts, and even in luxuries, would spring up between these rival communities; that wealth, instead of being pursued and hoarded by private individuals, would be as keenly contended for by these mutually jealous corporate aggregates of individuals.”

This objection proceeds on the admission of by far the greater proportion of the benefits expected from the system of mutual co-operation. All the clashing of interests, and the crimes and vices to which they give rise, between the individual members of the communities, cease; the advantages of the increased productiveness of labor, are enjoyed by all in increased comforts and increased leisure, disposable to other sources of happiness; and all the facilities for education and instruction, remain. Nor are these blessings to be lessened until the communities become so numerous as to begin to supersede the present mode of production by individual competition. It would appear therefore that an evil so remote, and extending to so small a portion of the system, might be left to find its cure by means of expedients which the increasing wisdom excited by the new institutions would induce. To fling away an immense mass of good, because a small portion of the evils of our present institutions must, after all our efforts, remain attached to it, would not appear to be wise. Is it any way probable, however, that these evils would take place?

For the principles of competition we must refer to ch. iii. sect. 1, p. 247. The competition that injuriously keeps down the remuneration of labor, or wages, is that which is carried on between the capitalists and the productive laborers,—not

that which takes place between capitalists themselves, in the disposal of their goods. But even the capitalist, as has been shown, would do little if left to himself: 'tis by means of the brutal expedients of insecurity, by keeping the whole mass of the productive classes in absolute ignorance, and by the varied employment of force and terror, sometimes decked with the name of law, sometimes under the name of custom, that the capitalist is enabled to keep down the remuneration of labor. The mere competition of producers, if left to the natural laws of distribution—free labor, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges—would be entirely of the exhilarating instead of the depressing species; and supported by increasing intelligence, would be ever on the advance with the increase of improvement in the arts, and of prudential and other moral habits in the people, till every laborer under equal security (casualties excepted) would be also a capitalist. This state of things is partially illustrated in the non-slave States of the North American Union, where the *nearest approach* has been made to equal security, though little has been yet done to impart more than the mere rudiments of knowledge to the people.

Now as it is here supposed, and as few will be inclined to dispute, that the general diffusion of the system of labor by mutual co-operation and common possession and enjoyment, would, from its moral influence, undermine, and leave no efficient supporters to, the present systems of insecurity, by whatever new, or old, or yet to be discovered, expedients supported; it follows that all the individual members of these communities being essentially capitalists as well as laborers, and laborers as well as capitalists, the one character would merge in that of the other, and in all transactions the greater interest, that of the laborer, would preponderate. The co-operating communities have, each of them, a mass of surplus produce to dispose of: but under what interest do they dispose of it, and to what species of customers? They dispose of it as laborers who have produced it, not to mere capitalists, but to other communities, laborers (as well as capitalists) like themselves. If under the exhilarating competition of equal security amongst individuals, the effect would be, *in spite* of the competition of mere capitalists unassisted by the expedients of insecurity, constantly to raise the remuneration of labor with the advance of improvement, while it at the same time cheapened the articles produced to society at large and consequently to all laborers, enabling the labor of all to go further; how much more powerfully would the principle of love of enjoyment, and of acquired habit, operate, amongst a community of laborers, from

the private transactions of whom with each other, competition had been altogether banished by mutual co-operation? Why should these communities of capitalist-laborers wish to undersell each other, further than as new processes had enabled them to produce with less labor? Is it their interest to undersell? Evidently not. All underselling is a sacrifice of produce, of the means of happiness; and will not take place if some stronger interest do not come in the way to compel it. Under the expedients of insecurity, that stronger interest has place: necessity forces the producers to the sacrifice, to a sacrifice never voluntarily made, but by the lovers of insecurity ignorantly or hypocritically styled voluntary. This necessity of the laborers underselling the produce of their labor, arises from the higher necessity of continuing existence, though in a state of depression. Under mutual co-operation, where could such necessity be found? Neither of the communities exchanging, is under any necessity, for the support of existence, to sell: the very first object of their mutual co-operation, is to procure an abundance of food and the other necessities of life. Where is the motive then, where is the necessity, for a sacrifice of their surplus produce for any other articles produced by less labor than they expended in that produce? If on such terms they cannot exchange, what is to prevent them from making the article immediately themselves, instead of any thing to be exchanged for it; or from making a substitute for it? or from doing without it, and directing that portion of their labor into a channel entirely new? It is clear that the general exchanges of the co-operating communities with each other, would not tend to the competition of underselling, so contrary to their interest, and demanded by no superior necessity, but to a demand of a just equivalent of labor for labor, and no more. Why wish to procure in exchange from another co-operating community of kindred producers, more of an article wanted than could be made by a quantity of labor equal to that which they expended on their own produce offered in exchange? 'Tis the interest of both communities, to get as much as they can respectively for their surplus produce. The desire of the one is met and checked by that of the other: neither of them is compelled to sell to support existence, all the immediate wants of both being supplied, and neither having any factitious advantage over the other. What will be the result? Necessarily the fixing on that price, the medium of exchange, which will promote most the interest of both parties. What is that? The amount of the labor contained in the articles to be exchanged. To aid this just estimate, spring forward the habits of the lives of the exchanging communities.

From all their internal arrangements, the principle of competition, with all its mysteries, falsehoods, and circumventings, has been banished. To enjoy the products of united labor and no more, has been the rule and practice of their lives. How revolting to them the injustice of taking away the products of the labor of others without the voluntary consent of the producers, either by force or by fraudulent representations of value! Bargain-making is unknown to them. Here then are interest and previous habits both operating on the side of justice—labor for labor, equal amounts for equal amounts; if no exact estimate can be found, mutual good faith will arrange, to the satisfaction of both parties, the apprehended amount of the labor to be exchanged as represented by the commodities. Here also is no counteracting necessity, to over-rule habits and all minor interests. The exchanges therefore will be made on the basis of the presumed amount of the labor expended on the respective productions. Should the labor of either of the parties have been misapplied, and consequently less productive than the average of labor, such defects cannot be taken into the calculation; but the discovery of them will lead the neglectful or unskilful party to revise their habits or improve their machinery or skill. If these communities exchange their surplus products with the capitalists of general society, their principles, because their well-understood, comprehensive interests, will be the same; but from the habits of the second party, more time and trouble may be expended in making the arrangement.

The interest of capitalists, which under the institutions of insecurity plays so important a part, which swallows up all other interests in the arrangements now made for the distribution of wealth,—under the proposed arrangements of voluntary equality by mutual co-operation, would cease to exist. There would be no other interest in the community, but that of producers: there would be no capitalists. Capital would signify no more than the necessary means of labor, or products of labor for enjoyment. No capitalists distinct from laborers, no capital as a source of revenue, of support independent of labor, would exist. None of those evils therefore, which spring from the competition or rather from the force or the fraud of capitalists, mostly under the shield of political power, could have place, either in the interior of such communities, or in their exchanges. In exchanging, the communities are mere laborers, desirous of a fair equivalent in labor for what their labor has produced. To amass capital by means of barter and profit on exchanges, in order to live on the produce of the labor of others, by getting into their

hands the articles necessary to make the labor of others productive, can form no part of their policy. If it did, and if it succeeded, it would bring all the miseries of excessive wealth, of idleness, in its train. But as we have seen that other capitalists, if left to themselves, unaided by the institutions of insecurity, could not have reduced their fellow-creatures to the abject mental and physical state in which they exist; neither could these communities, disclaiming such aid, as long as they remain faithful to the principles of their association, succeed in the accumulation of capital by profits on exchanges. By accumulating instead of enjoying, they might do so: but as the loss of enjoyment would be immediate, great in extent to the amount of the whole capital, while the advantage would be remote, comparatively insignificant, and but the interest or profit on the amount saved; it is one of the most improbable suppositions that can be formed, that a whole community of co-operating laborers should resign the enjoyments of the greater portion of the laborious part of their lives, that they might live without labor on the produce of the labor of others, (or with equal labor and its enjoyments increased by profits superadded from without,) for the remainder of their lives. Capitals are now accumulated out of the savings from *other people's* labor, not from those of the capitalist: by such means as those of self-produced accumulations, capitals for income never have been and never can be formed: it would be irrational; it would be encroaching on necessary enjoyment to-day, for the sake of superfluous enjoyment to-morrow. There remains then the creating of capital by barter, by profit on exchange. What is the object of these communities in exchanging? To procure for enjoyment an article which they want, in lieu of one of which they have a superabundance. If they make what is called a good exchange, what is the consequence? Simply, that the whole community has a fourth or a fifth more for consumption of the article procured in exchange. Which is more likely, which is more wise, that the community should enjoy this increased quantity (supposing it not to be superfluous for use), or that it should direct it to be rected into a stock for barter? On the appropriation of a stock for barter, some of the members must be appointed to manage this stock: these delegated capitalists must adopt the usual principles of trade and chicanery, of giving as little and getting as much as possible, which is mostly done by taking advantage of the ignorance or wants of others. By this act the community in fact dissolves itself, and brings upon itself with its own hand all the evils, which the object of its associa-

tion was to remove—for ever to banish. But could they act thus? The managers of the bartering stock, imbued with the vices of general society, would find means of appropriating to their own use this bartering stock as it accumulated, and of joining the society congenial to them. If in order to avoid this evil, the managers were frequently changed, the principles of bartering would pervade and corrupt the whole community, and plunder would still take place. But why should the community set aside any part of the articles procured for their annual consumption and enjoyment, for such a purpose? Has their labor produced them more than they can advantageously consume and enjoy during the year? If so, how absurd to add to it, to make provision for an increase of that which is already superfluous! or, to surrender the immediate enjoyment of large masses for the future uncertain enjoyment of smaller, in the way of profit! Why *over-labor* one year in order to *under-labor* another? Why not spread moderate labor, so necessary to health and enjoyment, equally over every year? Though an individual might, perhaps, wisely over-work, during health to provide against contingencies of disease, old age, or accident, no such reason could operate with a whole co-operating community, who form an insurance company to each other within themselves, and whose aggregate health never fails. If the useful and healthy labor of the present year, produces enough and to spare for the enjoyment of the year, what is to hinder the labor of the succeeding and of every future year from yielding the same abundant produce? If the mechanical labor of the year have been too productive, why not lessen the time for labor, and devote it to other pursuits more productive of happiness? Could the foolish idea be harboured in such a community, that it is easier and sweeter to live by profit and idleness on other's labor, than by industry and healthy exertion on their own? Has the whole of the history of mankind, told them in vain that the mercantile concerns of great bodies of men have been always mismanaged and directed to the aggrandizement of the managers of such concerns, at the expense of the capital accumulated by the previous industry of the individual contributors? And with these results of experience before them, will they embark on a fallacious, or needless, or wicked plan of amassing capital, to endeavour by means of the expedients of trade, to live in idleness on the produce of their fellow-creatures' toils? As far as capital is made use of as a mere means of productive labor and enjoyment, it may be most beneficially managed by such communities through their committees or otherwise; but

from the moment that it is converted into a trading stock and made a source of profit, the inevitable evils of barter will follow in its train.

If the communities were numerous, such a thing as bartering could not exist. There would be but one *wholesale* exchange in every community, for every article necessary for all the members thereof. Suppose these articles were thirty or forty: there would be so many wholesale transactions with other communities producing such superfluous articles. Retail bartering is out of the question. The same motive that led one community to exchange with a manufacturing community, without intermediate agents, their mutual surplus products, would lead all other communities to do the same: and though it would be quite absurd for an individual to supply his small demands from the manufacture (the expense of communication, carriage, &c. more than counter-balancing the increased sale price) in preference to the retail shop, it would be as absurd, in a whole community, not to supply its wholesale demands in that manner. 'Tis private individual consumption, that makes all the intricacies of bartering inevitable. A wholesale speculating community would not find customers, were it able to support the immense warehouses and the immense double carriage such wholesale transactions would require. Neither during the progress, nor at the ultimate prevalence of such communities, would there be any danger of their forming themselves into mercantile or trading establishments. If a co-operating community exported its own surplus produce, this would be adding only one to its yearly or half-yearly exchanges. Men now accumulate capital for profits, because it is acquired, not at the expense of their own labor, but of the labor of others. Where the producers accumulate, the check of the inconvenience of production, is always sufficient to prevent injurious accumulation for profits, to prevent further accumulations than such as are necessary to increase the productive powers of their own labor.

For these reasons it may be safely relied on, that these communities can never convert themselves into trading companies: it is not their interest, and they must necessarily be wise enough to see their interest.

Instead of such short-sighted and abortive attempts to live, by trafficking, on the labor of others, the increase of enjoyment will steadily proceed amongst the co-operating communities with the progress of industry and improvement in the sciences and the arts of life, whether effected by themselves or by others. This progress will be in many respects similar, in many superior, to that which would take place amongst indi-

viduals under the influence of equal security. A community makes an improvement, in agriculture suppose, by which grain is produced at one-fourth less cost of labor than before. What are the consequences? If the quantity of grain produced were before abundant for all useful purposes, (including always a stock in hand against the casualties of the seasons,) one-fourth of the labor, or time, previously directed to the production of grain, is now free for any other purpose of muscular or intellectual exertion, or of amusement or repose, which may be deemed most conducive to happiness. By means of the press, the improvement is immediately diffused through society at large; and by the improving community is enjoyed the additional pleasure of being the cause of diffusing so much additional happiness, or means of happiness, to all other individuals, by cheapening the production of one of the articles most necessary for human comfort. No patent, no monopoly, no exclusive privilege of any sort would be sought for by the discoverers. These expedients are induced and rendered necessary under the institutions of insecurity; by the regular operation of which the laborer is deprived of the products of his labor, by direct plunder or by indirect fraud and terror. That all motive to improvement, by the loss of which the privileged as well as the industrious would suffer, may not be withdrawn, patents and similar expedients are resorted to, to meet such cases and to remunerate the improvers. Were all the expedients of insecurity removed; were all individuals, whether producing alone or in mutual co-operation, assured of the free use of their faculties, and of all the products of the exertion of those faculties, the desire of enjoyment on the one hand, the love of public sympathy and of diffusing happiness on the other, would be motives abundant to prompt to every possible effort at improvement and to repay those efforts. In another co-operating community, discoveries are made by which heat or light are disengaged, or by which leather, woollens, or linens are fabricated at half the usual cost of effort. An additional quantity of labor is thus set free for other useful purposes, first in the community making the improvements, next and quickly throughout society at large. Thus every community derives immediate benefit from the progress of industry wherever developed: and the reciprocity, the quickness of the extension of the mutual benefits to all, produce incalculably more happiness than could be procured by confining the secret and the enjoyment of each discovery to the individual or community who made it.

In case the improvement was made upon an article of surplus produce, for exchange, what would be the effect? The article.

produced, say with half the labor, is of half the value it previously was: of course, as the improvement becomes generally known, double, or nearly double, the quantity will be necessary to command the articles previously obtained in exchange. This increased quantity will either supply and give enjoyment to those who were before unable to purchase at the high cost of production, or will give increased enjoyment of the same article to those who previously used it, or will set free a portion of their time and labor for other pursuits. In consequence, they will be enabled by this surplus time to produce more abundantly those things, whatever they might be, which they were accustomed to give in exchange. They will therefore be able to afford to give, and they will give, the products of *rather more* than half the labor which they were formerly under the necessity of giving for the now cheapened articles. So as to every other thing which the improving community gets in exchange for its cheapened surplus produce; the benefit will be shared between it and those with whom it exchanges, in proportion to the quantity of labor set free to each by the reduced cost, the reduced labor expended in production, of the cheapened article. Thus will the benefit of the discovery of every new useful article, or improvement of the old, be equally diffused through the whole of society. If any of the purchasers of the cheapened article, refused to give more than the exact half of the produce of the labor they used to give, when its cost of production was double, the consequence would be, that the improving community would direct a portion of its freed labor to the production of the article withheld, or of some substitute for it, which, or the capacity of doing which, would reduce the demand to that of a fair equivalent. Equality of labor and exertion would every where, by means of free distribution, produce an equality of enjoyment of the articles of wealth. It would be for every individual community to determine what portion of their time it would most tend to their happiness to appropriate to the production of such articles. Amongst individual producers under equal security, the habit of enjoying increased remuneration in increased wages, we have seen to be such, as gradually to erect, in the public opinion, into things necessary for decent and comfortable subsistence, called the necessaries of life, whatever the progress of industry may have enabled the producers for a certain portion of time to enjoy. In these communities, mutual co-operation secures still more effectually and impartially the same advantages to all, liable to none of the casualties to which the most perfect individual exertion must ever remain exposed. Thus, as discoveries and improve-

ments proceeded, and as labor became in any co-operating community more productive, the blessing would be diffused impartially to all, and would be in their own keeping. No competition of capitalists or of the communities with each other, could interrupt the progress. Every community would supply its own wants by a few wholesale exchanges; there would be no markets or customers, where, or by whom, these competition sales, bringing down prices beneath a fair remuneration of labor, could take place. It is admitted by the objector, that while only a few of the co-operating communities existed here and there, they would produce so much cheaper than the laborers of general society, that they would have nothing to fear from competition in the market; but would each enjoy their own cheapened abundant productions. In the present state of society, of labor by competition, the benefits of any improvements cheapening production, are reaped for as long a time as possible by a few capitalists, leaving as little benefit as possible either to the ignorant productive laborers or to the consumers. Under the system of co-operation, the whole of society would be immediately benefited by any improvement; and in proportion as a multiplicity of improvements cheapened productions, either the number of hours of labor would be lessened for all, or a greater abundance of articles of wealth and enjoyment would be produced, according to the tastes of different communities.

If any particular community, not being, from whatever cause, as industrious or skilful as its neighbours, produced less in the same time, it must be content to enjoy less, if it made no exchange. Making an exchange, the value of the products of its labor must be estimated by the average produce of ordinary industry: to rate them higher, would be to give a premium to indolence, enabling the most idle and least skilful of the communities to live at the expense of the industrious: rating them at this standard, would quicken the industry of all.

If the fear be altogether vain, that the competition of these intelligent capitalist-laboring communities would, in the disposal of their surplus produce, reduce it beneath the cost of production (the amount of the labor bestowed upon it), in a way similar to the depressing effects we see every day produced on the wages of individual labor, by competition amongst ignorant laborers, not capitalists, and overawed and overwhelmed by capitalists armed with all the expedients of insecurity; how much more vain is the fear as to competition in dress, elegancies, luxuries, &c., between the members of different communities!

All communities having from nature an equal capacity for production, each will direct its productive powers, or enjoy repose, as it may deem most conducive to its happiness. Objects of dress, elegance, luxury, will be estimated according to their intrinsic value, their real utility; not forgetting in the estimate any one pleasurable quality, the lustre and softness of the silk, or the peculiar flavour of the exotic production. All factitious importance given to articles of wealth as mere sources of distinction, will be forgotten with those distinctions which equality of wealth annihilates. If therefore the members of any community should see those of another dressed in a different way, using a new article of food, or of furniture—what follows? The question occurs: Is this dress, on the whole, more useful than ours, colour, form, texture, material, cost, (quantity of labor employed in its fabrication,) and all other items included? If so, we will adopt it; and the community now using it, will aid us in the calculation and instruct us in the mode of fabrication. Just in the same way as to articles of furniture or food. We may perhaps differ as to our estimate of value; in which case our labor will not be directed to the procuring of the new article, either by immediate fabrication or by exchange. If no difference of climate, or superior facility of production, can be adduced, our sole remaining contest will be, as to accuracy of the facts on which our inferences are founded, or the fairness of those inferences. To solve the first, we resort to experiment: for the second, we re-compare our inferences, endeavouring to unravel the circumstances which led to a difference of judgment. As it will be ultimately in the power of every community, by so directing its labor, to use the same articles with other communities, such articles can never be objects of vain emulation. As they will no longer indicate superior individual wealth with all its present attendants, there will be no public deference paid to the whims of particular individuals in varying their dress or furniture. Utility apart, they will be as unimportant, as the colour of gooseberries, exciting wonder towards the person who should deem them of importance. As a stimulus to excite industry, substantial use terminating in happiness of some species, is sufficiently energetic for all good purposes. Respecting clothing and food, many experiments remain to be made: little accurate knowledge is yet ascertained on these, as on so many other, subjects, important to human welfare.

What has been said may perhaps serve as an answer to another *economical* objection, namely, that “these co-operating communities would acquire a corporation spirit, that

the rule of them would be seized by a few, and the spirit of domination, if not of gain, would creep in, and mar the expected benefits."

If these co-operating communities were governed like other corporations, by charters given at the caprice of political power, and containing regulations out of the controul of the associated members, by means of which, a few or any number less than the majority of the community, could make the interests of their fellow-creatures, (the guidance of what ought to be their voluntary actions or the use of the products of their labor,) subservient to their supposed peculiar interests; no doubt such ruling favoured individuals would be moulded by the unfavourable circumstances in which they would thus be placed; and sheltered by political power, they would form a new support and partnership with it, and new institutions of insecurity would be invented to controul and frustrate the efforts of *associated* labor, as they have been hitherto devised to render impotent *individual* exertion. *No such communities are advocated in this work.* Whatever community is not self-governed as to its internal regulations, wants that *security*, without which all industry and all enjoyment, whether by co-operation or by individual effort, are suspended by a thread, and cannot by rational men be pursued in peace. Such communities, if governed by charter and on corporation principles, would cease to be communities of *voluntary* co-operation: their charm would be gone: the few of them so established would find no imitators; and if such were the principles, the surrender of private opinion as to the most interesting matters of internal arrangements, on which alone they could be established, they would soon cease to be instituted. The general laws of all existing societies, are little more than piles of restrictions on all human efforts, words, and consequently thoughts. To *evade* these, the co-operating communities were devised; or whether so devised or not, such is their most useful, their paramount, effect. How absurd then to re-institute, under another name, new restrictions, containing the germ (ruling by will, or by delusion, instead of ruling by reason through the conviction of the understanding) of all the evils, which these co-operating communities are devised to remedy! It is evident on the other hand, that if these communities are governed on principles diametrically the reverse of charter and corporation principles, if they are governed on the principle of perfect equality of all sane adults, instead of the principle of exclusion in any shape, no corporation evils can follow them. Corporate bodies, whether trading or not, have been always more or less miniature resemblances of the expe-

dients of the higher political power from which they were derived. Self-government, or the guidance of our actions by motives influencing the will through the understanding, is the only basis of all really useful action, whether in private life, in small communities, or in the affairs of general society, as well as international concerns. Whatever right, founded on its tendency to produce happiness, or preponderant good, any one individual has to this rational voluntary direction of his own actions, every other adult individual ought to have, for exactly the same reasons, the same right.

But of all the objections brought forward against social improvement, whether to be produced by individual exertion or by mutual co-operation, none has of late days been so triumphantly put forward, as that arising from what have been called the "principles of population." Particularly against systems of equality, has this objection, half moral, half economical, been directed. It has been the grand scare-crow to frighten away all attempts at social improvement. It cannot therefore be entirely passed over here, though volumes have been written upon it. This objection in effect says; "Improve as you may, multiply ever so abundantly the means of physical, intellectual, and moral good; there is lurking in the very constitution of man a source of evil, a principle of counter-action, hitherto overlooked, the mischievous action of which will be accelerated in proportion to this very improvement, and will produce an extent of devastation commensurate with the extent and intensity of previous happiness."

Were all this true, the question to be solved would be, "Will more happiness, on the whole, be produced by letting things remain as they are without effort, or by bringing about alterations of splendid happiness and deep misery?"

But the objection is founded on a gross mis-statement of fact, and on an utter ignorance, as well of the artificial nature of the absolute structure of society, as of the human mind, and of new social combinations.

It is admitted to these objectors, that there is a physical capability of increasing the numbers of the human species greater than any known physical capability of increasing the quantity of food necessary for human subsistence. It is also admitted, that nothing could be more useful in the present state of human knowledge, than to bring forward this important question for minute and uncompromising discussion.

In the physical constitution of man, there is a possibility of increasing the numbers of his kind at a quicker rate than the quantity of food. There is also a physical possibility of increasing the number of sheep or of silk-worms beyond the

quantity of food (grass, roots, or leaves,) necessary for their support. But who ever inferred from thence that human prudence was not sufficient, by means of the most obvious calculation, to limit this possibility of increase of these useful animals, to the food to be afforded them, and the purposes to be derived to man from their existence? As this power of breeding in their own species, is fully as much under the controul of human beings, as the same power in any animals which they rear; why should not the same principles of prudence be used in regulating the increase of men, as in regulating the increase of sheep or silk-worms? This general reply appears sufficient to the general objection.

But particulars are adduced: a long parade is made of historical facts; and from these it is sought to be established, that the mass of mankind are not only utterly devoid of prudence in this particular, but that in proportion to the general improvement in their circumstances, the supply of food always included, they necessarily indulge in the propensity to increase, till from the mere effect of over-numbers, of numbers beyond food, the old state of wretchedness, or a worse state, is brought back again; and so always and eternally in irremediable succession of want, vice, and misery; and abundance, morality, and happiness.

It is necessary here to premise, that were all this satisfactorily proved as to the *past* conduct of the great mass of mankind, it would only prove that great evils had been hitherto experienced by this great mass, the ignorant part, of mankind, from want of prudence respecting the increase of numbers. It would by no means prove that these evils were irremediable, that prudence could not be acquired, and that those evils must proceed for ever, because they had hitherto existed. Exactly on the same principle might it be said that force and fraud, the ingredients in varied proportions of all past expedients of insecurity, must ever prevail in the distribution of wealth, the product of human labor, because they have unhappily hitherto prevailed. Arguments like these are the eternal sophisms of ignorance. "These evils exist: I do not know how they may be avoided: therefore they must remain for ever." Such arguments were once equally cogent when applied to physical science: it is time that moral, should be as free from the precedents of past ignorance as physical, science. We might as rationally stop our inquiries respecting chemical or mechanical improvements, because in all past ages they had not yet been made, as abandon social improvement, because the evils arising from violence, from delusion, from imprudent increase of numbers, from ignorance, had

not yet been obviated. Yet weighed in the balance of reason, such is the real value of the population argument against social improvement. "It is a bar which no effort has yet removed: therefore no effort will be able to remove it; and therefore all effort to ameliorate social institutions, and to increase happiness under the equal security of the natural laws of distribution, whether by individual competition or by mutual co-operation, is delusive."

Now instead of such conclusions from such facts with respect to the improvement of the social machine, the simple conclusion of reason would be exactly similar to that which every maker of a steam-engine would come to, on discovering a defect hitherto unperceived retarding its motion, or counteracting the useful results expected from it. He would look upon the discovery of the defect as no unimportant step towards its removal, and would use double exertion to discover the means of removing it; no well ascertained law of nature (regular unvarying succession of natural phænomena) opposing such removal.

In this moral case, however, respecting the social machine, the remedy is absolutely indicated at the same time, and by the same process, that the defect is discovered. The defect is the tendency to increase beyond the supply of food: this defect arising from the want of prudence in the regulation of a natural appetite, on the part of the great mass, the ignorant mass, of mankind. If it be possible to impart prudence to the great mass of mankind, the evils said to arise from a want of prudence are plainly not irremediable. Not only has this prudence respecting the tendency to increase, prevailed amongst the rich portion, those living without labor, of every community; but they have been constantly reproached with the excess of this prudence as a vice; they have been punished for this supposed vice by foolish penal laws, and their numbers have been constantly kept up by recruits from the poorer classes. To impart prudence, is to impart knowledge of facts and habits of self-controul restraining immediate inclination for the sake of greater preponderant good. If it be possible to give this knowledge and these habits to one portion of society, we are at all events so far assured as to see that there is no law of nature against imparting knowledge and habits of self-controul to other portions of society, or generally to all the members thereof. This leads to the real solution of the pretended difficulty. The lovers of the institutions of insecurity, know full well that no law of nature prevents knowledge and habits of self-controul from being given to all: but they more than fear that such knowledge would be incompati-

ble with their institutions; and with them such institutions, systems, or expedients, are of more importance than the happiness of the whole human race. Therefore it is, that they lay it down as an axiom, that the mass of mankind must always necessarily remain ignorant and slaves to the impulses of momentary feelings, inasmuch as their ill-apprehended interests require, in their opinion, that such ignorance should continue. "Human beings, like rats, as soon as they have an abundance of food, will breed on till they kill each other: if the animals with four or two legs had knowledge, this overbreeding would be stopped: but if they had knowledge and bred less, we should not be able to seize on so much of the products of their labor, which our wise institutions have secured to us as our property: this property in the fruits of their labor is the world to us: therefore it would be absurd, wicked, impious, impracticable, and what not, to impart knowledge to the majority, the working portion of mankind, who are of right, and from all eternity, doomed to labor and to nothing but labor."

This, the diffusion of knowledge and self-controul amongst the individuals of all communities, the only important part of the population question, has been altogether kept out of view by its supporters. The ignorance and perversity of the mass of their fellow-creatures was necessary to their system. That ignorance and that perversity, were the necessary creation of the systems of insecurity to which they were attached; and they therefore decreed them to be eternal and irrevocable as any of the physical laws of nature. Whether they are so irrevocable, or necessarily attached to the constitution of human kind, those who have read the preceding pages will judge.

But the facts which they have brought forward, in support of this supposed past perverseness of ignorant human creatures, overbreeding and destroying, themselves, their own happiness, the moment that abundant food and increased comforts afforded them the means with prudence, of enjoying it, are altogether mis-stated. The real facts, as ascertained by human experience, are directly the reverse: they prove that every advance made in the career of industry and comfort, has a tendency to engender habits of *prudence*, and instead of producing a superfluous population greater *in proportion to food and comforts* than the previous numbers under a smaller share of industry and comforts; their uniform tendency on the contrary is to produce a lesser proportion. A greater *absolute* population always follows increased industry and comforts; but as certainly a smaller *relative* population, a

smaller population in proportion to the increased comforts and necessities of life. It is by not attending to this distinction, not perceiving or wilfully confounding things so different as an absolute and relative increase of population, that much of error on this subject has arisen. It is submitted to those who apprehend evils, so great as to arrest the progress of human improvement, from the increase of population alone, that even under the institutions of society as they have hitherto existed, even under the institutions of insecurity where human industry has not been entirely suppressed,

1. Increased comforts of life have always produced in every community, permanently enjoying them, increased (instead of diminished) prudence respecting the increase of their numbers.
2. Increased comforts of life permit an *absolute* increase of population consistently with the exercise of that prudence.
3. Increased comforts of life prevent any *relative* increase of population, proportioned to food, which would lessen those increased comforts.

And—what is still more important—all these effects on population arising from the possession of increased comforts, have been produced without any instruction, without any aid of laws respecting population, simply by the influence of the new circumstances in which communities have found themselves placed, those new circumstances affording new motives to action. What would the effects on general prudence have been, and of course on prudence as applied to population, had equal security, instead of expedients of insecurity, been the lot of all, and had knowledge been universally diffused?

An appeal to the prudential habits of every nation at different periods of its history—as far as those habits from certain transmitted facts can be ascertained—as well as to those of all the different people who now occupy the earth, will prove the first proposition. To instance those countries which we know the best, where amongst them exist in the greatest force prudential habits with respect to increase of numbers? In the poor or in the rich countries, in those possessing the most or the least of the comforts and conveniences of life, in Poland, Ireland, Russia, Naples, or in parts of Norway, Switzerland, England, France, the United States of North America? And in what districts again, amongst what classes, of all these countries, the poor or the rich, those enjoying or those wanting comforts, do these prudential habits most prevail?

In Ireland it is notorious that the great bulk of the com-

munity are not only without the conveniences and comforts, but often in want of the necessities, of life. Amongst those destitute members of the Irish community, it is equally notorious that no prudential habits exist with respect to the increase of numbers: but in the north of Ireland, where increased industry and superior comforts prevail, there prudential habits with respect to marriage and increase prevail also. In England, where increased comforts did prevail amongst the mass of the community, till political power, aided by the increasing exactions of capitalists, encouraged by the facilities of machinery and paper money advanced to an audacity of public plunder and extortion of the products of labor before unheard of, prudential views with respect to increase of numbers every where prevailed. In those parts of the country where wages were permanently highest and most comforts prevailed, there those prudential views were most prevalent. Still more prevalent in the middling classes; and in the richest, most of all. In manufacturing districts, where labor and comforts were at the highest, and amongst all the rich, those prudential views were carried too far, became selfish, short-sighted, and vicious. Once in the habit of enjoying certain comforts of food, clothing, dwelling, furniture and other conveniences, they form a part of our scheme of life, they are associated with our very notions of existence. Any change that will increase them, we hail with pleasure; but reject any arrangement that would abridge them, as subtracting so much of our existence or of that for which we live. When to this is added, the force of public opinion, bestowing its unmerited sympathy on those who possess most, without regard to use or merit, can we wonder that the possession of increased comforts engenders habits of foresight and caution as to the risk of decreasing them by marriage, or in any other way? It is no enlarged view of benevolence that is here wanting, no prospect of the misery that may await children brought up without means of support. Nothing more is wanting than a selfish love of immediate comforts, ever so injurious even in their effects to the possessor or to others. Of this vulgar selfish feeling, prudential habits, with respect to increase of numbers and marriage, are the necessary result. Hence exclamations against the irregular gratifications, unattended with increased numbers, of such classes; hence the lamentable increase of the preponderant miseries of prostitution, caused by such selfish habits. London and manufacturing establishments, possessing wealth and comforts, add to their numbers by recruits from without. From whence? from the poorest parts of the country, where there are fewest comforts; and where in consequence

of the want of comforts, the prudential check to marriage is least felt, where of course population most actively proceeds. They that have little can lose little; and of the few pleasures in their power that of breeding is not to be lost. Hence the poor children of the Irish, with no habits of comforts, avenge the old English system of jealousy of their prosperity, by underselling their labor in their own markets, under the depressing competition of insecurity.

In Ireland, there has been for the last fifty years an immense increase of population, in the midst of the absence of all the comforts of life. In the United States of North America, there has been a similar increase of numbers in the midst of abundance and comparative happiness. Mark the explanation. In Ireland, deprived by insecurity of comforts, the increase has been *both absolute and relative*; absolute as compared with the preceding numbers, relative as compared with means of support. In America, on the contrary, where partial security permitted the enjoyment of comforts to the whole community, the increase has been absolute merely, not relative. In America, the prudential check has operated differently in different parts of the country, but every where preventing an increase of numbers relative to food. The comforts of the people have been constantly on the advance with the increase of population: population has advanced because it was compatible with the continuance of increased comforts. Nay, such was frequently the remuneration of labor, that very young children could earn more than enough for their support, thus holding out the bounty of still increased comfort to the parents on their production. Under such circumstances, *not* to increase numbers would have been the height of imprudence.

In many parts of Norway, we are told, of Switzerland, and in Holland, the situation of the people as to the comforts and conveniences of life, has been much above that of those surrounding them. The circumstances, physical and political, of those countries, are very different. The conduct of the people with respect to marriage and increase, is also very different. The circumstances in which they agree, is in the possession of superior comforts by the people. What is the consequence as to increase of numbers? That the prudential check is every where in operation, struggling against the opposing and varying expedients of insecurity, to preserve to the people those comforts: and this prudential check exactly adapts itself to the varying physical and political circumstances of each country. In Norway and Switzerland, where the climate is healthy, where life is long, and there is no room for an increase of numbers without diminishing their comforts, marriages are late. Until there is an opening, by the natural

departure of the previous possessors of a dwelling and of employment, for a new marriage and consequent increase, an increase does not take place. But in those parts of Holland where the mortality is great from the unhealthiness of the climate, and where there is no more room for an increase of population than in Norway or Switzerland, the prudential check is differently exerted: more children must be there born, as well to supply the greater waste in childhood, as to succeed and replace the more quickly departing adults. Earlier marriages, more marriages and births, are there requisite to keep up the absolute population, preserving the same comforts to the new comers that the preceding occupants enjoyed, or rather not diminishing the previous comforts of the increasers of the population. Thus increased comforts beget, under varying circumstances, an equal desire to retain those comforts, and consequent disinclination to part with them, through the expenses of marriage, as much as through any other means.

In Russia, where there are no comforts, the mass of the country people being absolute slaves, sold always with the soil, like the rest of the live or dead stock, frequently disposed of, detached from the soil, like the slaves in the West Indies and the southern States of the *free* Union of North America, the prudential check with respect to marriage is unknown. The owners of this property, as it is termed, in their fellow-creatures, aware of this tendency, where the number of male and female slaves is nearly equal,—where they are not nearly equal there is no fear of an increase of population—mostly enforce a regulation rendering their consent necessary for the marriage of their slaves. As the labor of a West India or North American slave, produces much more than he is permitted to consume, the degraded owners of these, if possible, more degraded beings, have a pecuniary interest in their increase; and we do not hear of any regulations being adopted to deprive them of the sad solace of multiplying at their will, as far as other physical and moral circumstances permit, the inheritors of their wretchedness. Fatigue, privation, indiscriminate intercourse, regulation, may prevent the increase of slaves, black or white, in Russia, the West Indies, or the United States; but the exercise of foresight, the prudential check, never will. They will constantly breed up to the means of support, however wretched, to which they had been accustomed; and general ignorance and the habit of yielding to motives immediately stimulant, chiefly those of force, render them incapable of calculation and quite indifferent as to the effects of breeding beyond these means. All processes of thought, calculation, and prudence, are left to the master:

obedience and labor, and enjoying what he can get, are the province of the slave.

The increase of numbers in England and Ireland during the last fifty years, is a demonstration of the falsehood of the position, that increased comforts beget imprudence, and lead those possessing them to increase their numbers to an extent incompatible with the enjoyment of those comforts. In England the people had comforts, in Ireland they had not. In Ireland the population has increased more than fifty per cent. beyond the ratio of increase in England. The cause of the increase in Ireland was the possibility, from the removal of some of the previous restraints of insecurity, coinciding with the greater demand for agricultural produce, which the increasing manufacturing industry of England had produced, of maintaining a greater number of human beings in the same state of discomfort in which they had been accustomed to live; or perhaps even with some little increase of comfort. The cause of the increase in England was the continually increasing productiveness of labor for many years, permitting an increase of numbers to exist possessing the same comforts previously enjoyed. In Ireland, where there were no comforts, increase went on without prudence: In England, where there were comforts, increase went on with prudence, the increasing numbers enjoying like their predecessors. True, that even in England notwithstanding their comforts, as well as in Ireland, this seeming prosperity was arrested, and the increased population fell, and are falling, into wretchedness. What caused this? Was it the effect of increased comforts, generating imprudence, and over-population? No such thing. It has arisen from the operation of circumstances, producing results, which not only the prudence of the people working hard and enjoying mere comforts, could not have foreseen, but which not even the prudence nor the fears of the wisest, not laboring, but devoted to thought, and to thought on economical, political, and moral subjects, had anticipated. It arose from the deep-seated, wide-spreading, and secret-working machinations of political power, operating by means of the old and of superadded expedients of insecurity, plundering the products of present labor, anticipating the products of all future labor, and engrossing to itself and the possessors of capital, all the benefits of the immense facilities of production, which mechanical and other improvements in the sciences and arts had put within the reach of the whole community. Was it to be expected from the prudence or the knowledge of the artizan or the agriculturist, that he should foresee that in a few years the exertion of the same persevering labor and skill, which had enabled him hitherto to enjoy a certain quan-

tity of the comforts and conveniences, as well as the necessities, of life, would no longer render him the same advantages? Was it for him to calculate the effect of always fraudulent and devastating changes in the currency? Was it for him to calculate when it would please his plunderers to order him to pay two measures of wheat instead of one, which he previously paid? Was it for him to calculate the effects of the ceasing to squander in wicked expenditure the hard-earned capital of the country? under the name of loans accumulating what is called a national debt? Was it for him to anticipate or to provide against capricious changes in taxation, the amount or the mode of levying taxes, rendering certain branches of industry unproductive to-day, which had been most productive a few days before? Was it for him to anticipate or to provide against the effects of foreign treaties, battles, revolutions, of never-ending laws, each more wicked and absurd than its predecessors, interfering in favor of capitalists and the privileged classes, with the free direction and the remuneration of labor, over which he could have no controul? the effect of which and numerous other events in raising and depressing the remuneration of labor, was perfectly indifferent to the holders of political power, provided certain selfish objects of their own were attained by them? Was it for him to anticipate the effects of the treacherous bounty of poor-laws, the succedaneum for the mischiefs of the expedients of insecurity? These were the events,—all these and such as these, entirely extraneous to the regular course of industry,—that rendered unavailing the calculations of prudence: these were the events, and not the pretended folly of over-breeding under increased comforts, that have been bringing down the English people to the situation of paupers, and that must keep all mankind in a state of want, vice, and misery, as long as they are permitted to exist, as long as any institutions of insecurity, under whatever new disguises they may put on, remain amongst men. Were it not for these, were equal security established, or even that approach to it which permits a considerable share of comforts to the productive laborers, the mere habit and love of immediate enjoyment, would of itself guard against the loss of those comforts by over-breeding: how much more when this mere selfish feeling is aided by knowledge, by a prospective sympathy with the discomforts of those whom imprudence would bring into the world, by a dread of lowering the state of the productive laborers themselves to equal discomfort? In that country, and in that part of every country, where the people are the poorest and most ignorant, where the least comforts are enjoyed, there is uniformly the greatest increase of the population; and in

proportion as comforts are increased, the *comparative* progress of population diminishes, the love of comforts and the disinclination to part with them, seeming always to increase with their amount. No truth of economy and morals is more certain, than that the increase of comforts amongst mankind engenders prudence, and arrests, instead of encouraging, the tendency to increase their numbers beyond the supply of those comforts.

If under the individual exertion and competition of equal or even partial security, the progress of improvement and consequent increase of comforts, would constantly tend to increase the prudential check, and limit the increase of numbers to the constantly increasing command of enjoyments; what would be the peculiar effects under that branch of equal security, which takes mutual co-operation for its mode of production, and equality for its rule of enjoyment?

The general state of the country in which one or more of the co-operating communities may be placed, must be either stationary, advancing, or declining, as to general wealth and population. The declining state need not be considered; because, first, in such a country, as in Turkey, Poland, Russia, Austria, and similar despotisms, where the expedients of insecurity are the most ignorant and depressing, such establishments could not be formed, or if permitted to be formed, their superior industry would mark them out as more certain victims of political plunder; or if despotism capriciously instituted such establishments, its jealousies and appalling restraints would soon convert them into prison houses, where no liberty would be left but that of labor with perhaps the sleekness of well-fed cart-horses. Such communities under despotisms, like any other play-things of despots, depend on the breath of despots, their courtiers, or mistresses, like palaces of ice, or any other wonders or novelties which may last till a new sun or a new moon operates on them, or on the fancies that produced them. In no other country but a free country, under no other institutions but those of security, can such establishments take root and prosper. Without security, productive labor cannot proceed: without equal and perfect security, all its benefits cannot be produced; security as well from political power, as from private violence. No change in the mode of labor, from competition to co-operation, or any other conceivable or yet proposed mode, can in the least dispense with the universal necessity of security.

Let us suppose, then, that the state of the country in which these communities exist, is merely stationary, and admits of no increase of population, of nothing more than the replacing

by new births those who yearly cease to live. In such a state of things, in ordinary society, as we have seen, when the people live in comfort, the prudential check is called into full exertion, and is abundantly adequate to prevent any injurious increase of members, or such as would lessen those comforts: but when the circumstances of the people are wretched, 'tis not the prudential check that operates; prudence has no place amidst eternal want; breeding goes on as amongst the lower animals, till cold, nakedness, hunger, disease seize on their victims and keep down the population by misery to the level of their wretched means of support. What then is the modification that would be presented in the use of the prudential check by means of the system of co-operation, reposing, as all industry must repose, under the shelter of security? First; abundant comforts and the habit of enjoying would beget an unwillingness to part with them as before. Next, superior information and extended sympathy would increase and justify this disinclination, from a view of the discomfort it would produce to the new sharers as well as to the old. True that the inconveniencies of a large family would not under mutual co-operation press so heavily on the individual as under competition with the most perfect equal security: but a regard for the common welfare and common loss of comforts in which their own would be included, would soon become at least as powerful a curb, in such minds as those of the co-operators, as the simple individual motive produces in the minds of competitors. Suppose this motive however, of the loss of general comforts, to be ever so much weakened, to be reduced to nothing, still no evil would arise from its absence; for the *circumstances* of the new communities form such a barrier around them in the way of population, as would seem almost to render superfluous the exercise of that prudence, with which, on this as on other occasions, they must be pre-eminently imbued.

The case supposed is, that the co-operating community cannot increase its numbers without decreasing its comforts by dividing them amongst a larger number, and that this numerical expansion of diminished enjoyment, will not counterbalance the loss of its intensity to the smaller number. It is hardly possible to conceive any set of expedients better calculated to meet such a contingency, than those proposed for the co-operating communities. The size of the establishment, the number of apartments for married people is determined, as well as every other detail of the arrangements, for a given population. There is no check or inconvenience from want felt by the married from inequalities as to numbers of children, all being equally educated and maintained at the

common board: the peculiar inconvenience is simply that of the pain, trouble, and care, chiefly on the woman's side, of nourishing and attending children till two years old. From that age the peculiar trouble of the mother ceases. Many married persons in such communities, under such circumstances, would doubtless study the means of enjoying in the highest degree, every pleasure of personal attachment, and even increasing those pleasures, without the necessity of a continual increase of births—an object, simple, reconcilable with the utmost delicacy, and demanding nothing but a mental effort from the party whom a new birth would most inconvenience. But, supposing no care or foresight in this matter: the married women produce children as far as nature will permit them. Still no harm ensues: while young the children consume little, and that little the arrangements have abundantly provided for. When able to work, though not to half the productive power of an adult, their labor will do much more than support themselves; all persons not married, as before explained, occupying common dormitories for different ages of both sexes, and using the common halls for education, recreation, instruction, and all other useful purposes. Here then, if the married people will exert no foresight, and if all occupying the private rooms of the community are married persons, (which is by no means a necessary part of the system, as many of these rooms might be occupied by unmarried persons,) begins the *physical* check to supply the place of the prudential. In agricultural districts of general society, where the capabilities of land and industry, and the habits of the people, have been for a long time stationary, a marriage does not take place until an opening presents itself of succeeding to the occupation and establishment of old couples, or of those prematurely cut off by casualties. In such places, where the whole subject of over-population and its effects is *brought within a narrow compass under the eye of the most simple*, as in parts of Norway and Switzerland, we are told, that they are perfectly understood, the prudential check is in the highest state of operation, comforts are not lessened by any tendency to breed beyond the means of support: and added to all this, early and tender attachments and domestic happiness, and all the happiness that the sexes can render each other, are perhaps at their highest point. If such be the effect of having the whole subject brought before the eye, under the system of competition, where the exertion of prudence on the part of every individual is requisite, the exertion of prudence on the part of the uninformed youth; what will be the effect of having the subject still more concentrated, of having the population

concerns of a whole community more simple, clear, and less liable to chance, than those of any individual family under the system of competition? What will be the effect of having the deliberative prudence of the whole community guiding, instructing, and if necessary supplying the place of the individual prudence of, the young, while at the same time that individual prudence, from previous education and completeness of the facts before it, cannot possibly make a false judgement; or, if it err at all, must be with full perception of the circumstances necessary to the formation of a right judgement? The original settlers of a community are, say five hundred married persons, one hundred unmarried occupying rooms, and six hundred children and young people of all ages not adult. Any of the unmarried adults occupying rooms, have the means of marrying in the community whenever they please. In the course of a few years, some of the elder children become adult: but in the course of these same years, mortality is walking his silent rounds, and many of those desiring to marry succeed to the vacant rooms. Still vacancies may not occur as quickly as the expanding development and health of the young would demand them. Will not imprudent marriages take place? Impossible: at least, unless the parties marrying wish to leave the community. If, in spite of prudence and the benevolent opinion of the community, they marry; where will they live? All the marriage apartments are already occupied. Though married, they must live in the dormitories of the young till vacancies occur for their accommodation. But the probability is that such preposterous marriages would never occur, that regulations, in the formation of which these adult young people would have as much influence in proportion to their intellect as any other individuals, would be formed by the whole community, which, supported by enlightened public opinion, would cause such premature marriages to be unheard of. Here is therefore the physical check, which keeps the population stationary, never encroaching on absolute comforts, the state of society, by the supposition, not permitting of such increase. As on a map, the circumstances of the whole community as to population, and of every individual in it, are under the eye, seen, registered, for the information of all. What detached community living by competition, could ever afford a view of its circumstances to be in any way compared to this? Under competition, the establishment of the parent must be the resource of the child, and to that his attention is almost exclusively directed, all else depending on chances, more or less in the nature of lottery or gambling. Under co-operation, the vacancy of the particular rooms of the

parents, is no more under the eye of the children than any other vacancy: all, as they occur, are open to all that want. Under competition there is an injurious clashing of interest between parents and children, the happiness of the one by marriage depending on the vacating of the establishment by the other, an opposition of interests frequently fatal to all benevolence, occurs, implanting one set of vices in the parents, another in the children. Under the system of social co-operation these injurious circumstances are withdrawn; and no motives looking forward to fortune and independence of action on the death of parents, none, but such as accord with intelligence and virtue, are left to operate between parents and children. The depression too, arising to the whole community from the loss of an old co-operating friend, will be always soon succeeded and relieved by the certain prospect of lengthened happiness to the young, long and warmly attached, and to whom no pecuniary, no corrupting motive, none but the most generous sympathies could have served for grounds of attachment. A simple rule would present itself—those whose names, given in by themselves, longest remaining on record, should be the first married. In almost all cases they would be the oldest; and no hasty ill-judged alliances could take place. Marriages would of course under these circumstances be late; later in proportion to the healthiness of the community; ten years perhaps later than where the circumstances of the society admitted of a pretty rapid increase.

There is a way, before alluded to, by which early marriages and universal healthiness, may co-exist with a stationary population. Sexual, intellectual, and moral pleasures would be much increased thereby to the married parties. A mental effort on the side of refinement, not of grossness, is all the price necessary to be paid, and by only one party, for early marriages and mutual endearments, where the circumstances of society permit no increase of population. If this expedient of *gentle exercise* be not adopted, the risk of the evil—at whatever it may be estimated—of illicit intercourse, must be incurred. From the deplorable consequences of such intercourse, in the way of prostitution and all its miseries, the co-operating communities, as before shown, would, from their very organization, be altogether relieved. Want and folly could never barter beauty, happiness, and life for the means of temporary support or a short-lived fever of excitement. The evil would be reduced to that of the free unbought affections: and those affections would assuredly obey the enlightened public opinion of such communities, asking no apparent sa-

crifice of any species of happiness but with the view of repaying it with a more abundant future harvest. From such casual connexions, however, nothing injurious as to population could arise. When illicit births take place, it is where the parties live constantly together, married in every thing but the name. Such living together, as we have seen, could not occur in these communities. Neither prostitution nor mistress-keeping could exist. Were it possible that the pleasures of casual intercourse could be enjoyed without any risk to population, or any consequential evil to either of the parties, the morality of utility and benevolence, would look on such connexions with more than an indulgent eye. For the rest, it has been before shown that public opinion would necessarily be in those communities the most enlightened of society, because it would have the best data for judging rightly, and would have no contrariety of interests opposing a right decision; and that its influence would be the most efficient, because known to every one and partaken in by every one. For the force of public opinion in such communities, see the fanatic folly of the American Shakers: all the men and women of whole communities of which sect, live and look at each other all their lives as if they were all men or all women, not breeding nor running the risk of breeding at all. If for a *bad reason* of absurd fanaticism, these people can mount their public opinion so high, or sink it so low, as to root out altogether the most universal and necessary of passions, shall not other co-operating communities, *for good reasons*, be able so to direct their public opinion as to check the pernicious inclinations of this same passion, never imposing a restraint but when called for by apprehended preponderant evil from its gratification? Or if, even in ordinary society, public opinion is strong enough to command the chastity of the richer classes of women frequently through their whole lives, can it be without influence where its restraints would never be either partial or capricious? In these communities, there is no monopoly of private wealth in the hands of men, to enable them to keep mistresses, seraglios, or to hire prostitutes. Women have as much command as men over the common property of the community, partake of the same education, and thus raising themselves to the same level, cast off at one bound their antiquated degradations and miseries, and at least double the happiness of both sexes by raising all their intercourse to that of intelligence and affection amongst equals.

So very trivial being the evils to be apprehended from the principle of population amongst the co-operating communities, even under the most unfavorable circumstances in which

they can be placed; what, if any, are the evils to be apprehended from this principle when the circumstances are more favorable and admit of an increase of population more or less rapid? Though many generations, perhaps hundreds of years, would elapse before a failure of land, materials, and knowledge, could render it necessary for such communities to remain stationary as to population; yet as many may not so believe, the perfect facility of so directing the sexual passion, even under such a state of things, as to obviate all evil, has been pointed out. The declining state has not been enlarged upon, because it is impossible, the laws of physical nature remaining as they now are, that any thing but enormous mis-government on the part of political power could reduce such communities, or indeed society in general, to such a state as not to be able to support their own members. They must, by the supposition, have been previously able to support themselves in comfort, or there would be no prosperity from which to decline. Industry, land and materials, therefore, remaining the same, and no greater number of consumers to be provided for, what but some new distribution, some extrinsic power forcibly misdirecting the productive powers of the community, could prevent them from continuing to maintain the same number of individuals in the same comfort in which they had been habituated to maintain them? A volcano, a deluge, a change in the seasons, might sweep away themselves or their productive powers; but none of these things occurring, a decline in their affairs could only arise from a misdirection of their productive powers or waste of the fruits of them. From their own acts or those of others, this mischief must proceed. The co-operative societies established on the principle of free inquiry for the investigation of truth, knowledge amongst themselves not retrograding, and it being always their interest to maintain their own comforts, the mischief could not come from themselves. From without themselves, such mischief must come. But without, there is no arm sufficiently strong, but that of political power alone, to produce so tremendous a mischief as that of declining circumstances, whether by the forcible misdirection of, or restraints on, productive energies, or by abstracting the fruits of labor when produced. With any other but political power, these communities would be strong enough to cope. Once established, political power alone would be strong enough to render them declining. The decline of industry, whether carried on by competition or co-operation, must arise from the want of security. Nothing less can make real knowledge, so useful to mankind, to retrograde. The political power that

would be able and would be inclined to oppress these communities when established, would also be able and inclined to prevent their establishment to any useful purpose, to any purpose but that of rendering them machines of despotism—a purpose altogether inconsistent with their nature, which requires free exertion and palpable benefit as the connecting bond of their united labor. It is under free governments only, or those the most nearly approaching to perfect equal security, that mutual co-operating communities can flourish, or even perhaps that they can be established.

Declining circumstances, except from physical causes or general insecurity, being impossible to such communities, and the stationary having been discussed, the more favorable, the advancing, remain to be considered. Those who are most alarmed at the apprehensions of over-population, admit that their fears are groundless, where, as in the United States of North America, the circumstances of the country being in an advancing state, there is a constant demand for labor, and of course for all the human exertion that early marriages can afford, as quickly as laborers can be produced. Under such circumstances, as long as they last, as there is no need of the exercise of prudence with respect to marriage, no evil effects, it is affirmed, can result from the neglect of it. It is not till industry and exertion have outworked themselves and over supplied, by new hands, even the increasing demand of advancing prosperity, that the exercise of prudence as to increase of members, becomes necessary: it is then only that the effects of that imprudence which prosperity had generated, become perceptible in their bitter fruits of reduced wages and diminished comforts. If the facts and inferences, however, heretofore stated be correct, at no period of the progress of an advancing community has the prudential check as to population been relaxed. It is prudent to marry early and produce many children, when the state of society demands an increase of numbers, and can remunerate them without diminishing the comforts of the parents. But if while prosperity is advancing, political power, taking advantage of the lightness of heart and want of suspicion and calculation of the productive laborers, prepares in secret any of the endless and ever-varying expedients of insecurity, to wrest from the laborer the produce of his labor, or to restrain or misdirect his efforts, whether by incurring what are called national debts, by establishing monopolies of trade or still more pernicious monopolies of superstition, by direct public plunder (or taxation without consent), by withholding equal facility of access to justice and to education to all; if by these, or any other

means, political power renders impotent the toils of industry and the hopes of prudence, it is not to the want of industry or the want of prudence that the declining state of society must be attributed, but to the ignorant and selfish schemes of political power, pursuing its own supposed interests at the expense of the general happiness. In a declining state of society, should any such communities exist, their duty would be plainly to co-operate with all the other individuals of the declining society, to remove those general causes of poverty and misery which press equally on all.

What effects then, as to happiness, would arise from the principle of population amongst co-operating communities in an advancing state of society, under the shield of equal security, or under representative systems approaching to equal security, limited only by the want of knowledge amongst the general society adopting such representative systems?

If in general society, such a state of things renders, even amongst individual competitors, the exercise of prudence as to marriage almost superfluous, how much more will it relieve particular individuals from the anxious cares of numerous children, where no increase of exertion or privation of comfort will press upon the parents of many children more than on those of a few! excepting always the additional pain and trouble of the two first years of the children's existence. Why should a father and mother be punished—in diminished comforts—for having large families? To prevent premature marriages? It can have no such effect. The average number of children, is all that is or ought to be calculated upon: exceptions cannot form the general rule. Peculiar fecundity, altogether out of the power of calculation, generally occasions large families. The occupation of almost all the bloom and vigor of life of the mother, and the numerous casualties as to health attendant on a constant succession of children, are surely inconveniencies enough to limit the desire to a moderate number, without superadding comparative penury in the midst of general prosperity. If the society be advancing, and there be room for increased numbers without diminishing actual comforts to the general mass of productive laborers, why should they whom chance (causes which they could not calculate or controul) has made most instrumental to this increase, be more inconvenienced by it than the necessity of the case (physical or unavoidable moral causes) requires? The parents, particularly the mother, should be assisted and relieved under such circumstances; their means should be increased, not diminished. Under individual competition, such evils are perhaps unavoidable. No remedy, except in the way of

insurance, and that very partial and wasteful, could be applied: while under mutual co-operation the evil is completely remedied by an insurance exempt from waste, the joint efforts of all providing for the whole of the children in whatever numbers born to particular individuals. From the greater part of the troubles and anxieties of excessive numbers of children, parents are relieved; while all means of endearment by unrestricted communication are kept open to them. In the management of the children, as in every other particular, the community makes its own regulations, always bearing in mind the important but neglected truth, that no general regulations are justifiable, except in those particular cases in which the exercise of the private judgement, inclinations, and consequent actions, of individuals, are incompatible with each other. Where the effect of individual judgement or conduct remains with the individual himself, and as far as it so remains, it is tyrannical in a majority to compel that conduct to be regulated by the opinions of others. If even under this limitation a single individual disapprove of the mode adopted by the community of managing the children, that individual can withdraw, at any time, his children, or himself and his children, from such management, or from the community altogether. A co-operating member, not possessing an independent income, could no more devote his whole time to the mere education of his children in these communities than out of them. It would be in both cases incompatible with his other duties.

Thus, as affects population, are the greatest benefits of early marriages secured by co-operation to all who think proper to contract them, while the evils arising occasionally from them are, by an invisible and unerring system of insurance, reduced to their lowest level, to those bars which nature has imposed.

The organization of man affords him the sources of certain pleasures, those of the senses, of the gratification of hunger and thirst, of the sexual passion, of the feeling of health, or the easy play of all the internal animal functions, of the use of the muscular and intellectual faculties, including those of sympathy and benevolence; the aggregate of all of which, or their preponderance over the pains to which he may be subjected, constitutes his happiness. Not wisdom, but insanity, is the conduct which refuses to avail itself of the utmost possible enjoyment from all and every one of these sources. The limit is the production of ulterior preponderant evil, to the agent or others, by the gratification, or the expenditure of time in pleasures of a less value which would add more to

happiness if devoted to those of a superior order. With such limitations, necessary because conducing to happiness, it would be the object of these co-operating communities to increase to the utmost, as well the pleasures derivable from the sexual intercourse, as all other pleasures. In itself every pleasure is good, and the only rational object of living. By means of true and useful associations, the simple pleasures, and none more eminently than those of the sexual passion, may be raised in value (their grossnesses rejected) almost beyond calculation. To produce this effect with respect to this passion; what are the arrangements of the co-operating communities? First, the sphere of choice is enlarged to both sexes to the utmost possible extent, even to *all* the members of the community: next, the health, intelligence, and benevolence of all these multiplied aspirants to mutual sympathy are so universally excited, that the attractions of the lowest and the capacity to increase mutual happiness, must exist in a higher degree than amongst the best gifted with these qualities in general society.

To appreciate the immense accession to human happiness from this one source alone, the right direction of the sexual passion, would appear like romance. Let it be judged of from the immense mischiefs now experienced from its forced misdirection under the expedients of insecurity, leading whole hosts of religionists, ascetic moralists, and fanatics, to denounce the very passion itself, to make war on the continuation of their own species, and to confound all pleasures, except an admiration of their own extravagancies, under the name of vices. In general society, the choice, not only of one, but of all classes, is arbitrarily reduced to the narrowest possible limits; and from the prevalence of the competition for wealth, even where circumstances such as those of station are supposed to be equal, personal qualities are mostly disregarded, and pecuniary convenience regulates the most important contract of human life. The denial of all education, as of all equal justice, to women, rendering them for the most part of no character, the passive instruments of the animal propensities of men, co-operates in increasing the attachment to mere wealth, so that a connexion founded on esteem and real mutual admiration for palpable pleasing and useful qualities, as well as for nicer inappreciable circumstances, is quite a rare, and by most persons regarded as a very foolish, occurrence. This limitation of choice is by no means confined to the higher classes, but is diffused through all. The lower presume not to look to the higher, but revenge themselves in finding out the most trifling sources of distinction amongst each other,

which in their eyes would make disreputable a union with one below them, though the cause of inferiority may be seen by no eyes but those which fancy themselves the superior. One endless cause of limitation of choice, is the slightest difference as to wealth, or rather degrees of poverty. The consequence of all which is, that sexual enjoyment becomes, like every thing else in society, a matter of trade, of exchange, just like any other commodity, and every possible art of competition is made use of to buy the persons and lives of the sex, whom nature has made weaker and want of education more ignorant, at as low a price as possible. The animal pleasure, is all that remains even to the stronger sex, shorn of all its enchanting capabilities of sympathetic and intellectual association, which can only be enjoyed in the perfectly free intercourse of equals. Privation and neglect even as to this animal enjoyment, are the lot of the higher orders and of all the married of the weaker sex; and physical and mental pain after short-lived excitement, and speedy decay of the fever of life, are the lot of the great majority of the remainder of women, the use of whose persons is a matter of trade. All these evils being supposed unavoidable consequences of the sexual passion, and the institutions of insecurity being supposed of superhuman appointment and incapable of change, no wonder that well-meaning ignorance was confounded, and knowing nothing of the blessings which the passion rightly directed might produce, prayed for its annihilation, in consequence of its abuses, though that of the human race were included in the prayer!

But were it possible that the free mutual choice should be enlarged under the institutions of insecurity, little benefit would be derived therefrom. The general ignorance and perversity of all, counteracting each other in the pursuit of happiness, and the peculiar factitious imbecility of women chaining them down the passive tools of male animal selfishness, the numbers from which to choose would add little to any other variety but that of wealth: of this there would be all possible shades, but of moral and intellectual qualities still a blank. The flock would be larger, but the individuality of them would be the same to any other eye but that of the shepherd. A continual succession of similar selfish propensities, of similar blanks as to knowledge. In the co-operating communities, how different would be this effect of increased numbers out of whom to find congeniality of mind and affections! With the length, or terms, of the connexion we have nothing here to do; that matter falling under the head of general legislation: but it is obvious that the question of restraint, and that for life, would be disincumbered of its only plausible

excuse, the desertion of the wife and the comforts and education of the children, under arrangements where neither the comforts nor property of the wife or the children, nor the education of the children, could be at all affected by the duration of the contract. The iniquitous partiality of the law, giving unbridled range to the adulteries of one of the parties, while it punishes the other, those to whom nature has given less animal, and partial institutions, less mental strength, in a mode next in severity to the loss of existence, would, like so many other of the expedients of insecurity, be evaded in the co-operating communities. Divorce from bed and board and permission to re-marry, would be as acceptable, in case of ill-treatment or disagreement, to the weaker party as to the stronger. Community of property would dash to impotence the cruel infamy of the code of exclusion against one half of the human race, leaving them without property, civil or political rights, and consequently without knowledge, but keeping them liable to punishment, frequently aggravated, in case of contravention of the code. Hence, in these communities, from all these combined circumstances, it is almost impossible that any alliance of the sexes should be formed on any but the most virtuous principles, from a mutual perception of good personal qualities and a sincere desire to increase each other's happiness. Where there is nothing but affection and personal good qualities to be gained by the union, nothing else will be sought for. Where nothing is to be gained by ill-treatment of the physically weaker party, and where the means of tyranny equally pernicious to all, are taken out of the hands of, or rather voluntarily relinquished by, the stronger party, merit and kindness will necessarily be the qualities cultivated to ensure the esteem and conciliate the affections of parties so connected. No distinctions arising from the impertinencies of what are called birth or rank, any more than of wealth, being known in these communities, personal qualities founded on utility, or tendency to happiness, being the only sources of distinction, it is evident that any one having these—all, after the first founders, having partaken of one common and comprehensive education of real knowledge and useful habits—may aspire to please any other person of such a community. None calculated by peculiar shades of character and feelings to increase each other's happiness, would be separated and rendered miserable by perverted public opinion, or unfeeling private pride. Not only would all the unmarried be free to all, for the finding out of kindred inclinations within each community, but throughout every other co-operating community the universality of mutual choice would exist, so that amongst all such communities, the choice

would be as unrestrained to the members of each other, as at home. With such an opening for the exercise of esteem and affection, and all the pleasing associations attending on the sexual passion, who, of such communities, could ever think of wantonly flinging away the higher gratifications of this passion for its lowest impulses, encompassed with disgust and satiety, because not relieved by intelligence and sympathy? A thousand fold therefore would the pleasures arising from and connected with the sexual passion be increased by mutual co-operation and joint possession, the sources of the evils arising from its misdirection being dried up.

But, will it be asked? "In this free scope for esteem and affection, will not jealousies and rivalries spring up, and evil from this source be increased?" The chief cause of jealousy and rivalry—next to the general and all-pervading principles of disunion arising from the institutions of insecurity—is the low estimate in which women are now held, as mere articles of property, ornament, and occasional use to men. Women are supposed to have no feelings, no choice of their own: like houses or sheep, they are supposed to be quite passive as to the occupant; the perfection of the ascetic morality being that they should have no feelings at all, or if any, those of alienation from men and from happiness. Now where all these circumstances are reversed, where women are brought up and treated like rational beings, and enjoy in all respects equal advantages with men, they will not, like ripe fruit or bales of cloth, be fought for; their opinion will be of some trifling weight in the disposal of their persons and happiness for life; and no greater indignity could the imagination frame for such women, than the supposition that they were to become the willing prey of the stronger or more fortunate of two contending savages. Where the choice of two men is the same, the choice of the woman will of course be the preponderating motive; and *vice versa*, should two women happen to have an equal affection for one man. Besides the extent of the choice, the removal of all artificial restraints, the numbers all around of intelligent and amiable companions, hold out so much of hope in a new choice, that it is impossible gravely to apprehend any evil, further than the excitement of occasional and temporary regret for accidental miscalculations, from such a source. From peculiarities of physical temperament and natural defects of the mental (cerebral) organization, no state of social combination can guard.

The circumstances of general society admitting, by our supposition, of an advance of numbers, how is this increase to take place in these co-operating communities? As soon

as some of the young become adults, wish to marry, and find no private rooms in the community made vacant by nature, their wishes are made known. As adults, they have as much influence, in proportion to their means of persuasion, in the regulation of the affairs and the disposal of property, as any other members of the community. The sole question is, Would it add to the general happiness, that of old, young, middle-aged, children, and aspirants to marriage included, either that pecuniary means of establishment should be afforded out of the general stock, or that new habitations should be erected for the accommodation of the new couples? Whichever mode of proceeding is judged wisest, will be adopted. As even now in general society we find that parents sometimes abridge their actual comforts, or those they might otherwise enjoy, to establish their children, feeling more happiness from sympathy in the increased enjoyments of their children, than pain in the loss of the personal use or ownership of the articles of wealth which procured those increased enjoyments; how much more probable is it, that such pleasures of sympathy will be rated at their highest, where articles of wealth are estimated solely for their intrinsic use, and not at all as means of factitious distinction? So strong will doubtless frequently be the attachment to the scenes, the incidents, and the companions of youth, in these communities, that many, though wishing to marry, would prefer deferring and remaining amongst their friends to acquiring an establishment by purchase in another community, or as parties of a new community. Others again would be pleased with the variety of new settlements. None, it is presumed, would return into the comparative vices and miseries of general society. Should the parties wishing to marry, be of different communities, the rule followed, that of freedom as tending to the most happiness, would probably be that the parties, when agreed, should be permitted to fix on the community they liked best for their future residence (if determined to wait for a vacancy), the party removing to transfer an individual's share of stock from the old to the new-adopted community. The just value, under prosperous circumstances, to be given to adults preferring a settlement out of the community to waiting for a vacancy within, would be an equal share of the whole accumulated property, one out of a thousand or two thousand in proportion to the number of members. This or any smaller sum, would be given according to various circumstances, at different times, in the same or different establishments. On the freedom of choice in marriage, or even the time of marrying, no restraint whatever would be laid by these regulations,

the general laws of society rendering such restraint by compulsion impracticable, and the interests of the parties themselves not rendering a voluntary restraint probable. The effect of such premature marriages, would be simply, the want of a settlement of private rooms within the community, or of funds to procure a settlement without, accompanied of course with the censure of public opinion on an act of imprudence, should such connexions under such circumstances be deemed imprudent. But these casualties could only occur in a declining or stationary community: the present is supposed to be under advancing circumstances, under which the accumulations of the community would be always proceeding, in anticipation of such regularly-occurring demands. Where the original numbers were small, where additional adjoining land could be procured, where new buildings could be conveniently added to the original, or an additional story given to their height, such a mode of providing for increasing numbers, by enlarging the establishment, might be adopted: and nothing but experience will determine what number of co-operators, under different circumstances, will give the largest result of individual and of course of universal happiness. It is evident that under such circumstances of prosperity amongst co-operating communities, no evils whatever would arise from the sexual passion. Usefully and easily gratified, it would be the gentle bond of universal sympathy: restraint would not provoke it to crime, nor would means or opportunities of excess, reduce it to satiety, disgust, or cold selfish sensuality.

But may not the apprehension of some be excited, that population might be injuriously checked by such prudent co-operators, even in the midst of prosperity? "If it be true that the habit of enjoying increased comforts causes them shortly to be looked upon as necessities of life, that from the facilities given to all improvements in science and art these comforts may be indefinitely increased, and every increase still regarded as a necessary of life, and added to the common stock; what is to induce such a community, enjoying comforts in their estimation so necessary, the produce of their own labor, to abridge such comforts, present or prospective, not each for the settlement of his own child, but for the general benefit of the children of the community?" This difficulty will altogether vanish, when it is recollected that where wealth is held in common, the factitious love of it for distinction sake cannot be known, that it can only be valued for its real uses, that these uses are always decreasing in proportion to the accession of additional equal masses, and that the same mass, as a first portion in the hands of the young, would produce a

thousand times the happiness it could produce as a last equal portion in the hands of those already almost satiated with it. Add to this, the very facility of creating new wealth must produce generosity in disposing of it, particularly where any of the higher pleasures that mere wealth can so seldom purchase, are to be attained thereby. And what opportunity so attractive for the disposal of superfluous wealth can be conceived, as that of unfolding all the realities of life to those young persons, whose birth, childhood, and education the community have witnessed, in all whose pursuits they have sympathized, whose labors they have shared, labors perhaps more instrumental than their own, for many years, in accumulating the general stock? A regard to the real happiness of the young persons as connected with the general state of society, will most probably be the influential motive on such occasions, rather than the fear of parting with a portion of wealth. Different judgements will doubtless be formed by different communities on such subjects, so completely under the influence of habit and caprice. Those who began with little or nothing, the labor of the greater part of whose life has but at length procured for them the ownership of their establishment, lands, houses, stock and machinery, will set down lower the necessities of life, and their children will also be satisfied with less, having been accustomed to use less. The inevitable tendency of education and industry, however, being to equalize all these communities (peculiarities of taste excepted) both as to economical and moral blessings, that estimation of the conveniences, and what are called luxuries of life, will finally prevail amongst them all, which shall be found most conducive to real happiness; labor and inconvenience of acquisition balanced against real enjoyment. Whatever may in the mean time be the estimation of particular communities as to these comforts, the principles stated above respecting the providing for increasing numbers, will equally apply to all, whatever their absolute wealth may be. The great advantage of these co-operating communities over the same number of individuals acting by competition, particularly as regards population, is, that the whole subject is always plainly before the eyes of the whole community; all gambling individual speculation is precluded; imprudence is rendered so palpable, and public opinion so strong, that there is a moral impossibility of the occurrence of imprudence; while all factitious love of wealth being removed, wherever a preponderance of happiness can be gained to all by early marriages and increasing numbers, beyond the

evils of diminished comforts for all, there and there only will such marriages take place.

The effects on happiness of the principle of population in these communities, whether in a stationary or prosperous state of society, being thus developed, it may be observed in conclusion, that the increased means of producing wealth by such combinations beyond the capabilities of individual effort, are such as to afford the only hope of speedily raising from misery a nation even declining, pressed down to the extreme of privation amidst unenjoyed luxury by debts called national, taxation, and all the other expedients of insecurity; provided always that amidst such decline, a hope could be rationally entertained, that such communities would be permitted to labor and enjoy in security. The restraints of insecurity removed, free individual competition could do much to re-create wealth and happiness: but these same restraints removed, co-operation would do infinitely more. By mere mutual agreement amongst the co-operating members, a whole host of the evils of insecurity would be at once shaken off; and almost the only one, that of public plunder, to which they would be equally exposed with all individual producers, their intellectual and moral powers would be exerted, with those of their fellow-men, to abate. So much superior appears to be the power of co-operative industry to create wealth beyond the best directed individual exertions, under whatever degree of security the two may be placed, that the burdens which the one could hardly hope to discharge, the other might discharge out of their abundant production, and without materially infringing on their comforts. It is the only expedient proposed that wears the least appearance of probability of ultimately re-creating the capital squandered by the vices of political power under the institutions of insecurity; always provided that such operation is deemed just, or productive of preponderant good, by the real representatives of the whole people, no sane adult individual excepted; and provided also, that the iniquity of what is called public borrowing be never again practised. But as long as political power has an interest, real or apparent (i. e. in its opinion real), opposed to the interest, as to the accumulation and enjoyment of wealth, of the producers of that wealth, the great mass of all communities; so long will such power be indifferent to any mode of increasing wealth which does not tend to advance, or at all events to uphold, such opposing interest. Individual competition and mutual co-operation, if alike protected by equal security, tend to the production of abundance and

equality of wealth; mutual co-operation producing the effect more rapidly and completely than the most perfect system of competition, besides many other advantages unattainable by competition. By persuasion alone, the advocates of both would wish to see them established. But the holders of political power must cease to be what they are, before they yield to such persuasion; and as they are in the scale of nations and humanity, no more than any other individuals in the decision of such questions, it is the extreme of weakness to expect from them any more than reluctant submission, through fear of consequences, to the public will, the will of the majority of those who think. Labor by co-operation requires as much as labor by individual competition, protection of the fruits of its labor from public plunder, through the only known means, representative government or self-taxation. Without equal security implied in what are here termed the *natural laws of distribution*, neither the one nor the other can preserve any more than a sickly existence. Co-operative industry having more to lose, ought to be more anxious for such protection. So insatiable indeed have been the efforts of insecurity to individualize and appropriate for exclusive use every article of wealth, that labor by mutual co-operation, is absolutely, even in England, out of the pale of the law, its produce not being protected even from private plunder; and in order to protect it, a fiction, a lie, must be employed, and the property of the whole community must be formally vested in, and legally spoken of as belonging to, one or more specific individuals. To such miserable devices must co-operative industry bend before it can raise an arm to labor under insecurity: when it has labored, public plunder is ready to seize on its spoils. Equal security is therefore necessary to co-operative industry: but on this foundation established, it will turn stationary or declining circumstances, not founded on physical obstacles, into abundance and happiness.

We come now to the last of the popular objections to the system of voluntary equality, by means of joint production, possession, and enjoyment, to those of a *political* nature. The only one under this head that seems here deserving of notice, is that which alleges that, "these co-operating communities, if successful, would gradually supersede all the present institutions of society by withdrawing mankind from their operation, leaving ultimately the managers of such institutions no other subjects to govern, or to preach to, than themselves; and that they would also injure what is called the revenue of the state, (the amount of public plunder,) by the direction of

their industry to articles of use rather than those of luxury, thus evading many of the most productive taxes."

The whole of the first part of this objection is well founded. If the present institutions, the comforts, the characters, and enjoyments to which they give rise, were such as they ought to be, it would be superfluous to devise new arrangements to evade or improve upon them. It is exactly because these institutions are supposed to be defective, to be irreconcilable with the real improvement and happiness of man, that the new arrangements are proposed for adoption. But in what way is it proposed to supersede these old institutions founded in the ignorance and passions of past ages? By convincing those who support them, as well as those who are injuriously affected by them, that their happiness would be increased by joining in the new social arrangements. It proposes to take nothing of acquired property from any one. Its object is to raise all, even the most depressed, to an equality of happiness with those who now esteem themselves the most fortunate. Now, are the holders of political power and the retainers of these institutions, unwilling to trust themselves as judges, in their own cause? to permit themselves to adopt what on examination they may deem most conducive to their own happiness? would they wish to bind themselves to remain, in spite of their own convictions, the eternal slaves of institutions, though they might wish, on examination, to be no longer in bondage to them? Or would they wish to take away from their fellow-creatures that liberty of judging respecting their happiness, which they would claim for themselves? Political power has now no choice but the following left: it must either adopt this alternative of free discussion, or subject itself to the daily risk of the attacks of force from secret combinations. The truth has got abroad amongst the inhabitants of Europe, that all political institutions ought to be tributary to the happiness of at least the majority—and if of the majority, almost always of all—of those whose interests they affect, and that that happiness ought to be pursued in the way deemed by that majority the most conducive to it. Neither compulsion nor delusion can much longer govern the affairs of men. Human beings must henceforth judge for themselves, and must be governed through their understandings.

The mode of industrious exertion by mutual co-operation and joint possession, will doubtless, should it become the general practice of society, supersede almost all the present institutions relating to law both criminal and civil; and of course save for the enjoyment of the producers, those im-

mense sums which are now expended in the payment of the officers of law. All causes of contest about property, and of almost all other dissensions amongst individuals, being removed by the substitution of joint for individual possessions, those who live on such contests and dissensions must find other employments. But who so sanguine as to suppose that this change could take place so quickly as materially to inconvenience the present practitioners? From amongst the practitioners and retainers of law, as from every other class of general society, members of the new communities will be obtained. The demand for the exertions of legal people ceasing, the numbers of those brought up to the calling will diminish; and the present practitioners, constantly diminishing by death, will be sufficient for the constantly decreasing demand for their labors, should the new communities proceed. Should a moral impossibility be supposed, that these communities established themselves so quickly and universally, as not only not to permit an increase of lawyers and their retainers, but to leave destitute the present unsalaried part of the profession, what would be the consequence? Simply that the unemployed lawyers, and those in their train, must condescend to co-operate with their fellow-men in some of the co-operating communities most congenial to their habits, directing to some useful purpose for the common benefit their hitherto misdirected powers of mind and body. But were all these circumstances otherwise, who at this time of day will gravely maintain that the trade of law, though no customers were to be found, must be kept up for the sake of lawyers, any more than that turnpikes and tolls of roads should be kept up for the benefit of toll-receivers, and people compelled to pass through the gates, or pay the toll whether they passed or not? The use of one branch of law is to terminate individual disputes about individual property, and to secure it to whomsoever the law thinks proper to designate as the right owner. It is not for the sake of the disputes, but to prevent disputes, that laws are, or ought to be, instituted. Now if by any arrangement, or contrivance, or improvement in the disposition of people, these disputes ceased to occur, would not the real and only useful object of all just law be accomplished? Whenever these communities needed the aid of a lawyer respecting their joint property, they would of course refer to one, should none of their own members be competent to the task from knowledge of the existing laws. As local and other peculiar circumstances, will probably render individual exertion and possession unavoidable to a small minority of society, should the general principle of co-

operation be ever so triumphant; the change effected in the laws will be their greater simplicity, the extreme mildness of their punishments, and the contracted and always decreasing sphere of actions to which it will be necessary to apply them, in proportion as temptations are withdrawn, and the practice of private morals and the influence of public opinion are increased.

As with the professors of law, so with the professors of religion. The trade of religion, like the trade of the law, would most probably gradually cease as the communities improved in intelligence and moral conduct. The pretext under which priests, for the most part forcibly, appropriate to themselves so vast a portion of the products of human industry, is the necessity of superadding the sanction of superhuman terrors to those of natural motives, public opinion, and law, in order to compel men into virtuous conduct, or rather to restrain them from the practice of the most destructive crimes and vices. If by new circumstances, removing temptation and supplying motives to the practice of all the virtues really useful to humanity, these crimes and vices become so rare and so little alarming, as to be looked upon as unhappy diseases of the individuals afflicted with them, the turnpike for an unnecessary or unused road, would be as applicable to the priests as to the lawyers. As soon as men are permitted to acquire the use of their reason, and are not forced, from the operation on their minds of the circumstances in which they are placed, to hate and torment each other, they will most probably regard the introduction of superhuman motives for the guidance of their conduct to each other as altogether irrelevant, and as diverting their minds from the real points at issue. As to unintelligible dogmas, or idle speculations, where there are no data for judging, of what might have taken place before human or planetary existence began, or what may take place when the individual or planet in which he moves shall cease their accustomed motions, men will probably learn to be modest and altogether indifferent as to idle guesses on such immaterial points of inquiry, till they acquire the means of judging. They will probably see that they can judge as well as their priests on such matters; which can have no sort of connexion with the plain matter-of-fact questions of morals, the consequences of their voluntary actions. Should the whole, or any number of a community, wish for the speculations of any priest of any particular sect, there is nothing to hinder (but every thing to invite) any such man from becoming a member of the community, communing with those who find pleasure in his communications. There cannot be con-

ceived a test more decisive of the sincerity of such men and the motives by which they are actuated, than the facility held out to them, in common with all others, of joining and co-operating with such communities. If sincere, if truth be their object, and not the desire to live in idleness on the products of their fellow-creatures' labor, where can they find stations so attractive for their labors? The community being founded on the right to free inquiry, they will have a right to propose their notions to all, and the same right will all possess and exercise, of judging as freely of their opinions as of those of any other of their brethren. From the moment the priest begins to threaten them with evils, they will suspect that if he had any reason to offer, threatening would be unnecessary, as no teacher of chemistry threatens to singe the hair of the head of his class, if they will not admit his experiments or conclusions. Within a small compass, in a friendly circle, all the auditors of the communities are comprised: equal, intelligent, and anxious for truth and happiness, they are the disciples and the converts, of whose understandings a zealous and intelligent teacher would be proud. What more should his soul wish for than to be the equal and friendly instructor of such men? If a hireling, however, he will never settle amongst them: he may come and visit them, and collect the plunder, and curse, or, if of the favored cast, dragoon them, if they will not pay: he will do any thing but settle among them, share their simplicity and temperance, expose his own moral and intellectual qualities to their familiar investigation, and challenge a rigid examination of every proposition he brings forward. As teachers of morals by *words*, the business of these men will be superseded by the more efficient teaching of *circumstances*; but, to co-operate in this mode of teaching, their attention may be usefully directed. For any other purpose, it does not seem likely that their services would long be required. Very gradually, however, would this change take place. As in the case of the lawyers, the existing priests would cease in a few years by the course of nature, or would join the communities; and those who, under present circumstances, would be trained with a view to succeed them, would be trained to give and receive greater happiness than that of following the trade of a priest, in some of the co-operating communities. With the priests of established churches, and those otherwise paid by political power, these communities would have no more to do than other members of society. Peculiarly useless to them would be such a body of men. The continuance of the institutions under which any priesthood is supported by compulsory payment, as of that branch of the

lawyer trade so supported, would depend, as now, on the public opinion of general society, of which these communities, according to their numbers and intelligence, would form a more or less influential part. That some of these communities *might* get under the guidance of fanatics and exclusionists, the history of the Shakers and Harmonists in the North American United States will show: under such guidance, zeal might be directed to devote the half or the whole of the products of its labor, to the support of any priesthood or any institution: whether in Britain or Ireland such guidance and such zeal are much to be dreaded or hoped for, the reader will judge.

As with the classes of lawyers and priests, so with those trained for the avowed purpose of destroying the lives, and seizing by wholesale on the property, of their fellow-creatures, it is plainly admitted that, in the opinion of the writer, the necessary effect of the general establishment of communities of mutual co-operation, would be, in a few years to render such trades altogether unnecessary. It is not intimated, however, that the continuance or discontinuance of such classes, depends directly on the establishment of such communities: it depends solely on the general improvement of the public reason, and on these communities no more than on their apparent tendency to forward the progress of that public reason. They are proposed to be formed on no creed or exclusion of any sort: military men, as well as others, may join them, and may exert their powers of persuasion, by a recital of their warlike exploits and the advantages produced by them, to induce the community or a great portion of them to turn warriors. To them, as to priests of all sorts, the field of unlimited discussion will be open; but most probably the products of the community's labor will not be willingly given to any claimants of war, divinity, or law, or to any other class ever so useful, till they are convinced of that utility, and of the real preponderant good of what they receive in exchange. If all these classes believe their labors to be useful, what more ought they to wish for than the most ample means of convincing those around them of that utility? Whether labor be performed by competition or co-operation, to the severe scrutiny of utility all these and all other modes of living on the labors of others, will be subjected; particularly where compulsion is employed to collect the means for those modes of living. No management of these communities, could long support such institutions in face of an enlightened public opinion of general society: but, their great facilities of production would make easy the passage from the old employments to the new, and

would afford an asylum to all leaving such employments, or relinquishing the hope of them; which new mode of life experience would soon prove to be happier than the deserted occupations. The privileged classes, and those who now live on the compulsory labor of their fellow-creatures, ought to be the most anxious for the establishment of the co-operating communities, as affording an unlooked for expedient, by means of which their usurpations and plunder may cease to molest others, and they themselves may become happier than before, by cordial union with those from whom the perverse circumstances in which they had been placed, had estranged them.

Still more strongly ought these views to operate with all those connected with what are called national debts, finance, revenue, and all unnecessary or overpaid offices, not to speak of such as live on the labors of others without any pretence of services rendered. Whether to enable the whole society to pay the interest or the principal of capital wickedly squandered, to support a revenue overwhelming in its amount and corruptive influence, to maintain public officers in idle and enervating luxury, or to enable all or any of these classes, as they adopt the public feeling and become tired or ashamed of their former mode of life, dependent, humiliating, and irritating to those on the products of whose labor they existed, to change that mode of life for one in every respect more respectable and happier; whichever of these objects any of these parties would wish to attain, the communities of mutual co-operation are the real golden age to them, affording them the only possibility of retrieving their past errors, and rejoining the family of mankind from which they had been estranged. If the friends of old institutions really think them useful, and their utility capable of being demonstrated, what more happy contrivance could be for them devised than the assembling into industrious communities, from whence all immediate sources of irritation would be banished, all those of general society who are now discontented with such institutions? Where with such sure effect convince them of the utility of such institutions? What argument so cogent as the comparative smallness of the contributions they would have to pay, or the immense increase of surplus left after paying them?

The latter part of the political objection to these communities, that "they would injure the revenue of the state by the direction of their industry to articles of use not taxed, rather than to those of luxury," may be well founded or not according to circumstances; but whether well founded or not, is of very little importance as to the utility of these communities. State revenue, in comparison to the happiness of the

contributors, is at best but as dust in the balance. If the communities be prosperous and happy, they will voluntarily contribute to the revenue if it be useful: if not, they ought not to contribute, were their means ever so abundant.

The consequence no doubt seems very probable, that these co-operating communities, judging every thing by the touchstone of utility, will not consume many articles of home and foreign manufacture heavily taxed, but either injurious to the health of those who use them or utterly useless. Such articles are used now in large quantities, chiefly because those who consume are not the producers of them, as well as from the bad habits and ignorance prevailing in general society. Were the consumers of useless gew-gaws, or of pernicious drugs or compounds, under the necessity of producing them, either by individual exertion or mutual co-operation, they would soon begin to balance the pleasure of the acquisition with the pain of production; and should the time devoted to such production be necessary for the acquisition of objects of undoubted use and necessity, all desire for such useless or pernicious articles would vanish. So, it should seem, would be influenced the members of the new communities. Until they became very general, however, they could produce no serious effect on the revenue, even should the direction of their industry be as predicted. If numerous, their opinions would have a corresponding weight as members of general society. The chief use to which the revenue is applied, is to supply indefinite numbers of unproductive individuals with these useless or pernicious articles. Even to these individuals would the new estimate of the value of such articles reach. They would look round in vain for that admiration and sympathy which the possession of such articles used to procure them: they would be forced to inquire into their intrinsic value: their attachment to such things would be weakened, and the loss of some of them, from the falling off of the revenue, would be little regretted. Their salaries and their expenses would be diminished, to conform to the change in public opinion and in their own. Many of them would be entire converts to the principles of the new communities, and would join them.

Should the lovers of the expedients of insecurity object that these expectations are altogether puerile, that articles of luxury and intemperance will always be liked, as they are now liked, by general society, and for the same reasons; should they say that it is useful that the revenue should be supported to its present amount; in what way can these co-operating communities be injurious to them? Can they not

convince these communities of all these utilities? or, if that be impracticable or beneath them, have they not the same power to compel payment of taxes, without reason or explanation, by the co-operating communities, exactly as by the rest of society producing by individual exertion? Are they such novices in the mysteries of taxation, as not to know that wherever overflowing production and wealth are, the means of reaping it to add to the mass of public plunder, can never be wanting? The fear now is, that the people employed under the restraints of insecurity, will not be able, by individual competition, to produce spare wealth to the amount of the present revenue. The first and greatest object, then, of the supporters of the necessity of this revenue, should surely be to increase the mass of annual productions, of surplus productions, out of which there may be at least a possibility of levying the amount required. In whatever way considered, it appears altogether preposterous to discourage a mode of producing increased wealth, lest by possibility the producers of it should be too wise or too strong to give the products of their labors without an equivalent. If the wealth is not produced, it *cannot* be given: if it be produced, it *may* be given, or taken.

But, there remains another objection, partaking of the nature of all the preceding, economical, political, and moral, to the anticipations of equality of wealth and universal diffusion of happiness from production by mutual co-operation. It is said, that “communities possessing the richest land, though in no greater quantity than necessary for their own support, will always have an advantage over those possessing poor soils requiring more labor in culture and manure to obtain the same amount of produce; and that this advantage will be constantly increasing as population advances, and less and less fertile lands are necessarily brought into cultivation.”

This statement supposes that the system of mutual co-operation has so far advanced, that all the communities are possessors of their own soil and capital; a result which would certainly take place in a few years after their establishment, even where the original co-operators were so poor as to be under the necessity of borrowing the whole of their capital. The more destitute such a community at its commencement, the longer probably and more persevering would be their daily labor to work out their independence.

That the advantage pointed out, would be enjoyed by the fortunate holders of rich land over those cultivating the poor, though held by each in quantities no more than sufficient for the supply of their own wants, cannot be doubted. But the following considerations will show how very small is the amount of this apprehended evil.

As there is in every country, in proportion to its present population, an abundance of land of the first and second quality, whether naturally rich or sterile, to support its present population under the system of labor by mutual co-operation, and in most cases to support a much larger population; there can be no necessity for tilling bad lands, not to say the worst, till the working of the system of mutual co-operation shall have very much increased the population of all nations adopting it.

When this shall have taken place—reverting to the operation of increased comforts in begetting a desire to retain them, and habits of foresight and prudence to secure their continuance, as well as to the operation of knowledge, by education and otherwise, on the minds of young and old of these communities—when all the good lands shall have been cultivated, it will then be a simple question of calculation, how far it would be desirable, productive of increased happiness to the whole society, to proceed in the cultivation of inferior lands. Let improvements in culture be what they may, as we cannot suppose but that rich as well as poor lands will partake of their benefits, or that they will ever make rocks, sands, and mountains as fertile as loams, the difference of soils and the superiority of the good must continue. There will be always in every country and almost in every district, some lands so barren, that not all the labor of a whole community during eight hours, or every hour, of every day of the year, could extort from them enough to preserve the lives of the cultivators. Were rocks and sands, by breaking down, mixing, and absolute superinduction of an artificial soil upon them, made productive, the want of heat, from elevation, would in many cases baffle the effort; and the enormous yearly toil requisite to keep such artificial soils in repair, would always ensure the advantage of the naturally fertile soils. The inequality of effort, requisite to procure for different communities an equal supply of food and other articles procured by labor from land, must therefore continue. But we may safely trust to the wisdom of future societies, to prevent a waste of their labor on such unproductive soils, to discontinue their efforts at that point of infertility when labor will cease to yield preponderant good. The check will operate in this way. The young people of the flourishing and happy communities already established on the good lands, wish for marriage unions before vacancies (rooms) occur in their respective establishments. Their share of the capital of the community to which they belong, we suppose they can command. What is the choice before them? Either to join with other young

people like themselves, and devote the united labors of their lives to improve a portion of the sterile land, or to remain surrounded with every rational comfort where they are till the circumstances of the community permit their marriage. Let the desire of marriage and settlement be ever so strong, the experience of all men in all times, convinces us, that it will not be gratified at the expense of the sacrifice not only of the previous physical comforts of life, but of all those ties of kindred and friendship which would here so powerfully prevail. What *now* makes emigrants and settlers on new, though even the most fertile, soils? *Distress*: distress of the emigrants, and of the parent society from which they emigrate. Who ever heard of the emigration and new settlement of prosperous young people, in order to anticipate by a few years the period of marriage? But even if they did *now* take place, when every individual, without any data for judging, trusts to his chance in the lottery of life, and gratifies at all hazards a present inclination, what reason would that afford that under circumstances so altered, where chances on all sides were reduced to certainties, the same imprudencies would occur? imprudencies no longer, but converted into absolute insanities? It is almost needless to observe, that whatever lands could not be advantageously cultivated under mutual co-operation, could much less be cultivated under individual exertion. To pasturage or some other use than tillage would such lands be converted.

The mass of the evil ultimately apprehended from this source being thus removed, we must still follow its minutest traces. Until all the best lands are cultivated, no evil, or no perceptible evil, arises. When cultivated, those owning the richer lands will have the choice, either of working half an hour, or perhaps an hour, less in the day than those on the worst lands, or of adding to their wealth by devoting such spare hours to exertion productive of wealth. Perhaps the probability is, that as soon as experience shall have discovered the number of hours' labor and the degree of exertion during those hours, most conducive to health in a given latitude, *that* proportion of muscular exertion will be the rule of the whole society. If so, all working alike, an equal number of hours, the owners of the rich and of inferior land, what is to be done with the produce of the labor, necessarily employed on manufacturing industry, of the owners of the richer soils? Less of the labor of the owners of the richer soils being required to get the same produce from their smaller portion of land, to what use will be converted the objects of wealth created by their surplus labor? Will they be by them-

selves consumed? If not, to what other use will they probably be converted?

It is probable that those communities possessing rich land sufficient for their support (and perhaps no community ought to possess more of rich or poor land than sufficient for this purpose) would find more happiness in disposing of their surplus produce in other modes than in consuming it immediately themselves. One obvious mode presents itself. The surplus production of their equal labor, after an equal supply of all their own wants with those of other communities, might be appropriated to outfit the increasing population of the community. A greater capacity existing in such communities to provide for increased numbers without diminishing their comforts, increased numbers would be by them produced. Marriages with them would be earlier and more prolific: they would be the breeding stocks of society. For a contrary reason, the poor land communities, being able to produce by an equal number of hours' work every day no more than sufficient to supply their own wants on the same scale of enjoyment with the rich land-owners, having no surplus to provide for an increasing population, would not bring such population into existence: marriages would be with them later and less prolific: their numbers would remain stationary, or perhaps would at times require recruits from the richer communities. If they required recruits, it would probably be in consequence of some long-continued physical casualties, or other misfortunes, which prudence could not avert. Most frequently these misfortunes would require aid in capital as well as men: the recruits from the rich land communities overflowing with numbers, would supply them with capital, the portion of each of their young people, as well as strength. Thus would the equilibrium of numbers as well as of comforts, be maintained amongst the poor and the rich land communities.

The difference of industrious produce, however, would not be so great as at first sight might appear. Very infertile soils, whose culture would necessitate a life of privation, if not of misery, would not be brought into culture by a rational society, till such an outlay of capital in the improvement of their very texture could be spared, as would render their yearly demand for the labor of culture no more than the quantity demanded by the poorest lands already in culture. This premised, what proportion of the labor of an ordinary community expended on the supply of all of its wants, is necessary for the production of its food? Not a third part of its whole labor, or two to three hours a day, six to nine hours a day being supposed the time of the day's labor

for the supply of all wants. It is probable that no lands requiring, when improved to the utmost of their capability, much more than double the labor to yield the same produce that rich lands require, would be kept in tillage, but devoted to pasture or other uses. The spare labor then, arising from this source, of the most favored communities, would be but an hour to an hour and a half per day, but the sixth part of their whole labor. The poorness of the soil, it is evident, would not render less productive the remainder of the labor applied to other objects: in all the communities, holding rich or poor land, this, by far the greater portion of the labor of all, would be equally productive. Whereas, *now*, under the system of labor by competition, one man becomes one hundred thousand times richer, by mere accident or knavery as often as by superior intelligence, than his neighbour: under labor by co-operation, the utmost inequality between men, would be an increase of *one-sixth* at most to the richest over the lowest average comforts of their fellow-creatures! What evils could thence ensue?

If the society, in which these communities, whether cultivating poor or rich lands, were established, admitted of an increase of population; from those holding the rich land and possessing surplus labor and wealth, would that increase of population necessarily be drawn. The increasing numbers would always consist of those the best trained, possessing the most comforts and the most happiness, with the means of their establishment and support, aided by their own future labor, provided for them. How different this from the present progress of competition under the wretched expedients of insecurity! At present, the increase is supplied by the poorest and most ignorant, always keeping down to the lowest by their depressing competition the remuneration of labor, and presenting fresh masses of mental imbecility and powers of muscular exertion, inviting all the outrages and plunder of capitalists and political power, and yielding slavish uninquiring obedience to every vicious regulation which selfishness dictates under the name of law.

Should the state of society require the whole population to be stationary, the communities with rich land and spare labor might still produce beyond their own numbers; if not to increase the whole population, to supply the deficiencies that, under such circumstances, would be apt to occur in the least favourably circumstanced communities. Or if all communities exactly balanced their population, might not the produce of the surplus labor of the rich lands, be devoted to purposes of general utility, to public works, roads, canals,

in thinly peopled districts where no superfluity of labor over wants existed?

But after all our speculations, what is the amount of this alleged evil arising from inequality of agricultural produce out of the same amount of labor? Some communities out of the same amount of labor might produce more comforts than others. Would they therefore be envied, or hated, or injured by any other communities? Wealth being *now* almost the only source of distinction, all other distinctions merging in wealth and being measured by it, and inequality of possession being so enormous, as one, as nothing to millions, differences in point of wealth, involving the extremes of penury and starvation, or excess to satiety of enjoyment; what wonder that all human hopes and fears should be directed to the more or the less of this now all-commanding, all-engrossing instrument? But where all these circumstances are changed, where no distinction of wealth takes place as to the individuals of any given community, and where there is therefore no inequality whatever, where wealth has no value as a mark of distinction, nothing but what depends on its intrinsic utility; where even amongst the different communities the greatest (unavoidable) difference in point of wealth, could be no more than one-sixth of a unit instead of millions to one or to nothing, what possible evil could arise from such a difference of wealth, or of the power of producing it? The probability is, that this very inequality of wealth would be useful, as affording scope for the gratification of different inclinations as to muscular and intellectual exertion. When the monstrous prejudice shall have ceased, that attaches dishonour to *useful* muscular exertion, lavishing its envy and admiration on every useless and pernicious exertion of muscular power, provided it has no connexion with utility; when the true value of muscular exertion shall be known, the dishonor will be to squander that power, the exercise of which, properly directed, might always promote consequential comforts as well as health: the choice will be, whether more or less of the day shall be passed in muscular, or intellectual exertion, or in social intercourse. Inaction of body and mind, mere idleness, will be the universal opprobrium. Some will prefer passing more of their time in muscular, some in intellectual, some in social pursuits; in idleness none. Some whole communities will be more inclined to intellectual and social pursuits, some to muscular exertion in the production of wealth. Those who do not produce, nor of course consume, the same quantity of the articles of wealth that others do, do not produce them simply because, in their estimate of happiness, their time is

more wisely devoted to other objects. By what possibility, then, can they envy the possession of those things to others, the possession of which is by appropriate exertion in their own power, but which they deliberately think unworthy of the purchase? The communities, more inclined to mental and social pursuits, would naturally attract to them those individuals whose tastes assimilated with their own, from other communities more inclined to the enjoyments derivable from articles of wealth, and of course devoting more of their exertion to produce them. Changes would continually take place between individuals of different communities, to associate themselves with those of congenial pursuits. The intellectual, the social, the elegantly furnished, the variously fed communities, or those partaking in a medium degree of all these advantages, would no more be induced to envy each other for their several pursuits and enjoyments, than people sitting at the same table and preferring different meats or fruits, of each of which there was abundance for all, would envy those whose tastes differed from theirs. If any feelings existed, they would be those of pity and wonder, that people of good organization and improved intellect should prefer sources of pleasure generally deemed inferior. Far from wanting theirs, they would rather endeavour gently to force, by reason and experiment, their tastes upon others.

If still any jealousy exist in the mind of the objector, if any fear remain of this *obstacle of nature* to a perfect equality of wealth, from the different productiveness of different soils; an expedient remains, just to all, not a forced but a voluntary expedient, by which all such fear and jealousy must be effectually dispelled. All restraints and of course all institutions of insecurity being, as we suppose, removed, still the same principle of co-operation of communities, will be requisite in conducting the national affairs of common interest of all the individuals of all communities, that is so admirably beneficial in conducting the comparatively private affairs of a family of individuals in each separate community. If the principle be good for the co-operation of a thousand individuals in one community, it is equally good for the co-operation of a thousand or a hundred thousand communities, where their joint interests are concerned. Contributions of national wealth will still be requisite to carry on national undertakings, to maintain *security* from without as well as from within. Public as well as private plunder ceasing, the products of the labor of no community being abstracted from its own use without an equivalent by it deemed satisfactory, its consent must be obtained to every such abstraction. The amount of these

voluntary abstractions or contributions for district, provincial, national, international, or philanthropic purposes, would be inconceivably small, when the passion for individual accumulation and display of wealth had ceased, and when almost all the occasions for the exercise of the ordinary functions of government had also ceased, being superseded by the voluntary discharge of such of those duties as were found necessary within each separate community for its own benefit. Small as they might be, suppose it was proposed to these communities, or any individuals representing them, that the owners of the rich soils producing more wealth, with equal effort, than their less fortunate neighbours, should, according to the degree of fertility of their soils, contribute towards these necessary annual payments. Is it to be supposed that such a contribution, for none but useful purposes, would by such favored communities be objected to? a payment in the shape of what is now called rent, the accumulation of which in individual hands is one of the main-stays of excessive inequality of wealth. The contest more probably would be on the part of the communities with poor land, for opportunity to share the pleasure of contributing to such useful objects. Suppose again the worst, that all were selfish, and none wished to pay any part of the public burden though for purposes of which all, or at least a great majority, approved, and in which all were interested, the will of the majority decrees a tax in the shape of rent, in lieu of all other taxes, to be levied on the rich lands in proportion to their surplus fertility over the poorest generally cultivated lands. By such a regulation, the public burdens would be discharged, and perfect equality as to labor and enjoyments derived from wealth, would be produced. If therefore, after all the explanations that have been given, the evil from unequal fertility of soils is still esteemed great, the remedy is simple, is at hand, and quite commensurate to the disease.

Such is the survey, which truth, according to the best judgment of which I am capable, compels me to take of the system of voluntary equality in the distribution of wealth by means of mutual co-operation, under the shelter of equal and perfect security. All force and delusion being removed, the co-operation of each individual depending on his perception of the tendency of the proposed measures to exalt his individual happiness by associating it with that of others, all sinister

interest or mysterious design on the part of the agents and promoters of such plans being removed, what remains but that rational men should every where try so magnificent an experiment?

Much remains to be done. Knowledge remains to be diffused. Mystery must be disclaimed. The whole truth in all its simplicity must be laid before the minds of all. Neither from the few holders of political power, nor from the real society, every where plundered, made vicious and miserable by the wretched institutions of which the holders of political power are the tools, and the champions, must any part of the truth be concealed. All *consequences* must be frankly laid open. Men must be henceforth governed by their reason, contemplating their interest. These communities will not be formed, and ought not to be formed, by enthusiasm, any more than by the arm of authority. Every individual co-operator must be, and ought to be, convinced. This individual convincing, remains to be achieved. It is not enough that no force, no delusion, no sinister interest should exist; the very suspicion of them should be cleared away from the minds of those expected to co-operate in such communities. Whether Jesuits, Moravians, Shakers, or Harmonists; no communities of mutual co-operation have hitherto been instituted, that have not been founded on principles of exclusion. Hence the persuasion that it is impossible to found them on other principles. Ignorance on the part of the flock, blind submission to their mountebank leaders, proscription of all free inquiry and all other knowledge than that scanty portion requisite to make them regular producers and feeders, have been hitherto the characteristics of labor by mutual co-operation. No wonder that the enlightened and the sincere, no wonder that all lovers of truth, turned from them in disgust.

These deep-rooted associations must be broken: on free inquiry and knowledge, must these communities be henceforth founded: their utility, not only as to food and raiment, but as to every other source of human happiness, particularly as to freedom from sinister controul, must be demonstrated. Men must ultimately see and pursue their interest when plainly laid before them. A more important and more extensive change in human society was never contemplated by the mind of man. Reason is the only agent worthy of effecting such a change. The puny and suspicious aid of self-constituted political power, would but mar the mighty work. The deliberate wisdom of whole nations, expressed through those, or in the manner, they may appoint, may hereafter facilitate to all individuals so inclined, the acquisition of the entire use

of the products of their labor by mutual co-operation. Meanwhile, let individual persuasion go forth: for surely a scheme for the production and distribution of wealth, combining all the benefits of all the opposite modes of human exertion hitherto practised, and for the attainment in the highest degree of all other human enjoyments, a scheme so wise and so beneficent, and withal so gentle even to those who must be its opponents, creating and not destroying, raising all and depressing none—in real happiness depressing none—the progress of human knowledge never, heretofore, enabled human being to disclose.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

OF all the sources of error in reasonings respecting wealth, none have been more frequent or more unavoidable, than assuming that the circumstances surrounding the writer, in whatever country writing, circumstances generated by the modifications of insecurity there prevailing, were unavoidable and necessarily permanent. The institutions of insecurity, generating peculiar moral or immoral habits, and causing endless modifications in the production and distribution of wealth, not only differ in every country on the face of the globe, but are continually varying in the same country. Hence the improbability of establishing any permanent or universal truths on such partial and treacherous foundations: but hence also the prevalence of the error of generalizing, or drawing false conclusions from insufficient data. The writer, surrounded all his life with certain moral features, accustomed to witness certain restraints and certain peculiarities of distribution, is apt to regard them as equally stationary with the natural features of the scenery around him. In admiration of the natural scenery, however wild, useless, or pernicious to his well-being, he is trained from infancy to bow down, because he is told it was made by super-human power: in admiration of the existing institutions and their consequences, he is trained to bow down in equal admiration, because they were created by human power, guided, as he is told, sometimes by human, sometimes by superhuman, wisdom. Whatever is, he is taught to reverence; his conduct he is *compelled* to make conformable to the existing institutions. A class of productive laborers, sometimes slaves, a class of capitalists, a class of rent- or land-owners, sometimes a class of farmers of these lands, sometimes a class of fundholders, always numerous classes of idlers, living under different pretences on the labors of the industrious, he is accustomed to behold. These groups, with the various modifications or additions of different systems

of insecurity, have been the data, not only for investigating what has been, and how the different phenomena respecting wealth have been produced, but also for fixing what must be and what ought to be. Now it is evident that the best past construction of windmills, or the absolute mode of construction in any particular country, would be no better guide in solving the question as to the best possible way of making these machines, than the absolute expedients in any particular country, or the past expedients of creating or distributing wealth, could be conclusive as to the best mode of creating or distributing it. As a matter of history, of curiosity, of necessary information to guide our inquiry, nothing can be more useful: to proceed in the inquiry without such information, would be working without tools, building without materials. But neither the tools nor the materials are the finished fabric: neither the past expedients of insecurity, nor the actors, nor the actions generated by them, are the problem of which we are in search. 'Tis not the history of the invention, 'tis not the explanation of the working of an actual machine, but the best mode of producing the effect, for the production of which alone the machine ought to be worked or supported, that we are inquiring after.

Such, however, is necessarily the slow progress of knowledge. As in physical so in moral inquiries, we must first ascertain facts. In physics, material things and their properties; in morals, institutions, actions and their consequences. In morals, the real difficulties, and till of late years the persecutions, attending the inquiries, have retarded this first step of science. This step, however, only preparatory to real knowledge, has been looked upon as knowledge itself: the materials of judging have been used as a bar to prevent the exercise of judgement. Explaining the way in which wealth had been hitherto produced and distributed, inquirers thought their work was done. A collection of all past laws, would be as rational a substitute for the best code of legislation.

Our object being, to ascertain that mode of distributing wealth which would lead to its greatest reproduction and to the greatest preponderant happiness from all other sources; all former modes of production and distribution have necessarily been discarded as authorities to preclude our judgement as to new combinations, and have been used simply as materials to enable us to form that judgement aright. Slavery and free labor with all their modifications, the institutions of Hindostan and those of Britain, have been equally used as materials of judging, have been equally spurned as authorities to preclude judgement, and have been equally subjected to

the rigid scrutiny of utility. In this mode of inquiry, discarding all particular interests, all existing modes of distribution, or rather merging all particular ill-understood interests, all those aptly termed sinister interests, in the universal interest, the interest of the great mass of men, we have endeavoured to disentangle the question from the intricacies of expedients, instituted for the most part by passion and ignorance, to attain objects for the most part also undesirable, and to reduce the question of distribution to its simplest elements. Men, labor, materials; the materials afforded by nature, out of which the mental and muscular powers of mankind must fabricate all those means of happiness which wealth affords; such are our simple elements. How out of these to fabricate, by means of wealth, the greatest mass of happiness, has been the problem to be solved. This problem solved, another inquiry only secondary in importance, presented itself—how with the least inconvenience to reduce the present chance-formed modes of producing and distributing wealth to that mode which would produce the most happiness?

It was found in the beginning of the inquiry that *equality* of distribution was calculated to produce incalculably more happiness than any other mode of distributing wealth, provided the ultimate lots were not so small as to be unworthy the trouble of acquiring and enjoying them, and provided such distribution were effected without the evils of force.

Equality of distribution, ought therefore to be the rule: to be departed from in those cases only where reasons can be given productive of preponderant good.

There being no other way of producing wealth but by human effort; sometimes by individual exertion, sometimes by the united exertions of more than one, sometimes by united exertions of hundreds; it is obvious that if the principle of equality of distribution of any given quantity of wealth were extended beyond those concerned in its production, though the present pleasure of enjoyment by the distribution were increased, yet the motive to the future production of wealth would be taken away from the producers, and would by no means be given to those to whom enjoyment was given by equality of distribution without having shared in the labor of production. The producer or producers of wealth would never voluntarily consent that what they had produced for their own purposes, for their own use and enjoyment, should, after production, be taken from them and distributed to increase the happiness of others not co-operating in its production. This principle applies equally to the cases where the wealth in question has been produced by the joint efforts of two hundred or two thousand, as where it has been produced by two. This limitation as to equality

of distribution of the articles of wealth, is called the principle of security. Equality must be limited by security. Security means "free labor, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges." Without security there is no reproduction. In proportion to the completeness of the security—knowledge and all other circumstances remaining equal—will be the abundance of the production. In proportion to the defect of the security, will be the falling off in the production, till it shall ultimately cease. Whether wealth is produced by one or by a thousand individuals, by individual competition or by mutual co-operation, the necessity of security to reproduction is the same. If the articles of wealth produced by a thousand or ten thousand, be without their consent distributed amongst twenty or a hundred thousand, amongst as many as think the shares so reduced worth their acceptance, will not the future productions of these one thousand or ten thousand, be as much discouraged, as the production of an individual would be by a like distribution of what his single efforts had produced?

The universal and paramount claim for security—which can only apply to articles procured by labor—thus established, and no other principle being discovered to restrain the blessings of equality; it follows that equality ought always to be the rule of distribution where not incompatible with security, much more where the dictates of security and those of equality point the same way.

The term "security" has been stripped of the falsehood and sophistry with which it has been hitherto associated. The security here spoken of, is the equal security of all, not the security of a few only, with the insecurity of the greater number; it is the security of "the power of producing," of producing indefinite quantities to be consumed and reproduced every year, of the productive powers of every individual, not of the mere handful of accumulated products of those powers which some few have, by whatever means, accumulated.

The only justifiable limit, that is to say, the only limit productive of preponderant good, to equality of distribution, being *equality of security*, the effects of upholding impartially this principle of equal security, have been anxiously traced; and it has been shown that equal security impartially dealt out to all members of society, instead of being confined to a favored few, becomes in its progress the companion and the only firm and unfailing support of equality of distribution; not, as hitherto falsely supposed, its enemy. Though it may not produce absolute equality, though it may not preclude the possibility of casualties arising chiefly from physical

causes, though some may be still found richer and some poorer than others, yet will all extremes of wealth and poverty be banished. The great mass of the vices and miseries arising from excessive wealth and excessive poverty, will cease, and those only will remain which are inseparable from the competition of talent and exertion in its most useful form.

That spurious security, upheld by the terrors of political power, and too often slavishly or ignorantly worshiped by political economists, security in the enjoyment and *perpetuation* of all existing modes of acquisition, or rather of commanding the products of the yearly labor of others, to their chance possessors, though wrung from the insecurity of the rest of the community, has been exposed; and the monstrous hypocrisy and other vices, the various wretchedness, and the weakening even to the annihilation of industry and reproduction in proportion to the extent of its sway, which this false substitute for real impartial security has every where produced, have been exhibited. To this fatal usurper of the name of security, has been given its real and appropriate title, "insecurity," and all the various and ever-shifting means of force and fraud, which it has employed to attain its ends, to perpetuate its usurpations over the happiness of men, have been styled the "expedients or institutions of insecurity." While the genuine principle of equal security leads to an almost actual equality in the distribution of wealth, produced by impartial competition, the false principle of spurious security leads to the utmost inequality of its distribution, by trampling down competition and excluding all the world but itself from the benefits of security. To such horrible abuses has the spurious term security been applied, that under its name has been justified and is still upheld, the system of human slavery, that assemblage in one word, that wholesale license for the perpetration, of all human vices and crimes affecting the property and the person of another. The security in all shapes of one human being must be surrendered to maintain an inconsiderable atom of the security, that of part of the property, of another human being!

The characteristics of genuine, or equal, security and of spurious security, or of security and insecurity, have been developed.

Equal security

Protects the free direction of the labor of all.

Spurious security

Restrains the free direction of labor to all but its favorites; to whom, in addition, it permits the use of force and fraud.

Protects all alike in the entire use of the products of their labor:	Permits the plunder of the products of the labor of all, by those having political or other power:
Protects all voluntary exchanges.	Restrains all exchanges in order to increase or perpetuate the acquisitions of its favorites, (<i>by means of which acquisitions they engross almost all the products of human labor</i>), or to facilitate the collection of public plunder, or for other partial purposes.

These characteristics of equal security as to wealth, embrace what have been vaguely called the “Natural Laws of Distribution,” or those fundamental rules respecting the distribution of wealth, which no law of any society can violate without detracting in a proportionate degree from the greatest mass of happiness which wealth is calculated to produce:—*Free labor, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchanges*; so simple are the rules on which all just distribution of wealth ought to be founded.

Equal or genuine security, consisting in the observance of these rules, being founded on the interest of all, removing without effort the excesses of inequality and the vices to which those excesses give rise, both on the side of poverty and superfluity, requires none but the most simple laws and the mildest punishments to preserve the peace and happiness of society; while unequal or spurious security, founded on the mistaken interest as to happiness, the real interest as to magnitude of wealth, of a very inconsiderable number of the individuals of which society is composed, and necessarily complicated in its arrangements, requires laws without end to follow those complications, and brutal in their deterring punishments in proportion to the number and inequality and consequent injustice of the restraints they impose. The one protects all by mild laws; the other restrains all but the favored few by vexatious and sanguinary laws.

Spurious security directs its almost undivided attention to the *actual accumulations* of wealth, to the preservation of the divisions and modes of division which actually exist: equal or genuine security, looks more to the *productive powers*, to the capacity of producing future wealth, than to the actual quantity accumulated; and neither to that portion which is, or which may be, accumulated, is its attention directed with

any other view than that of educing therefrom the greatest possible mass of human happiness, that of the non-possessors as much as of those who possess. To estimate the importance of this distinction, we should inquire, which of the two masses of wealth, that already accumulated even in the most wealthy community, or that capable of being produced, yearly, or in a few years, by ordinary skill and industry, are the greatest in quantity and the most influential on human happiness.

It is little thought, by most persons not at all suspected, how very small a proportion, either in extent or influence, the actual accumulations of society bear to human productive powers, even to the ordinary consumption of a few years of a single generation. The reason is obvious; but the effect very pernicious. The wealth that is annually consumed, disappearing with its consumption, is seen but for a moment, and makes no impression but during the act of enjoyment or use. But that part of wealth which is of slow consumption, furniture, machinery, buildings, from childhood to old age stand out before the eye, the durable monuments of human exertion. By means of the possession of this fixed, permanent or slowly consumed, part of national wealth, of the land and materials to work upon, the tools to work with, the houses to shelter whilst working, the holders of these articles command for their own benefit the yearly productive powers of all the really efficient productive laborers of society, though these articles may bear ever so small a proportion to the recurring products of that labor. The population of Britain and Ireland being twenty millions, the average consumption of each individual, man, woman, and child, is probably about twenty pounds, making four hundred millions of wealth, the product of labor annually consumed. The whole amount of the accumulated capital of these countries, it has been estimated, does not exceed twelve hundred millions, or three times the year's labor of the community; or, if equally divided, sixty pounds capital for every individual. 'Tis with the *proportions*, rather than with the absolute accurate amount of these estimated sums, we are concerned. The interest of this capital stock would support the whole population in the same comfort in which they now exist, for about two months of one year, and the whole accumulated capital itself would maintain them in idleness (could purchasers be found) for three years! at the end of which time, without houses, clothes, or food, they must starve, or become the slaves of those who supported them in the three years idleness. As three years to the life of one healthy generation, say forty years, so is the magnitude and importance

of the actual wealth, the accumulated capital of even the wealthiest community, to their productive powers; to the productive powers of only one generation; not of what, under judicious arrangements of equal security, they might produce, particularly with the aid of co-operative labor, but of what, under the defective and depressing expedients of insecurity, they do absolutely produce! It is probable that were the whole society at full and easy work under the co-operative system, they would be able to reproduce in a year and a half (were they in the mean time supported) the seeming mighty mass of existing capital; to maintain and perpetuate which (or rather the command of the products of yearly labor which it serves as the means of engrossing)—for no one wishes to lessen it—in its present state of forced division, are all the horrible machinery, the vices, crimes, and miseries of insecurity, sought to be perpetuated. As nothing can be accumulated without first supplying necessities, and as the great current of human inclination is to enjoyment; hence the comparatively trifling amount of the actual wealth of society at any particular moment. 'Tis an eternal round of production and consumption. From the amount of this immense mass of annual consumption and production, the handful of actual accumulation would hardly be missed; and yet it is to this handful, and not to the mass of productive power, that attention has chiefly been directed. This handful however having been seized upon by a few, and been made the instrument of converting to their use the constantly recurring annual products of the labor of the great majority of their fellow-creatures; hence, in the opinion of these few, the paramount importance of such an instrument. Of importance, that is to say of benefit, to them, yes; but of a far different, a melancholy importance to those, the labor of whose life it makes tributary to the enjoyments, supposed or real, of the favored few; of importance, as compared with the labor of the lives of the productive classes, none whatever. As about one third part of the annual products of the labor of these countries is now abstracted from the producers, under the name of public burdens, and unproductively consumed by those who give no equivalent, that is to say, none satisfactory to the producers, it is evident that even under the present arrangements, *this abstraction ceasing*, the amount of the present capital, twelve hundred millions, could be accumulated, though at the expense of great privation and distress, in nine years. The annual produce being four hundred millions, the produce of nine years would be three thousand six hundred millions, the one-third part of which, or twelve hundred millions, is the capital demanded. Under the co-

operative system of labor, half the time, or much less, would produce the same result, and allow of ample comforts to the producers during the accumulation. Both of these cases suppose that the present burdens of insecurity were removed. While they remain, individual exertion and co-operative labor must both pine; though co-operative labor would thrive, were it silly enough to bear it, under a burden, which would crush to the earth individual exertion.

A fair estimate, it is hoped, may now be formed of the comparative importance in the scale of human happiness of accumulated wealth, as opposed to productive powers of creating wealth. With the accumulated masses, particularly when held forth in the hands of a few individuals, the vulgar eye has been always struck. The annually produced and consumed masses, like the eternal and incalculable waves of a mighty river, roll on and are lost in the forgotten ocean of consumption. On this eternal consumption however are dependant, not only for almost all gratifications, but even for existence, the whole human race. The quantity and distribution of these yearly products, ought to be the paramount objects of consideration. The actual accumulation is altogether of secondary importance; and derives almost the whole of that importance from its influence on the distribution of the yearly productions.

It is in this point of view that the happiness derivable from wealth, has been here considered. Actual accumulations and distributions, have been always considered in reference and subordinate to the power of producing. In almost all other systems, the power of producing has been considered in reference and subordinate to actual accumulations, and to the perpetuating of the existing modes of distribution. In comparison to the preservation of this actual distribution, the ever-recurring misery or happiness of the whole human race has been considered as unworthy of regard. To perpetuate the results of force, fraud, and chance, has been called security; and to the support of this spurious security, have all the productive powers of the human race been unrelentingly sacrificed. But it is here maintained that no actual mode of distribution is worthy of a moment's regard, except in as far as it tends to promote a preponderance of happiness of the whole society, the poor as well as the rich included.

To set free the *future* productive powers of the community, is what equal security demands. Actual accumulations must be separated from the power of future production. While on the one hand equal security interferes not with the great mass of past real accumulations, on the other it shields the future

exertions of productive power from the future continued attacks of that force, fraud, and chance, to which they have been hitherto exposed.

It has been shown that equality and security equally demand, that in order to obtain the greatest blessings of which they are susceptible, it is necessary, that every producer of wealth should have the entire use of the products of his labor or exertion. But as long as the laborer stands in society divested of every thing but the mere power of producing, as long as he possesses neither the tools nor machinery to work with, the land or materials to work upon, the house and clothes that shelter him, or even the food which he is consuming while in the act of producing; as long as any institutions or expedients exist, by the open or unseen operation of which he stands dependant, day by day, for his very life on those who have accumulated these necessary means of his exertions; so long will he remain deprived of almost all the products of his labor, instead of having the use of all of them.

Force (as well as fraud and chance) being altogether excluded, as inconsistent with genuine equal security, from being employed as an instrument in producing the benefits of equality of distribution, or of the greatest practicable degree of equality; and the great mass of productive laborers being now without those means of making their labor productive to themselves or to those whom they wish to benefit by it; it has been proved that a strict adherence for the future to the natural laws of distribution, free labor, entire use of its products, and voluntary exchange, (implying of course the abolition of institutions or expedients inconsistent with them,) would lead peaceably to this desirable result, and gradually put all productive laborers in possession of the several articles, under the name of capital, which are necessary to them to enable them to gather the fruits of their industry.

But, under the protection of the natural laws of distribution, or of equal security, there are two modes of production which may be employed to attain this most essential object, to put all productive laborers into the possession of that portion of capital, and no more, which may be necessary to secure to them the products of their labor. It is as inconsistent with human happiness in general, as with the greatest production of wealth, that capital should be possessed by one set of individuals, and labor by another: utility demands that all productive laborers should become capitalists, that labor and capital should be in the same hands. Knowledge, in the present state of the human mind, will follow the union of capital and labor.

Many political economists, it is true, assert that this state of things can never generally exist. If you ask, why? the reason is, It has never been. This reason, at best but partially true, is not worth examining. Not so, the amount of the extortion by these means practised on the producers of wealth. By taking out of the possession of the laborer the articles necessary to make his labor productive, and vesting them in other hands than his, in the hands of a distinct set of men, called capitalists, by the open and covert expedients of insecurity, the producer is frequently defrauded of three-fourths of the produce of his labor. If the producer owned his own house, machinery, materials, &c. to the amount say of a hundred pounds, what would be to him the yearly cost or waste of such property? If these articles lasted one with another fifty years, the expense would be two pounds a-year, to which for repairs add one, and three pounds a year will at the end of the fifty years replace the original capital of one hundred pounds, keeping it all the intermediate time in a state fit for production. Suppose the worth of his labor to be two shillings a day for three hundred days in the year, we have thirty pounds to represent the yearly value of his labor; out of which, three pounds, or one *tenth*, is consumed in keeping up the things necessary, under the name of capital, to make his labor productive. The remaining nine-tenths of the products of his labor, remain free to be applied to the purposes of enjoyment, either by immediate consumption or by the fabrication of articles calculated for the use of many years. How different is the case when this capital, instead of being possessed by the producer, is possessed by another person called his employer! For the use of the one hundred pounds capital, the employer will require a profit of ten to twenty, say on an average fifteen, per cent. The yearly value of his labor remains as before thirty pounds. Thus one third, a half, or two thirds, of the value of his labor, according to quantity of capital accumulated and other circumstances influencing the rate of profits, are abstracted from him and handed over to the possessor of the capital. And lest this extortion should not be sufficient, the modes of regulating wages and keeping down combinations amongst the producers, are resorted to, to reduce still further to the smallest possible pittance, the remnant of the produce of his own labor left to the producer for his support. But this capital, represented by one hundred pounds, if produced by the laborers themselves, would not cost one half the labor represented by that sum. On the other hand, the abstraction by political power of one third of the remaining products of labor, reduces to a

contemptible decimal the portion of the produce of their own labor left to the producer. Lest his eyes should be opened to this multiplied and enormous injustice, he is kept every where in the most profound possible state of ignorance; the advocates of insecurity shrewdly and wisely suspecting that if he acquired knowledge, he would become unfit for his situation, and discontented with it. Doubtless as knowledge is diffused, this tremendous state of things will cease, and the laborer possessing knowledge, will not only be entitled to, but will enjoy his reward in the entire use of the products of his labor. Capital, labor, and knowledge will be re-united, never more to separate.

The two modes, under the shield of equal security, of effecting this union are,

The mode of production by labor, with equal individual competition,

The mode of production by labor, with mutual co-operation.

The advantages of the system of labor by free and equal competition over the present every where existing systems of restraints and exclusions, have been pointed out; and the still superior advantages of labor by mutual co-operation over the ordinary mode of labor under these same expedients of insecurity, have also been pointed out. The advantages of the system of labor by mutual co-operation over the best direction of it by individual exertion, have been explained in many particulars; enough to show the great superiority of that mode of production, not only as respects wealth but every other source of happiness, over all the modes of production hitherto practised. It is evidently for the interest of society, and even more as to happiness from all other sources than from mere immediate wealth, that as much as possible of human labor should be performed by mutual co-operation; in preference to the system of individual exertion and competition, even in the best form of which it is susceptible.

These two schemes of production, or systems of labor, resting equally on the broad basis of impartial security, so far from being incompatible with each other, must lend each other support for their mutual protection against the expedients of insecurity, against the revival of them, or of new expedients of oppression. Whatever number of individuals from the different isolated occupations of life, associate together for common benefit, the rest of society is left unmolested, its previous accumulations of capital untouched. The associated communities produce and consume like large families, of such numbers as to supply conveniently the whole of each other's

wants and comforts of all sorts worthy of the trouble of supplying them by labor, without in any way interfering with those who labor by competition. The associated communities, for all important articles, are a demand and supply to themselves. If from the effect of their superior combinations and universally diffused skill, they are able to undersell the capitalists of general society, in the disposal of that part of their produce which they raise, to be exchanged for articles which they cannot at equal cost of labor produce themselves at home, one important effect will be, that productive laborers and all rational idlers (if such there be), retailers, and such classes, will see, day by day, the policy of adopting the line, always open to them, of changing their mode of labor by competition for that of co-operation. It is not till the co-operating communities spread over the face of society, absorbing almost the whole domestic and foreign supply of such articles as they deem it wise to produce, that these communities will, in an extensive mercantile way, clash with the interests of large capitalists and their individual pauper producers. Should such time arrive, then the producers by competition of such articles must of necessity adopt the improved method of associating together, and supplying their wants by mutual co-operation. From the impossibility of living any longer isolated, each striving for himself, they will be forced—capitalists and laborers—to make themselves happy by a combination of supply and demand. If they are undersold in their old mode of industry, a new and superior mode is always open to them; a mode which does not admit of over-stocking, where on themselves alone will depend the supplying of all their essential wants. Were half the labor of society done by mutual co-operation, half the business of the different professions would also be done in the same way. Lawyers, priests, physicians, the communities would have no need of, beyond themselves. Whatever useful could be done by any of these professions, would be done by some of the associated members, on the principle of co-operation, just like the rendering of any other services. The only consequence would be, that half of the members of the professions that were really wanting, that might be deemed useful, would practise in the communities instead of practising in general society; and those not deemed useful would become ordinary members of the community, or none would be brought up to occupy places no longer wanting.

The great object of wisdom and benevolence with respect to the distribution of wealth should be, to make every member of society a capitalist and a contributor to the joint stock of happiness; and with this view to devise arrangements by which

this great object may be effected with the least possible inconvenience, not only to the holders of the capital already accumulated, but even to the idlers who are now a mere burden on productive labor, and of little benefit to themselves. Whatever the supposed inconvenience, 'tis as nothing compared with the benefits of the mighty change. Political changes are useful in as far only as by establishing, or making advances to the establishment of, the great principle of genuine "security;" their obvious tendency is to bring about this great change, which the unnecessarily degraded mass of mankind, without knowledge, without comfort, without mutual kindness, demand of the hand of justice, and which the real interests of those who esteem themselves *privileged* classes, almost equally demand.

As long as the accumulated capital of society remains in one set of hands, and the productive powers of creating wealth remain in another, this accumulated capital will, while the nature of man continues as at present, be made use of to counteract the natural laws of distribution, and to deprive the producers of the use of what their labor has produced. Were it possible to conceive that under simple representative institutions, any such of the expedients of insecurity should be permitted to remain in existence as would uphold the disunion of capital and labor; such representative institutions (though all the plunder of political power should cease) would be of little further benefit to the real happiness of mankind, than as affording an easy means for the development of knowledge and the ultimate abolition of such expedients. As long as a class of mere capitalists exists, society must remain in a diseased state. Whatever plunder is saved from the hand of political power, will be levied in another way under the name of profits, by capitalists, who, while capitalists, must be always the law-makers. The possession of larger masses of capital than the ordinary average, by a *few* scattered through society, and forming an exception to the general rule, would produce no apparent mischief: its influence in the way of extortion, would be nothing in face of the general system of capitalist-producers. Producing by competition or producing by co-operation, till the producers become possessed of the houses in which they live, and of all things requisite to make their labor productive, and to secure to their own disposal the whole products of their labor, they will remain, though by whatever indirect means, the efficient, though apparently voluntary, slaves of those possessed of the things without which their power of producing is vain.

But the case supposed is an impossible one. Representa-

tive institutions are incompatible with the expedients of insecurity: their very establishment includes the ceasing of the most mischievous of all expedients, that of public plunder, of abstracting, for any purpose, the products of labor without the consent of the producer: their very establishment tends to the dissolution of the league between capitalists and the holders of political power; because the great and paramount interest of those not possessed of capital would be as fully represented as that of those possessing it: their very establishment gives the power to the majority, whose interest it is, to abolish one by one every expedient of insecurity, and at the same time affords the most efficient means for the acquiring of that knowledge, which is necessary to all having power, for its right use, the production of the greatest mass of happiness.

The strong holds of insecurity once broken down by simple representative institutions, all its minor ramifications will gradually be rooted out by the diffusion of knowledge, without force or effort. Whether the universal establishment of equal security, or the natural laws of distribution, as here laid down, would lead to that equalizing of capital amongst productive laborers here anticipated, may be disputed. Some doubtless will maintain that nothing less than the system of co-operative labor by mutual agreement before production, will effect this great step in the progress of human improvement. Others will maintain that the utmost possible equality of wealth consistent with reproduction, will necessarily follow in the train of equal security without the aid of mutual co-operation. All must agree that the removal of all the restraints of insecurity are necessary, in order to give fair play to human exertion; in order to afford a chance to the productive laborers of society for the acquisition of knowledge and capital; and none can be more convinced of this truth than the friends of labor by mutual co-operation, the very basis of their co-operation depending on the evading of these very restraints, and the voluntary mutual undertaking not to enforce them against each other.

In fact, until all the restraints of insecurity are removed, until no obstacle remains in the way of the full development of the powers of human industry under the natural laws of distribution, it is vain to speak of limits to the amount of good to be expected under such circumstances; we can hardly say where the progression of the good effects would cease. Labor by co-operation has been triumphantly contrasted by its advocates with labor by competition, *encumbered with all the shackles of insecurity*. Let but the one expedient of insecurity, the power of public plunder, press heavily on the

co-operating communities,—of what avail their increased powers of production, though ten times beyond those of labor by individual competition? It is necessary for human happiness that both experiments should be tried. If the friends of labor by co-operation object to the removal of the restraints of insecurity, they wish to keep up an eternal comparison between their hands, *untied*, under co-operation, untied by mutual agreement, and the hands of labor by competition, *tied* so as to render impotent their powers of production. Is this comparison just? Is this conduct generous? Is it compatible with professions of attachment to the system of co-operation solely from its increased tendency to multiply wealth and happiness? Is such conduct compatible even with its own ultimate security? How long, under systems of insecurity, could such communities prosper? Is it not proposed to be their proudest triumph and their greatest ultimate praise, that they will render unnecessary all the existing expedients of insecurity by which society is tormented, by the universal perception of the degrading folly and mischievousness of such institutions? By what mode, but by reason addressed to the interests of men, do they hope to effect this mighty change? Why then not let reason at once accomplish its work, and enter into a fair competition with the unshackled exertions of individual industry?

Inimical to every scheme of labor, to every arrangement tending to remove those of the present pernicious distinctions of society which are unconnected with moral or intellectual worth, inimical to every project for raising their fellow-creatures to a level with themselves, whether by competition or co-operation, must the holders of political power necessarily be. Otherwise they would use that power for the sole purpose of abolishing, with as little inconvenience as possible to any human being, all such distinctions. Are they not, like all other human beings, the creatures of the circumstances in which they are and have been placed? And can it be rationally expected that they will become the admirers of systems, the ultimate effect of which must be to abolish all factitious distinctions between them and their fellow-creatures? all those distinctions, on which depends almost the whole of the little happiness of life they possess, though purchased by the wretchedness of the millions of their fellow-men? No—no—they will patronize whatever and whomsoever they can hope to make subservient to their limited and mistaken views. Failing this object, no other aid can be expected of them, than the withholding of brute force as an answer to statements of facts and reasonings addressed to the interest of mankind.

Prudence will compell them to this policy. As a class, conviction will never operate upon them: in proportion as knowledge is diffused through the mass of mankind, they will yield through prudence, not through conviction.

The system of labor by mutual co-operation appears to be attended with such paramount advantages, not to class or party, but to the whole of society, that it can well afford a competition with individual or isolated exertion in its best shape. If it cannot, it ought not to be preferred or followed. Nothing but experience of the two under their best forms, can or ought to convince mankind of the superiority of either. The same previous circumstances are requisite for the full development of both. Equal security once established, and the best form of individual exertion being exhibited, the real points of superiority of labor by co-operation will be apparent, and individual exertion will have no means of evading the proofs of its inferiority by appealing to restraints no longer existing. Equal security once established, a theatre, boundless as human efforts, will be open to every possible combination of labor; and that system of labor which shall be found to promote the most happiness, and the most wealth (as far as worth the labor necessary to create it), will ultimately supersede all other combinations, in as far as it can be usefully applied. Equal security once established, those who are now destitute, the poor, the ignorant, the vicious, the wretched productive laborers of society, will gradually acquire the small capitals necessary to enable them to form large unions of co-operative labor, without depending on the precarious aid of capitalists to put their productive powers in motion. Equal security once established, labor by co-operation will follow in its train as a necessary consequence, should the fatal disunion between capital and labor impede, while that disunion and the institutions on which it is founded remain, its previous establishment. Equal security once established, the co-operating communities, like the rest of society, may exert all their energies and multiply productions in peace, assured that the whole fruits of their industry will be at their own disposal.

What is the conclusion from the whole of our inquiry?

Of all the causes which operate on the human character and human happiness, none is of so much importance as the distribution of wealth; because on that depend almost all those circumstances, those relations, on which the development of character and happiness depends. But, on the principle of utility, every existing generation having alone

the means of judging correctly, possesses the same right, or in other words, would promote its own greatest happiness by exerting the power, of so distributing all the means of happiness it possesses, wealth included, as to ensure that greatest happiness; just as that same right was exercised by its predecessors.

No existing distribution ought to be upheld further than as it can be shown to promote preponderant good. If therefore it increased the mass of happiness of the whole community (all interests and consequences immediate and remote considered), to re-distribute in any possible way the accumulated wealth, land, houses, machinery, food, clothes, and other materials of the whole society, and to re-regulate the future direction of labor, that re-distribution and re-regulation ought to take place; inconvenience to any party being as much as possible removed or mitigated in effecting the change.

The mass of real accumulated wealth, in point of magnitude and influence on human happiness, is so utterly insignificant when compared with the powers of production of the same society in whatever state of civilization, or even compared with the actual consumption for even a few years of that society, that the great attention of legislators and political economists should be directed to "*productive powers*" and their future free development, and not as hitherto to the mere accumulated wealth that strikes the eye.

Of what is called *accumulated* wealth, by far the greater part is only nominal, consisting not of any real things, ships, houses, cottons, improvements on land, but of mere demands on the future annual productive powers of society, engendered and perpetuated by the expedients or institutions of insecurity.

Therefore without injury to future production and happiness, all accumulations of physical things, or real wealth, may be left in the hands of those who now possess them, to enjoy them as they may; the use of such articles as a mere means of appropriating to their possessors the wealth to be created by the future productive powers of society, being that alone of which the natural laws of distribution would, without force, gradually deprive them, or, if aided by co-operative labor, would in a very few years deprive them.

If nine-tenths of any society were persuaded that it would tend to the happiness of all, by means of the system of co-operative labor, or any other modification of labor, under the shield of equal security, that all the existing accumulations of real wealth should be equally divided, so as to make all capitalist-laborers; it would not be the interest of all to use

compulsion towards the minority of one-tenth, being the possessors of the real wealth, to force this distribution; because,

If force, instead of persuasion, were used in the formation of the new arrangements of society, what guarantee could be given that force would not be used by every succeeding majority, leading to the annihilation of industry and production?

The unconvinced possessors of the real wealth would suffer more than the majority would gain, the sense of injustice neutralizing the pleasures of the majority, and increasing the pain of the privations of the oppressed;

The surplus produce of the productive powers of a few years of the majority of the whole society would repay this capital, if borrowed instead of being taken by force, to the satisfaction of all; or would soon produce a greater amount, without the obligation of borrowing; making their own houses, machinery, &c. themselves.

The small minority, possessors of the real capital, would be ultimately convinced to lend, or devote it, to such useful purposes—if proved to be useful;—or whether convinced or not, they would, whether from sympathy or prudence, or both, conform to the clearly expressed wishes of those around them: where there is public opinion founded on knowledge, a minority can never long resist it: 'tis only where there is no knowledge, no public opinion, that a minority can rule by force.

The small minority, possessors of the real capital, whether convinced, sympathizing, prudential, or not, would, under such circumstances, find no other use for their capital than making it instrumental to bring about the new order of things generally desired. Equal security not affording them the means of using it as an engine for extorting the bulk of the future products of labor from the producers, it must remain unproductive, or be employed to bring about, however reluctantly, the end desired.

If a mere majority of any society were persuaded that all producers should be capitalists, all the evils of the use of force would be so much the greater. Equal security, and free discussion, one of its consequences, would speedily accomplish, without force, every thing useful.

In a word, in order to produce the greatest happiness derivable from wealth, the greatest equality reconcileable with security, every producer, whether agricultural, manufacturing, or in any other way affording a satisfactory equivalent for wealth, ought to possess the faculty of freely directing his

labor, with *capital* sufficient to secure to himself the whole products of his labor, whether producing on his own account alone, or co-operating in company with others; and along with this, *knowledge*, to show him how to use and retain these advantages.

The means to bring about this desirable distribution, are,

1. Simple *representative institutions*.
2. The *entire abolition*, under these, of *all the restraints of insecurity*, (entail, primogeniture, combination local and general, wages-regulation direct or indirect, monopolies of knowledge of professions, of trades, bounties, game, privilege laws, public plunder, with all other expedients incompatible with equal security or the natural laws of distribution,) with as little inconvenience as possible to any individual; leaving untouched all past real accumulations, but guarding all future products of labor equally from all attacks of force or fraud, direct or indirect, public or private.
3. *The progress and diffusion of knowledge*, and the gradual perception of their real interests by all societies, would gradually effect the remainder; that is to say, every thing useful as to wealth, as well as to every other means of producing happiness, in social arrangement.

THE END.